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Abstract 
 
The PhD dissertation concerns the social policies in Great Britain, Vichy France 
and Fascist Italy during World War II. This work, however, takes into account 
the path dependences and policy legacies, and opens up to the further 
developments of the immediate postwar years. 
The expansion of compulsory schemes, healthcare and other social provisions 
is an incremental process, but WWII provided the trigger for a qualitative leap 
in the political goals and extent of public social policy. The dissertation studies 
the policy convergences and the ideological divergences in tackling the issue of 
public social protection in the three countries. 
The British universalistic reforms reformulated the “social pact” around the 
enhancement of the rights of citizenship, strengthening the bonds of social 
solidarity thanks to the mediation of the State. The coeval proposals in Fascist 
Italy and in Vichy France opted for different approaches. In Italy, the regime 
tried to pass a set of provisions to redefine the industrial relations and the 
income distribution. The Vichy’s ruling classes, instead, tried to recast a 
corporative order, spreading “occupational solidarity” in each industrial 
branch. In all these countries there was no consensus on detailed policies, while 
the common ground was the strengthening of the compulsory insurances; the 
administrative unification and rationalization; the incorporation of the social 
welfare as a core State policy area; the overcoming of the social unrest and 
social question through the establishment of links of solidarity among the 
members of the national communities. 
The “total war” triggered social change due to domestic stabilization and to the 
ideological content of WWII. The promotion of social enhancement for a “better 
future” was a key point of propaganda. In Britain, the social plans were a tool 
to re-assert the role of the country as a leader in the postwar settlement. The 
military victory of the Allies made possible the spreading of social security. The 
British universalistic model did not become a model in the Continent, but its 
core principles fueled the postwar debates and plans of social reforms.  
The study shows the intermingling of different processes at the root of the shift 
from the “social insurances” to the “social security” during and after WWII. On 
the one hand, some political principles and administrative practices gradually 
emerged, irrespective of the different political regimes and levels of 
industrialization. On the other, WWII brought about two different views 
concerning the goals and the role of the social protection in the modern 
societies.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 In his celebrated report, Lord William Beveridge declared that 
«the prevention of want and the diminution and relief of disease – the 
special aim of the social services – are in fact a common interest of all 
citizens. It may be possible to secure a keener realisation of that fact in 
war than it is in peace, because war breeds national unity. […] to 
sacrifice personal interests to the common cause, […] will be accepted 
on all hands as advances, but which it might be difficult to make at 
other times.»1 The Italian Fascists were also aware of the social 
implications of the Second World War: «the social question is the main 
concern of all peoples; from the current conflict expect its solution».2 
Referring to the British Beveridge Report, they insinuated that it «had to 
promise to the British workers and soldiers a better future after this 
gruelling war effort. […] the promises made to the British workers for 
the post-war are much less substantial than the benefits granted by 
Fascism even before the outbreak of this war.»3 Also in the État français 
– the official name of the commonly nicknamed Vichy regime – the 
milieu close to the collaborationist government considered that WWII 
had revolutionary social and economic effects.4 Putting a different 
                                                          
1 HMSO, Social Insurance and Allied Services. Report by Sir William Beveridge Presented to 
Parliament by Command of His Majesty, November 1942, London, 1942, Cmd. 6404, p.171. 
Henceforward, we refer to this edition of the Beveridge Report, unless we mention other 
editions or translations of this document. 
2F. Mezzasoma, La politica sociale di Mussolini dal settembre 1943. Discorso pronunciato al 
Teatro Carignano di Torino il 4 febbraio 1945, Milano, Edizioni Erre, 1945, p. 11. 
3 Ibidem. 
4 J. Winschuh, Le Chef d’entreprise dans la Nouvelle Europe, Bruxelles, Maison International 
d’Edition, 1942; C. Ross, L’avènement d’une nouvelle Europe dans le cadre d’un nouvel ordre 
mondial, Paris, Les Conférences du Groupe « Collaboration », 1941; F. Fried, Les problèmes 
sociaux dans l’Europe nouvelle, Paris, Les Conférences du Groupe « Collaboration », 1941.  
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accent in comparison with Italian Fascism, the Vichy regime tried to 
make its own revolution, which also had important social goals. The 
years 1939-45 were not only years of military and economic 
mobilization; plans to social reform were set up in the countries 
directly involved in the conflict, as Britain and Italy, and in those which 
were not, like the Vichy regime. 
The British, French and Italian plans for social reform, meant as 
policy guidelines for the postwar period, and their use for the behalf of 
propaganda during the war represent the very topics of the PhD 
dissertation. The main question I want to address is why, in the midst 
of “total war”, these countries invested so much effort to propose 
detailed plans for the overhaul of the social insurances systems and 
policies. It is also relevant to carve out the terms of international 
circulation of these projects. As I will try to demonstrate, some concepts 
and practices behind social policies – to a certain degree – converged, 
whereas more important divergences existed in the public narratives. I 
propose that in the realm of social policy already by the end of the 
Thirties such common ground existed. I do not want to conduct my 
research in the field of the mutual transfer of policies and practices 
between “totalitarian” and “democratic” countries;5 in the very specific 
field of social policy, such contraposition is somehow misleading. I 
would instead support the hypothesis that, in a global perspective, 
some structural characteristics, theoretical assumptions and practical 
tools were common among industrialized countries, and crossed 
opposing political systems, in spite of the rhetoric of the primary 
sources of the time.  
No wonder, then, that the “new” social policies also responded 
to some common criteria: the intermingling between social and 
economic policies; the end of the residual charity-driven approach to 
the social question, and consequently the crucial role assumed by the 
State in providing social protection; the unification of the social security 
agencies, the fiscal rationalization of the insurances and the 
administrative simplification of the services; the need to secure social 
                                                          
5 See for example W. Schivelbusch, Three New Deals: Reflections on Roosevelt’s America, 
Mussolini’s Italy, and Hitler’s Germany, 1933-1939, New York, Picador, 2007.   
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rest (or social collaboration, according to different ideological lexicons); 
the aim to rebuild the “social pact” on a new basis after the 19th century 
laissez-faire paradigm vanished.  
The social services and insurances would play a key role in the 
post-war period, as demonstrated by the establishment of the welfare 
state, according to new political and economic model. The theoretical 
design of the post-1945 welfare measures was in fact already elaborated 
by the beginning of the war, at least in its embryonic form. Only WWII, 
however, allowed the qualitative leap. On the one side, during the war 
new ideas penetrated the governments’ actions. On the other, the 
“total” mobilization for the war had a huge impact on the socio-
economic and political systems. WWII became the trigger of 
elaborations that systematized social policy. This happened, to various 
degrees, in Great Britain, in the Vichy Regime and the Italian Fascist 
regime. The analysis of these three case-studies constitutes the first part 
of this research. 
But the mobilization and the climate of “total war” cannot 
completely explain the “Copernican Revolution” in social policies that 
occurred from 1942 onwards. The paradigm shift also resulted from the 
gradual revision of the theoretical assumption regarding the scope and 
aims of public intervention. This already became relevant in the 
interwar years, especially after 1929. The changing intellectual 
framework in public policies can help to explain why, between war and 
post-war years, in the industrialized countries the topic of social 
security assumed such an overwhelming importance. This was 
certainly the French case: both Vichy in 1940–44, and the Republican 
parties in the post-war period set up plans for the social reforms. The 
ideological background of the two experiences was completely 
different. Yet, the common goal was to overcome the pre-war French 
social insurances schemes and re-organize at the same time the national 
economy. In Italy, the Fascist regime extended the social legislation 
during the war, without effectively mobilizing both economy and 
society for war production. After 1943, the creation of the puppet 
regime named Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI) represented Fascism’s last 
attempt to achieve a breakthrough in the socio-economic organization. 
18 
 
The British reforms – which represent the touchstone of the comparison 
– should be understood in the light of the country’s maximum effort to 
win the war. In Great Britain, the theories of the Thirties helped 
implementing new legal mechanisms in order to manage the economy, 
especially since 1941. Ultimately, in all the three countries, the war 
created a climate favourable for radical social reforms.  
 Yet, I do not think that “total war” would make sense if used as 
a one-sided interpretive key. The concept of “total war” is per se 
slippery. In terms of mobilization, it is a relative concept for Britain, 
and does not apply to the Italian and French cases. Britain steered more 
than 50% of the production for the war and achieved full employment; 
Italy converted only one fifth of the industries to war production, with 
increasing levels of unemployment from 1943; Vichy France, whose 
economy was embedded in the German war machinery, did not 
directly mobilize its economy. These differing contingencies in the 
presence of similar long-term stimuli for social reform do not invalidate 
the causal link between “total war” and social change. Undoubtedly, 
however, they make it more difficult to establish a direct correlation 
between “total war” and social reforms; as social policy is a typically 
incremental process, its understanding is possible only if the influence 
of warfare is combined with a longer-term perspective, and only if 
considering the very content and the social propaganda of the warring 
parties.  
Since its first formulations, the concept of “total war” was an 
abstract model. Carl von Clausewitz’s categorization of “absolute war” 
was anachronistic with regard to the re-conceptualization of “total 
war” in the interwar period. Erich Ludendorff popularized the term, 
but its theoretical formulation occurred in Europe against the backdrop 
of the Great War’s experience.6 In the era of the mass societies and 
ideologies, the industrial warfare involved the home front and 
domestic consensus. The label “total war” was mostly exploited by the 
                                                          
6 H.-U. Wehler, «“Absoluter” und “totaler” Krieg: Clausewitz von Ludendorff», Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift, n.2-3/1969, pp. 220-248; see also the various contributions in section 
three of the of R. Chickering, S. Förster (eds.), Shadows of Total War. Europe, East Asia and 
the United States, 1919-1939, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 151-253. 
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opponents as rhetorical device, and therefore care is needed when 
handling this concept.7 I will extensively use the definition of “total 
war” (in brackets) with a narrower sense. If WWII encompassed all 
aspects of the society, then the ideological dimension of the confrontation 
is a not secondary element of “total war”. The Second world war, as no 
conflict before, called into question the previous social models. The 
policy-makers were compelled to draft post-war reform plans and to 
account their public opinions of them. There were some constraints to 
the “total” mobilization for the war, failing which the States would 
have lost the home front; the limits did not only reside on the economic 
aspects, but also to the extent of the capacity to strengthen the 
adherence to a whole set of value system. On both sides, projects of 
socio-economic reform, linked to a new international settlement, have 
to be added to the consequences of the war effort. The reform plans 
also had to do with the rise of Soviet Communism, the other ideological 
pole and social model.  
There never really was the clash between “democratic” and 
“totalitarian” social policies; at least, not in terms they were depicted 
by the sides in the conflict, later epitomized as historiographic 
commonplace. The frontline rather concerned different criteria to be 
entitled to social rights and benefits; the wartime confrontation made 
clearer the distinction between two approaches, which deployed 
regardless political systems. In wartime Britain, the social welfare was 
linked to the status of “citizen”.8 On the Continent, the plans for social 
reform during the war were instead associated to the traditional 
equation of the social rights with the status of “worker”, which also 
                                                          
7 J. Goebbels, «Nun, Volk steh auf, und Sturm brich los! Rede im Berliner 
Sportpalast,» Der steile Aufstieg, Munich, Zentralverlag der NSDAP 1944, pp. 167-204; see 
also P. Longerich, «Joseph Goebbels und der totale Kriege. Eine unbekannte Denkschrift 
des Propagandaministers vom 18. July 1944», Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, n.35/1987, 
pp. 289-314; F. Crivellari, «Der Wille zum totalen Krieg», Arbeitskreis Militärgeschichte 
Newsletter, n.12/2000, pp. 10-14. 
8 In a different path, also Nordic countries and the Netherlands yielded similar outcomes. 
On the Dutch case, see W. van Oorschot, «The Dutch Welfare State. From collective 
solidarity towards individual responsibility», CCWS Working paper, 41/2006, pp.1-3. 
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defined the membership to the national communities.9 The bone of 
contention therefore concerned different ways to understand the social 
rights of citizenship and the very concept of social solidarity. Only after 
the war, the European setting progressively contaminated itself with 
important elements of universalism. This process did not occur right 
away and did not happen with the same extent everywhere, but the 
older occupational schemes increasingly coexisted with citizenship-
based benefits until the coming of the neo-liberalism, which changed 
once again policies and paradigms.10 
While distinguished, before and during WWII the different 
models adopted similar political and administrative solutions. I will 
argue that social policies structurally converged in their extension, 
centralization and rationalization. This tendency was evident in the 
Thirties, and wartime innovations did not represent a radical break. 
WWII, however, offered the political and cultural climate to enact 
radical reforms and put to the test different conceptions of the social 
policies. In Britain, the new social security was related to the rights of 
citizenship, thanks to the universalism of the compulsory social 
insurances, which fell under public control. On the contrary, in the 
Vichy Regime and in the RSI, the social policy relied on principles of 
social solidarity along the lines of the occupational/professional 
categories. This setting, which traced the Bismarckian compulsory 
schemes, overlapped the “corporatist” narrative of the regimes, and 
resulted – especially in the French case – in a certain opposition to 
State’s management of the insurances. These ideological resistances 
made less incisive the reforms, but did not halt the progressive State’s 
handover. 
Eventually, war radicalized ideas; social security proved to be a 
good way to build consensus and promote (moderate) social and 
economic reforms. With the victory of the Allies, it secured capitalism 
                                                          
9 S. Lanaro, Nazione e lavoro. Saggio sulla cultura Borghese in Italia (1870-1925), Venezia, 
Marsilio, 2001. 
10 G. Esping-Andersen, «Welfare States without Work: the Impasse of Labour Shedding 
and Familialism in Continental European Social Policy», in Id. (ed.), Welfare States in 
Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies, London, Sage, 1996, pp. 68-87, 
particularly pp. 68-74. 
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and the democratic institutions. In that very specific regard, the war 
impressed a radical divergence between the narratives of the 
democracies and the Axis powers; the use of social policy as a tool for 
propaganda did not apply only at home, but had an important 
carryover also in the propaganda against the enemy. Notwithstanding 
the common grounds abovementioned, in the midst of the war both 
sides promoted two competing vision of the post-war settlement, 
where social protection had a role in both political agendas. Social 
policy was exploited to define the respective fields, and the promise of 
redefining the “social pact” after the war through social security and 
increased welfare standards was expected to ensure political leadership 
also in the international relations. 
 The very concept of “social policy” is shifty. A general 
definition describes them as public policy that encompasses different 
areas: social insurances, healthcare, education, housing, social services. 
Some of these fields are directly related to the economic security (social 
insurances), while others address other human and societal needs. 
Healthcare and housing responded to different inputs over time, but 
originally had less to do with the extension of social rights. Still 
different is the case of the public education, that since the first 
formulations was regarded as a right of citizenship.11 Historically, 
different conceptualizations of the meaning of social policy exist. They 
changed over time and geographical areas; the English definition of 
Welfare State only partially overlaps the Italian Stato sociale or the 
French État-providence which have no direct translation in English.12 
                                                          
11 In the Jacobin Constitution of the Year I, the article 22 recommended to «put education 
at the door of every citizen.». See «Constitution of the Year I, June 24, 1793», Frank M. 
Anderson, (ed.), The Constitutions and other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of 
France, 1789-1907, Minneapolis, Wilson & CO., 1908, pp. 171-174, p. 171 
12 See the contributions in K. Petersen, D. Béland (eds.), Analysing Social Policy Concepts 
and Language. Comparative and Transnational Perspectives, Bristol, Policy Press at the 
University of Bristol, 2014, and particularly D. Wincott, «Original and imitated or elusive 
and limited? Towards a genealogy of the welfare state idea in Britain», pp. 127-142, and 
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overview on the Begriffsgeschichte, see the essays in H. E. Bödecker (ed.), Begriffsgeschichte, 
Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngesichte, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, 2002, and particularly R. 
Koselleck, «Hinweise auf die temporalen Strukturen begriffsgeschichtlichen Wandels», 
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Social policy includes different fields. Each of these passed through the 
“Copernican Revolution” of the wartime years; yet, I focus on the three 
core areas that Beveridge himself identified in order to achieve “social 
security” as ultimate goal: social insurances (including family 
allowances), national health service and policies for full employment. 
My dissertation deals with the paradigm shift that occurred in 
the political culture and actions as far as social policies were concerned. 
The combination of longer- and shorter-term views highlights its 
continuities and ruptures. During WWII, it switched from the 
haphazard juxtaposition of legislations, whose provisions had different 
purposes (ensuring the social peace, improving the national public 
health, demography, anti-cyclical measures), to coherent plans that 
linked the social rights to the economic security of the citizens and to 
forms of social solidarity mediated by the State. This was a seismic 
shift; while differences persisted and were significant, common 
grounds can be found in the three cases; this suggests, once again, that 
the development of social policy in the 20th century is irrelevant to 
opposing political systems. Both “democracies” (Great Britain), and 
“authoritarian/totalitarian regimes” (the Vichy regime and Fascist Italy) 
attempted to improve the coherence of the different social policy areas, 
and to widen coverages and bases of social benefits. Eventually, the 
progressive affirmation of citizenship-based social policy was linked to 
the tide of war and to the overarching mobilization for the conflict.  
  
Social politics in historical perspective: a dialogue between historians and 
social scientists? 
 The historical studies on social policies have increased over the 
years, but very few carried out comparative studies, which are used 
more extensively in social science.13 Yet, the most important theorists 
                                                                                                                               
pp. 29-47, and M. Bevir, «The role of contexts in understanding and explanation», pp.159-
208. 
13 G. Ritter, Der Sozialstaat. Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich, 
München, GmbH, 1991; P. Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of European 
Welfare State, 1875-1975, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990; A. 
Rapini, Lo Stato sociale, Bologna, Archetipo, 2010; C. Conrad, «Wohlfahrtsstaaten im 
Vergleich: Historische und sozialwissenschaftliche Ansätze», in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt 
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and scholars in the latter disciplines dealt with the historical 
development of social security, providing models to explain their 
growth.14 On the other hand, the historians of welfare policies usually 
verge on theoretical categories borrowed from social sciences. A refusal 
of trans-disciplinary methodological and conceptual contaminations 
would therefore be unjustified in the present field of research. It 
remains, however, at least in my view, that the historian can deal more 
appropriately with a certain interpretative level. Generally speaking, 
political and social sciences supply interpretations over macro-
processes and trends, tending to privilege quantitative to qualitative 
analyses. These models are usually based on general and a-historical 
patterns of development. Conversely, the historian can make a 
significant contribution with regard to the deepening of the intellectual, 
socio-economic and political history of welfare, grounding the analysis 
on the primary sources.  
The political scientist Hugh Heclo indicated four phases in 
welfare state development, brought about by the economic and 
intellectual environment. His interpretation considered the link 
between mass-democratic politics and the increase of social insurances; 
the role of the economic environments and paradigms in shaping social 
programmes; the importance of technocratic and/or intellectual milieu, 
e.g. public officers and civil servants, in encouraging social reforms. 
                                                                                                                               
and Jürgen Kocka (eds), Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse international 
vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung, Frankfurt -New York, Camous Verlag, 1996, pp. 155–
180; T. Inglot, Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919-2004, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008.  
14 C. Kerr, et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1960; J.K. Galbraith The New Industrial State, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967; R. Badham, 
Theories of Industrial Society, London-New York, Routledge, 1986; W. Korpi, «Power 
Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and 
Varieties of Capitalism», World Politics, n. 58 (Jan. 2006), pp. 167-206; G. Olsen, J. 
O’Connor, «Understanding the Welfare State: Power Resources Theory and Its Critics», 
Id. (eds.), Power Resources Theory and the Welfare State: A Critical Approach, Toronto, 
Toronto University Press, 19988, pp. 3-33.  
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According to this view, State bodies and public authorities were the 
driving force behind the changes in social policies.15  
This interpretive outlook might be a blueprint for historians. 
Heclo could be legitimately seen as the forerunner of historical 
institutionalists. Neoinstitutionalism underlines the importance of path 
dependence to understand political choices. It studies policies in their 
historical perspective and through the emphasis on the link between 
institutional legacies and macro-processes. Historical institutionalism 
refuses all-understanding theories, even if its most important scholars 
are Marxist or Weberian.16 The lack of theoretical schemes leads to 
empiricism and to a focus on multi-causal and contextual explanations, 
stressing the historical perspective in the study of social policy. 
Although using frequently the comparative approach, these scholars 
link political processes back to peculiar country-level institutions, they 
do not imply a necessary convergence of structural processes, leaving 
room for the autonomy of political decisions and for contingent 
circumstances that determine institutional changes.17 Historical 
institutionalism highlights the interaction between institutional actors 
and the State over time, taking into account public authorities and 
bureaucracies, and various political and social movements that are able 
to negotiate with the State.  
The concepts of path dependence, sequence and critical junctures, 
largely used by neoinstitutionalism, are “historical” by nature, as they 
focus on time, evolutions and ruptures. Path dependence describes either 
                                                          
15 H. Heclo, «Towards a New Welfare State?», in Peter Flora, Arnold J. Heidenheimer 
(eds.), The Development of Welfare State in Europe and America, New Brunswick-London, 
Transaction Publishers, 1984, pp. 384-406; Id., Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: 
from Relief to Income Maintenance, New Haven-London, Yale University Press, 1974, pp. 
303-306. 
16 P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, T. Skocpol, «On the Road toward a More Adequate 
Understanding of the State», in Id. (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 347-366. 
17 T. Skocpol, E. Amenta, «States and Social Policies», Annual Review of Sociology, 
n.12/1986, pp. 131-157. E. Amenta, «What We Know about the Development of Social 
Policy: Comparative and Historical Research in Comparative and Historical Perspective», 
in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, James Mahoney, (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the 
Social Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 91-130. 
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the self-reinforcing or the reactive features of political processes. In 
relation with any critical juncture, thus, path dependence might explain 
why policy-makers chose a political path instead of another. Different 
choices are justified in the light of the political legacy, the positive 
feedbacks and the sequence of temporally ordered and causally 
connected events. The tie between critical juncture and path dependence is 
regarded at the very foundation of any institutional shift. It is not 
merely the consideration that any crisis produces stable political 
change; this latter is conversely conceivable only if a critical juncture is 
followed (and sometimes even preceded) by a path dependence, making 
institutions follow a new direction.18 The path dependence explanation, in 
relation with the critical junctures and the concept of political legacy, offer 
interesting insights for the historical analysis of typically incremental 
processes such as social policies. 
A second relevant interpretation was provided by some neo-
Marxist scholars in the 1970s, who considered the welfare state as a tool 
to reconcile social conflict with political consensus. James O’Connor 
emphasized the connection between the mode of production in the 
advanced capitalist system and the expansion of public sector and 
welfare schemes. This trend was characterized by the dual affirmation 
of the “military-welfare state” and of the monopolistic capitalism. 
According to O’Connor, the welfare state was part of Western 
advanced capitalistic societies’ evolution, making such a pattern 
socially sustainable.19 The British sociologist Ian Gough considered 
welfare state and Keynesian economic policies functional to the 
development of advanced capitalism. He stated that «the welfare state 
is a product of the contradictory development of capitalist society and 
in turn has generated new contradictions which every day become 
                                                          
18 J. Mahoney, «Path Dependence in Historical Sociology», Theory and Society, n. 29/2000, 
pp. 507-548; J. Mahoney, D. Schensul, «Historical Context and Path Dependence», in 
Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly, (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 454-471. 
19 J. O’Connor, The Corporation and the State: Essays in the Theory of Capitalism and 
Imperialism, New York, Harper&Collins, 1974; Id., The Fiscal Crisis of the State, New Jersey, 
Transaction Publishers, 2001. 
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more apparent.»20 His critique should probably be related to the crisis 
of the British welfare state in the 1970s, even if the author stressed the 
historically conservative feature of social insurances.21  
These analyses grounded on functionalist reasoning; they 
studied advanced capitalism and the way in which welfare state 
addressed markets’ deficiencies and coordinated increasingly complex 
industrial societies; economic growth, new demands in public 
expenditure (namely work-related insurances) and the need to secure 
the capitalist system explained the expansion of social security.22 
Frances Pivot and Richard Cloward eventually took to the extreme this 
view in their classical work Regulating the Poor.23 These theories are not 
exempt from oversimplifications; as the Marxian sociologist Göran 
Therborn stated: «a basic weakness of functionalist explanations, 
however, is that they tell us nothing about how and in what form 
solution to a functional problem are found. Here a historical, causal 
theory is called for, although it should never be forgotten that Clio 
hardly ever gets firmly caught by any of her theoretical chasers.»24  
The neoinstitutionalist and neo-Marxist interpretations offer 
two distinguished perspectives for my dissertation. Of the former, I 
retain the core concepts of path dependence and critical conjuncture; in 
historical terms, they mean that social policy can be understood on the 
long-run, and that major shifts occur in the presence of structural crises 
and political turmoil. The neoinstitutionalist theories, with their 
emphasis on the State, provide a good basis for an historical 
explanation of the evolution of welfare policies. In turn, a more 
substantial historical take on the subject could not fail to point out that 
social security became consistently and “ideologically” a public policy 
only from WWII onwards. Of the neo-Marxist theories, what is chiefly 
                                                          
20 I. Gough, The political economy of the welfare state, London, MacMillan, 1979, p. 152. 
21 Ivi. pp. 1-15, pp. 55-74 and pp. 128-152 
22 N. Ginsburg, Class, Capital, and Social Policy, London, MacMillan, 1979. 
23 F.F. Piven, R.A.Cloward, Regulating the Poor: the Functions of Public Welfare, New York, 
Vintage Editions, 1993.  
24 G. Therborn, «Karl Marx returning. The Welfare State and Neo-Marxist, Corporatist, 
and Statist Theories», International Political Science Review, n. 2/1986. The State and the 
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relevant is the critical approach on the matter. Once social insurance 
schemes structurally took on the role of State policy, they also fulfilled 
the function of retaining the inherent dynamics of Western capitalism. 
Welfare states have constraining features and have been functional to 
rescue the Western Nation-States and capitalism from alternative 
models that arose throughout the 20th century. This peculiar aspect of 
social security systems underpins my PhD dissertation.  
Studies on social security are a relatively new field of historical 
investigation. At present, overall transnational interpretations of the 
historical process from social insurances to the welfare state are still 
lacking. Usually, and legitimately, the process is treated as a collateral 
phenomenon of modernization.25 In this brief account of some theories 
regarding the welfare state, I do not want to place my PhD dissertation 
under a certain model; rather, it serves to provide some sociological 
categories may form a useful theoretical background for my research. 
The related scholarly literature may help to build my working 
hypotheses, which nonetheless have to pass through the ordeal of the 
historical documents and sources. I do not want to merely confirm or 
refute social science theory. I tried to address this subject sticking to an 
historical approach, pursuing an exploratory research on primary 
sources and trying to avoid generalizations. The results of my research 
pointed at providing an interpretation of the contradictory path to the 
redefinition of social policy after 1945, simultaneously to the 
resettlement of public policies at home and of international balance of 
power. This happened in ages of growing ideological polarization at 
the eve of the «extraordinary, unprecedented, fundamental changes 
which the world economy, and consequently human societies, had 
undergone in the period since the Cold War began.»26  
Social policy is linked to so many factors (economy, political 
culture, international relations, employment structures, industrial 
relations), that it proves impossible to reduce this phenomenon to an 
                                                          
25 D. S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus.Technological Change and Industrial Development in 
Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
26 E. J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, London, 
Abacus, 1995, p.256. 
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unequivocal and comprehensive interpretation. My conclusions are just 
a possible explanation of the evolution of social policies during and 
immediately after the war. They resulted from a specific interpretive 
key and from a selection of primary sources, which does not pretend to 
be exhaustive. In the conclusions, I tried to take into account all the 
factors that led to what I would define a “Copernican Revolution” in 
the scope and goals of social policies, as well as the limits and 
contradictions of this paradigm shift, which are evident to a comparative 
glance. In Britain, the war years marked a conceptual revolution. 
Elsewhere, the timing and extent of this upheaval should be nuanced, 
even if the seeds of change sowed during WWII would germinate also 
on the European Continent. Holding the strings of the longer- and 
shorter-run economic, political and international factors complicated 
the understanding of the topic; in the same time, hopefully, this 
approach pawed the way for further explorations. The key factors I 
took into consideration are the growth of social insurances as State 
policy area; the redefinition of social policies around the concepts of 
solidarity and citizenship; social security as pillar of domestic and 
international legitimization. 
The assumption according to which welfare policies have 
always been purely State policy seems oversimplifying. The 
participation of vested interests and social actors in the political process 
has to be take into account. A comprehensive historical enquiry could 
easily highlight the active role of mutual-aid organizations, trade-
unions and their affiliates, as well as private insurance companies. All 
contributed – to varying degrees and in different periods, according to 
the peculiar development of each country – to the emergence of social 
protection before the birth of the compulsory schemes regulated by 
law.27 In the present study, however, I will focus on the moment when 
                                                          
27 Pat Thane, «The Working Class and State “Welfare” in Britain, 1880-1914», The 
Historical Journal, n.4/1984, pp. 877-900; B. Harris, P. Bridgen, «Introduction: The “Mixed 
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the States took over good part of the functions of former private and 
mutual insurances. From that moment onwards, the social insurance 
permanently became a matter of public policy, structurally embedded 
within the States’ administrations. This change opens up some new 
interpretive and methodological perspectives. Since the former will be 
a major concern throughout my whole dissertation, I will not dwell on 
them at this particular point of the introduction. Regarding 
methodology, I briefly describe the character of the primary sources I 
consulted, and argue in favour of their heuristic value, before 
discussing the structure of my exposition. 
Since during 1939-45 the States sought to reorganize the social 
insurance according to public schemes, I privileged a certain kind of 
sources: firstly, the laws, reports and surveys by governmental 
authorities, then official and private documents drafted by civil 
servants, associations, parties and trade unions. Similar political 
statements had major relevance in Britain than in Italy or in France; in 
these countries, the Resistance parties received the British social plans 
and reforms. The second strand of the research required the sources 
related to war propaganda. The agencies and authorities to refer to are 
still the Ministries and other governmental authorities for the 
mobilization and the psychological warfare. Alongside the directives 
for the propaganda, the surveys and the confidential dispatches from 
the home fronts and from the enemy countries, I also investigated the 
whole chain of the propaganda: bulletins, leaflets, pamphlets, posters, 
summaries of the plans, journals, newspapers, and – particularly 
relevant – the broadcastings. The means of mass communication were 
exploited to an unprecedent extent to reach as wide a public as possible 
with the promises for the world after the flood of the war. Conference 
proceedings, the bulletins of study centres and associations, as well as 
books and essays on the topic fell into the scope of the political 
propaganda as well.  
One last remark concerns the level of detail of the survey, 
based on the archive records. As the research covers three countries in a 
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lapse of time dense of events and documents, exhaustiveness cannot be 
expected. The selection of documents that I have operated followed 
criteria of relevancy for the two above mentioned principal strands of 
my research. After the typological selection, a further choice had to be 
made regarding the documents eventually quoted in the thesis. One of 
the major difficulties in the writing was the necessity to concentrate on 
the most significant documents and discard many others, some of 
which are admittedly redundant. This is especially the case of 
propaganda material (e.g. leaflets, informational pamphlets), and 
journal articles (except some chiefly important ones, I have discarded 
them altogether), but holds also for the correspondences and 
provisional drafts of reports, laws, and other official documents. 
As for the archives and libraries, the largest part of the primary 
resources comes from the national archives: the Archivio Centrale di 
Stato (ACS) in Rome, the Archives Nationales (AN) in Paris, and the 
National Archives (TNA) in London. Besides the State records, other 
institutional archives were fundamental: the funds Beveridge and 
Tawney at the London School of Economics (LSEA), the records at the 
Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent (IHTP), the Centre d’Histoire 
Sociale du 20ème Siècle (CHS) and the Bibliothèque de Documentation 
Internationale Contemporaine (BDIC), and – in Italy – at the 
Fondazione Micheletti (FM). Besides archive records, I consulted other 
kinds of primary and secondary sources in the Central Libraries and 
research libraries, such as British Library, Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France, and Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze.  
 The dissertation focuses on the wartime social reforms both in 
terms of national policies and transnational circulation. As these are 
two different levels of analysis of processes that are intertwined and 
often hardly distinguishable on the level of concrete historical events, 
the organization of the text put some additional problems. I opted for 
splitting the dissertation in three parts. The first one sketches out the 
big picture of the social legislation in the three countries until 1939 and 
reviews the discussion on “total war” and social change, and to what 
extension this category is applicable to my study. The second section 
scrutinizes social plans and legislation in each country, and cross-
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checks the 1939–45 social programmes. The third part deals with the 
wartime propaganda and its goals, reconstructing the far-reaching 
circulation of ideas during the conflict. The first two parts compares 
different but simultaneous situation, being the context of war the major 
common link in the second section. The last part opens up to 
transnational perspectives, as focuses on competition and possible 
influences from a model to another between war and early post-war 
years, scrutinizing extent and limits of the wartime transfers. 
 A similar division of the text implies different kinds of sources 
and different depths of analysis. The first part resumes the legislative 
and intellectual environment in Britain, France, and Italy. As it covers a 
period of nearly seventy years, this overview unavoidably 
oversimplifies some passages, makes a less extensive use of primary 
resources and eludes the details. The section on “total war” mainly 
leans on historical and sociological works. The following two parts are, 
instead, firmly grounded on archive records and other primary 
documents, dissecting in much greater detail the years of war.  
  
“Total war” and social change: Germany and the United States (and the 
USSR) 
 Given my theoretical assumptions and working proposals, a 
few lines should be devoted to the reasons why two of the main 
Powers during WWII have been left out. Monographic studies exist on 
both Nazi Germany and the United States. On Germany, there is an 
extensive literature on different aspects of the social policy before and 
during the war.28 Nazi Germany represented the clearest example of an 
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advanced social system in a highly industrialized country committed to 
“total war”.29 The Nazi regime was also the major target for the Allies. 
The Germans, for their part, showed the awareness that the 
confrontation concerned also social policy. The Deutsche Arbeitsfront 
(DAP, the German Labour Front) elaborated a comprehensive plan of 
social reforms, which was extremely expensive and which moved on 
universalistic lines.30  
The United States were the other benchmark. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal in the Thirties represented a turn in the way to conceive the 
relationship between State and society, and the relation between 
government and economy.31 As for the 1942 project of Robert Ley in 
Germany, also the US proposed “their own” Beveridge Report. In 1943 
the American National Resources Planning Board came out with a 
thorough project of social insurance reform, nicknamed the “American 
Beveridge Plan”.32 Even in the American case, the drafting of these 
projects implied a certain degree of competition with Britain for taking 
the lead of the post-war world. This leadership was also grounded on 
the promise to guarantee greater security and a higher standard of life.  
Both practical and interpretive aspects suggested to leave 
Germany and the United States out of my comparison. From a practical 
point of view, it would have been hardly affordable to hold the strings 
of a comparison over five countries, without lowering the quality of the 
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work with the documents. As a result, the comparison most probably 
would have led to a less meaningful historical analysis. However, the 
archive records convey the idea of an important wartime circulation of 
the social programmes in both countries. There is room for further 
improvement of the transnational perspective on the subject, whether 
considering the opposition between the Anglo-Saxon projects and the 
German social plans, or the transatlantic transfers. Such an enlargement 
of scope could provide perhaps the big picture of the shifting social 
policies during WWII, with its consequences after the war, even if 
“smaller” actors, such as the Scandinavian countries and others, should 
not be forgotten.  
As for Germany and the US, the other Power left out of the 
comparison is the USSR.33 Soviet Russia was the “spectre” that haunted 
the debates on the post-war social protection, more as an ideological 
bogey than for the detailed policies. The references to Soviet Russia 
were recurring in the British and in the Italian or French documents; 
the confrontation with Bolshevism affected, to differing degrees, the 
policy-makers in these countries. The sources I consulted suggest that 
Soviet Communism was feared by the European ruling classes because 
embodied the class struggle and social strife, rather than a clear 
“model” in opposition to which elaborate social policies. At first glance, 
it seems that Soviet Russia got partially cut off the international 
network of studies, surveys and flow of information in Europe and 
between the shores of the Atlantic. 
The intention to include Germany and US in this big picture is 
still valid, but it might be a possible track for further improvement and 
a subsequent extension of this project, or as brand-new research. 
Especially the second part of the thesis, grounded on wartime 
circulations, leaves the door open to further developments. In the light 
of recent historiographic trends on the transnational welfare studies, on 
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which I will dwell more diffusely, I intend my dissertation as a first 
provisional step. I hope that my work might make a small contribution 
in the further deepening of a “global” perspective on social policies in 
the crucial years of the Second world war and in the decade 
immediately after the conflict. Such approach might allow to open up 
some perspectives in the understanding of the 20th century evolution of 
the welfare policies. 
 
From social insurance to the welfare state: a crooked path 
 The present research deals with a “Copernican Revolution” in 
social policies that progressively elapsed in Europe between the 
interwar period and accelerated dramatically during and after WWII. 
My investigation concerns both political and economic history, and 
looks simultaneously at political and structural change. Both for the 
Allies and the Axis and their satellites, the emphasis on the social 
reforms constituted at once a measure of public policy and an 
unavoidable necessity related to the war. On the one side, the 
propaganda and the plans for the post-war recovery aimed at 
strengthening the political and social consensus on the home front; on 
the other, social security was exploited to project the own social models 
abroad. There is, for example, documentary evidence that, while the 
British addressed their social propaganda against the Axis powers, the 
underlying confrontation was already directed against the USSR, in 
view of the coming post-war international and domestic order. If the 
Allies could crush Nazism and Fascism, this was also due to the 
successful mobilization of their societies based on the promise of a 
better world. The social insurances represented a relevant part of the 
political programme to ensure the “four freedoms” that the President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised to achieve in the aftermath of the 
war: freedom of speech and worship, and freedom from want and fear.34  
The post-war Western welfare state was strongly associated 
with the development of inclusive and democratic societies. Since its 
embryonic wartime formulation, social security was expected to 
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contribute to increase wealth and economic growth. Providing higher 
levels of productivity and standards of living formed, according to the 
economic historian Herman Van der Wee, «a central plank in post-war 
government programmes. Growth became a frontier, even an 
obsession.»35 Growth and welfare did not simply constitute an 
ideology; they were also expected to secure the international order, 
enforce capitalism and ensure social harmony in the Western European 
countries. Later, this model of “welfare capitalism” combined social 
and employment policies with the unforeseen economic growth. In that 
sense, it went beyond the original intentions of the social reformers of 
the 1930s and 1940s. It was even further enhanced as the confrontation 
with Soviet Russia peaked. The welfare state did not only conform to 
the functional requirements of the advanced capitalist mode of 
production, but also to the eminently political need to ensure socio-
political consensus. 
The subject of the social insurances calls into question the 
overall evolution of the public policies in the modern industrial 
countries. I tried to not indulge in any sort of Whig interpretation, 
explaining the establishment of the welfare state in Britain (and, later, 
in the Continent) as the “natural” outcome of the British political 
culture.36 This was the view of the British social reformists at that time, 
biased by their political commitment in the midst of “total war”. 
Historiography should keep a distance from what political sources 
said. The incremental nature of social policy and the concepts of path 
dependence does not automatically imply the existence of a “straight 
path” to the welfare state as it eventually deployed. As I will argue in 
my dissertation, the conjunctural rupture involved the political aims of 
social policies even before than their administrative functioning; before 
the war, few elements seemed to suggest the radical turn enacted after 
1945.  
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The comparative and transnational analysis is useful because 
allows to grasp the complexity of simultaneously overlapping different 
processes behind social welfare legislations. We cannot know for sure, 
of course, whether the evolution of the social security systems would 
have taken a similar path without the outbreak of the war. I think that 
most probably they would have not. To me, it seems that the tragic 
events through which the social security reforms passed call into 
question the idyllic visions of a linear path towards the welfare state. In 
fact, various critical junctures determined the paradigm shift: the Great 
Depression and mass unemployment in most capitalist countries; the 
alternative proposals by the Nazi-Fascist models to turn to full 
employment and tackle the conflicts between capital and labour, which 
then were defeated by the force of arms rather than collapsing because 
of their inherent inconsistencies; the permanent bogey of Soviet 
Communism and communist movements in the Western countries; the 
exceptional conditions and hardships of the war.   
After going through all these upheavals, the capitalist countries 
in the Western world were able to deploy a new model of 
development. According to different scholars, it has been defined 
“welfare capitalism”, “mixed economy”, “organized capitalism”, “neo-
corporatist”.37 Nowadays, welfare state is a permanent feature of 
modern capitalist States, pretty much regardless their socio-economic, 
political and cultural orientations. Its consistent retrenchment is 
unlikely, although this goal, already proposed by Thatcherism and 
neoliberalism, is still on the political agenda in Europe, under the 
hegemony of the ordoliberals and their austerity plans and spending 
cuts. The structural adjustment plans put pressure on social 
expenditure and they may affect social welfare in the long-run. The 
current model of capitalism seems to undergo a structural crisis which 
in many regards is comparable to that of the Thirties, as it similarly 
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called into question the hegemonic policies and discourses. The 
parallelism ends there; the paradigm shift after 1945 resulted from 
upheavals and military-ideological confrontations that compelled the 
Western ruling classes to reformulate their policies, and to establish a 
link between economic growth, redistribution of wealth and social 
welfare. Nowadays, while the austerity policies persist with the 
support of the left and the right, free market, redistributive policies, 
economic wealth and public social welfare are almost completely 
falling apart.  
Between the end of the Second World War and the coming of 
the neoliberal globalization, the “social pact” of solidarity and the 
welfare policies in Western Europe relied on some political and 
structural assumptions; the democratic forms of representation of the 
popular sovereignty within the Nation-state, and the Taylorism-
Fordism as productive model. The new paradigm’s features have been 
defined by the sociologist Colin Crouch as the «democratic moment 
around the mid-point of the 20th century».38 According to him, the 
advanced capitalist countries lumped together economic development, 
democratic inclusiveness and social compromise between capitalist 
business and working class. Since the 1980s, the affirmation of the 
“global capitalism” depleted the d institutions forged after the war and 
narrowed the social bases of the democracies towards forms of 
“supranational” oligarchy. The “post-democracy” impacted on every 
level on society and politics, calling into questions some issues that 
transcend the welfare state as a mere “policy”. It questions the concept 
of citizenship and the limits of the democratic and national sphere of 
action.  
Crouch’s arguments do not differ from those of Zygmunt 
Bauman or Ulrich Beck, who captured the changes in the social 
identities and the erosion of the functions of the “classic” welfare 
states.39 They ensured domestic and international stabilization after 
WWII; yet, in our current new order led by growing insecurity and 
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risks, the political legitimation of the welfare systems has been put 
under attack. The “collectivization” of the individual risks and the 
establishment of “national” social solidarity, is being replaced by new 
forms of “individualization” of the social inequalities and the 
supranationalisation of what Beck defines the “global risk society”; the 
“post-modernity” strips the Nation-states of their older functions.40 
Under the pressure of the two rushes to the “global” and to the 
“individual”, the concept of “welfare citizenship” as asserted after 1945 
crumbled; new risks and new needs emerge as the economic and 
political bases of the welfare states are undermined. The rise of ethnic 
minorities and new social actors, the changing forms of “work”, the 
decline of the mass parties, alongside the pre-eminence of global 
corporations, and of austerity ideology in the international 
organizations; all these factors contributed to the fragmentation of the 
welfare state.41 It is not merely a matter of retrenchment of social 
expenditure or austerity reforms; the path of the “post-modern” 
welfare state seems even more crooked than before. Its true nature 
apparently is the depletion of welfare states’ political scope in the 
definition of the “social pact” and social rights.  
Not unlike the “post-democratic” representative institutions, 
the welfare states are not withdrawn. The political scientist Paul 
Pierson underlined how welfare states created a transversal 
“consensus” and socio-political constituencies: the recipients of the 
social benefits and the administrative structures. Their interests can be 
hardly eradicated from the democratic arena, which by nature would 
tend to preserve the acquired rights.42 But the “involution” of welfare 
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states might occur in other respects; for instance, by reducing the whole 
issue of its reform to a mere problem of public accounts. Welfare states 
lost their political significance in terms of social citizenship and 
solidarity, whose affirmation during and immediately after WWII is at 
the core of my dissertation. The Great Recession started in 2008 seems 
to confirm how the welfare state lost political centrality. No other 
policy and idea could apparently challenge the dominant 
neoliberal/ordoliberal austerity.  
Scholarly studies have just started studying the functioning 
and effects of the austerity agenda in Europe; the politics of welfare 
expenditure’s retrenchment is apparently less coherent and more 
contradictory than one might expect.43 What seems to converge is the 
incapacity of the traditional political and social actors (State’s 
bureaucracies, parties, trade unions, business) to rethink the welfare 
policies in the “post-modern” and “post-industrial” societies outside 
the austerity paradigm. It has to be seen – and this probably will be the 
main issue of the next years, in spite of this apparent political deadlock 
– whether Western capitalism will be another time able to rejuvenate 
itself, and Western democracies to assert a new social pact, just as they 
did between World War II and the postwar “Golden Age”.  
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1. The “long waves” of social politics: from the origins to World War II 
 
 
 
 
 “History matters” even when social scientists study the welfare 
states.44 Different approaches tackled the subject in the long-run 
perspective, studying the variations over time and the phases in the 
development of social insurances.45 Heclo identified four steps in the 
achievement of a comprehensive welfare state. The first stage, from 
1870 to 1920, was characterized by the “experimentation”, as the States 
provided the first social insurances and residual social interventions for 
the poor. It was reinforced by the second phase, shaped by the impact 
of the economic crisis and the rise of totalitarian regimes. The 
aftermaths of the war led to a new “consensus” towards social security, 
which did not envisage the modern post-war welfare state yet. For 
Heclo, this was still the stage of  social policies, which had anyway in 
embryo the key elements of the welfare state. The latter was favoured by 
an unexpected period of economic growth and by an intensified public 
commitment for full employment and prevailingly pro-welfare 
intellectual framework. These pillars underwent a crisis starting from 
the ‘70s; the worldwide recession and high inflation rates accompanied 
the discredit for the welfare state, high taxation and state bureaucracy. 
The fourth stage of this transition was only sketched in Heclo’s 
analysis, written in the early 1980s, in the midst of the welfare states 
backlashes in the Anglo-Saxon world.46 Historians may object on some 
details of his periodization, but should admit that it is conceptually 
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productive for historical enquiry. Breaking down the evolution of social 
policy into single “long waves” allows to grasp their incremental 
nature, and their turbulences and ebbs. In this chapter, I will sketch out 
the overall deployment of social insurances in Britain, Italy and France, 
to put the wartime innovations in their right historical perspective.  
   The birth of the modern social policy as compulsory 
insurances is usually ascribed to the 1883-89 Bismarck’s legislation, 
considered as the first attempts to provide a modern social policy. 
While the German schemes constituted the blueprint for many other 
European countries, another model made inroad on the other side of 
the Atlantic. In the US, social allowances were improved for family 
policies and for supporting veterans and mutilated after the 1861–5 
American Civil War.47 One by one, the other major industrialized 
countries passed pieces of legislation that culminated with organic 
reforms in the first decade of the 20th century. They had different labels 
and political formulas, but represented the peak of the pre-1914 ruling 
classes’ effort to provide compulsory schemes of social protection. This 
phase ended with the Great War. A second wave of reforms 
characterized the interwar periods, under the urges of the post-war 
recovery, the care for millions of mutilated and orphans and, later on, 
unemployment effects of the 1929 Great Crush. While they retained 
piecemeal features, they strengthened the framework of compulsory 
schemes. However, they did not envisage the “Copernican Revolution” 
set in motion by the Second World War.  
 
1.1. The social protection from the origins to the Great War 
 
The German legislation pointed at generating loyalty to the 
political institutions that lavished these benefits. Old-age, sickness and 
disability insurances were expected to gain the workers’ consensus, by 
enlarging their economic guarantees in the hierarchical organization of 
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the German Reich.48 That was the way forward by Germany to 
integrate the popular classes and to address the “social question”, 
according to a paternalistic principle, since «public assistance had to be 
granted as a favour and could never be claimed as a right».49 This was 
one of the features of pre-1945 European social legislations; poor relief, 
workers’ protection, public health, social benefits were granted either 
as State benevolence or as a means of paternalistic control.  
If the general goals were similar, different institutional 
environments led to different solutions. Gustav von Rimlinger pointed 
out that the Bismarckian legislation emerged in a context of Nation-
building and militarization of the society. While social welfare is 
usually linked to the progressive democratization, the very early 
German legislation tried to impede this process.50 In Britain and France 
the first social provisions at the end of 1800 were passed by 
conservative governments, under the pressure of the labour 
organizations. More consistent policies were supported by social 
reformers, concerned over the increase of dispossessed people. Social 
inquiries shed light on pauperism; the conditions of the poor were 
studied with a scientific approach, attentive to the socio-economic 
reasons of their status, even though a certain social paternalism was 
still present.51 The quests of the working class met the changing 
perception of the “social question” by the establishment. The liberal 
governments started cooperating with socialist parties. The Italian case 
slightly differed; as Italy faced the same Nation-building issues of 
Germany, its ruling classes swigged between top-down authoritarian 
solutions and more liberal settings. By the outbreak of the Great War, 
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Britain, France and Italy had all haphazard systems of social insurances 
that recalled the compulsoriness of the German one, while social 
policies adapted to each specific socio-economic condition.  
 
Great Britain: from the Poor Laws to the liberal welfare reforms (1880-1911) 
 The history of modern assistance in Britain traced back to the 
rural poor relief in the beginning of the 19th century. Feeble public 
interventions and Poor Laws were accompanied by an ideological 
paradigm hostile to State action in the self-regulated free market. 
Although the view of the unregulated laissez-faire is somehow 
stereotypical, these policies were extremely residual and fragmentary, 
and steadily characterized by the fear of social unrest.52 In the second 
half of the century, the emergence of the “social question” required a 
qualitative leap. Social policies rose from two contradictory factors: 
paternalism and social stigma, and the spreading of socialism. In 
addition, the scientific inquiries on poverty as social phenomenon led 
to the discovery of pauperism in the British society, affecting the public 
debate and legislation.53 At the end of century, concurrently with a 
cyclical crisis and increasing rates of unemployment, new ideas and 
approaches to poverty developed.54 The 1897 Workmen’s Compensation 
Act finally provided benefits for injuries to some categories of workers, 
regardless the responsibilities or implicit knowledge of danger.55 As 
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everywhere, the measures against industrial accidents were the first 
forms of social protection, even though they were not yet configured as 
a public insurance scheme.  
The decade before the Great War was characterized by the 
commitment for social reforms, gone down in history as liberal welfare 
reforms, under the Whig governments of David Lloyd George and the 
ideological influence of the New Liberalism.56 These reforms, in reality, 
continued the Conservative action, which in 1905-6 introduced the 
Unemployed Workmen’s Act and generalized the benefits of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act to all the working categories.57 The Tories 
charged a commission to the study of broader reforms of social 
assistance, opening to the Fabian intellectuals Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb. “Social issues” became electoral matters, as popular classes 
acceded to vote, and the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) tripled their 
members in twenty years. The improvement of social protection started 
being, therefore, a topical issue.  
However, it is oversimplifying to reduce the whole social 
reformism to the pressure of the working-class associations. In the first 
place, social legislation helped to adjust the labour market to the 
necessities of an increase in production capacities under the 
simultaneous condition of labour scarcity; public welfare services 
fostered the economic efficiency of the national economy.58 Secondly, 
the public social assistance created institutional actors and civil 
servants who gradually addressed the problem of poverty and 
unemployment with a different attitude. At the very beginning of the 
century, some civil servants scientifically analysed the social problems. 
Economist John A. Hobson studied unemployment in its aftermaths on 
the economic development, while the social investigator Hubert 
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Llewellyn-Smith advocated for social reforms and wage increase.59 In 
1909, Beveridge wrote the first edition of Unemployment: A Problem of 
Industry, with a brand new approach to unemployment.60 He collected 
data instead of blaming the moral attitude of the unemployed; 
unemployment was neither a moral fault of the workers nor an 
irredeemable failure of the economic system. He proposed policies to 
reorganize the labour market, rather than charity-like and residual aids. 
Some elements of 1942 Beveridge ideological discourse were already 
present, as he considered unemployment «not a want to be satisfied, 
but a disease to be eradicated.»61 
During the Whig welfare reforms between 1906 and 1914, the 
British social protection made the first qualitative leap, setting the 
framework of the social service state.62 The Whigs introduced old-age 
pensions, insurances against unemployment, and public services for 
the children and the poor. The complex of social provisions revealed a 
residual approach, excluding the middle classes and the poorest. Some 
measures marked a break with the Poor Laws and were driven by public 
health concerns, especially for the childhood.63 In 1908, social pensions 
were granted for those who could not benefit from contributory 
pensions.64 The act combined charity-like intervention and public social 
assistance. It had all the traditional features of the Poor Laws and of the 
means tests: discrimination between “deserving” and “undeserving” 
poor, e.g. the inquires on moral and social behaviour. It marked, 
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however, the involvement of the State to finance non-contributory 
social pensions for limited indigent categories over 70 years old.  
The 1911 National Insurance Act encompassed healthcare 
insurance and unemployment benefits.65 The first part dealt with the 
healthcare insurances, sickness and permanent invalidity. It was not a 
universalistic healthcare service as it concerned working categories and 
needy people and was not funded by general revenues, but by 
employers and employees’ contributions, with limited participation of 
the State. The private and mutual healthcare framework was 
prominent. The second part of the act established unemployment 
benefits for very limited working categories in the heavy industry. 
Britain was the only State to provide public insurance against 
unemployment. Unlike old-age pension, illness and work-related 
accidents, the involuntary unemployment directly called into question 
the free market deficiencies. Accordingly, the 1911 National Insurance 
Act recognized that unemployment was due to the laissez-faire economy 
and that was task of the State to protect the workers against that risk. 
These measures, therefore, «trace the trajectory of a fast distancing from 
the minimal State as supported by the Manchester philosophies.»66  
The 1911 National Insurance Act was the swansong of New 
Liberalism. The decline of the Whig party ironically befell 
simultaneously with their most ambitious (healthcare insurance) and 
influential (unemployment benefits) reforms.67 The healthcare 
provisions marked the upper limit of social reformism in the 
Edwardian Era. It also left behind the Puritan view of poverty as 
personal fault and to some extent the 19th century philanthropy, even if 
the healthcare provisions were not generalized. They resulted from the 
compromise with the pre-existing Friendly Societies and the British 
Medical Association (BMA), and eventually the original intention to 
cover widows and orphans in the sickness and invalidity benefits 
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dropped.68 Unemployment insurances modernized British social 
legislation, representing what Winston Churchill defined «the 
untrodden field in politics».69 The Liberals tackled unemployment with 
a combined provision of a limited range of benefits and voluntary 
labour exchanges. Yet, this legislation was still residual. The State 
limitedly contributed to the funding of the benefits and the compulsory 
insurances concerned only the wage earners. Lastly, the 1911 national 
insurance lacked of a comprehensive approach to social policy and 
wider goals of social enhancement; by no means it prefigured the post-
1945 welfare state. In the case of the provisions for healthcare and 
children, they were rather due to the concerns for national efficiency. 
These pertained both with the improvement of the conditions of lower 
classes, and the worries for the health of the “British race” after the 
Boer War.70 However, at the end of the Liberal epoch the foundations of 
the British social service state were laid, alongside with the persistence of 
the Poor Law. 
 
France: from the “égalité” to the social legislation (1893-1910) 
 According to historian Giovanna Procacci, since 1848 France 
was the cradle of the modern approaches to social policy; pauperism 
was separated from labour matters and the assistance for the poor 
diverged from the insurances for the workers.71 In the republican 
rhetoric, they corresponded respectively to the right to assistance and 
to the right to work. They constituted a difficult compromise between 
liberal individualism and the aims of social equality; the further French 
legislation ranged between these two principles.72 In the last years of 
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the 19th century, the French political and public reflection on the “social 
question” was contradictory: on the one hand, the State had 
theoretically the duty to improve the social conditions of its citizens; on 
the other, the liberal ideology did not want to foster the idleness of the 
poor with public aid.73 Even under a thick layer of egalitarian rhetoric 
of solidarity, the main concerns behind the social reforms in France still 
regarded social peace.74 The mutualist setting of the French social 
legislation was seen by liberals as the expression of French “liberty” 
and “self-regulation”.75 This aspect met also the demographic concerns, 
constituting two long-lasting pillars of the French social policy. 
Not unlike Britain, the Radicals reoriented themselves towards 
a reformist programme, incorporating moderate social elements.76 The 
radical-socialist government of Léon Bourgeois took up the torch of the 
conservatives’ first social provisions. In 1893, the Parliament passed 
free medical assistance for injured workers; over the next 20 years, 
insurances and allowances came into operation, while the budget for 
welfare expenses doubled. In 1898, the insurances against industrial 
accidents charged the employers for the benefits regardless the 
responsibilities of the accident.77 By 1923, this insurance covered all 
workers and some categories of self-employed, and was extended to 
some occupational diseases. The government also enacted the Charte de 
la mutualité, which encouraged and deregulated voluntary mutualism. 
The State limited itself to subside and monitor the financial 
management of the mutual funds.78 The major reforms were enacted 
under the 1906-9 Georges Clemenceau’s Ministry. The political goals of 
these governments did not vary from the coeval approaches to the 
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social protection; the Radicals pursued social solidarity with reforms, 
while securing industrial rest and wiping out the revolutionary trends 
within the French trade unions, even contemplating repressive 
measures.  
In 1904 were created the first family allowances and maternity 
assistance programmes, as for the mixed offices providing medical and 
social assistance for needy expectants. The subsequent year, the first 
old-age pensions and insurances for disabled persons appeared. In the 
same year, the Commission d’assurance et de prévoyance sociales 
(Committee for the social insurances), chaired by the socialists 
Alexandre Millerand and Paul Guieysse proposed the reform of 
industrial workers’ old-age pensions, the invalidity insurances and the 
survivors’ pensions. This was the first step towards a more unified 
compulsory scheme; among the proposals, the creation of a National 
Pension Fund had a preeminent opting-out for voluntary insurances. 
The pension contributions were equally paid by employers and 
employees, subsided by the State, and they did not include the farm 
workers.79 The Loi du 5 avril 1910 sur les retraites ouvrières et paysannes 
transposed many of the proposals for an overall reform elaborated in 
the decades before.80 The scheme of national pensions was addressed to 
industrial, trade and farm workers; it had upper-income limits and 
provided relatively scarce benefits. The self-employed and the higher 
wage-earners could subscribe to the voluntary pension scheme. The 
law retained the contributory principle with State subsidies, and the 
freedom of choice between public or private funds. The employers and 
some categories of workers were hostile to the compulsoriness of the 
pension, due to economic inconvenience or ideological opposition.81 
 Historian Philip Nord has defined the first French social 
legislation «republican and familist in mold.»82 The Republican values 
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and public discourses forged a rhetoric of égalité républicaine and social 
solidarity. At the same time, French policies for the maternal care were 
the most advanced in terms of benefits and assistance services. The first 
laws regulating women’s working hours dated back to 1892, while in 
1913 the paid leave for childbirth was passed. This kind of protection 
did not primarily aim at the interests of the women as workers, but as 
mothers. Since the beginning, the French social policy was linked to 
birth-rate policy.83 Another permanent feature was the importance of 
private assurance companies, medical associations and mutualist funds 
as providers of “corporatist” self-aid.84 The tasks for social insurance 
schemes rested with the trade associations, the factory agreements, the 
private sector. The State took in charge the assistance to the indigents. 
As for Britain, the social provisions addressed with different tools the 
people able to work and the marginalized. For the latter, the public aid 
took place effectively. The French social insurances lacked consistent 
public schemes; the insurance against the accidents was compulsory, 
but that against sickness relied on the mutual associations. The 
compulsory old age pensions were residual, in favour of voluntary 
sector. As for unemployment, the French social legislation lacked of 
insurance schemes.  
 
Italy: between “Bismarckian” approaches and liberal reforms (1890-1912) 
The Italian social policies rooted on a different context if 
compared to Britain and France. As a newly formed State, Italy faced 
similar problems of nation-building as Bismarck’s Germany, without 
having the same industrial development. Yet, the goals of the early 
social legislation were the same than in the “Conservative” Germany or 
in the “Liberal” Britain: the social protection for the workers, the 
weakening of the socialists and the control of the poor.  
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In the last decade of the 19th century, Francesco Crispi’s 
government passed the first pieces of legislation, addressing the 
assistance to relief the poor with the 1890 Legge Crispi.85 The ecclesial 
institutions maintained the monopoly of the social assistance, but they 
became public authorities. The State recognized the existence of the 
“social question” and the need to provide social assistance. At the same 
time, the government avoided the direct public involvement in its 
management; the mere recognition of previous religious charities did 
not allow coordination nor unification of services and policies. Only the 
industrialization of Northern Italy and the growth of the working-class 
organizations drove the further evolution in the social insurances and 
the work-related matters. The industrial workforce progressively 
increased about one million of units from the Unification to the first 
decade of the 20th century, although with sectorial and geographical 
breakdowns.86 The trade unions strengthened their traditional 
mutualism, coordinating the employment services, education, and 
training assistance through self-managed organizations of workers. In 
the absence of a consistent State intervention, they also granted social 
provisions.87  
In 1898 the Parliament passed the compulsory insurances 
against industrial accidents and created the Cassa Nazionale di 
Previdenza per l’invalidità e la vecchiaia (National Insurance Fund for old-
age pensions and disability, later renamed CNAS).88 It was not a public 
authority but constitued the framework of the further Italian social 
insurances and institutions. These acts were the paternalist response of 
the Italian political establishment afraid of social disorder and the 
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democratization of public institutions.89 Their social legislation was 
intended to halt further democratic reforms. Yet, the laws hooked Italy 
on the European trend towards public compulsory insurances, with the 
participation of employers, employees and – in a subsidiary role – of 
the State in their funding. 
At the turn of the century, the working class’s social quests 
obtained some response by the politics of the new Prime Minister 
Antonio Giolitti.90 He opened up to the political mass movements, 
modernize Italy and mitigate the social tensions. The improvements in 
the social protection, right to strike and social assistance were not only 
mere concessions, but the effort to integrate the masses within the 
liberal institutions. For a period of fifteen years, Giolitti-lead or inspired 
governments deliberated long-lasting reforms. The most relevant 
concerned the social insurances for industrial workers, the first legal 
provisions regarding female labour and workforce of minor age, and 
the institution, in 1911, of the public primary schools. His governments 
also favoured wages increases and diluted the anti-labour legislation. 
In 1904, the assurance against industrial accidents was extended to 
farmers and seafarers, and made the employers legally responsible for 
the safety at workplace.91 Maternity allowances for the industrial 
workers made their appearance in 1910.  
The CNAS was in charge of these benefits; the provision 
extended its legal and de facto competences. The 1910 law also unified 
the family protection within the fund of social protection.92 The 
watershed year was 1912; with the Legge 4 aprile 1912, n. 305 the 
nationalization and coercive merger of the life-insurance agencies in 
one single public fund took over the previous voluntary framework. It 
did not envisage an overall reformulation of the social insurances (since 
they were not compulsory), nor did it operate effective innovations 
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regarding the public authorities. Yet, it established the complete 
devolution of the remaining profits to the National fund for old-age 
pensions and disability.93 The civil servants and State offices committed 
themselves in the study of the phenomenon of unemployment, getting 
in that regard Italy closer to British experience.94 It was political 
concerns that led to the creation of public employment offices, even if 
no legislative measures were taken against unemployment.  
It was during the years 1901-14 that the Italian approach to 
social policies changed. Concurrently to the expansion of the electoral 
franchise, the Liberals recognized the Socialist and Catholic 
organizations as political counterpart. In addition, the social insurances 
shifted from paternalistic control to an attempt of integrating the 
masses in the State. Giolitti’s reformism grounded on the collaboration 
among Liberals and the new mass parties. Good part of liberal 
establishment agreed with the urgent nature of some actions.95 On the 
other side, both Socialists and Catholics demonstrated to be very 
sensitive to the social reforms. The first years of the 20th century 
represented the peak of reformist socialism, whose social programme 
matched in fact the left-wing liberal reforms. The escalation of the 
social strife and the backwardness of the Italian socio-economic context 
prevented a more consistent collaboration.96 The Catholics grounded 
their social commitment on the 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum. It 
backed the measures to protect workers, women and children, as well 
as confessional workers’ organizations, even if they had other reasons 
compared to liberals and Socialists; the social doctrine of the Catholic 
Church opposed industrial societies and liberal democracies. As a 
consequence, it abstained from cooperating in the creation of social 
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insurances, as «the social action of the Catholics embedded the human 
promotion of the poor in an overall hierocratic design.»97  
On the verge of the Great War, the major political and social 
forces regarded favourably at mutualist forms of self-relief alongside 
residual compulsory insurances. The liberals promoted the progressive 
democratization of social institutions with two goals; the traditional 
response to the social strife, and the aim to include wider cross-section 
of society within the State. The Italian social protection complied with 
the European coeval social insurance schemes, even if relatively later 
than other European States; this was also due to the socio-economic 
cleavages within the country. The insurances were linked to the 
occupational categories, accordingly to the geographical and social 
gaps that affected the employment structure of the country at that 
time.98  
 
1.2. The interwar reforms: recovery and crisis 
 
The more or less explicit collaboration between liberals and 
socialists characterized the utmost momentum for the pre-war social 
reforms, which grafted into the first provision enabled by the 
conservatives. The first compulsory schemes traced the German 
system. The Italian ruling classes borrowed also the political goals of 
the German social reformers, while in Britain they adapted the 
compulsory schemes to some issues (unemployment, healthcare) that 
affected the society. France retained residual approach to the “social 
question”, in many regards even more liberal than the British one. The 
social insurances became compulsory, but this did not automatically 
mean that the State took in charge of their funding. According to each 
country and risk category, the social contribution was rather bipartite 
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between workers and employers, with residual State’s incentives. [TAB. 
1]  
 
TAB.1. Funding of the social insurances in Germany (as reference), 
Great Britain, France and Italy, according to each risk category (1914) 
 Germany Great 
Britain 
France Italy 
Old-
age/Invalidity  
2/5 
Workers 
2/5 
Employers 
1/5 State 
Non-
contributo
ry 
pensions 
(deserving 
lower-
income 
workers) 
1/2 
Workers 
1/2 
Employer
s 
+ State 
subsidies 
Voluntary 
insurance  
+State/employe
rs’ free 
contribution 
Industrial 
Injuries 
Employers Employers
’ civil 
liability 
Employer
s’ civil 
liability 
Employers 
Sickness/Mate
rnity 
2/3 
Workers 
1/3 
Employers 
4/9 
Workers 
3/9 
Employers 
2/9 State 
Voluntar
y 
insurance 
1/2 Workers 
1/2 Employers 
+ State 
subsidies 
Unemployme
nt 
 –  3/10 
Workers 
3/10 
Employers 
4/10 State 
 –   –  
 
However, the reforms moved towards progressive 
compulsoriness of insurances. Besides Germany, the sequence of the 
social insurances started with the industrial injuries to include, in the 
British case, unemployment benefits. [TAB. 2]      
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TAB.2. Main reforms of the social insurances in Great Britain, France, 
Italy (1892-1914) 
 Industria
l Injuries 
Sickness/Maternit
y 
Old-
age/Invalidit
y 
Unemployme
nt 
Great 
Britai
n 
1897 1911 1908 1911 
Franc
e 
1898 1898* 1910   – 
Italy 1898 1910** 1898***   –  
*voluntary insurance    **only maternity 
  
***voluntary pension with State and employers’ free contributions 
 
The lib-lab experiments of the first decade of the twentieth 
century marked the upper limit of the political concessions by 
conservative and liberal elites, and the major success of socialists’ 
reformist strategy. Both these forces moved within the mind-set of the 
19th century bourgeois societies. The Great War swept away the liberal 
political settings and called into question the existence of pre-war 
reformism. State policies changed during and after the war. The Soviet 
Revolution also had a relevant role in the redefinition of the State 
intervention. Later, the Great Depression of the ‘30s put a strain on the 
ideological paradigms that shaped the liberal and bourgeois mindsets 
between 19th and 20th century. New approaches gradually emerged in 
the debate, to become public policy after 1945. In the ‘20s and the ‘30s, 
the Weimar Republic and the US experience convey the idea of the 
changing role of the State with regard to economy and society.  
Born on the verge of the proletarian revolution in Germany, the 
Weimar Constitution incorporated social democratic goals.99 Weimar 
Republic combined repressive policies and social concessions, the latter 
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resulting in a systematic and far-sighted legislation.100 Its principles 
proclaimed the right and duty to work, the social protection, the 
assistance by the State for inability, occupational disease, accident, 
family allowances and public pensions. The collective bargaining 
recognized by the law, the factory councils and cooperative forms of 
economic production completed the democratic “social state”.101 For the 
first time, the social policies were coherently linked to democracy and 
rights.  
In spite of the compromise nature of Weimar Republic, the 
government adopted a wider-ranging approach: from 1923 to 1927, 
public assistance programmes and social insurances schemes 
addressed unemployment. The occupational insurance funds were 
progressively unified, and between 1920 and 1925 the war’s pensions, 
the insurances against professional diseases and the programmes for 
the education were part of the compulsory insurance schemes.102 Yet, 
due to the higher unemployment rates and increasing fiscal burden of 
the social schemes in front of the loss of contributory basis, the Weimar 
social programmes were no longer sustainable.103 The deepening of the 
crisis, with hyperinflation, fiscal bankruptcy and mass unemployment, 
eventually alienated the middle and working classes from Weimar.104 
The collapse of Weimar “social state” ambitions was a clear signal that 
social reforms without the endorsement of the middle classes and the 
bureaucracies were destined to fail. In 1919, the Weimar Republic tried 
to restore “authority” after the end of the Whilelmine Empire through 
the integration of social protection within a new democratic 
framework; at the same time, it used forceful means to suppress the 
revolutionary movements. While the older ruling classes constantly 
tried to push the wheels of history backwards, the fragile social and 
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political compromise collapsed under the weight of the 1929 Great 
Crash, which undermined any residual social and political 
legitimation.105 
The Great Depression was also behind the other remarkable 
experience of the interwar period. The US New Deal represented the 
most important forerunner of the post-war social programmes and the 
first experiment for State interventions against unemployment. When 
Roosevelt became president, the production halved, while foreign trade 
collapsed and unemployment grew exponentially within a couple of 
years. The deflationary policies enacted by the Republican government 
were overcome by the plans set up from 1933 to 1938.106 The crisis hit 
both middle and working classes: suspension of the internal and trade 
markets, excess of unsold agricultural and industrial products, vertical 
drop in prices, standstill in investment and eventually contraction in 
the industrial production and – as consequence –  the drastic wage 
reduction and unemployment for the industrial workers and the 
indebtedness for the farmers.  
The New Deal articulated in two phases; the emergency 
measures in the first 100 days of Roosevelt Administration pointed at 
convincing the opinion of the stability of the credit, the reform of the 
banking system (e.g., the separation of commercial banks and financial 
institutions), the control of financial transition, the creation of Federal 
Authorities for the industrial and agricultural recovery via public 
works, progressive taxation and stabilization of prices. A second wave 
of reforms addressed social security and labour relations, granting 
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public schemes for unemployment, old-age, disability funded by 
tripartite contributions, family allowances and wage policy.107  
The New Deal did not reabsorb the levels of cyclical 
unemployment, but partially restored industrial and farm production. 
It was instead able to restore confidence in the democratic institutions 
and in renewed forms of capitalism supported by policies that 
consolidated the “strong State”: «the New Deal’s greatest success – 
including its reversal of the terrifying downward economic spiral in 
1933 and its establishment of greater economic security in 1935 – 
insured that its economic reforms would remain secure for at least as 
long as most voters could remember the Great Depression.»108  
The crisis spread across the Atlantic, with devastating impacts 
on trades, societies and politics.109 Its same transmission channels 
spread also new ideas, which influenced the social reformers during 
the war. The American New Deal was the subject of a bi-univocal 
transfer between the Atlantic. The New Deal, regardless its effective 
achievements, changed the perception of the relations between State 
and economy in the US, being studied by social reformers in Europe at 
that time. Mutually, the United States borrowed some elements from 
the European model of compulsory insurance schemes.110  
 
Great Britain: the struggle against unemployment 
The high unemployment after the Great War oriented the 
British social policy and polarized the intellectual debate; the main 
concern throughout the ‘20s was the social peace in the factories after 
the war, while the emergence of Keynesian theories characterized the 
‘30s. The social legislation against unemployment grew rather untidily, 
in front of persistent economic stagnation. The GDP growth rates 
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fluctuated between a first major crisis in 1921-2 and the economic 
upswing of 1937, when unemployment decreased, also thanks to the 
rearmament programme. The interwar social policies patched the 
inefficiencies of British economy, which brought about negative trade 
balance, falling exports, slowdown of productivity growth, sharp fall in 
foreign capital investments and depression of the older industrial areas 
and sectors.111 Unemployment never fell below 10% in the interwar 
years; it peaked with 22,5% in 1932, when nearly 3.3 million workers 
were registered unemployed.  
The post-1918 unemployment benefit schemes were closely tied 
to the pre-war legislation and to measures related to the 
demobilization. Complementary measures overlapped and get out of 
compulsory schemes, as non-contributory benefits were granted to 
unemployed who did not join the schemes. The contributory system 
was ceaselessly overstepped with extra-benefits, avoiding that 
unemployed workers could fall under the Poor Laws (renamed Public 
Assistance Committees). Alongside the contributory benefits, from 1921 
to 1927 were enacted the uncovenanted, the extended and the 
transitional benefits, while in 1931 were set the transitional payments.112 
These extra benefits were submitted to some forms of means tests, but 
they did not imply the destitution policy underpinning the ancient Poor 
Laws. These constituted the “third stage” of protection against the loss 
of income, financed with the insurances fund, chronically in deficit.113    
The coexistence of different levels of public assistance raised 
political and fiscal problems, e.g. for the administrative discretionary 
power and for the funding of the benefits. In the years 1931–5, the 
National Government of the former laborite Ramsay MacDonald 
rationalized the social schemes, in «the worst phase of the interwar 
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years for the unemployed, at least in the public mind. The household 
means test, the reduction in the money value of benefits, the sense of 
national gloom generated by the “fall of the pound” and the rise of 
fascist governments abroad, and above all the very high level of 
unemployment, particularly in the depressed areas, combined to make 
the years 1930-4 the worst of the whole period.»114 The rough 
household controls operated by the Public Assistance Committee were 
under attack and no longer politically sustainable. The 1934 
Unemployment Assistance Act unified the management of the means test, 
under the Unemployment Assistance Board (UAB), which operated from 
1935 on.115 The authority was under the control of the Ministry of 
Labour and was directly funded by the Treasury.116 The UAB took 
charge of the assistance to all unemployed, those under compulsory 
schemes and those who previously were granted by non-contributory 
benefits or by the Poor Laws. The UAB in fact replaced the Poor Laws 
and laid the foundations of the administrative structure of post-war 
welfare agencies; it was a central public authority that unified and 
rationalized previous institutions. Furthermore, the system of 
contributory and non-contributory benefits reshaped the State aid to 
the marginal.117  
The reaction to the Great Depression led to more systematic 
intervention of the State, fixing some main features of the British social 
policy. At the same time, the debate on social policy shrouded the pre-
existing “idealism” of the social reformers in a comprehensive scholarly 
approach. This combination of policy legacy and newer elaborations 
resurfaced during the wartime.118 However, the universalistic turn was 
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not come yet. In spite of the promotion of even more inclusive social 
reforms, the administrations continued to operate on discriminative 
basis and the policy-makers did not directly handle the question of the 
“social citizenship”. The British social legislation was basically a 
reaction to the prolonged economic crisis and massive unemployment; 
the policies enacted were founded on the fear of the desegregation of 
the social fabric.  
Unemployment had deep repercussion in the economic 
thought. Proposals on how to cope with it proliferated and would have 
slowly penetrated and affected policies. In 1930, Beveridge returned on 
this issue. He supported anti-cyclical measures to reduce the 
disequilibrium between wages and productivity. In his view, benefits 
alone could not solve the problem of the persistence of high 
unemployment. He claimed for a mix of reformed old institutions and a 
newer planning policy to create employment in the most strongly 
depressed area, e.g. for the strengthening of the Labour Exchange, to 
make labour more fluid in the industrial areas and sectors.119 
Beveridge’s view was part of a wider interest in “planning policies” in 
the Thirties. “Planning”, however, became a catch-all formula, 
encompassing a vast spectrum of position, from the nationalists to the 
collectivist plans. They all claimed for more radical solutions than 
temporary benefits or budgetary policies to boost the demand, even if 
these latter proved most efficient to relieve unemployment.120 For 
Beveridge, public expenditure could stimulate investments and bank 
credits. Public money could also subside the ailing industries, favor the 
redeployment of workers to the dynamics industrial areas and reabsorb 
unemployed manpower due to industrial improvement and 
rationalization.121 Beveridge did not consider unemployment as an 
unavoidable side effect of free market, as «some things in Britain’s 
destiny are beyond management by its government and its leaders; […] 
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But unemployment is not of these.»122 At the same time, he regarded 
the patchwork quilts against the income losses as double edged-worse. 
They did not solve the economic and industrial roots of unemployment 
and demoralized political and social actors. Beveridge developed an 
approach attentive to the causes of unemployment, some of them 
would have been more systematically elaborated during WWII.123  
A real paradigm shift was spreading within British political 
and cultural elites: «change of heart or change of some sort is 
indispensable today – in business policy, in labour policies, in 
statesmanship. We must be ready for all sorts of new expedients in the 
control of industry and in government. We have got to find planners 
and give them power and trust them.»124 The first incentives for the 
buildings or the schedules of manpower in the sectors with labour 
shortage moved in this direction, albeit they were not consistent 
policies yet. In the Thirties, “planning policies” did not go beyond 
political debate. Even before the publication of the major Keynesian 
works on unemployment, it was generally agreed in the huddle of 
experts and civil servants that supply-side oriented policies could more 
easily reduce unemployment than demand-side ones. Export bonuses 
on general tariffs, dole to employers, cheaper capital for industries, tax 
reductions, national works, and employment agencies were some of the 
proposals at stake.125  
It is difficult to dig out the effective penetration of “planning” 
ideas in British public policy during the ‘30s; while economic theories 
affected the public debate, politics had to take under control public 
expenditure and the effective monetary policy. Before 1936–7, when 
Britain started a programme of rearmament, the Treasury remained 
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reluctant to enact deficit spending or borrowing to reduce 
unemployment, for example through public works.126 However, the 
most advanced solutions were not totally insensible to forms of 
redistributive policies, or even to the national planning of industries.127 
This was the case of the pro-fascist and “corporatist” position of 
Oswald Mosley, or the fascination for bolshevist collectivism, which 
affected the Fabian circles. Keynes himself was quite pragmatic when it 
came to the best solution to cope with the factual end of the laissez-faire 
economy.  
 
France: the social insurances and the family welfare 
The “corporatist” mutual aid watered down after the Great 
War, when the voluntary social assurances gradually lost ground in the 
French social protection. The years of the recovery were marked by the 
illusion of a quick return to the laissez-faire, and the political projects of 
compulsory insurances faced the harsh opposition of the assurance 
business.128 The most important input to overcome the residual French 
system came from the re-annexation of the Alsatian and Lorraine 
territories after the war. There, the workers previously enjoyed the 
German compulsory social assurances for sickness, old-age, invalidity 
and accidents; with the exception of the work accidents, all these 
insurances were neither compulsory nor public in France.129 The 
fragmented French social protection experienced further 
differentiations, as the juxtaposition of voluntary insurances with 
public schemes required the harmonization with the compulsory 
German system. The French social reformers addressed this 
fragmentation with a compromise upwards, extending the benefits to 
the whole French territories. The compulsory insurances were longer 
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overdue; yet, they faced the opposition of medical and private 
business, but – unlike the pre-war years – public social reforms were 
endorsed by labour organizations.  
Compulsory insurances were adopted in France only in 1928 
and 1930, even if the first commissions to study the reform dated back 
to 1921.130 The two complementary laws of 5th April 1928 and 30th April 
1930 constituted a turn in the French social policy.131 They were at the 
same time the culmination of pre-war reformism and the result of post-
war concerns. They implemented a compulsory and unique system of 
insurances, funded by employers and employees with a relatively small 
contribution by the State, covering all the risk categories except 
unemployment.132 It covered all the working categories (industrial 
workers, shopkeepers, farm workers). The peasants had their own 
social insurances with the Loi du 30 avril 1930. These laws retained 
separate schemes for specific categories, e.g. the miners; the 
occupational framework remained within compulsory schemes, as well 
as the wide room left for voluntary sector. The lack of unemployment 
benefits signaled the persistence of social stigma and exclusion for this 
condition. The French approach still combined private charity and 
public assistance with the voluntary insurances financially supported 
by the State since 1905.  
During the Great Depression France did not experience 
disruptive unemployment.133 While Britain implemented the 
Unemployment Assistance Act in 1934, France tried to create work 
supply.134 This latter was expected to be achieved through monetary or 
supply-side policies, rather than policies to boost the demand. For 
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instance, the government tried to favor the “return to land” to balance 
employment levels between cities and countryside. Not even the 
structural crisis led to a global rethinking of unemployment provisions. 
While Britain set up programmes against mass unemployment, in 
France the traditional paradigms persisted. Only the Popular Front 
tried to provide some benefits with the Loi du 28 aout 1936; also in this 
case, the benefits were rather subsidiary to other policies against 
unemployment, e.g. public works, and were not framed in a more 
organic scheme of compulsory insurances.  
In turn, in the mid-30s the family policy was a key area of the 
French social protection; it marked a difference with the other 
countries, as resulted from the dread of demographic decline after 
WWI. The 1932 Loi Laundry extended the services and the coverage of 
the family allowances, which were generalized and made compulsory 
for all the workers in the industrial and trade sector.135 While the extra-
contributions made for the employees with at least two children 
became compulsory, the employers were left free to choose the 
insurance funds agreed upon the State. This measure eventually turned 
into a genuinely universalistic feature in 1939, under the impulse of 
birth-rate concerns. The family allowances were extended to the whole 
active population, either employed or unemployed, and the 
arbitrariness of the allowances was partially amended with a system of 
quotas, particularly favorable for the peasant families, considered the 
“core” of the nation.136 
By the end of the Thirties, France moved toward two 
distinguished trends. In the social insurances the mutualist substrate 
persisted, centered on the action of working class organizations, the 
collaboration/struggle with the employers, the separate occupational 
schemes, the key role of private insurances. Unemployment benefits, 
for instance, were devolved to the trade unions self-help, under the 
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supervision of the Labour Office. But mutualism forged the whole 
setting of social insurances, geographically and financially 
decentralized along corporatist/occupational lines.137 In the family 
policies, instead, the interwar France did important steps toward State-
directed and universalistic services, albeit the fiscal involvement of the 
State was still relatively secondary. The universalization of the services 
did not automatically imply a right-based political discourse. The 
political consensus towards the extension of social provisions for the 
motherhood had first and foremost birth-rate concerns.138 In that 
regard, there are continuities between the III Republic and the Vichy 
demographic actions, e.g. for the primacy of rural over urban families.  
 
Italy: from the liberal to the fascist social legislation 
In Italy, the interwar social policies did not experience major 
ruptures, in spite of political breakdowns; the Fascist seizure of power 
changed the institutional order in Italy, but the public policies 
developed from the last liberal provisions. The regime carried out 
longer-run projects of industrial and social modernization to “fill the 
gap” with other more advanced Western countries; protectionist 
barriers, public investments and subsidies to industry, public work, 
new industrial settlements.139 These eclectic policies applied also for 
labour and social matters. While, for example, Fascism implemented 
harsh deflationary policy and outlawed the non-fascist trade unions, 
the regime could also claim for the settlement of a wide-range system 
of social insurances.140 
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In Italy, not unlike Britain and France, the Great War gave 
momentum for social reformism. The Italian government set up a 
special Commission on social insurances as part of the reconstruction 
policy. As a consequence of the war, social policies did not involve only 
the industrial workers, but also peasants and middle class. In 1919, the 
old-age pensions, concerning almost 12 million workers, became 
compulsory and the government passed the first unemployment 
insurances.141 The claims of trade unions were also granted: minimum 
wage, collective labour agreements, profit sharing via workers’ share 
owning, the establishment of the Central Employment Office. The 
impetus toward the unification of social insurances came up against the 
limits of the liberal ruling class and the festering of the social fights in 
1919–20. The results were feeble reforms, as for the establishment of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security.  
Fascism, instead, claimed to face the “social question” head-on. 
In reality, the Fascist regime retained continuities with the liberals in 
the Twenties, and enacted improvements in the Thirties, which 
nonetheless did not depart from trends in other nations. In the 1920s, 
the annexing of two former Austrian provinces, which had compulsory 
insurances against ill and sickness, did not serve to upward adequate 
the Italian insurances. Vice versa, those compulsory insurances were 
strongly restricted even where they were previously enacted. The 
Fascist regime favored the small retailers and their corporative claims, 
rather than salaried workers.142 The regime initially opted for relying on 
self-aid, and later to frame the occupational social protection within the 
corporative construction, resulting in a very high fragmentation of 
social protection on occupational basis.  
From 1927 onward, the Fascist regime followed up on a more 
consistent social policy, whose ideological features were stated in the 
Carta del Lavoro (Labour Charter): work was defined as a social duty 
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and was protected in order to strengthen the national power. Fascists 
set up the collective employment agreements, the organization of the 
associations of workers and employers. The Labour Charter also 
committed in the improvement of social insurances: accident 
insurances; extension of the maternity allowances; insurance against 
work-related illnesses and tuberculosis; sickness insurances; 
involuntary unemployment benefits; insurance policies for young 
workers and measures to combat youth unemployment. Social 
insurances were halfway between corporatist fragmentation and 
compulsory public schemes. For example, the corporations took in 
charge the workers’ professional training or actions for the security at 
work. The mixed funding employers/employees retained the liberal 
schemes of public compulsory insurances. The State, instead, controlled 
unemployment rates on national basis.143  
Although developed autonomously from the outsets of the 
Labour Charter, Fascist rhetoric stressed the link among social 
insurances and corporative ideology. In the Thirties, this intermingling 
resulted in the creation of the Enti Pubblici (the Fascist Public 
Authorities) expressly designed to manage the social schemes and to 
centralize the services.144 While the Fascists fostered the crystallization 
of privileges and inequalities among the insured categories, the 
legislative actions served to demonstrate the «socialist face of the 
regime».145 These measures marked the departure from the liberal 
approach to become public policy; the harshest years of crisis 1929-32 
compelled to strengthen the social protection schemes. The State 
became at the same time banker and entrepreneur, via the creation of 
the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI, Institute for Industrial 
Reconstruction) and the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI, Institute for 
National Credit). New social agencies were also created: the Istituto 
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Nazionale Fascista per l’Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro 
(INFAIL, the Fascist National Fund for Work Injuries) unified all 
precedent funds in a single national authority; the Istituto Nazionale 
Fascista della Previdenza Sociale (INFPS, the Fascist National Fund of 
Social Security) succeeded the CNAS of the liberal era. From residual 
social insurances, the regime foreshadowed a comprehensive system, 
centralized (but also widespread and intrusive in the periphery), and 
controlled by the Ministry of the Corporations.  
The first director of the INFPS was Giuseppe Bottai, former 
Head of the Ministry of the Corporations and theorist behind the 
Labour Charter. The subsequent legislation of the regime until 1943 
moved along the lines of this first reorganization. The INFAIL enlarged 
the range of industrial injury insurances, now compulsory for every 
industry and inclusive of compensation and healthcare assistance. The 
amount of the compensation was linked to the workers’ family units, 
relating social benefits with family policies; social insurances dwelt at 
the crossroad of demographic goals, policies of eugenic safeguard, 
effective modernization of public assistance and healthcare and the 
expansion of the State.146 Similarly, alongside the classic risk categories 
– disability, old age, illness, unemployment, maternity –  and the war 
pensions, the regime established two new categories: marriage and 
birth.  
The Fascist measures moved toward a “solidarity” coverage, 
albeit primarily addressed to indigent, poor mothers, orphans. They 
were not, anyway, expression of any recognition of the social rights. 
The regime rather regimented the “social question” trough the creation 
of State-owned authorities; the rationalization and unification of the 
insurances was the consequence of the aim for strengthening its 
political basis. The creation of these bodies created consensus and 
distributed social benefits according to the loyalty of administrative 
bodies and working categories. No wonder then, a very high 
occupational fragmentation of social benefits characterized the Italian 
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social protection.147 Overall, the regime guided the Italian transition 
from the residual social insurances to the compulsory public schemes, 
managed by Fascist central authorities.  
Fascist social policy changed over time according to different 
orientations, although always under the smoke-screen of the 
“corporatist revolution”. The shift occurred in the years 1929-32; from 
the liberal setting of the beginnings, the regime implemented wide-
ranging socio-economic policies. The system of public authorities 
gathered different social and economic interests, waged political 
consensus and became a tool for implementing State-directed economy. 
The historian Chiara Giorgi wrote that «in the new reality of that time 
characterized by innovative forms of State interventionism in the 
economic processes, the Infps will become one of the most important 
auxiliary authorities of the Treasury, other than a fundamental 
provider of investments to fund public enterprises.»148 The peculiar 
trait of the Italian social policy in the Thirties was the intermingling 
between social and economic policies. However, during that decade 
other countries, like the United States, Sweden, or Nazi Germany, 
arrived at similar solutions. Yet, the effective legislation implemented 
by the Fascist regime went beyond those put up in Great Britain and 
especially France. The awareness of the achievement made by the 
regime in this field resurfaced as propagandistic mottos in the eve of its 
dissolution in 1942. 
 
1.3. The State and the crisis: corporatism, planning, collectivism, and 
Keynesianism on the verge of the war 
 
The development of social insurances in the interwar years was 
incremental; previous schemes expanded for the recipients, the benefits 
and the risk categories. According to each national situation, certain 
insurances improved more than others. Italy and France rearranged 
their compulsory schemes; to some extent, the Italian and French 
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reforms were more organic, while Britain mostly passed emergency 
legislation coping with mass unemployment. The two continental 
countries, which had a leeway to make-up, passed important and 
comprehensive legislative reforms, which constituted the foundations 
for further improvements. In turn, France and Italy did not reconsider 
the occupational/mutualist setting of the social insurances, with relative 
few room left for State’s financial commitment. In Britain, instead, the 
need to patch the loss of incomes caused by high unemployment led to 
rethink the parameters to enjoy social benefits. Some elements of 
universalism were present, especially for the old-age pensions and the 
unemployment benefits, even if still directed to specific lower-income 
or risk categories. The issue of the citizenship-based social rights was 
not addressed in a coherent way, as during and after WWII.  [TAB.3] 
Overall, the social schemes converged toward centralization 
and administrative coherence. Bone of contention in the Thirties was 
the ways of dealing with the collapse of free market paradigms. In 
Western Europe two main directions were at stake: different forms of 
planning and corporatism. Eventually, both these ideas fell into the 
category of the “third way” between Soviet collectivism and laissez-faire 
capitalism. 
 
The “corporatist myth” in Fascist Italy during the Great Depression 
 In Italy, the regime claimed to have solved the contradictions of 
capitalism with new forms of social organization. In his discourses to 
the trade unions, Mussolini remarked that corporative collaboration 
took over the class struggle.149 This was the official stance of the regime, 
which actually hid the harsh and thorough confrontation of the 
different trends within Fascism. The settlement of the social strife for 
the “supreme interest of the nation” was the classical formulation of the 
philosopher Giovanni Gentile and the jurist Alfredo Rocco, who also 
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TAB.3 Reforms of the social insurances in Great Britain, France and Italy, and funding mechanisms (1919-1939) 
 Legislation/Government Policy Area 
Great 
Britain 
Widows’, Orphans’, and Old-Age Contributory 
Pensions Act, 1925/Conservatives 
Unemployment Insurance Act, 
1920/Conservatives 
Unemployment Act, 1934/National Government 
First public contributory pensions scheme, funded 
by workers and employers 
 
Extensions of working categories; dole system 
funded by workers and employers 
Creation of UAB (non-contributory 
unemployment assistance); extension of 
contributory benefits 
France Loi du 5 avril 1928 /National Government 
(amended with the Loi du 30 avril 1930/Radical 
Party) 
Loi du 11 mars /Centre-Right 
 
Décret-loi du 29 juillet 1939 /Radical Party 
Loi du 20 juin 1936 /Front Populaire 
Compulsory insurances against invalidity, 
sickness, and old-age pensions to all the industrial 
workers; set up of the High Council of the Social 
Insurances 
Compulsory family allowances to all the 
industrial and trade salaried workers (two 
children or more) 
Extension of the family allowances to the whole 
active population 
Two weeks paid vacations extended to all the 
salaried workers  
Italy Decreto Legge 21 aprile 1919/Liberal Compulsory old-age pensions for all the salaried 
77 
 
Decreto Luogotenenziale 5 gennaio 1919/Liberal 
 
Regio Decreto Legge 23 marzo 1933/Fascism 
Regio Decreto Legge 27 marzo 1933/Fascism 
Regio Decreto Legge 4 ottobre 1935/Fascism 
 
workers  
Compulsory insurances against unemployment 
for farm/industrial salaried workers and 
employees 
Unification of the funds against industrial injuries 
under the INFAIL 
Coordination of all the compulsory insurances 
under the INFPS 
Social insurances became a State duty; the 
insurance contract is automatic as the social 
benefits 
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passed the anti-union legislation.150Both carried out a comprehensive 
critique of the doctrines centered on the class struggle: Liberalism and 
Marxism. The Fascist State was corporative as the different socialbodies 
and interests found their representativeness, regulated by the 
government.151 
Minister Bottai stated that the Labour Charter, by overcoming 
collectivism and individualism, showed to the “plutocratic” countries 
that «employers and workers […] can make united front without being 
submitted to the spiteful democratic tradition.»152 Bottai justified 
corporatism by the collapse of the liberal State in its historical forms. 
He was committed to the administrative and intellectual deepening of 
corporatist theories; he created the Scuola di Perfezionamento di Science 
Corporative, which had an important role in the formation of the 
technocratic elite.153 The “institutional” positions caged the most 
revolutionary trends within the Fascist trade unionism. These were still 
alive and inspired to varying degrees the coeval para-fascist 
movements in Europe.154 The “left-wing” Fascist Ugo Spirito supported 
the creation of a State of producers, through the “owner corporatism”, 
that is, the shareholding by all the producers in each enterprise.155 His 
ideas were minority during the Ventennio, but returned with the 
collapse of the regime in 1943; assimilated to the so called “Fascist left-
wing”, they had a role in the last Fascist programmes.  
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The spreading of corporatism – emphasized by the Fascist 
propaganda – could be correlated with the harshening of the economic 
crisis. Fascism adopted a thorough policy which included corporate 
and banks bailouts, creation of industrial cartels and trusts, 
protectionism, State intervention to save private enterprises; these 
measures helped to control the prices and to regulate industrial 
investments. Policies of wage squeeze, instead, were eased by the 
corporatist structures. Statistical arrangements allowed the regime to 
adjust the figures on unemployment, which in reality was stable 
around 15%. The study of the Fascist economic policies before and 
during the Great Depression is out of the scope of this thesis. At all 
events, they had different stages; initially, in accordance with some 
liberal goals, they emphasized productivism, while in the Thirties the 
regime put in place policies for industrial recovery and modernization. 
The regime seized the opportunity to regulate industrial and economic 
life, and to confront the “plutocratic” capitalist powers.156  
Corporatism was perceived by various milieus, both in Italy 
and abroad, as being the most viable solution to recover from the crisis 
and reorganize the industrial relations. Fascism tried to boost this idea 
through direct propaganda and the promotion of cultural initiatives.157 
The Convegno italo-francese di studi corporativi, held in Rome in 1935, was 
a good example of it. The meeting was organized by the Istituto Fascista 
di Cultura, which promoted Fascist ideology in Italy and abroad, and 
had Bottai and Hubert Lagardelle as political sponsors. The meeting 
gathered some of the most relevant Fascist intellectuals such as Spirito 
and Bottai, with former revolutionary unionists, Edmondo Rossoni and 
Luigi Razza, and representatives of the Fascist industrial trade unions. 
On the French side, participated exponents of the non conformistes and 
critical sectors of the trade unionism, with less relevance for the 
traditional right-wings. The most consistent group adhered to the 
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movements Ordre Nouveau, Homme Nouveau and Esprit; Paul Marion, 
George Roditi, Emmanuel Mounier, and Gaston Bergery were some of 
the delegates. Also representatives of XXeme Siècle and Homme Réel 
were invited. The debates did not untangle the main issues of 
corporatism and from the Italian point of view the meeting failed its 
goals. Nonetheless, it allowed the French non conformistes to deepen the 
study of corporatism in the context of the crisis of French republican 
institutions in the Thirties.158 The meeting was one of the most relevant 
attempts by Fascists to promote corporatism and to provide cultural 
sophistication to it, just the year after the introduction of the 
corporations by law.  
After 1935, however, the intellectual debate lost momentum. In 
Italy, corporatism became an administrative and bureaucratic matter. 
The historiographic debate on Italian corporatism distinguished 
between the “ideological” corporatism supported by Fascism, which 
refers to a specific historical context, and the broader European trend 
that involved employment relations, representative bodies, decision-
making structures.159 According to historian Rolf Petri “corporatism” as 
set of institutions, practices, legislation went beyond the Fascist 
ideological scope. Fascism reluctantly opted for corporatism, and later 
autarchy, only in the 1930s. The corporative organization and the 
autarchic policies grounded on the neo-classical theory and their 
cultural background dated back to Neo-mercantilism and liberal 
protectionism.160 In Petri’s interpretation, the theoretical bases of 
“Corporatism” should not be retraced in a specific ideology, but rather 
in a set of practices of socio-economic mediation and inclusion of 
private business within the decision-making processes.  
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The Fascist “formal corporatism” did not achieve its declared 
goals: corporatism did not solve the class struggle nor overhauled the 
conflict of the different vested interests. The “substantial corporatism”, 
instead, pre-existed and survived to the Fascist wave.161 Corporative 
tools to settle social strife and to harmonize the productive and 
economic factors were enacted: collective agreements, public 
authorities, the cartels, the study institutions and committees, the price 
regulations and production, social protection matters. In this sense, 
some of the Fascist corporative institutions and methods, e.g. the Enti 
Pubblici and the collective agreements, survived to the regime. They 
contributed to the Italian economic modernization, arguably because 
they were, in reality, normative tools of interest intermediation, related 
to the reorganization of functional interests in industrial societies: 
«rightly, Schmitter’s distinction of a state corporatism from the rising 
postwar societal corporatism, refers mostly to the highly differentiated, 
but equally efficient, integration of the enterprises and social 
organizations in the economic decision-makings. Precisely because the 
Fascist Corporatism did not overcome the opposite and conflicting 
interests, as required by its “integralist” representatives, it eventually 
revealed to be a specific form of the Neo-corporatist practices, enacted 
in many 20th century mass societies.»162 
 At that time, however, corporatism served to the Fascist anti-
“demo-plutocratic” propaganda, which confusingly equalized 
corporatism and social policy. In reality, the corporatist system 
concerned the organization of the labour market, the prices and the 
production, while social insurances were somehow disengaged by the 
corporations and their management was controlled by State-owned 
authorities. The Fascists tended to superimpose corporatism and social 
legislation; since the very beginning, they identified corporatism with 
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the “social functions” of the State to secure social justice.163 In Fascist 
propaganda, the social legislation was a crucial part of the Fascist 
revolution in the «construction of the “new order” […] in function of 
the power of the Fascist idea, which is the idea of social justice, civil 
solidarity, and national unity.»164 Social policy encompassed social 
insurances and corporatism, as ratified by the Labour Chamber, and as 
exemplified by the political career of Bottai, supporter of corporatism, 
Minister of the Corporations from 1929 to 1932, and first President of 
INFPS until 1935. Corporatism was the crowbar of the social 
propaganda, to gain consensus at home and to promote the Fascism 
abroad, in the year of crisis. 
 
France: economic orthodoxy and “non conformist” debates 
Corporatist thought had a rather long history in France.165 This 
theory wasshared by reactionary Catholics and nationalists, as well as 
by some strands of the revolutionary unionism; La Tour du Pin or 
Charles Maurras belonged to the former, while Lagardelle, Gustav 
Hervé, Georges Valois to the latter. These theorizations dated back to 
pre-1914, but got new blood in the interwar period; Historian Zeev 
Sternhell argued that sectors of the French political culture close to 
Sorel’s revolutionary unionism borrowed from nationalism some 
theoretical elements, coming to a new theoretical synthesis.166 
According to him, Fascism was born in France even before WWI, 
merging Socialism and Nationalism; the Italian model represented the 
statehood achievement two decades later. In reality, there is no direct 
correlation between Fascist corporatism and the French debate in the 
1930s. Essays, revues and pamphlets backing corporatism flourished 
around the Twenties and the Thirties; many of them had little 
originality, but all showed a “French background” and a very limited 
influence from the coeval Italian experiments in that field.167 
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In the Thirties the corporatist theories coexisted with other 
modernizing trends, usually gathered around the French label of les 
non conformistes des Années 30, which encompassed different groups, 
intellectuals and political orientations, which shared some common 
characteristics.168 They gravitated around revues like the 
abovementioned Ordre Nouveau, Homme Nouveau and Esprit. But some 
walk-outs of the far right could be assimilated to this intellectual vague, 
as well as the research group X-Crise. These latter were for the main 
part young technocrats of the Ecole Polytechnique and had high 
economic, technical and administrative preparation. They were an elite 
that claimed for State-driven family, pronatalist and welfare policies; a 
break with the worn-out Republican institutions; economic planning; 
anti-communism and some “national revolutionary” aspirations. This 
did not imply any sympathy for Fascism, as journals like Esprit 
campaigned for “moral” revolutions, alternative to Fascism in their 
arguments against Liberalism and Bolshevism.169  
They generally had an eclectic interest for the foreign and 
transatlantic coeval experiences.170 Groups like X-Crise were keen of the 
policies and theories, including the Soviet plans and corporatism.171 
This modernizing vague eventually penetrated the governmental 
machinery. Already by the end of the Thirties some personalities close 
to the non conformistes were public functionaries; some of them adhered 
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to Vichy but a good part joined the Resistance. Their planning-centered 
policies might affect post-war planning with the theoretical and 
political background of the Thirties. An illustrative case was Pierre 
Laroque, social reformer and civil servant in the 1930s and the 1940s; he 
initially collaborated with Vichy government to join Free France in 
London and eventually became the founding father of the French 
sécurité sociale after the war.172   
A third consistent trend in the French debate in the 1930s was 
planisme, which eventually converged to some technocratic solutions, 
but originally came out of the revisionist socialists. Directly influenced 
by the Secretary of the Parti Ouvrier Belge, Henri De Man, relevant 
sectors of the French Socialist Party (SFIO) and of the CGT, pushed for 
the adoption of planisme in the official programme of socialist 
organizations.173 These groups were the néo-socialistes of Marcel Déat, 
and the trends Syndicats ! of the Secretary of the CGT Réné Belin, both 
anti-Communists.174 They joined later the Vichy regime. The supporters 
of planisme harked back to wartime “socialist” planning, where the 
State managed a mixed economy, under the democratic supervision of 
producers’ representative bodies. The planning was presented as a 
“third way”, alternative to Communism and reformism. Planisme 
sought to overcome Marxism and to retain democratic institutions. It 
criticized therefore the reformists, who were not able to contrast 
Bolshevism and Fascism. Even if the main part of the néo-socialistes 
eventually joined fascism (and the same did De Man), planisme was 
originally meant to bring the socialists and the democracies out of the 
political and cultural paralysis of in front of the rise of fascism in 
Europe. 
The background of all these movements was the crisis of the 
French III Republic. France was the last country to be affected by the 
crisis, but – unlike the others – could not recover until the aftermath of 
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the war. In certain economic indicators France diverged from the 
American and British trends; unemployment, for instance, became one 
of the major issues only during WWII, and especially after the defeat.  
The causes of the long recovery of France are controversial, but 
deflationary policies, the stubborn refusal to devaluate, indirect 
taxation in place of more consistent income taxes, the protectionist 
policies, and the persistence of Malthusian mentalities within the elites 
contributed to prevent economic recovery in the Thirties.175 The 
outdated orthodoxy matched the overall backwardness of industrial 
apparatus, in front of an harsh politics of cut spending that 
encompassed public pensions and even the military, in absence of 
wide-ranging plans of rearmament as the British and German ones.176  
The Thirties were also dominated by political instability. 
Eleven governments succeeded between 1932 and 1936; they did not 
have coherent foreign policies in front of Nazi Germany and, at home, 
facing the rise of the far-right. The social and political strife culminated 
in the facts of 6th February 1934, when the Fascist leagues clashed 
against the police in front of the Parliament.177 As a consequence, the 
French lefts reorganized in the Popular Front, which won the elections 
in 1936 with promises of social and democratic progresses operating a 
U-turn with previous policies. The first government of Léon Blum 
introduced social and economic reforms: collective agreements, labour 
legislation, price and wages policies, paid leaves, reductions of the 
weekly working hours. It passed also a first vague of nationalizations, 
authorities to support the agricultural sector, the control of the financial 
operations and budgetary measures for macro-economic 
stabilization.178 All these actions did not prevent the drop in production 
and consumption, the need to devaluate and the rising unemployment. 
The weakening of popular support and the liberal-conservative 
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opposition marked the return of Edouard Daladier at the government 
and the backlash in the social and economic reforms. 
The Thirties in France were a hive of intellectual debate; from 
corporatism to dirigisme and planning, different solutions were 
supposed to address the crisis of the French institutions and economy. 
Corporatists harked back to the anti-Republican traditions of the 
Catholic and nationalist far-right. Planners had a modernizing 
programme, not necessarily anti-democratic, but sharing with the 
corporatists the mistrust for the laissez-faire capitalism and for the 
inefficiencies of the Republican democracy. These two groups 
eventually confronted for the hegemony during the Vichy experience, 
as they were factually lumped together by a negative outlook of Third 
Republic’s moral and political collapse.  
 
Britain: the Keynesian revolution in the making? 
 The identification between “corporatism” and “Fascism” was 
purposely propagandized by the Fascists. In reality, the keen interest 
for forms of industrial collaboration in Britain did not imply neither the 
adoption of “corporatism”, as socio-economic practice, nor the 
adherence “Fascism”, as political ideology. Corporatism was 
historically stranger to Anglo-Saxon economic culture. The fewer 
groups that studied Italian corporations, were not interested in them as 
a specific product of Fascism, but rather as a doable way to achieve 
social concord in national life.179 As for the Fascist ideology, it only 
inspired Edward Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. This movement 
never gained a wide public support, and also the pretended sympathy 
of Anglo-Saxon ruling classes for the Fascist regime has probably been 
overestimated.180  
From the mid-‘30s were rather the Nazi socio-economic policies to 
constitute a potential danger.181 The lack of interest in the Italian 
                                                          
179 L.P. Carpenter, «Corporatism in Britain, 1930-45», Journal of Contemporary History, 
1/1976, pp. 3-25. 
180 M. Palla, Fascismo e stato corporativo. Un’inchiesta della diplomazia britannica, Milano, 
Franco Angeli, 1992, pp. 117-8. 
181 N. Götz, K. K. Patel, «Facing the Fascist Model: Discourse and the Construction of 
Labour Service in the USA and Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s», Journal of Contemporary 
87 
 
corporatism was probably also due to the poor knowledge of the very 
conditions in the country, even if the Italian Embassy in London 
reported that – between 1929 and 1931 – in Britain arose a certain 
interest for some of the assistance and social institutions of Fascist 
Italy.182  However, the studies on Fascist Italy were rather sporadic and 
had limited follow-up. A keener interest rather concerned the Soviet 
model. This was the case of the Webbs’ enthusiasm for Soviet 
Communism: 
 
«In 1933, when settling the title of the book-to-be, we chose 
“Soviet Communism” to express our purpose of describing 
the actual organization of the USSR. Before publication, in 
1935, we added the query, “A New Civilization?”. What we 
have learnt of the developments during 1936-1937 has 
persuaded us to withdraw the interrogation mark. We see 
non sign in the USSR of any weakening on the stern 
prohibition of private profit-making; […] Moreover, fifteen 
years’ experience of three successive Five-Year Plans has 
demonstrated the practicability of what the western world 
declared to be beyond human capacity, namely, the advance 
planning of the wealth production and the cultural activities 
of an immense population.»183 
 
 The Webbs represented the “collectivist” trend within the 
Fabian movement and their interest for the Russian experience 
grounded on the acknowledgement of «the economic discovery 
that the substitution, for profit-making manufacturing, of planned 
production for community consumption frees the nation […] from 
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the hitherto incessant social malady of involuntary mass 
unemployment.»184  
The temporary infatuation of Labour Party with planning 
was however due to Cole, who supported socialization of 
industries and property.185 This stance was part of a wider debate 
on “planning policies” and management of economy, which 
overcame the socialists. Unlike the French planners, these groups 
pushed forward for economic and political reforms within the 
capitalist system. This was the case of the Political and Economic 
Planning (PEP), which had an important role as research institute 
after the war or of the New Five Years, which claimed for 
progressive planning to reconcile the different national interests.  
Their cultural background differed from the French non 
conformistes, but they equally were in favor of State’s takeover of 
some functions of the free market. The pro-planning ferment of 
British “centrist” milieu was rather heterogeneous, and the 
“myth” of the economic plan progressively declined. Nonetheless, 
it paved the way to State’s interventions, such as in housing 
policy. The governmental committees appointed before and 
during the war, and the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act might 
owe something to this debate.186 The demand-side oriented 
programs for social housing combined demand-side policies, 
urban decongestion and social enhancement.187 After 1936, 
Keynesian solutions covered the lion’s share in public debate and 
many former “planners” moved into Keynesianism, even if this 
was something theoretically and practically different from the 
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planning as prefigured in the 1930s. The Keynesian agenda 
proved to be a tool to settle differences and establish consensus, 
providing «an early indication of the role played by Keynesian 
economics in national politics during and after the war.»188 
 Mass unemployment decisively affected the debate in this 
sense. The government was called upon to directly assume 
responsibility of more structured economic policies, besides social 
benefits.189 Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money was the outcome of a long reflection on monetary and 
ideological limits of the classical theory, started with the 1919 
pamphlet The Economic Consequence of the Peace.190 In his 
masterpiece, Keynes turned the linchpins of the classical theories 
upside-down. He challenged the vision of the self-regulating 
capitalism, which proved to tend to underemployment and 
underinvestment. Once assumed the many fails of the free market, 
the revolutionary part of his theory consisted in the renewed role 
of the State to boost the effective demands, which otherwise might 
fall even more. The General Theory was not a political agenda, but 
rather an analysis of the structural problems of the British 
economy and a gesture of how the contingent problems of 
capitalism could be solved with a radical “paradigm shift”.  
More detailed policies were the outcome of this new 
approach; the State could help to “multiply” the incomes available 
for consumption, investment and employment. The means to 
achieve this result were public works, redistribution of income 
and public expenditure, even at the expenses of deficit spending 
and increase of public debt, which, in a time of crisis was a tool to 
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recover. Just after the publication of the General Theory, Keynes 
committed himself to the divulgation of his theory, which he 
himself considered revolutionary in many regards.191 He run up 
against the Treasury, which entrenched in orthodox positions. The 
Treasury denied the possibility that fiscal policy could affect the 
effective demand and boost economic activities and employment. 
Keynes advocated a change of course in British economic policy. It 
has been argued that most of his writings might be understood in 
the light of the effort to convince the Treasury to abandon its 
stance.192 The “Treasury View” was gradually undermined by 
events, as one by one all the bulwarks of orthodoxy weakened: 
gold standard and free trade collapsed in 1931, while the 1932-6 
unemployment schemes demanded state borrowing and the 
rearmament from 1937 was achieved by an increase in taxation.  
On the other side, Keynes’ ideas spread among the 
economists and the opinion. Many scholars and economists – 
labeled under the name of “Keynesians” – borrowed elements and 
ideas from Keynes’ General Theory, also distorting some of his 
assumptions.193 Beveridge himself initially opposed to Keynesian 
theories on unemployment. Even if he was transitioning to more 
critical positions with regard to free market and the classical 
liberal assumption, he criticized the General Theory as «a work that 
seemed to challenge many of his most cherished beliefs about 
both the nature of social science and the direction of public policy. 
In general he took strong objection to Keynes’ reliance on 
deductive reasoning and to his reduction of economic concepts to 
a high level of abstraction.»194 Keynes’ theories split the British 
academic world, and Beveridge only partially received them. 
Their divergences were ironed out during the war, thanks to the 
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common effort to have their proposals adopted by the 
government.195 
 
The economic policies in the Thirties between conjuncture and intellectual 
change 
 In the Thirties, a broad debate crossed Western countries on the 
methods to respond to the crisis of laissez-faire capitalism, without 
falling into the Soviet collectivism. The Great Depression and its 
aftermaths challenged the political legitimization in France and Britain; 
the aim was to integrate the working masses within the economic and 
productive processes, resolving the class struggle in favor of the 
stabilization of capitalism.196 The Italian regime’s source of 
legitimization at home and in the international arena tapped into the 
uncertainties that spread in Western Europe. 
From 1933 on, Fascists devoted their propaganda to identify 
“Fascism” with “corporatism”. This narrative was just in time to prove 
that Italian industrial policies offered a solution for the crisis of liberal 
capitalism.197 The Fascist “revolutionary” ambitions had very little 
success abroad and among popular masses. The European reactionary 
and para-fascist movements captured the coercive aspects of the 
corporative experience, that is, the authoritarian regulation of the class 
struggle, which was the effective dynamic set in motion by the Fascist 
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regime.198 While British ruling classes proved to disregard Italian 
corporatism, in France it had many supporters, at least until 1935-6. 
Except for Georges Valois’ Faisceau des combattants et de producteurs and 
for Jacques Doriot’s endorsement of the Fascist corporative model in 
Italy, there was no necessarily identification between corporatism and 
Fascism.199 The non conformistes received the Italian experiment merely 
as the effort to overcome laissez-faire, individualism and the class 
struggle through new forms of social organization and economic 
regulations.  
Louis Franck, a French contemporary observer of corporatism 
in Italy, criticized the general lack of knowledge of its real mechanisms. 
He concluded that the regime only restated older protectionist 
principles, made even unfairer after the crush of the workers’ 
organizations; Fascism eventually solved the class struggle in support 
of industrialists.200 These became an oligarchy within the corporatist 
institutions, while the interests of the industrial organizations 
intermingled with those of the party and the bureaucracies. From his 
pages emerged the concern of good part of the French left-wing, 
squeezed between domestic crisis and the rise of the Nazi Germany. In 
the political and economic uncertainties of that time, some intellectual 
and politicians – in the socialist area – started to wonder «if Fascism 
was the Western form of socialism, and the Bolshevism the Eastern 
form.»201  
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The equation between “Fascism” and “corporatism” should be 
revisited beyond political and historical commonplaces. The witnesses 
of the former Fascists – usually coming from the “revolutionary” wings 
– tried to portray the interpretation of a half-finished revolution, while 
historiography borrowed stereotypical views of Fascism as a 
“propaganda bluff”, of which Franck’s constituted one of the main 
references. In fact, the regime opted for emergency measures, which 
later became structural. In that regard, is commendable the opinion of 
historian Gianpasquale Santomassimo: «the choice made, beyond the 
rhetorical smokescreen, was in fact the mixed economy. […] the 
corporative framework was not the central element, and the solution 
adopted in Italy did not differ, in its broad lines, from those of the other 
“capitalist” economies. In addition, it worth notice the return of 
substantial hegemony of the liberal economic thought, and the 
withdrawal of corporative doctrines, not quantitatively, but in the 
effective capacity to have an impact and to propose solutions and 
perspectives. It is as if, once passed the corporations, the whole 
ideological construction started to creak, to survive as mere rhetoric 
and propaganda.»202 The same dynamic applied for the social 
insurances, where the ideological discourse of the regime masked the 
substantial convergence towards the other European trends.  
 By the end of the Thirties, forms of State intervention where 
shared by different political systems. Even France abandoned the 
orthodox approach with the Popular Front; the nationalizations of 
strategic sectors, the creation of the State railways and a stricter control 
over the Bank of France were followed by a programme of public 
spending for the rearmament, especially after 1936. Given the previous 
outflow of private capitals, to manage this programme the government 
had to plan the industrial production in heavy sectors, the funding 
with public capitals and the regulation of the industrial relations. 
According to historian Robert Frankenstein, the rearmament had a 
fundamental role in the further development of French policies, as «it 
was at once the best forerunner and the foundation to the current 
interventionism which broadly developed in civilian sector after the 
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Second World War.»203 The effort for the rearmament compelled the 
government to partially rethink budgetary policies; the Head of 
Cabinet George Boris and the State Secretary Pierre Mendès-France 
proposed to fund it in deficit spending. This policy could questionably 
be defined “Keynesian” and had not carryover; it had mostly 
circumstantial reasons, and the Parliament rejected the bill.204 But it was 
the first attempt to introduce in French public policies more consistent 
planning. The plan for the rearmament confirmed the statement of the 
historian Eugen Weber, according to whom there was «continuity 
between the planning of State-driven economy, which paved the way 
to the triumphant success of the commissariat au plan of the 4th Republic, 
as well as to the collaboration between State and industry, which 
inspired the hierarchs of Vichy and the leaders of the economic miracle 
of the post-war.»205 Mendés-France, for instance, was one of the key 
figures in the economic modernization of France through planning, 
while at the eve of the war the theories of the planners were gradually 
shifting from the intellectual debate to the governmental policies.  
 Similar process occurred in Britain. The plans for the 
rearmament introduced economic policies that were not officially 
accepted in the governmental circles yet. Unlike France, however, the 
thorough debate on planning had a more solid background. Webbs’ 
fascination for Soviet collectivism was surely not shared by Keynes; 
however, after a travel to Russia, he also caught the inherent nature of 
the Soviet experiment, at the crossroad between «missionary religion 
and experimental economic technique.»206 Keynes did not regard 
Communism as an efficient economic system to address the 
contemporary issues of Western capitalism, but he positively assessed 
the ideological shift impressed by the Soviet Revolution. It was a 
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counterexample to the lack of idealistic goals that affected capitalism: 
«a revolution in our ways of thinking and feeling about money may 
become the growing purpose of contemporary embodiments of the 
ideal. Perhaps, therefore, Russian Communism does represent the first 
confused stirrings of a great religion.»207 This evaluation was 
accompanied by the feeling that the older theoretical paradigms were 
outdated:  
 
«Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general 
principles upon which, from time to time, laissez-faire has 
been founded. It is not true that individuals possess a 
prescriptive “natural liberty” in their economic activities. 
There is no “compact” conferring perpetual rights on those 
who Have or on those who Acquire. The world is not so 
governed from above that private and social interest always 
coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they 
coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the principles of 
economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in 
the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is 
enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to 
promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to 
attain even these. Experience does not show that individuals, 
when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-
sighted than when they act separately.»208 
 
 The challenge of Keynesianism was not accepted initially by 
the government, which refused to open-up to budget policies. The first 
counter-cyclical public work policy was the rearmament programme, 
which from 1935 supported the pace of recovery and expansion of the 
heavy industries. While the Treasury was initially reluctant, the 
rearmament represented the more consistent Keynesian-like 
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programme of public works and multiplier of effective demand, 
boosted by government expenditure and borrowings.  
From 1933 to 1938 Britain spent approximatively 1,200 million 
pounds for the rearmament, less than half in comparison with the 
German military investments. The programme increased the 
production of the heavy industrial sectors (coal, iron and steel 
industries, engineering and shipbuilding), created employment (one 
million jobs per year), enabled some measure of “regional planning” of 
manpower allocation, and represented a wide-range programmes of 
rationalization in the allocation of resources.209 Other analyses 
challenged the effective impact of “Keynesian” multipliers, recognizing 
nonetheless the positive private sector’s response to a long-lasting 
programme of defence expenditure.210 Whether Keynesian or not, the 
rearmament created new governmental bodies to manage the industrial 
process, like the Ministry of Supply, after the failure of the 
collaboration between government and industries.211  
The gradual and reluctant transition to new ways to manage 
economy thanks to rearmament loan finance and expenditure did not 
imply, however, any conversion to “Keynesianism” in ideological 
terms. Treasury was increasingly attentive to the macro-economic 
impact of the fiscal policies, but only the war cut the Gordian knot of 
ideological resistances. On the one side, Britain managed public 
expenditure in such a scale that made necessary the adoption of tools 
that took into consideration the national-income accounts. On the other, 
the wartime climate favoured the agreement towards some Keynesian 
principles which overlooked the residual resistances in the parties and 
governmental administration.212  
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Everywhere the debates – especially in the non-governmental 
circles – focused on the necessity to elaborate new forms of State 
interventionism, and opened-up to various forms of “mixed economy”. 
This transition was neither linear nor immediate; British ruling class in 
the Thirties still refused to tackle unemployment through public works, 
relying on cash benefits rather than countercyclical policies.213 There is 
no agreement among economic historians on the factual 
implementation of Keynes’ public policies after 1941; some scholars 
even disputed the effective implementation of any “Keynesian 
revolution” in public policies.214 The same applied for France, where 
the return of the liberals in 1938 slowed further involvement of the 
State in social and economic affairs. The tripartite structures put in 
place by the Popular Front, the attempt to settle forms of regulation 
and redistribution and the nationalizations of the military sectors 
frightened the liberal establishment. However, these structures of 
consultations and the first macro-economic approaches were not 
withdrawn in the subsequent years.215 In Italy the economic policy was 
characterized by State intervention to rescue and finance the private 
sectors, and by the public control of industrial investments. This form 
of “mixed economy” accelerated the modernization of the industrial 
structures, in continuity with some productivism stances of the late 
Liberal era and laid the groundworks for further evolutions in the post-
war.216 
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 As for the social insurances, the compulsory schemes were 
present in all the major countries, residual in their benefits and 
coverages, with wider room for opt-out and voluntary insurances. The 
policy-makers did not handle the issue of the social reforms as a unity, 
but rather treated it as a conjunctural policy; this might be the example 
of the overwhelming importance given to unemployment benefits in 
Britain or their substantial neglecting in France. Social policy was not 
coordinated among the different policy areas yet, but was submitted to 
an incremental process in scope and financial burden, due to 
emergency reasons, as well as to the creation of public authorities and a 
wider audience of recipients of the social services. Gradually, social 
insurances anchored in State structures and policies. The convergences, 
by the end of the Thirties, dwelt on the strengthening of 
compulsory/voluntary social schemes, to set up central administrative 
structures and to overcome the older residual and liberal ideology.  
The adoption of “mixed economies” and strengthening of 
social insurances was not expected to be permanent in any of these 
three countries, even if there was a full debate on different ways to 
address the Great Depression. The rush towards the rearmaments 
involved all the major European countries, representing the testing 
ground for the mobilization and beyond. It committed the governments 
in public programmes and restored the industrial production. In 
Germany the arms industry circumscribed forms of “military 
Keynesianism”, and State’s stimuli on specific industrial sectors 
sustained the recovery and the growth.217 Later, in the midst of “total 
war” the ideological mobilization led the European countries to 
address for the first time the social protection as a whole, overlapping 
the past experiences with the wartime situation, and projecting the 
reformulation of the “new” social policy to a future of peace and 
prosperity after the war. 
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1.4. “Total war” and social change: effectiveness and limits of the 
interpretive category 
Theories and studies on “total war” and social change have 
been elaborated by political scientists, economists and historians.218 The 
Great War contributed to open a new historical phase in public policies; 
the States’ planning and regulatory capacities were largely expanded. 
Alongside political rights, also assistance measures, insurance schemes 
and labour legislation were addressed to soldiers, workers (men and 
women) and families. The outbreak of the Soviet Revolution in 1917 
impacted on post-war politics and society as well. WWII had an even 
wider impact on social insurances; other than the structural aspect, the 
conflict had “total” ideological features.219 No one was expecting that 
the post-war order would be similar to the pre-1939 era. For this 
reason, the wartime debate on social policy generated detailed plans for 
the reconstruction. 
“Total war” is a catch-all label that eventually escapes precise 
definitions. It indicates the mobilization of labour and industries, the 
magnitude of destruction and civilians’ involvement, the “totalizing” 
features of the war fought everywhere and with greater use of 
destructive technologies. In the formulations of its principal theorists, 
from Clausewitz to Ludendorff, “total war” was not limited to the 
armies, but required the participation of all political, productive and 
social forces of a belligerent country to ensure the “total” annihilation 
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of the enemy.220 These theorizations adapted the military strategies to 
the mass industrial societies, but did not serve to capture the link 
between war and social change throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.  
Conventionally, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Wars are regarded as having huge impact on political institutions and 
self-perceptions of the communities, prefiguring some of the dynamics 
of the 20th century world wars; the military universal conscription, for 
instance, changed the boundaries of the citizenship and the kind of 
relation between the individual and State.221 The label “total war”, 
however, was coined only later; more appropriately, it takes into due 
consideration the key factor of the industrial production. The 
percentage of the military production over the civilian one defines the 
magnitude of industrial mobilization, which has to be scaled to the 
different societies. For semi-industrial countries like Italy and the 
USSR, a high level of mobilization would have led to rationing and 
deprivations that hit the population to a major extent than Britain, 
Germany and the US. Mutually, the different productive potential 
among the powers in conflict resulted in different outcomes of the 
mobilization.222 The gap between the major industrial powers and the 
others was too wide to have similar results in the allocation of 
resources and aftermaths of the war. The overall impact of “total war” 
might be assessed by looking at the structural, political and 
psychological consequences on the society: the impact on industrial 
production and economic policies; the integration of the productive 
elements in the decision-making structures; the changes in the political 
culture and in the (self)perceptions of the societies; the capacity to 
overcome resistances to social and political reforms from vested 
interests. 
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The works of Alan Milward were pioneering because 
addressed warfare as economic policy, and the welfare state as indirect 
result of this process.223 He contributed to open up the perspective on 
the role of the war as “generator” of economic growth, trade 
integrations and technological improvement.224 Functionalist sociology 
also stressed the role of wartime forced mobilization of manpower and 
resources in levelling social differences. In the stratified industrial 
societies, different social statuses might represent a serious obstacle to 
wage the war, slowing down the pace of mobilization or leading to 
social unrest and desegregation of the internal front.225 Higher social 
cohesion and productive efficiency transited from war to peace, to 
become features of the post-war Western societies during the so-called 
“Golden Age”, as they responded to structural and political needs: 
 
«The total-war system attempted to unite all the people 
under the slogan of a common destiny as citizens of a single 
national community and to intervene against the momentum 
toward social exclusion and conflict that had been inherent in 
modern societies since their inception. The policy of 
“enforced homogeneity” was pursued under the 
extraordinary and irrational circumstance of war, but its 
implementation was not confined to such circumstances.»226 
 
 The functionalist approach regarded “total war” as the 
transitional moment in the reorganization of societal dynamics from 
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class conflict to integration. According to Talcott Parsons, the post-1945 
States were restructured as “system” and no longer as class-society, 
incorporating all their members and institutionalizing the conflict via 
multiple policies and functions.227 This shift occurred in the 
representation of the interests and in the political culture. The post-war 
British universalist social security dilute differences in the access to 
equal and uniform social protection and provided a new “social pact” 
between State and citizens. As a result, social welfare progressively 
became State policy. In Britain, which experienced a relative high 
degree of “total war” mobilization, this link was expressed in almost 
explicit terms; but the connection between social citizenship and 
welfare state would have progressively deployed as principle also on 
the Continent.  
The legacy and the myth of the “classless” society at war 
affected the British studies on welfare state, as good part of these 
analyses were made during the years of apparent “consensus”.228 
Sociologist Richard Titmuss elaborated the classical formulation on the 
direct link between “total war” and social improvement.229 The modern 
warfare redefined social policy both for the organizational machinery 
and for the aftermaths of the conflict on population; his take was 
decisively affected by the wartime narrative that boosted the self-
perception of a society fully mobilized for social progress:230 the 
Ministry of Health dealt with the evacuees, with the care for air-raid 
victims in the towns and with other assistance for the town dwellers; 
the Ministry of Pension provided non-contributory benefits for the 
civilian and military injured, survivors’ pensions, children’ allowances 
and the pensions for veterans; the National Assistance Board, the Board of 
Trade and the local authorities, traditionally in charge of the assistance 
tasks, faced massive claims for compensation for damage to land, 
building and personal chattels.  
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The British healthcare system underwent a process of 
centralization and nationalization, amalgamation and empowering of 
the health services, planning, modernization and research, promotion 
of health education, public prevention measures, nutrition policies and 
the free treatment for evacuated, also becoming employment sector. 
The Emergency Hospitals Service was the forerunner, in the service and 
in the “spirit”, to the post-war NHS. The Assistance Board was charged 
of the new schemes for the prevention and relief of distress caused by 
the war, including «all kinds of persons who had never before been in 
need of State help».231 The social assistance overlapped functions of the 
social insurances, as for injury and supplementary pensions. War 
broadened the categories of recipients of public benefits and grants, 
and led to greater national unity, as exemplified by the agreement on 
the abolition of the means tests. Lastly, the wartime productive 
conditions affected directly the manpower. Its strong militarization 
entailed some provisions to guarantee facilities and services for the 
workers. The unions were also involved in co-joint committees to 
bargain welfare measures in the workplace.  
All these modifications were expected to be structural.232 The 
setting up of a Ministry for the Reconstruction established a road map 
for the wider-ranging reforms, which went beyond the “inherent” 
changes brought about by the war: 
 
«All this is essential war service. Finding hostels, for 
evacuees, starting mothers’ clubs, feeding the homeless – 
these and similar activities are parts of the nation’s effort to 
win the war. They shelter and comfort those who are 
bombed out; they play a part in preserving morale. But they 
are more than that. The social services of Britain at war are at 
the same time part of the reconstruction of Britain after the 
war is won. Evacuation is only one of the great social 
experiments from which we are learning practical lessons for 
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the future. Steps have been taken since the war began which 
go very far indeed towards establishing a national minimum 
standard of well being for all.»233 
 
 Titmuss probably projected the consensus of the Butskellism 
over wartime Britain.234 The idea of the 1940-1 people’s war and 
“classless” society has been disputed by historiography, which 
challenged both the extent of wartime consensus and Titmuss’ 
interpretation.235 More recently, historian David Edgerton criticized the 
dichotomy between “British liberal welfare state” and “Nazi 
totalitarian warfare state”. In reality, the main feature of British 
mobilization was a “liberal militarism” opposed to “Prussian 
militarism”; the two kinds of warfare only differed for the strategy to 
annihilate the enemy. According to Edgerton, the overall level of social 
services dramatically collapsed during wartime; the social expenditure 
did not reach the levels of the 1930s until the early 1950s.236 His 
interpretation provides some challenging insights regarding the 
interpenetration of the models of warfare/welfare in the years 1939-45; 
the “malleable” boundaries between the two sides in conflict concerned 
also social policy. 
A wider comparative view seems to confirm, however, that 20th 
century wars drove socio-political reforms. Arthur Marwick provided a 
systematic pattern of the tie between war and social change in the 20th 
century, grounded on four moments of transition: the war as material 
and institutional destruction; the war as test of the existing practices 
and “paradigms”; the war as social enhancement for the lower classes; 
the cultural and psychological impact of the war on the communities.237 
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Marwick did not necessarily identified “social change” with welfare 
state, but with deeper transformations that concerned different fields: 
the underprivileged social groups; the revolution; the culture. As for 
Milward’s studies on the economy of WWII, Marwick’s parameters 
paved the way to the historiographic debate. The impact of wars on 
State institutions and social actors has proven undeniable, even if «it is 
also necessary to place wartime change and development within the 
context of long-term social trends, which often suggest evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary change during the course of the longer 
period. [...] Total war could not fail to generate some change through its 
sheer scale, but it is important to judge how far changes survived the 
immediate postwar situation that generated them and, indeed how far 
such changes would have occurred in any case.»238 The monographic 
studies problematized these theoretical assumptions, reducing the 
general trends to the national specificities and providing documentary 
evidence of the changes brought about by the war.  
The Great War has been widely investigated, in comparative 
perspective and with a focus on single national cases.239 Historian 
Procacci studied the reconfiguration of the relations between State and 
society in Italy, the changes in administrative practices and industrial 
relations. The rights of citizenship were ambiguously granted to 
soldiers and workers during and after the war, with a trade-off 
between social control and social assistance/protection.240 Even before 
Fascism, the attempts at reforming the social legislation after 1918 were 
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driven by the war, as for the studies of the Royal Commission Rava, 
which was charged of the reassessment of the social insurance just after 
the end of the war.241 These studies suggest a causal relation between 
war and social enhancement, and a path dependence in the social 
reforms, which crossed each nation. After the Great War, indeed, the 
regulation of the class struggle was not only on the political agenda of 
Fascism. It was a central issue in all the major industrial countries, and 
concerned conservatives and left-wing; the formers were afraid of the 
rise of unemployment and its social aftermaths, while the latter hoped 
that the reconstruction could have brought about social 
enhancement.242  
Recent approaches are attentive of these transnational relations 
and transfers.243 According to historian Akira Iriye, «transnational 
history perspective enriches our understanding of a more traditional 
subject like war. Indeed, the study of the war will never be the same 
now that transnational history has made its inroad even into such a 
geopolitical subject.»244 War is not merely a governmental activity, but a 
transnational phenomenon by definition. Military and civilian 
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mobilizations, industries and technologies, pacifism, assistance are 
transnational phenomena that escape national boundaries and 
governmental controls.245 The works on the emergence of supranational 
humanitarianism and international associations at the end of WWI 
fruitfully combined the study of the relations between mass wars and 
the emergence of “social policy”.246 The idea of “human rights” 
wormed its way after the Great War and their “exploitation” 
strengthened the political position of the winners.247 International aid 
accompanied the aim of reshaping post-war international relations an 
ideas. These two “dimensions” of social policies, between solidarity 
and power politics, constituted a pattern after WWII; the intermingling 
between domestic social security and international settlement was even 
more organic and articulated after 1945.  
The transnational approach puzzles the historical processes 
and digs out the interrelations of the factors at the foundation of social 
protection. Recent works study the public policies during the interwar 
years with a focus on supranational transfers.248 This does not 
necessarily mean that policy-makers merely borrowed ideas or policies 
from abroad, nor that models were “shared” between different political 
systems. But trans-European and trans-Atlantic networks existed and 
they did not involve only governmental policies, but also cultural 
circles (academics and civil servants), political and social groups, 
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transnational organizations.249 The first wave of globalization did not 
withdraw in the interwar period; flow of policies and practices even 
intensified in the Thirties, to be institutionalized after the war. The new 
researches frame social policies in a wider space of circulations, which 
also include the Nazi and Fascist social models. But this interpretation 
could apply also to non-governmental organizations and forums; the 
Thirties were a decisive moment not only for the implementation of 
economic and social reforms, but also for the reformulation of ideas 
and approaches after the 1929 Great Crush.250 The mutual exchange 
between State policies, non-governmental actors and technicians 
suggests an important transnational circulation in the context of the 
overarching confrontation of WWII. The British social plans were part 
of a wider mutual exchange between Allied and Axis powers, where 
the policies blended in with propaganda, and the projects of social 
reform with power politics. On the other side, the spread of 
information about the British project and its influence in the immediate 
post-war Europe showed the strength of these transnational transfers. 
In last instance, “total war” impacted on social policy on 
multiple levels. For the British case, the maximum effort of the years 
1941–3 was accompanied by socio-political dynamics that led to post-
war legislation. But “total war” set in motion changes also on the 
Continent; in the countries not directly involved in the conflict, like the 
Vichy regime, or in those which did not experience “total” war 
mobilization, like Italy. Both regimes grounded on social enhancement 
good part of their political legitimation, and, by facing emergency, 
elaborated plans for reform that actually overcame wartime 
conjuncture and prepared the “aftermaths”, just as Britain did. The 
Resistance movements presented programmes of social reforms as well; 
drafted in the midst of the conflict, they were affected by the ongoing 
British debate and the wartime circulation of British documents, even if 
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the legislative outcomes, as for the French case, merged the national 
policy legacies and traditions with the new principles of “social 
security”.  
“Total war” pattern – usually applied to the British case – 
might be used in a supranational perspective, shifting the focus from 
the structural mobilization to a similar wartime climate which actually 
favoured the flow of information and the commitment to 
reconstruction plans, which involved governments, social and political 
actors, international organizations. The link between “total war” and 
social change did not lie only in the structural transformations, nor in 
the State’s tasks facing the material devastations and humanitarian 
action, and not even in the establishment of a “classless society”. These 
factors explain part of the paradigm shift operated during WWII, but 
they rest on a national level. The war led to social reforms also because 
the policy-makers on both sides prefigured the establishment of a new 
“social pact” and international settlement. Two distinctive features 
were the crucible of the war between 1939 and 1945: on the one side, 
the myth of “the war that ends all wars”; on the other, the attempt to 
solve once for all the “social question” in the modern industrial Nation-
State through more inclusiveness.     
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Part Two. Politics and Policies in Comparison 
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2. Great Britain: social policy as right of citizenship 
 
 
 
 
 From 1939 to 1941 the British government concentrated efforts 
to resist to the Nazi assault. On 9th May 1940 the War Cabinet held by 
Neville Chamberlain resigned. The new Churchill’s War Coalition 
included Labour and Liberals. Labour hold key positions: Clement 
Attlee as Deputy Prime Minister, Ernst Bevin as Minister of Labour and 
National Service, Herbert Morrison as Home Secretary, and Arthur 
Greenwood as Minister without Portfolio. Later during the war, the 
left-wing former laborite Stafford Cripps was nominated Lord Privy 
Seal, then Minister of Aircraft Production. This last Ministry was taken 
by the only Liberal, Ernest Brown, who had an important role as 
Minister of Health from 1941 to 1943. However, Conservatives had 
under control wartime economics: the Lord Beaverbrook was Minister 
of Wartime Production and the Lord Woolton Minister of 
Reconstruction from 1943. Chancellors of the Exchequer were the 
Conservatives Sir Kinglsey Wood, and Sir John Anderson. Churchill 
was Prime Minister, First Lord of Treasury, and Minister of Defense, 
influencing all the ministers related with war production. The War 
Coalition was a watershed in the war conduct and organization of the 
administrative machinery.  
 In the biennial 1940-41 the war took a catastrophic turn for 
Britain. After the evacuation from Dunkerque, the Luftwaffe hammered 
London and the major aircraft industries during the three-months 
Battle of Britain. These events gathered the nation around the so-called 
“Dunkirk Spirit” and the subsequent narrative of the Britain “standing 
alone” against the Nazi enemy, carefully fostered by propaganda.251 
The structure of the government was reshaped according to wartime 
exigencies. It was a restricted cabinet (from nine to five members), and 
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grounded on some charismatic leaders: Winston Churchill, Lord 
Beaverbrook, and Bevin. This encountered the critics against the 
previous War Cabinet, like Beveridge, who claimed for a centralized and 
powerful government with strong leaders, coordinating few ministers 
to decongest the administrative machinery. In turn, the national unity 
government balanced the relations with the Parliament and created 
political consensus for the centralization of functions. Churchill quickly 
got the grip over the war production matters, but other domestic affairs 
fell over his sphere of influence; new ministerial departments, boards, 
committees and sub-committees gave birth to that central “thinking 
and planning machine” Churchill clamed for.252 The highest levels of 
the government represented the whole political spectrum, while the 
executive machinery intermingled political control and non-politicians 
civil servants, whose expertise was particularly demanded in the 
organization of the warfare production. By 1942, British War Cabinet 
was the head of an highly structured administrative war machine. It 
had strong decision-making power to secure production for the war 
and to coordinate other aspects of domestic and foreign affairs.  
The biennial 1940-1 were the years of the emergence; by the 
end of 1941, however, the “Dunkirk Spirit” and the wartime 
administrative reforms could be addressed to the issues of the 
reconstruction.253 The reform of the social security was linked to the 
wartime planning and to the achievement of consensus through a plan 
for the aftermath of the war.  
 
2.1.  “The war is everywhere”: planning for war and reconstruction 
 
2.1.1. The war effort: mobilization, production, and labour relations 
Until the comprehensive proposals of the Beveridge Report – 
which had not immediate legislative outcomes – the governmental 
actions did not differ from the social provisions already set up during 
World War I: allowances and pensions for veterans and their families, 
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services pay, emergency labour legislation. The regulation of industrial 
and social issues assumed growing importance as Britain steered to 
war production, and the War Cabinet needed to strengthen social fabric. 
Wartime industrial policies and political consensus had a certain 
impact on the drafting of social reforms. 
British economy steered to war production faster than Nazi 
Germany, which was oriented towards the total war only in 1942-3.254 
The 1935-9 rearmament were two antecedents for the wartime 
economic planning. The expenditure for rearmament had a more 
favourable impact on political and economic establishment, which 
generally mistrusted the coeval social programmes.255 Spending for war 
was easier than spending for unemployment or for public works. The 
rearmament also imposed the re-allocation of manpower in the war 
production. Government had thus to bargain wages policies between 
employers and the unions in sectors like engineering and building.256 
This collaboration, refused during the harshest years of crisis, was 
needed to secure the expansion of war production.  
War also transformed production and labour market. By 1943, 
Britain increased the total volume of its production: the economy 
turned around as long as industries produced more and the civilian 
market consumed less; the unemployment rates fell under 3%; the 
women massively entered the labour market; the working hours were 
extended to the limits; production efficiency improved; the investments 
at home and abroad were concentrated to wartime production. The 
State extended control on allocation and prices of raw materials, on the 
industrial capacity, on restriction of supplies, utilities, and transports. 
Imports were limited to the essential supplies, while the exports were 
regulated among the allies for the necessities related to the war effort, 
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or to pay in goods the imports of the essential materials for the British 
economy. The civilian market was squeezed in order to make possible 
the expansion of the warfare production.  
The necessities of the war drew manpower from the 
unessential industries to the key sectors of the war production. When 
unskilled workforce was taken out of labour market due to the 
conscription, the unemployed, non-employed or under-employed 
workers were called up in the factories. Britain showed a greater 
capacity to mobilize manpower than during the Great War, reaching 
the full employment by the beginning of 1943. From 1939 to 1944 the 
total number of men and women employed in the services or in 
industry rose from 18 to more than 22 million. Less than 50% of the 
total industrial manpower was actually employed in the war 
production (engineering, shipbuilding, metals and chemical industries, 
munitions) and 53% were involved in food supply and other civil 
services.257 
Important changes involved also taxation and consumptions. 
Britain shifted national resources to war economy in three ways: direct 
control, taxation, and consumptions’ rationing. In these domains, 
State’s expansion allowed to wage the wartime effort. The government 
increased direct taxation and income taxes, which doubled in wartime. 
The indirect taxes levied by central government and local authorities 
more than doubled; governmental taxes quadrupled from peacetime to 
1943. All kinds of taxes were introduced: income taxes and surtaxes 
(this later partially recovered by post-war credit); the Excess Profit Tax 
burdened war profit of 100% and was covered by post-war credit; 
indirect and purchase taxation for luxury goods in some cases rose to 
100%.258 The increase in direct/indirect taxation, the personal savings 
and the rationing of essential supplies reduced the purchasing power 
and thus the demand for goods and services for personal consumption.  
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The mere financial leverage was not enough to achieve 
overarching control consumption. The Ministry of Food was set up in 
1939. It rationed food supply, controlled prices and tried to prevent the 
profiteering and the expansion of the black market. The government 
also provided subsidies to slow down the cost-of-living increase.259 
Regardless the general scarcity and restriction of non-priority classes of 
goods, the governmental reports highlighted that «rationing and other 
measures have tended to reduce the inequalities in food consumptions 
which existed before the war.»260 The production and rationing of 
durable goods was instead stricter, in some cases even suspending the 
production. The manufacture and distribution of some food was 
submitted to austerity as for the staple foodstuff, and other categories 
of food were strictly limited or even prohibited. The increased output 
of weapons was achieved at the expenses of a qualitative recomposition 
of food consumption and of the heavy cut of other goods.261  
The 1940 Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Code 
(commonly called Order 1305), and the 1941 Essential Work Orders 
combined coercive measures and welfare provisions.262 They 
established that wage standards and working conditions should be 
determined in any trade by collective agreements; the limitation of the 
maximum working hours (which in 1941 largely overcome the 60 hours 
per weeks in some industrial sectors);263 the restriction of the movement 
of workers; the guaranteed weekly wage and welfare facilities, e.g. 
canteens, training, and safety. The Order 1305 prohibited strikes and 
lockouts, and made compulsory for employers to observe the terms 
and conditions of collective agreements and arbitrations. Even more 
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related to the war effort was the Essential Work (General Provisions) 
Order, concerning 7,5 millions of workers. It limited industrial labour 
turnover and transfer, placing under the control of the National Service 
Office the dismissal or replacement of workers. It also established the 
“guaranteed wage”, and limited the maximum number of weekly 
hours to 60 for men and 55 for women. In 1942, when the war 
production almost reached its maximum capacity, governmental circles 
proposed the further diminution of the working scheduled and the 
improvement of working conditions and managerial efficiency to 
preserve high production.264  
The issue of the working hours was a key point of the wartime 
industrial policies, as concerned the need to maintain the high level of 
productivity of the factories. At the same time, it showed the failure to 
institute efficient public training programmes to form skilled workers 
in the first years of the war. As the employers encountered problems to 
recruit and train the skilled manpower, it was impossible to reduce the 
overall working hours (the work was over-intensified up to 80/90 hours 
per week). From 1941, the approach in industrial relations changed, 
when Britain could efficiently run at full capacity labour mobilization 
and allocation of resources. Under Bevin’s Minister, the War Cabinet 
strengthened tripartite industrial relations, which already underpinned 
the industrial relations since the 1935-39 rearmament programme; 
employers and labour, coordinated by the government, bargained 
policies to keep inflation under control and to allocate resources. From 
1941 onwards, central and local governmental structures eased this 
collaboration. The Central Production Advisory Committee, later renamed 
National Production Advisory Council, was a consultative board 
subordinated to War Cabinet, where representatives of employers and 
trade unions advised government on production and industrial 
relations. The transmission belt between government and medium-
sized and large factories were instead the Joint Production Committees. 
These advisory committees reported the condition of manpower and 
resource allocations to the Ministry of Supply and Production. Britain 
ran the war economy with a steady state of growth in productivity, and 
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stabilizing the supply of manpower and raw materials. This was made 
possible by cooperative industrial relations; this choice reduced 
industrial unrest, prevented the slowdown in productivity due to 
strikes and changed employment structure, e.g. for the involvement of 
women in industries.265 Wartime tripartism was a tool to secure 
industrial concord rather than an enlargement of social participation, 
but turned out to provide an efficient management of the economy. As 
side-effect, trade unions were also allowed to enter in the boardroom of 
the war effort.  
The government tried to prevent social movements in the 
factories also through other means. Until 1941 the Communists, 
politically weak but very numerous in the trade unions, refused to be 
bound by war commitment. The USSR entry into the war and the 
presence of the charismatic and anti-Communist former trade unionist 
Bevin crushed their resistance. He set up the Joint Consultative 
Committee, which took over pre-war institutions such as the National 
Joint Advisory Committee. The new seven-a-side structure integrated 
trade unions in the national unity “consensus”, as for the wage policy 
as for the prevention of industrial action.266 The Minister of Labour 
preferred to settle conflict through conciliation rather than coercive 
methods. All industries scheduled for the Essential Work Order had to 
provide welfare arrangements for the workers, to guarantee breaks and 
work shifts, and to relieve the material working conditions in the war 
industries. He also did much political work to convince the workers 
that their strains and their inhuman paces of work (from 10 to 12 hours 
per day, including Sunday, at the peak of the war mobilization) were to 
“secure a better Britain”. Bevin’s attitude explains the relative lack of 
zeal in the application of the Order 1305. Many strikes (except for those 
which were considered “subversive actions”, harshly santioned from 
1943 onwards) were regarded as relief valves and harmless moments of 
rest from the wartime working conditions. Stoppages, strikes, loss of 
days’ production increased as the war continued, reaching their peak in 
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1944. Yet, the number of unionist effectively persecuted or even 
imprisoned was very limited, as proceedings were taken only in 6 
cases.267 These actions usually spin from the control of TUC leaders, 
who generally endorsed governmental policies. The illegal strikes had 
minimal impact; in 1941 more than 1000 illegal strikes took place, but – 
after Soviet Russia joined the war – only Trotskyites carried out 
agitations in the factories. 
War changed the industrial relations, rebalancing the power of 
the regulative State to workers and employers. This favoured further 
legislative turns, as «the need to maximise war production together 
with a growing realisation of the relation between the well-being of 
workers and their productive efficiency have led to a new emphasis on 
welfare measures.»268 The Ministry of Labour created two departments 
dealing with the tripartite bargaining of welfare measures: the Welfare 
Department and the Factory and Welfare Advisory Board. These authorities 
addressed the daily needs of the workers involved in the war 
production: canteens and other facilities, measure to secure safety and 
first aid in the workplaces, clothing, sleeping and washing 
accommodation, amenities for the free time. To preserve the highest 
productivity, with shortage of labour and difficult changeover of 
skilled workers, the commitment was to improve working and living 
conditions.  
 
2.1.2. The financial policy and the Keynesian budgets 
The adoption of emergency “Keynesian” policies and of higher 
tax extraction also contributed to structurally change public policies. 
The overall income taxation doubled from 1938 to 1944, resulting from 
a policy that relied on taxation rather than loan and debt.269 The fiscal 
policy only partially followed Keynes’ recommendations to increase 
taxation and compulsory savings or deferred pay from salaried, 
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lending money to government.270 Other social measures invocated by 
Keynes had better luck, as for the subsidies in food and the family 
allowances, the major social reform passed during wartime. Keynes’ 
first concern was to avoid inflation and extra-taxation, which would 
have depressed the demand for the post-war recovery. He defined as 
“inflationary gap” the overestimation of the expected expenditure over 
the outputs. This condition was inherent in economies with reduced 
civilian goods and expanded military production. Keynes thus 
proposed to finance the war and boost the demand for the recovery, 
once the workers would have withdrawn their own savings: «from the 
exigency of war positive social improvements. The complete scheme 
now proposed, including universal family allowances in cash, the 
accumulation of working-class wealth under working-class control, a 
cheap ration of necessaries, and a capital levy (or tax) after the war, 
embodies an advance towards economic equality greater than any 
which we have made in recent times.»271  
The sacrifices of the war could have led to more social justice 
and to a wider redistribution of national wealth, instead of its further 
concentration through higher taxation and inflation, as it happened in 
WWI. He proposed a set of policies «conceived in a spirit of social 
justice, a plan which uses a time of general sacrifice, not as an excuse 
for postponing desirable reforms, but as an opportunity for moving 
further than we have moved hitherto towards reducing inequalities.»272 
Alongside the unavoidable shortage of goods and services, the 
compulsory savings and borrowings would have granted the 
sustainable funding of the war, and limited the inflation without 
dramatically bringing down consumptions. 273 This protected the lower 
incomes and equilibrated aggregate consumptions between higher and 
lower income groups. Alongside the financial tools, the cash benefits 
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showed to be the best option: family allowances, the national minimum 
income (similar to the benefits proposed by the Beveridge Report, £35 
and £45 respectively for unmarried and married men), and the 
indexation of the social provisions to the changes in costs of limited 
rationed articles. Keynes wanted to secure a fairer redistribution of 
wealth in favour of the working class. He was probably aware of the 
need to grant the social collaboration during and after the war, and 
indeed he sought for the support of the TUC.  
Some aspects of the plan were contested by the Labour 
movement, probably mostly for ideological distrust for Keynes’ ideas 
and background, and because the watchwords of these organizations 
were still concentred on the “direct control” rather than 
macroeconomic management and stabilization.274 One of the main 
bones of contentions was the anti-inflationary orientation and the 
reduction of the wartime demand brought about by these proposals, 
which prevented the rise of basic wage-rates due to full employment 
and increase of working hours. If Keynes’ plan had not the complete 
endorsement of the workers’ organizations, his proposals fair means to 
finance the war fell on receptive ears in the public opinion. In turn, his 
influence on policy-making was still ambivalent. On the one side, the 
Treasury was increasingly penetrated by Keynes’ ideas, and the 
“Keynesians” were co-opted within the wartime committees, even if 
Keynes was never directly involved. On the other, the government 
increased taxation, price controls and rationing, that is, the traditional 
tools to wage the war economy. Family allowances were enacted 
during wartime, but the act was passed only in 1944. What changed 
was the concept of “annual budget” and the use of the budget 
accountability as a tool of macroeconomic stabilization. This economic 
innovation was originally implemented as emergency measure. After 
1945, the Keynesian use of the budget proved useful to accompany 
social welfare and redistributive policies.  
One of the most important sources to finance the war was the 
income tax. One of the last measures enacted by Chamberlain’s War 
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Cabinet in 1940 was the abovementioned Excess Profits Tax, and was 
retained by Churchill’s Cabinet.275 For wage earners income tax, some 
concerns regarded the workers’ «hardship and discouragement of full 
support for war production»,276 due to the system of tax levied, 
perceived as unequal. TUC and employers deplored the delay of the 
fiscal deductions, the overall loss of the families when both spouses 
called back to work, and mostly the taxation of the overtime 
earnings.277 The introduction of the “Pay As You Earn” system in 1944, 
was saluted as a fairer method to calculate the effective charge of tax in 
the financial year to define the workers’ true liability, and, in case, 
refund them.278 This reform revised the tax levied and did not imply 
any redistributive change, but nonetheless accommodated the needs of 
the lower incomes weekly wage earners. These latter were usually 
submitted to seasonal earning fluctuations in some vital sectors, they 
had additional incomes even for extra hours due to the war effort (e.g. 
Sunday work) or they were married women bounded to return to 
work, whose earnings were devoured by income tax. The taxation on 
the current earning was perceived as a more reliable way to calculate 
the tax burden of the workers.   
The enduring effort of the war economy required the transfer 
of domestic resources, and the ensuring of goods and services from 
abroad. In that regard, the financial policy dramatically turned both 
during the war and for the years to come. And the changes involved 
also the last bulwark of the orthodox economic ideology, the Treasury, 
which accepted some Keynesian principles. The War Cabinet co-opted 
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economists and technicians to varying degrees related to Keynes, such 
as James Meade, Joan Robinson, Marcus Fleming. They served as civil 
officials within governmental structures, especially the Economic 
Section. Their contribution eventually reshaped the official view over 
key socio-economic issues, as for unemployment policy.279 The 
Economic Section primarily addressed the post-war economic recovery, 
considering social policy under the point of view of anti-inflationary 
measure. These economists also advised the Ministries on the macro-
economic conduct of the conflict, especially for the allocation of scarce 
resources and manpower.280 Their impact should not be overestimated, 
but it was effective to eventually impose Keynesianism as the dominant 
economic discourse for British policy-makers.  
The innovations in the 1941 war budget conveys the idea of the 
revolution in the making. The budgets of 1939 and 1940 were formed in 
a context still unaffected by “total war”, as the former was a pre-war 
budget, while the latter coincided with the “phoney war”, when the 
magnitude of the war mobilisation was not full yet. Both reflected a 
traditional approach: increasing of direct and indirect taxation and 
voluntary savings, regardless the rise of the inflation and its social 
consequences. The events of the war in 1940 compelled to reconsider 
this view. The resignation of Chamberlain Cabinet resulted from the 
perceived inadequacy of waging the war, also from the financial point 
of view. The 1940 budget was criticized by the most relevant economic 
opinion-makers, such as The Economist, which claimed for more incisive 
measures to mobilise for the war.281 The new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, introduced supplementary budget 
measures, increasing war expenditure by a third for the current year. 
Alongside the financial interventions, a thorough reflection on the way 
to finance the war marked the organization of the budget for 1941. The 
first “Keynesian budget” was an instrument for regulating domestic 
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expenditure and controlling inflation. The historiographic debate tends 
nowadays to reduce the scope of this budget.282 Historian Jim 
Tomlinson suggested that the regulation of macroeconomic data and 
the forecasting of economic aggregates was rather a measure dictated 
by necessity and pragmatism.283 However, this did not necessarily 
undermine its value as a statement of public finance principles. 
According to economist Richard Sidney Sayers, «the 1941 budget, the 
cornerstone of Britain’s internal financial policy, was the manifestation 
in the financial sphere of the national change of heart that marked the 
summer of 1940.»284   
The budget contained embryonic elements of political 
innovations, and even social reformism, although its primary goal was 
the price stabilisation. The Treasury had to incorporate some of the 
Keynesian arithmetic tools to estimate the necessary amount of 
taxation, e.g. for the calculation of the “inflationary gap”, expected to 
be about £500 million. The 1941 budget was directed to stabilise prices 
and to prevent wage inflation due to war economy and full 
employment: the Chancellor Wood expected to fill the “inflationary 
gap” mainly thanks to additional taxation and compulsory savings. The 
income tax was more than quintupled in comparison with the 
beginning of the war, purchase tax was increased to 100%, in order to 
depress demand of consumer goods and to prevent the inflationary 
spiral. On the other side, the 1941 budget was incardinated to other 
measures of capital and credit control, to enlarge the volume of 
national savings and investments outlets and to enlarge the existing 
external financial relations.285 The 1942-5 budgets followed the 
blueprint of the 1941 budget speech. However, the Keynesian gradual 
penetration in public policies was not limited to the macroeconomic 
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stabilization. Following the tides of war, after 1942 more attention was 
paid on how redirect the new fiscal leverages and policies to other 
goals. The debate gradually shifted from war economy to the 
reconstruction; and this last topic was inseparable from social policy. 
The financial tools and the swingeing taxation of the State was 
progressively oriented towards what Keynes defined as «Social Policy 
Budget».286 The budget policy since 1941 incorporated family 
allowances and food subsides. They were originally accessory 
provision to keep the cost-of-living acceptable for the working class; the 
new budget policy, as a whole, achieved more equity in the structure of 
the taxation, to the extent that The Economist defined it one of the 
«social triumphs of the war».287 Initially, the direct taxation and the 
Excess Profits Tax absorbed purchasing power without hitting hardest 
specific categories. Later, the new configuration of the budget 
supported the reconstruction, from welfare policy to the economic 
recovery.  
  While Keynesianism seemed to gradually take over the fiscal 
policy, forms of public control extended on other aspects of national 
economics, even if the government successfully planned the 
mobilization and allocation of manpower without massive industrial 
concentration or nationalizations.288 Besides the “Keynesian” use of the 
national account from 1941 on, the overall extent of State’s control 
could be disputed. Some historical interpretations tended to put less 
emphasis on the new Keynesian polices, stressing the importance of 
British position in the international trade; the advantages of great 
imperial possessions, having the anchor currency in its imperial trade 
area; the world-wide facilities afforded by the British financial system; 
the technological and scientific superiority of Britain in comparison to 
the Axis Powers.289 Britain was part of a larger imperial and 
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transatlantic market, which allowed the country to benefit of the 
American financial aid and trade, and to drain resources from the vast 
Dominions. The war did not transform British economy into something 
different than a capitalist economy, and the flow of goods, services, 
capital and people was not interrupted.  
The British over-mobilisation did not result merely from more 
rational and State-driven allocations of resources. However, as 
Keynesian economic policies were a pillar of post-war British welfare 
state, also more critical interpretation of the “Keynesian Revolution” 
recognized that «by the late 1940s Keynesian economic theory had 
clearly become the dominant discourse of economic policy-making in 
official circles in Britain.»290 They eventually influenced also social 
policy, as for the proposals to use the budget to support employment. 
Alongside Beveridge’ proposals, the 1944 White Paper on employment 
policy presented echoes from Keynesian theory. As for the taxation, 
Keynes’ ideas, often revisited, were retained by post-war Labour 
government, to maintain high levels of taxation to finance public 
services, not last the welfare service.291  
 
2.1.3. War, planning, and reconstruction 
The plans for social reforms were originally under the 
supervision of the War Aims Committee created in August 1940 and 
chaired by Clement Attlee. It was later transformed in the Cabinet 
Committee on Reconstruction Problems, directed by Greenwood, and 
disbanded by the very beginning of 1942.292 In this year, the ideas 
elaborated in previous decades met “total war”, which created a 
favourable environment and public opinion towards reconstruction, 
planning, social reforms in Britain. These aspects were interwoven, and 
the collaboration between public authorities and sectional interests 
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fostered social reforms. The list of governmental committees, studies, 
and reports to be published or forthcoming between 1941 and 1942 is 
impressive: the Uthwatt, Scott, Barlow, Beveridge Committees, the 
Directorate of Post-War Building, the Consultative Panel on 
Reconstruction, the memoranda on Agricultural Education, Housing, 
Health, Education, Population, Trade, Shipping, problems, and the 
Study Committees on Post-War Relief, Food Supply, Surplus, just to 
mention the most relevant.293  The propitious environment for planning 
and reforms was laid down in the Thirties. Yet, only during WWII 
these topics became matter of public debates, meeting, and wide 
dissemination through the media.294     
This was the case of the 1940 Barlow Report, or the 1942 Scott 
Report and Uthwatt Report.295 The Barlow Report resulted from the 1937 
Barlow Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, but was 
now framed in the plans for the “reconstruction”, the recurrent concept 
in British political lexicon at that time.296 The recommendations of the 
Barlow, Scott, and Uthwatt Report constituted a step towards a more 
centralized planning and control of the British industrial and 
agricultural productive system. The Barlow Report pointed out the 
imbalance in the geographical distribution of the key industrial areas, 
concentrated in the Greater London. This led to industrial congestion 
and higher costs of living in this area, and to the destruction of capital 
in the depressed areas of older industrial settlement, which became the 
pool of labour of London. This relocation brought about the decline of 
coal industries in the North-West, and the concentration of light 
industries and trade services in the South-West. The overdevelopment 
                                                          
293 TNA, INF/1/683, «Britain and Post-War Reconstruction. 10th July, 1942» 
294 D. Hardy, From Garden Cities to New Towns. Campaigning for Town and Country Planning, 
cit., pp. 256-271; Town and Country Planning, London, Staples and Staples Limited, 1943. 
295 HMSO, Barlow Report. Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population. 
Report Presented to the Parliament by Command of His Majesty, London, Cmd. 6153, 1940; 
HMSO, Scott Report. Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas. Report Presented to the 
Parliament by Command of His Majesty, London, Cmd. 6378; HMSO, Uthwatt Report. Expert 
Committee on Compensation and Betterment, London, Cmd. 6386. 
296 D. Hardy, From Garden Cities to New Towns. Campaigning for Town and Country Planning, 
1899-1946, London, Chapman&Hall, 1991.  
128 
 
of London area entailed a set of productive, industrial, health and 
defence issues. These later were even more relevant during wartime, 
when German bombings particularly stroke the area of the Greater 
London and the industrialized cities of the South-West, such as 
Coventry. The report advanced regional policies coordinated by a 
central authority, a plan of decentralization of industrial activities and 
population from the South-West. The Barlow Report testified the 
increasing influence of the concept of “planning” in public policies, as 
well as the concerns on unemployment among British social 
reformers.297 The industrial regional planning, indeed, was supported 
the dispersal cities and industrial areas, in order to balance the 
employment throughout the country.  
The 1942 Scott and Uthwatt reports, instead, dealt with the land 
and countryside inefficiencies. They were in the same wavelength of 
the Barlow Report, to such an extent that they are considered «a triad 
covering most aspects of the physical planning and reconstruction».298 
The 1942 Scott Report, in particular, provided some similar solutions of 
the 1940 Royal Commission’s report, but focusing on the land 
utilisation in rural areas; the establishment of the Central Planning 
Authority to pursue five-years plans for the countryside and public 
interventions to foster agriculture, to provide public utility services, to 
prevent the depopulation of farm country and to preserve amenities. It 
handled some long-run features of the British industrial development, 
in the very context of the wartimes needs. The historical run down of 
the British food supply became a potentially disruptive shortage after 
the German submarine blockade. If, before the war, Britain depended 
on import for 70% of the total food consumption, then the war imposed 
a dramatic food rationing. The Scott Report was part of a wider 
campaign to boost farm production, to revitalize the countryside and to 
reduce the migration flows to the cities.299 The report also suggested the 
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enactment of rational planning policy to stem the drift of labour from 
the land and to regulate the decentralisation or dispersal of industries 
and industrial manpower in the countryside. Its recommendations 
lapped the employment and agricultural policies, and somehow 
prefigured embryonic elements of an environmental policy, as «the 
Scott Committee has reached the conclusion that the continuation of 
unregulated constructional development following pre-war trends 
cannot be consistent with the maintenance of agriculture, the well-
being of rival communities or the preservation of the beauty of the 
country-side, or indeed with the well-being of the nation as a whole.»300 
The less known Uthwatt Report, instead, marked an important shift in 
the matter of ownership and economic efficiency, as it was impossible 
to keep: «the purely individualistic approach to land ownership. That 
was perhaps inevitable in early days of industrialization and limited 
facilities of communication, but it is no longer completely tenable in 
our present stage of development and it operates to prevent the proper 
and effective utilisation of our effective natural resources. Town and 
country planning is not an end in itself; it is the instrument by which to 
secure that the best use is made of the available land in the interest of 
the community as a whole.»301 The Uthwatt Report dealt with the 
betterment in respect of land public control. The report laid down the 
basic points of a fair policy for the reconstruction and planning of the 
land use, grounded on the compensation of public acquisition to pre-
war values, and the creation of the Central Planning Authority to control 
building and other developments. 
These reports get the picture of the debate on the “economic 
planning” in Britain before and during the war, and of the importance 
of “planning” approaches in addressing old and new problems. They 
resulted from previous legislation, and to some extent – not unlike the 
report on social insurances and allied services – the war led to a 
systematization of the legislative actions and experiences of the 1930s. 
The Barlow Report, for instance, continued along the lines of the 1934 
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and 1937 Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Acts that tried to 
attract industries in the areas with higher unemployment rates in 
Wales, Scotland and Northern England.302 By 1939, these provisions did 
not work as expected, since the biggest part of business still gravitated 
around London, the Midlands, and the South-East. Similarly, the Scott 
Report and Uthwatt Report encountered the renewed interest for town 
and country planning in the 1930s. The three reports on industrial, 
town, and countryside planning matched with the most famous 
Beveridge Report. Altogether, they marked the extent of the British social 
reformism during wartime and of the projects related with postwar 
reconstruction; the modernization and regulation of the labour market, 
the land and town planning (related to the physical reconstruction of 
devastated cities) and the social policies were interlinked. The reports 
were regarded as important – and to some extent coherent – part of 
planning and coordination between central government and local 
authorities. The Reconstruction Committee recommended the 
government to pass legislation already during wartime, in order to 
handle the recovery with the administrative and technical tools to 
address efficiently the reconstruction:  
 
«It would appear that the trend of post-war planning and 
development, so far as local authorities are concerned, 
depends upon what modifications of existing planning law 
the Government intend to make as a result of the 
recommendations of the three reports referred to above. 
Continued delay in acquainting interested bodies with the 
intentions of Government policy will, in the opinion of your 
Committee, tend unnecessarily to complicate the tasks of 
local authorities in the field of planning. If the new 
legislation promised by the Government does not reach the 
Statute Book within a reasonable time before the end of the 
war, it is clear that insufficient time will be available to allow 
adequate and co-ordinated schemes of planning to precede 
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actual development. This result would, in the considered 
view of your Committee, be extremely unfortunate.»303  
 
The reconstruction problems tackled in these three committees 
differed from the issue of social security because they were considered 
unrelated to international set-up and conditions. They were a matter of 
internal regulation, but crossed the wartime conditions as for the 
demobilisation, the educational policy, the employment of disabled 
persons and the housing policy. The problems were therefore 
inherently intermingled. Especially the housing policy, which did not 
fall the specific tasks of these committees, was one of the reconstruction 
core areas. The housing programmes had wide consensus among 
parties because combined the recovery from war damages and the need 
to tackle longer-run social diseases in Britain. The nagging problem of 
housing was addressed by British social reformers in both economic 
and social terms. The demand for buildings could have prevent post-
war slumps, raised the supply of consumption goods after years of war 
economy and possibly encouraged stable levels of employment. But 
there was also a problem of social fairness. The social reformers 
proposed various methods to relieve the burden of the rents on the 
lower-income families: subsidies paid by local authorities, the 
incorporation of house subsidies within the family allowances or the 
provision of houses «as a state service.»304 This last measure recalled the 
coeval Fascist proposals; one of the hobbyhorses of RSI social 
programme and narrative was the house owning to all the workers. 
Beveridge himself regarded at the housing programme as one of the 
priority in the struggle against the “Five Giants” on the road to social 
progress:  
 
«First, variations in housing standards represent the greatest 
inequalities between different sections of the community and 
afford, therefore, the greatest scope for raising the standard 
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of living. Second, expenditure of our energies and our money 
on getting good housing is the most practical immediate 
contribution that we can make towards winning full 
employment, by the radical route of social demand. […] 
Third, good housing – far better housing than we have at 
present – is the indispensable foundation for health, 
efficiency and education. […] We now have new materials 
and new methods of construction, new ideas on planning 
town and preserving country, new means of transport, new 
understanding of all that the State can do to place new 
homes […] Squalor in Britain, no less than Want, is a 
needless scandal.»305    
 
New Ministries and inter-departmental commitees were set up 
to address all these problems remain unsolved. This was the case for 
the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. This would have been 
also the case of the Ministry of Social Insurance and of the inter-
departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Service, whose 
results were considered in 1942 «of fundamental importance.» 306   
 
 
2.2 The birth of the social security: the Beveridge Report and the White Papers 
on social insurances 
 
2.2.1. The Beveridge Report 
Also for the Beveridge Report, the war events triggered 
momentum for addressing long-run issues of British social insurances. 
In 1941, the War Cabinet established the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Social Insurance and Allied Service. Its composition was rather 
heterogeneous for political orientations and competences. The 
governmental representatives rotated throughout the 44 meetings of 
the Committee between July 1941 and October 1942. They were 
technicians committed to governmental activities since the 1930s, and 
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they came out of the British civil services, as Beveridge himself. During 
First World War, he was appointed member of the Munitions of War 
Committee, for the organization and recruitment of skilled labour in the 
armament industry. In the interwar period, he became director of the 
London School of Economics, becoming in the 1930s chairman of the 
Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee, the advisory authority 
dealing with unemployment.307 When he was appointed chairman for 
the social insurances reform, Beveridge had just presented the reports 
on the mobilization of manpower for the war, which had positive 
impact on public opinion.308 The report suggested massive women’s 
employment, dispersal of factories in the areas whit surplus labour, 
forced hiring of unskilled manpower and its training by the employees, 
and the expansion of weapons industries as more men were recalled for 
service in the armed. Nearly 3 million men were expected to be 
additionally employed in the army and in the war production every 
year; the outlook in 1940 was the expansion and steering of the civilian 
production mobilization for the war, including stringent wages 
policies, conscription of women, and extension of State control over 
production and labour mobility. These advices owed WWI experiences, 
but they were also the result of Beveridge’s renewed approach. 
According to his biographer, José Harris, to the outbreak of the war he 
already was « increasingly committed to policies of radical social and 
economic change.»309, to such an extent that Cole and the Webbs 
considered him a “Socialist”.  
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The Ministries more involved in the activities of the Committee 
were the Labour and National Service and the Health Department, and 
the technicians of the economic Ministries. Later, the new-born 
Ministry of the Pensions also joined the Committee.310 The drafting of 
the report overlapped many competencies; every authority joined the 
Committee since the administrations of the social benefits were 
dispersed through different Ministries: the Home Office controlled the 
Workmen’s Compensations; the Ministry of Labour supervised 
unemployment benefits; the old-age pensions were administrated by 
two different Ministers depending on whether contributory or not; the 
health and accident insurances were also shared among different 
authorities and structures; the local institutions completed the 
framework of the highly fragmented British social services. Such 
intermingling was the result of the incremental stratification of the 
social legislation over the decades. The goals and scope of the 
committee were originally modest. The terms of reference were «to 
undertake, with special reference to the inter-relation of the schemes, a 
survey of the existing national schemes of social insurance and allied 
services, including workmen’s compensation, and to make 
recommendations.»311 The further development of the Beveridge Report 
to more important outcomes was the result of the wartime sideslip; the 
favourable climate for social reforms, the enthusiastic reception by the 
public, and the political dynamics within the government made 
possible the qualitative leap.312  
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The works of the Committee resulted in the bargaining of 
proposals and resolutions among different political and social actors in 
the public and private sectors. The drafts and the correspondence of 
Committee conveyed the weight of the political legacy in this field and 
the common effort to achieve a far-reaching reform of social security. 
Some of the stable members of the Committee were P.Y. Blundun, for 
the Ministry of Labour and National Service, Majory Cox for the 
Ministry of Pensions, Hamilton Farrell for the Ministry of Health, and 
B.K. White, who was instead the Registry of the Friendly Societies. In 
the drafting of the report, the Committee operated thus in close 
connection both with governmental bodies and with the organisations 
of the social and economic interests, and especially with the Friendly 
Societies, whose role in post-war social security was not cleared up. The 
reform went indeed to the hearth of established and vested interests; 
the Committee was cautioned to not disappoint them, by trying to 
integrate their representatives in the preliminary drafting and 
discussions. The same went for the TUC, which in different meetings 
and memoranda discussed key points, such as the proposals on the 
equal tripartite contribution, the unification of social insurances, the 
flat-rate benefits and contributions.  In public imagination and in the 
historical narrative, the Committee became the “Beveridge 
Committee”. It was also the collective wartime effort of British sectional 
interests to contribute to the reformulation of the mechanisms of social 
security.313  
The Beveridge Report was eventually submitted on 20th 
November 1942 to the Paymaster General, Sir William Jowitt, and to 
the government, after more than one year of through studies. The 
report balanced technical survey and far-reaching reform proposals. 
                                                                                                                               
the social reforms has been however undeniable. A contemporary American 
commentator reported that: «next to Winston Churchill, the most popular figure in 
Britain.» was Beveridge. Quoted in Eric Wigham, Strikes and the Government, p. 95. 
313 The letters and memoranda sent to the Committee by representative of Trade Unions, 
Assurances, Approved Societies, Friendly Societies and other associations involved in the 
social insurances, public assistance and healthcare constituted one of the appendices of 
the report. HMSO, Social Insurance and Allied Services. Memoranda from Organisation. 
Appendix G to Report by Sir William Beveridge, London, 1942, Cmd. 6405.  
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This immediately caught the public opinion around some watchwords. 
The first part is probably the most ideologically relevant, while 
subsequently the report analysed the problems of the current system as 
well as advantages and limits of the universalistic turn. The Report 
tackled different issues: the reform of the social insurances as primary 
objective; the children’s allowances, the establishment of a separate 
health service, and the policies to maintain the employment as 
corollaries to ensure the social progress in Britain. Employment policies 
fell within the plan for social security because of financial and moral 
reasons; how to fund the whole plan in a sustainable way, and how to 
prevent the protracted idleness with social benefits.314 Later, 
employment policies hogged the debate in the last years of the war.  
 The report recognized that the guide-lines of the Committee 
eventually overcame the original goals and scope. Besides the re-
organization of previous social benefit, what actually marked the 
qualitative leap of the Beveridge Report was the awareness to go through 
«a revolutionary moment in the world’s history» which therefore was 
«a time for revolutions, not for patching.»315 The way to accomplish 
what the report called the «British revolution»316 was to promote an 
universalistic programme of social security with the collaboration 
between State and individual, covering all working categories. At the 
same time, the State guaranteed the national minimal income and 
encouraged also the voluntary action by individual to provide more 
than the vital income for him and his family. On the other side, the plan 
moved from an analysis of British society, which was successfully 
synthesized by Beveridge’s “Five Giants”: Want, Disease, Ignorance, 
Squalor, and Idleness.317 The report specifically focused on the 
“Freedom from Want”, by proposing a double redistribution to prevent 
the loss of income and the fall below the subsistence level. The means 
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were the extension of the rates of benefit, and the use of social 
insurances and family allowances as autonomous and permanent ways 
to ensure the minimal income. The report mainly rearranged the 
previous British social insurances, taking into consideration interwar 
surveys; but the political content of social insurances dramatically 
changed.  
 The guidelines tended to the unification and simplification of 
the social schemes and the broadening of the recipients, without upper 
income limits. It broke with the purely insurance-based benefits, 
because covered all the citizens regardless their incomes, including 
state employees and better paid employments. The plan segmented the 
population in six classes, of which four covered the workers: 
employees, employers and self-employed, housewives, and the 
unoccupied/unemployed. The other two concerned the economically 
inactive citizens, the retired and the population below the working age. 
These two later categories received retirement pensions and family 
allowances, while the others fell into social insurance schemes. The 
unification was achieved by the single security contribution, varying 
according to every class; it was funded by the contributions of the 
workers, the employers and the State. The tripartite funding (paid in 
the Social Insurance Fund), now extended to all the risk categories, was 
a cardinal principle of the report. The one single contribution allowed 
all classes to enjoy pensions on retirement, health and medical 
treatment, as well as funeral expenses. Unemployment and disability 
benefits were subjected to changes according to the different categories. 
The housewives had lower benefits than the other categories, but could 
benefit of provisions for widowhood as survivors’ pensions, and were 
entitled of generous maternity grants and allowances, regardless the 
contributions of their husbands. The Beveridge Report was still 
calibrated on the model of the “male breadwinner”, providing the 
incomes for the family.318 However, three members of the committee 
were women, and the plan effectively took into account the new 
economic conditions of married women; the income for working 
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women were secured in case of childbirth, to make possible to leave 
and return back to work as soon as possible. The plan balanced 
demographic concerns and equal treatment; the combined provision of 
maternity grants and social benefits allowed women to enjoy almost 
the same treatment of men, who were still nonetheless entitled of 
family allowances.  
Another crucial innovation was the flat-rate benefit; for any 
benefit, the State provided the same rate, regardless the past earnings. 
This rate constituted the minimal income granted to every citizen in 
every moment of his life, to prevent him to the loss of income. The basic 
benefit could have been complemented by other supplementary 
benefits, e.g. for maternity. The weekly flat-rate quotas were indexed to 
the cost-of-living and inflation. The most significant innovation 
concerned the unemployed; the provisional rates were £40 per week for 
unemployed men and wife, who would receive allowances of £8 for 
each dependent child. This weekly benefit marked a consistent increase 
in comparison with the pre-war benefits. The plan proposed the 
amalgamation of the special schemes of unemployment provisions 
with the general scheme. The increases of the rates and their 
homologation concerned also the other risk categories, which overall 
had the same amount of the basic unemployment benefit. The total 
burden of the Social Security budget (including family allowances, and 
the health service) was estimated at nearly £700,000,000 in the first 
years, while the inflations and the adaptation of the expenditure 
headings would have only moderately increased its overall burden in 
the lapse of 20 years.  
Other major changes concerned the means-tests, leftovers of the 
Poor Laws. The report proposed their abolition for all benefits, including 
disability and unemployment, which was subjected to the attendance to 
vocational training. In turn, some form of verification of the means of 
subsistence were retained for the cases falling into the National 
Assistance, outside the range of the contributory social schemes, even 
though was considered «an essential subsidiary method in the whole 
Plan for Social Security».319 The plan proposed to reform the old age 
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pensions, establishing the age of retirement at 65 and 60 years 
respectively for men and women, with increased rates if the retirement 
was postponed, or for particular cases, e.g. for widows of working age, 
whether with dependent children or not. All the measures of 
unification of the contributions and social services regarded the 
technical aspects of social security.  
The rationalization, however, concerned also the administrative 
and the political management. The report recommended to create the 
Ministry of Social Security, with increased powers to supervise 
governmental authorities and to organize the local services. At central 
level, the most important agencies were transferred to the Ministry of 
the Social Security: the Assistance Board; the non-contributory pensions; 
all unemployment and cash benefits managed by the Ministry of 
Labour and by the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee 
(transformed in Social Insurance Statutory Committee). It was also 
proposed to nationalize the business of the industrial assurances, 
transformed into the Industrial Assurance Board controlled by the 
Ministry of Social Security. As for the local social services, the report 
centralized the cash benefits while retaining their ramification. For 
instance, the Local Social Offices had the tasks of social benefits and of 
the assistance to specific categories, e.g. blind person. The new Ministry 
replaced the overlapping of different charges without excluding Local 
Authorities and voluntary associations; the aim was to simplify the 
stratification and superposition of the previous legislative processes. 
The report harked back to the heritage of the national social system, 
and started afresh with a modern organization of social security. The 
creation of the Ministry of National Health from scratch was easier, 
dealing with a complete new structure. On the overlying of function 
between the social security and the health service, however, the report 
delivered a transitional opinion, as many different solutions concerning 
the health service were still at stake. The standpoint was nonetheless 
the separation of the medical services from the insurance system of 
cash benefits, in favour of a universal medical service for all citizens, 
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and covering any form of disease, regardless insurance coverage and 
contributions paid.320  
The simplification did not concern only the political 
management of the social insurances, but the administrative 
organization as well. The National Insurance Fund was expected to 
overcome the burden of the British mutual-aid associations and 
insurances. This applied for the Friendly and Approved Societies for the 
sickness benefit, and for the Trade Unions (which also had the 
functions of the Friendly Societies) and the Workmen’s Compensations 
(replaced by the inclusion of the industrial accidents and disease within 
the social security). Their suppression pointed at equalizing the cash 
benefits; they were previously shared across the different societies, 
which applied separate schemes of compensation, different procedures 
of claims and insurance payments, and various contributory cards for 
illness, industrial accident and diseases. The national minimum income 
uniformed all these risk categories; the Friendly Societies, which actively 
participated to the drafting of the report, could then reduce the scope of 
the universalistic turn. The reform of social security was considered «a 
natural development from the past»;321consequently, the mutualist 
framework was proposed to be progressively amalgamated with the 
public social security. They were proposed to be retained as voluntary 
insurance, to which supplement the compulsory national schemes. One 
of the British oldest social institutions, the Workmen’s Compensation, 
was incorporated within the industrial injuriess. The protection against 
the work-related accidents was no longer matter of reconciliation 
regulated by the labour legislation, but a compulsory social insurance. 
This limited the weight of Friendly Societies and Trade Unions, as it 
allowed all workers to join the benefit. While the Workmen’s 
Compensation fixed compensations for the individual employer, the 
compulsory insurance against industrial accident secured the vital 
incomes for the assured. It was not grounded on the principle of 
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individual employer’s liability, but on the principle that the benefit for 
the accidents should have been equal, regardless the individual 
responsibilities.  
 The Beveridge Report established new prolitical and 
administrative solutions. Its ideological scope was related to the war 
effort, and to the statement of principles endorsed by the British in the 
Atlantic Charter. This was particularly evident in the aims of the social 
security schemes, which for the first time explicitly pointed at freeing 
Britain “from Want”. From the administrative point of view, instead, it 
had continuities with the previous legislation, which nonetheless was 
turned upside-down. The report carefully stressed out how it was the 
“natural” outcome of decades of British social legislation. In reality, the 
linchpins of the proposed reform dwelt on the centralization and 
nationalization of different schemes and authorities, the unification of 
the contributory basis of the social insurances, the rationalization of the 
funding, the universalism of the benefits to all the citizens, regardless 
their incomes and work category. Such innovations required a strong 
political and administrative effort, and faced many resistances from 
politics and vested interests. 
The results of the Committee were delivered to the Minister of 
Reconstruction, Howitt. The report rose some issues, but the 
government endorsed the universalist setting for political and practical 
reasons: «first, the desirability of giving each person security 
appropriate to his circumstances by way of insurances, and, second, the 
desirability of avoiding as far as possible difficult questions of 
demarcation between one group and another and transfers between 
compulsory and excepted employment involving complicated 
arrangements for voluntary insurances.»322 The first governmental 
reports welcomed the reorganization for classes and the moderate 
redistributive features of the report. The preliminary view of the 
ministerial offices gave a positive view on the plan, which «has 
impressed us with the fact that its proposals are closely inter-related, 
and that a decision with regard to any one of the major items must to a 
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large extent determine the fate of others.»323 On the other side, the 
government did not establish immediately the Ministry of the Social 
Security. As the prospected departmental re-organization depleted the 
staff of the Ministries, the pre-existing offices were charged of 
discussing the parts of the Beveridge Report within their competences.324 
Every department, committee, technical office provided notes, whose 
remarks and suggestions were retained in the 1944 governmental White 
Paper. The amount of reports from numerous different departments 
conveys the idea of the scope and ambition of the reforms contained in 
the Beveridge Report. The government had to decide whether reject in all 
respects the innovations of the plan, or just provide minor adjustments 
in the same general lines of the Beveridge Report. That option involved 
the governmental committees in 1943, and covered all the main aspects 
in view of the publication of the White Paper on the social insurances. 
Eventually, the reform of social security would have moved on 
Beveridge’s lines, while not all his proposals were retained.325  The 
commentaries sent to Howitt also suggested to prepare detailed 
policies in all main areas of social policy, grounded on some essential 
points: family allowances, the NHS, the abolition of the Approved 
Societies and of the older Workmen’s Compensation, and finally the 
extension of the compulsory insurances to guarantee the minimal 
income to free people from want. 
Also the Treasury presented the memorandum to the Committee 
on Reconstruction Problems. The Chancellor of the Exchequer listed four 
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main issues for the financial sustainability of the plan: the expected 
high military expenditure due to the post-war commitments; the full 
restoration of trade and export as prerequisite for full employment; the 
balance of tax cuts with the funding of the plan; the role of social 
security in the plans for the reconstruction. The memorandum 
criticized the underestimation of the fiscal burden of the Beveridge 
Report.326 Treasury’s estimated costs of such a plan exceeded the pre-
war burden by £m265 every year, with consistent increase in general 
taxation for the NHS and for the social insurances contributory system. 
The Treasury raised the same doubts for the family allowances. The 
Treasury questioned their non-contributory system, as well as their 
extension regardless the income limits, since in this last case the 
universalism clashed against the need to provide no more than the 
minimal income.327  
The criticisms of the Treasury concerned also the new classes of 
recipients, whose benefits were not proportionally linked with the 
contributions; the progressive overloading of the costs on the long-run, 
demanding a strong legislative and social pact, achievable during 
wartime but perhaps not in peacetimes; the faith without any basis in 
an enduring period of economic growth and full employment. The 
memorandum of the Chancellor – which did not argue against the 
political convenience or the principles of the report – proposed to rely 
on the contributory system rather than the general revenue. It 
remarked that, without the export-driven economic expansions and 
consolidation of the balance of payments, the universalistic social 
security scheme would have made the national budget explode. The 
Treasury observed how after the war, the government had to be 
cautious with too generous welfare provisions, matching them with 
austerity policies.  
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The Beveridge Committee was scrutinized from the political and 
financial point of view, in all its detailed provisions.328 To straighten 
these many issues, the Reconstruction Committee eventually endorsed 
the creation of the Ministry of the Social Insurances, to launch the new 
scheme. There was general mistrust to establish a new administrative 
machinery, but they considered its set-up a prerequisite to bring into 
operation the new scheme as soon as possible. According to the 
Minister Lord Woolton, this political move could also have a positive 
impact on the opinion on the intentions of the government, since «the 
appointment of a new Minister would have great political advantage as 
an earnest of the Government’s intention to push on with this work as 
rapidly as possible.»329 The governmental committees in charge of the 
drafting of the White Papers also received notes by different sectors of 
the society, as for the lobbies of the voluntary hospitals or the feminist 
militants, who criticized the framework of the Beveridge Report, built 
around the male breadwinner, and unfair in the provisions for men and 
women.330 The debate on social security was part of a wider 
redefinition of the scope of social provisions, and of the harmonization 
of all social policy areas, which not always slavishly followed the 
report. For instance, the Assistance Board decided to raise non-
contributory supplementary war pensions at higher rate than the social 
insurances. Eventually the government decided to approve the increase 
of the assistance grants, and to keep lower social insurances benefits. 
The Ministry for Labour and National Service invoked a principle that 
opposed to Beveridge’s proposal on the correlation of the benefit with 
the cost of maintenance: 
 
«it was not illogical that there should be disparities between 
the rates of assistance and the rates of benefit under the 
social insurance scheme; […] there should be no difficulty in 
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defending these disparities if the Government adhered 
firmly to the principle that, while the former were designed 
to cover the maintenance of persons with no other resources 
and were subject to a test of need, the latter were contractual 
benefits paid as of right in return for contributions. Benefits 
under a scheme of contributory insurance had even been 
designed to meet the needs of all contributors.»331  
 
Further memoranda discussed technical and financial 
improvements for war and retirement pensions, family allowances, the 
harmonization of the insurance benefits with assistance and health 
services, or the incorporation of the Workmen’s Compensation within 
the sickness compulsory insurances, as proposed by Beveridge.332 The 
previous system was in fact discriminatory (only the members of the 
TUC or Approved Societies could factually prosecute a claim), and 
moreover it was grounded on the employer’s liability, encouraging 
strife and mistrust. The retail or suppression of the Approved Societies 
played a crucial role in the effectiveness of a genuinely universalistic 
reform.333 Beveridge proposed the abolition of the Approved Societies 
and their replacement with public Security Offices implanted on the 
territory. The Industrial Life Offices, gathering the Industrial and Life 
Assurance Companies, opposed the withdrawn of the Mutual 
Insurance Companies. Their claimed for administrative and economic 
dangers. The unification of contributes and social insurances under 
State schemes forwent competences and knowledge on the field of the 
healthcare insurances that the private Approved Societies acquired 
through the decades; furthermore, their replacement with public 
authorities would have increased costs, confusion in the competences, 
State control. The Approved Societies had to maintain «without 
damaging the framework of the Social Insurance Scheme and while it 
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would not be so “revolutionary” in its operation as Sir William desires, 
it would have the merit of being in harmony with British character 
which has always preferred elasticity and freedom to rigidity and State 
control.»334 Likewise memoranda were submitted to the government 
throughout the whole debate leading to the White Papers and beyond. 
In 1945 – when the main lines of social security were decided – 
different associations of Friendly Societies regretted the fewer room for 
voluntary schemes and the exclusion of private business to any joint 
administration of public insurances. The Friendly Societies never 
contested the need to the universalistic turn nor modifications in their 
juridical status, but they stood against the squeezing of the voluntary 
sector, which in Britain concerned about 8 million insured, and – they 
claimed – meant also suppression of expertise, self-government, 
pluralism, self-relief.335 
Governmental bureaucracies and experts, as well as vested 
interests resisted to specific aspects of the universalistic turn, while 
endorsing their very general principles, or at least accepting them as 
unavoidable. Also the parties welcomed the Beveridge Report with a 
thorough debate. Both Conservatives and Labour were sceptical on the 
possibility to implement the plan as presented by Beveridge. The 
Conservatives were afraid of its financial burden and its political and 
social implications. But also the left-wing organizations were initially 
suspicious of the report. It came out of liberal milieu, it was inherently 
centralist and it advocated to the State many of the previous tasks of 
the working-class organizations.  
 
2.2.2. The White Papers on Social Insurance  
The British parties eventually agreed on Beveridge’s general 
guidelines and principles. The publication of the report set in motion 
the legislative action; in February 1943, the Home Secretary Herbert 
Morrison declared the government’s commitment to a preliminary 
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survey for the social reforms in the framework of reconstruction 
policies. After the presentation of the Beveridge Report to the Parliament, 
in 1944 the government presented the White Paper on the Social 
Insurance. This explicitly harked back to the 1942 report, and to the 
effort to rethink the social policy in the midst of the war: 
 
«As far back as June, 1941, therefore, when – so far as could 
then be judged – the menace of heavy air attack and invasion 
had not yet been lifted the Government invited Sir William 
Beveridge to take charge of a comprehensive survey of 
existing schemes. In November 1942, he presented his Report 
on Social Insurance and Allied Services (Cmd. 6404). This 
was an outline plan, covering “all citizens without upper 
income limit… all-embracing in scope of persons and needs.” 
It did not purport to be a complete and final scheme, ready 
for immediate translation into legislative form. The detail 
had still to be worked out. Further, the plan was based on 
three assumptions; first the institution of a scheme of 
children’s allowances, second the framing of a 
comprehensive health service, and third the avoidance of 
mass unemployment. But they were assumptions only, and 
as they were not an integral part of the plan, Sir William 
Beveridge, naturally and properly, did not attempt in his 
Report to work out detailed proposals for implementing 
them. The Government, while accepting these assumptions 
as necessary prerequisites to an improved and 
comprehensive plan of social insurance, have had to examine 
them closely in order to be reasonably sure that they could be 
realised in practice.»336 
 
 The Beveridge Report proposed a global solution to the 
fragmentation of social insurances. The government published different 
White Papers on social insurances, national health service, employment 
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policies. This did not derogate from the universalism of the report, but 
rather found specific solutions in each domain. 
The White Paper on the social security had two parts: the first 
concerned the proposal for the reform of the social insurances, while 
the second part treated separately the industrial injury insurance.337 
Family allowances were excluded, as the bill for their implementation 
already passed during wartime; the White Paper instead dealt with a 
more comprehensive social and economic policy for the reconstruction, 
which globally pointed at fostering economic growth and wealth, and 
preventing income loss in any change in life. The social benefits were 
no longer residual policy, but part of a renewed commitment of the 
State, as «the next aim of national policy must be to secure the general 
prosperity and happiness of the citizens.»338 This is why they were 
embedded into the reconstruction policies: 
 
«Neither of these courses of action can be effective alone. In a 
community whose earning power was seriously impaired by 
its failure to use its people and resources effectively – that is 
to say, by unemployment or inefficiency – it would be 
impossible to avoid widespread individual poverty, 
whatever special measures were adopted. But it is also true 
that a nation with a high power of production would not 
have solved its problem if it included any appreciable section 
of people who were in want, whether through loss of 
individual earning power, due to ill-health, unemployment 
or old-age, or through inability to provide properly for their 
children. Only when this problem is also solved has a 
community achieved genuine social security.»339 
 
The White Paper retained the main aspects of the Beveridge 
Report: the State’s contribution in the funding of social security, family 
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allowances and NHS; the flat-rate contribution; the reorganization of 
the categories in six classes, with the new risk categories (death grants 
and those for the married women); the rationalization of the schemes 
on the principle “one card, one stamp, all benefits”; the room left for 
the complementary pensions; the universalism and social solidarity. 
The standards rates for sickness and unemployment benefits did not 
overcome the threshold of 35£, with supplementary grants according to 
different conditions (married couples with children had an extension of 
family allowances to the eldest child, who normally could not qualify 
for the weekly 5£ allowance). The retiring age, as in the Beveridge 
Report, was 65 and 60 respectively for men and women, with increased 
benefits for those who did not leave work by that age. The married 
women’ grants, widows’ benefits and death grants might not be as 
relevant as unemployment, sickness and old-age benefits; however, 
they marked that shift of social policy to the system later called “from 
the cradle to the grave”.  
The White Paper did not merely transpose Beveridge’ 
indications. Unemployment benefits were limited to 30 weeks in 
continuous periods, with further extension; the Beveridge Report 
recommended instead to make benefits for sickness and 
unemployment unlimited in time, but submitted respectively to 
behaviour conditions and vocational training. The government refused 
to accept such a proposal in order to prevent abuses of benefit. The old-
age pensions underwent a similar simplification, considering the 
demographic trend, which would have doubled the recipients as the 
contributors would dropped. The flat-rate schemes matched social 
solidarity with fiscal sustainability. Last, the government tackled also 
the thorny issue of the Approved Societies. The Beveridge Report 
purposely did not grip the issue of their abolition concurrently with the 
birth of the NHS. The Government did not retain the Approved Societies; 
there was no room for independent and alternative financial units in a 
flat-rate, universalist, system. With the National Insurance Funds, no 
other responsible agent needed to exist, as the NHS was free and 
universalistic. Different was the approach towards Friendly Societies and 
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other private companies; compulsory and voluntary schemes might 
coexist, conditional upon the reform.  
The social assistance was included in the social protection. The 
National Assistance Board unified the previous forms of assistance; 
before the reform proposed in the White Paper, there were four forms of 
assistance out of public moneys for persons whose own resources were 
insufficient for their maintenance. Thy were the outdoor relief under 
the Poor Law and the financial assistance for specific cases, such as 
supplementary pensions, blindness, war distresses. These schemes 
were managed both by the local authorities (especially for the Poor 
Laws) and by the National Assistance Boards. The government proposed 
the unification of the schemes under a single system of national 
assistance;340 it also extended the cases for the “disregarding” of other 
benefits to allow the access to the assistance (e.g. sickness or industrial 
injuries benefits), thus broadening the recipients. In that regard, the 
government did not accept the recommendations of the National 
Assistance Board, which suggested more caution.341 
In the second part of the White Paper, the government dealt 
with the special scheme for the industrial injuries, adjusting 
Beveridge’s proposals with political and financial considerations.342 The 
industrial injury insurance replaced the Workmen’s Compensations, 
milestone of the “older” British social insurances. It was extended to all 
workers, and covered also certain industrial diseases. In many respects, 
the industrial injury insurance worked similarly as the war pensions’ 
schemes. It recognised a certain similarity between the soldier 
wounded on the battlefield and the worker injured during his 
productive activity for the community. From the private contract 
design of the older Workmen’s Compensations, the new insurance 
inferred that guaranteeing the worker’s health and his incomes 
concerned the whole community. It also reflected the changing 
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perspective operated by the war; in the public discourses and 
perceptions, the national effort weakened the traditional social 
distinction and involved the workers in the national struggle. As for the 
veterans of the war, workers were entitled of pensions in case of loss in 
health, strength, power to fully enjoy life. These lifetime pensions could 
be extended also to the dependants of the insured, the benefits were 
flat-rate and non-contributory. The funding of industrial injury was 
autonomous from the national fund of the other social insurances, still 
being under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Insurances. The 
tripartite administration of the authority was granted;employers and 
workers’ representative coupled the public officers. For this reason, the 
industrial injury insurance scheme was treated separately to the other 
insurances. 
The previous Workmen’s Compensation covered some 17 
million workers, with important charges for public finances and 
employers. The industrial injury insurance affected the core of the 
British social legislation, and was considered an essential reform. The 
older system was defined in a Fabian report delivered to the 
government as «a formidable catalogue of injustice and hardships 
arising from it […] can only be defined as scandalous.»343There was no 
systematic provision to ensure the rehabilitation, the liability of the 
compensation was on the individual employer, the dispute was still 
settled by the tribunals and the compensations were relatively low. 
This 1940 report claimed for a radical change of the Workmen’s 
Compensation in a wider reform: «Workmen’s Compensation and the 
Social Services having grown up in a typically English, haphazard 
fashion, will not in the period of post-war reconstruction provide a 
golden opportunity for securing the advantages of uniformity and 
systematization in the Social Services as a whole? The task might well 
be one for another Royal Commission much smaller and much more 
powerful in personnel than the present Royal Commission on 
Workmen’s Compensation.»344  
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This kind of considerations affected the works of the Beveridge 
Committee, which owed much to TUC concerns as well as to the Royal 
Commission on Workmen’s Compensation.345 The final decision of the 
Government was to incorporate the industrial injury insurance within 
the social insurances, but as a separate scheme. Thus, the provisions for 
disablement or loss of life eventually became a public social service. As 
for the funding of the whole system of social security, the contributory 
tripartite funding was retained for social insurances like retirement 
pensions, unemployment, sickness and invalidity benefits, widows, 
maternity and death grants. Family allowances, the National 
Assistance, the industrial injury insurance, and the NHS instead were 
integrally paid by general taxation. These were the only four provisions 
fully universalistic, as financed by the whole community and accessible 
to all citizens regardless the contributions paid.  
Alongside the proposals on the social insurance, within few 
months the Government published other two White Papers, respectively 
on the NHS and on full employment. The Government retained 
Beveridge’s formulation on the action on three directions: social 
insurance, health service and full employment. The establishment of 
the free health service was prefigured in the A National Health Service, 
outlined by new-born Ministry of Health, directed by the liberal Ernest 
Brown.346 The healthcare reforms were defined in the White Paper as the 
“natural” outcome of the British history:  
 
«The idea of a full health and medical service for the whole 
population is not a completely new on, arising only as part of 
post-war reconstruction. In the long and continuous process 
by which this country has been steadily evolving its health 
services the stage has been reached, in the Government’s 
view, at which the single comprehensive service for all 
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should be regarded as the natural next development. The 
end of the war will present the opportunity, and plans for 
post-war reconstruction provide a setting, but the proposal 
to set up a comprehensive service has to be seen against the 
past as well as the future and to be recognised as part of a 
general evolution of improved health services which has 
been going on in this country for generations. […] The 
methods of organising it must be closely related to history 
and to past and present experience.»347 
 
The fully universal and free features of the NHS was 
confirmed: free healthcare available to anyone, funding via general 
taxation; health coverage for minor accidents to major surgeries and 
illnesses, from maternity to tuberculosis. This latter was not tackled 
through the establishment of specific contributory insurances, like in 
Italy, but through it treatment in the free national service. The NHS did 
not treat only physical illness, but also mental diseases. In its first 
configuration, it was expected to cover also some specific healings, as 
for the dental care, which traditionally has never been included in the 
systems of social policy. The White Paper established an organization on 
three levels: the General Practitioners (the family doctor), the Health 
Centres that combined general treatments and social assistances services 
at a local level, and the public hospitals. The GPs were the basis of the 
healthcare service, as around their function gravitated the most 
important political concerns, and because the BMA and the voluntary 
hospitals represented important vested interests.348 New Local Planning 
Authorities were created to entrench in the territory the structures of the 
NHS, which was centrally directed by the Ministry of Health.  
These White Papers, accessible to a wider audience, were 
discussed in the House of Commons. Jowitt, Ministry Without Portfolio 
and Ministry Designate of Social Insurances, presented the 
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governmental proposals in the Parliament before Beveridge. He 
defined it as «one of the greatest single advances which had ever been 
made either in this country or in any other country in the development 
of Social Insurance.»349 Beveridge’s principles were retained except for 
the subsistence level of the benefits. It was not task, Jowitt argued, of 
social insurances to secure the vital income:  
 
«It is not and does not pretend to be a scheme of social 
security. Social security can only be achieved by many and 
diverse methods. Economic justice, political justice, justice 
everywhere, full employment, organization of the health 
services, maintenance of a stable price level, a satisfactory 
house policy – these things and many others are all necessary 
ingredients in a policy of social security.»350 
 
The governmental view on social policy did not apparently 
limit itself to the reform of social insurances, part of a wider project of 
social security. And the intervention of the conservative Minister of 
Education R.A.B. Butler confirmed the consistency of the governmental 
effort, introducing the Education Act as an important piece in the British 
social policy.351 A a thorough plan of social security required a 
coordinated ministerial action. This was for instance the case of family 
allowances. The helps in kind provided by the Family Allowance Bill fell 
also within the scope of public education, the social insurances and the 
healthcare, being the foundation of State’s nutritional policy:  
 
«The Government’s policy of providing both cash allowances 
and free meals and milk in school as “combined operation” 
[…]. The Government plan is based on the belief that we are 
introducing in this system of help in kind a great new social 
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reform which will have very desirable results in improving 
the children’s health, and at the same time we are accepting 
the view that family allowances in themselves are a very fine 
measure of social advance.»352 
 
Slightly different was the case of industrial accident, which 
usually had separate provisions and administration. The government 
retained a fully universalistic approach, rejecting special levy for 
hazardous industries and flat-rate contributory risk instead of 
industrial compensations based on earnings. The compensation was 
thus paid not only for the loss of income, but also for the physical loss. 
The government aimed at eradicating the litigation between workers 
and employers, typical of the older Workmen’s Compensations. The 
compensations lost their juridical framework to become an 
administrative practice, with new means to settle the conflict; the 
consultation between employers and insurance companies were 
replaced by the public Advisory Council to reconcile. The Home 
Secretary Morrison, stated that «cumulatively this scheme represents a 
revolution.»353  
Jowitt’s speech was welcomed by the deputies. The more 
enthusiastic regarded the scheme as «a piece of administrative 
machinery which we can recommend to the rest of the world as a 
British product.»354 The most part of them endorsed the plan of social 
insurances and family allowances, with reservations for their financial 
boundaries, or for special provision for specific categories. The 
industrial injuries insurances reached an even larger consensus. The 
House of Common looked at them as the permanent abandonment of 
the outdated and unfair system, in favour of a modern concept of 
protection for workers, including non-industrial categories. For the first 
time, the State committed itself to provide a compulsory public 
insurance, almost doubling the benefits for the injured workers. Few 
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voices raised against the universalism of the reforms, as for Sir 
Waldron Smithers, admirer of von Hayek and fierce anti-communist, 
who joined the anti-welfare frond within the Tory and assisted Mrs. 
Margaret Thatcher political beginnings. He considered the scheme 
unworkable from the financial point of view, and mostly «contrary to 
the natural law.»355 His position reflected old liberal positions; his 
concerns on the aftermaths on the budget were quite generic, but the 
ideological opposition was clearer: «the Government had not right to 
gamble and raise hopes which could not be realised. The scheme ought 
to be left over until the General Elections for the people to decide. The 
enactment of the proposal, which undermine creative energy, should 
be postponed until we knew better where we stood financially. The 
only thing the proposal did not insure against was laziness, and they 
indicated more and more State control.»356 These voices were minority 
in the Parliament and in the country. However, they constituted the 
core of a strain of thought that passed through the “Golden Age” to 
remerge with Thatcherism.  
Greenwood and Beveridge were present to the debate in the 
House of Common. The former appreciated the holistic approach: the 
social insurances were closely interwoven with social services; the 
healthcare with social assistance, and strictly related to the sickness 
benefits; unemployment was considered a failure of the State to create 
jobs and economic growth. For the first time, these issues were not 
handled on a piecemeal approach, but as a whole. His main criticisms 
concerned the timing of the reform. With the exception of family 
allowances, the other reforms were not on the immediate agenda of the 
government. Greenwood directly linked the possibility to enact such an 
ambitious programme with the wartime conditions. Unlike the 
deputies opposing to social security, he claimed for a complete 
implementation of these reforms before the general elections and 
during the war:  
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«I do not believe that a party Government, on the peace-time 
model, could carry through a Bill like this without facing 
very grave perils. If this House, composed as it is now, 
makes up its mind, it can get this scheme. There will be 
attacks from vested interests. It is no good hiding the fact. 
The spate of protests grows from morning to morning, but 
my hon. Friends and I have no intention of bowing our heads 
to any vested interest. If the Government will stand firm in 
their proposals they will have our united backing. We cannot 
afford to have this scheme sabotaged or imperilled. There are 
people in this House who have a very uneasy feeling that we 
cannot afford it. We have got to afford it. We are not going to 
afford this scheme by whittling it down, or by introducing 
measures of so-called economy. We can afford this scheme if 
our people are enabled to work for their living, as the vast 
majority of them desire to do.»357     
 
Beveridge welcomed what he defined – borrowing Churchill’s 
words – a “gigantic scheme”, which endorsed one of the major changes 
underpinning his report: «instead of having a scheme for employees 
only they had a scheme for all citizens, including housewives and 
persons working on their own account.»358 Beveridge feared major 
departures from the main principles of the report, as for the individual 
responsibility to abolish the want. He also claimed for a regulation of 
the Friendly Societies to prevent the overlapping of the schemes, and 
thus to produce unequal benefits for equal contributions. Beveridge 
also regarded favourably at the State monopoly for industrial 
assurances, through the Industrial Assurance Board. He assessed 
governmental proposal not as «a mere improvement of the social 
insurance but a first step towards a new Britain, a Britain without 
want.»359 For this reason, he wanted them implemented before the 1945 
elections, in order to prevent controversies and the political auction of 
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the electoral campaigns, and to retain the exceptional strain and unity 
of British society and politics.  
 
2.2.3. The parties, the social security, and the limits of consensus 
Yet, social security became one of the core topics of the 1945 
general elections. Beveridge himself got out with the Liberal Party, 
drawing on his popularity due to his report. In the official debates, the 
parties shared a general consensus on principles, basic administrative 
tools and the very general functioning of the social insurances. Major 
differences concerned the extent of social benefits and services. The 
debate crossed the whole spectrum of the British politics, including the 
Communist Party.360 It also involved different factions and areas within 
the same parties. This was particular true for the two major British 
parties.  
Stiff resistances came from the right-wing of the Tories, which 
quickly gathered around some figures like Smithers and the National 
League for Freedom. In turn, a relevant trend of the party endorsed social 
security. The Tory Reform Committee was born within the parliamentary 
group, chaired by the Viscount Hinchingbrooke. They represented the 
political fraction of the party that fully backed the general guidelines 
and outcomes of the report, as well as other planning policies.361 They 
proposed a wide set of reforms to recast British society and economy 
“from the right”, through the incorporation of social reforms, full 
employment and national planning in the political programme of the 
party. They wanted a strong collaboration with the TUC and 
employers’ representatives, in order to involve the organized interests 
and the national community, respectively, in the definition of public 
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policies and in the funding of social security. The war was the moment 
to renew the spirit of British democratic institutions, as «the supreme 
test of parliamentary democracy will lie in its ability to reconcile 
planning for full employment with the liberty of the individual.»362 The 
committee published nine bulletins on different reforms; the land, town 
and country planning, the budget, and, mostly, proposals on 
universalistic social insurances and employment policy.363 They also 
claimed for withdrawing the Approved Societies, and for resizing the 
Friendly Societies fields of action in voluntary sickness schemes. Part of 
the Tories joined the so-called “reluctant collectivists”, those liberals 
and conservatives that accepted a more important role of the State in 
the social and economic life. 
This group devoted particular attention to social security, 
whose implementation required an important fiscal burden. An 
ambitious programme of social security worked only with stable 
economic growth, considerable attainable by British industry: «the time 
has come to concentrate upon increasing the national income in the 
cause of Social Progress by every means, and in particular by increased 
industrial efficiency.»364 By the very beginning of 1945, the drafts for the 
economic policies moved towards policies to boost production and 
promoted higher redistribution of wealth: «the national income must 
be restored and augmented by deliberately organising and expanding 
economy.»365 This goals was a cross-cutting policy, which defined two 
distinguished ideas of the post-war society: «there is today a clear-cut 
division between those who seek security through a policy of 
restriction and those who seek a rising standard of life through a policy 
of expansion. This cleavage cuts across party and class alignments, and 
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corresponds with the mental outlook of individuals. […] Tory 
reformers take their stand upon the side of expansion.»366 The need to 
increase the wealth was not a goal of social policy in itself, but was 
considered – at once – a political goal and the only way to make full 
employment and social security sustainable. What the Tory Committee 
claimed for was even an «an expansion upon a scale comparable to that 
which took place in this country and America during the industrial 
revolution.»367 For doing so, they admitted how «almost everything 
was wrong with our pre-war outlook and its legacy of out-of-date 
methods and equipment.»368  
The hope of conservative reformers was to combine the tasks of 
the reconstruction with a policy of productivity and expansion led by 
the government, refusing the left-wing nationalisations as well as the 
rightist belief in the private enterprise. This “new centre” proposed 
some kind of Keynesian planning for the reconstruction, then 
applicable to regulate industrial and budget policies. Government 
should coordinate the economic and industrial actors, boost the export 
and use the budget leverages, such as public investments and money 
supply.369 Limited nationalizations were not driven by ideological 
assumptions, but on the very pragmatic acknowledgement – 
strengthened by the war effort – that State interventionism could boost 
the productivity. The challenge was to apply the tools of the war 
economy in peacetimes. Electoral considerations also stepped in; they 
alleged that social reformism was entrenched in the party’s traditional 
realism and pragmatism in representing, unlike the Labour, the national 
community and not the “sectional interests”, which were regarded 
unfavourably in the public discourse of the time. 
The reform of the social insurances crossed the internal debate 
in the Labour Party, with some consequences in the post-war approach 
of Attlee’s Government. They became, alongside nationalizations, the 
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frontline between the left-wing and the centre in the party. Historian 
Stephen Brooke noticed that the former still wanted to accompany 
social reforms with wider planning of industrial production and 
socializations, while the latter focused on social security, full 
employment and demand management as “socialist measures” in 
themselves.370 By 1944, the Labour moved to a more consistent 
endorsement of social security in its programme, pushing 
nationalisation into the background. As the problems of the recovery 
entered in the debate, the party debate possible ways to steer from war 
economy without losing the grip over the economic system. The 
“revisionists” pragmatically proposed to nationalise only coal, 
transports and electricity; the Labour was vague on the possibility of 
socialist planning even without massive industrial socializations.371 
While Labour’s right-wing set a minimum definition of the “socialist 
policies”, the left-wing, led by the future Health Minister Aneurin 
Bevan, considered the nationalisation of the economic key-sectors the 
only way to improve British industrial productivity. The explicit 
reference on nationalisation differed the 1945 Labour electoral 
programme from Liberals and Conservatives, but did not solve 
fundamental ambiguities on the political direction of the party: 
«Labour’s victory in 1945 was one of triumph, but confusions and 
differences over the ends and means of socialism lay just below the 
surface.»372  
Labour extensively discussed the main provisions related to 
social insurance and the NHS. The party generally welcomed the White 
Papers, which «in their scope and comprehensiveness represent a great 
step forward.»373 Labour looked favourably at all the major provisions, 
advocating to the very history of the working-class movement the 
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claims for these reforms, from its origins to the wartime legislations 
and reforms. Labour Party tried to present itself as a “national party”, 
as the Tories did, supporting the White Paper. However, they were 
critical on some aspects; on the levels of benefits, the Labour claimed 
for objectives subsistence parameters under which the incomes should 
not drop. This was a key point, as the governmental White Papers 
consistently differed from the Beveridge Report. The Labour then 
criticized other major departures from the Beveridge Report: the time 
limits for sickness benefits; the lower rates of old-age pensions with 
regard to unemployment benefits; the ineligibility of the mothers to be 
paid for family allowances; the low rates of the industrial injuries 
insurances, which Labour wanted accompanied by medical services. 
The Liberal Beveridge made similar criticisms in each of these points.  
More problematic was the case for the NHS. As it represented 
the most relevant innovation from the previous health services, Labour 
frightened its watering down, due to resistances by vested interests. 
The party proposed to give great power to central Ministry to 
implement a planned-oriented reform, through the collaboration with 
the local and central Joint Authorities, in order to cover the whole 
territory. The major concern were the objection of the BMA and of the 
voluntary hospitals, which Labour proposed to include in the public 
schemes. The wartime experiments on planning might influence 
Labour proposals in that regard; the party backed the White Paper 
policy of “regional planning”, coordinated from the central 
government, to relieve congestion in “over-doctorate” areas and 
increase medical services in “under-doctorate” areas.374 Such proposals 
signalled the preference of the Labour for more planned and State-
driven policies, as the doctors were compelled to exercise their 
profession into the public service. The struggle for making healthcare 
an universalistic and public service was a crucial one, because 
encompassed the “planning” momentum and the leftovers of the 
former system: «both these proposals are absolutely necessary in the 
public interest if the present limited supply of doctors is to go round. 
Both are bitterly opposed by the BMA as interference with the rights of 
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individual.»375 The Labour went beyond some cautions of the White 
Papers, proposing the nationalisation of all kinds of medical services 
and treatments, making them free and available for all under the new 
NHS and the related health centres. Their 1943 report considered it the 
most relevant among all the social policies, and the prerequisite to deal 
with the reconstruction with unified approach:  
 
«The aim of the nation’s Health policy can be nothing less 
than the utmost possible fitness of body and mind for all the 
people. [...] for full health is the greatest asset of an 
individual, and a healthy population is the greatest asset of a 
nation. [...] We need social action to create the conditions 
under which the healthy needs of the whole people can be 
satisfied. In truth, there is hardly any activity of government 
which does not affect health, directly and indirectly. If, 
through a sound social and economic policy, we can master 
poverty, we shall thereby do much to eliminate ill-health; for 
poverty is still the greatest cause of ill-health. If, by good 
government, we secure for all good conditions of work, with 
full employment, and with ample possibilities for leisure and 
exercise; if, through our public services, the citizen can obtain 
well-built and well-placed houses with sanitation, water, 
clean and plentiful milk and other nourishing food, clean air 
and as much sunlight as possible, and freedom from 
injurious noise; then the health of the nation will benefit far 
more from these causes than from much doctoring.»376 
 
Health policy encompassed other areas of public intervention; 
Labour claimed for the health service to combine curative and 
preventive cures. As party’s document recognized, «the war has forced 
us to move in this direction.»377, as it promoted planning, assistance and 
food-rationing policies. This experiments could develop planned food, 
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preventive, housing and assistance policies to improve the life 
standards. Labour Party pushed for the NHS more consistently than 
the Conservatives, as they were «calling for something different in kind 
from an Insurance Scheme. We want the whole nation to be the insurer, and 
the whole nation to be insured. What we want does not involve a mass of 
paper work, or filling-in of forms, or competitive offers of this and that 
special benefit as the reward for an increased premium. What we want, 
in short, is a comprehensive service for the health of the whole nation, 
provided by the nation, for the nation.»378 
The traditional view on British politics during WWII stressed 
the existence of a general “consensus” that war led among the parties 
and in the society.379 A second historiographic wave contested the 
extent of such agreement on social policy. In their view, the War 
Cabinet, where the Tories had the lead, watered down the most 
innovative aspects of the Beveridge Report, e.g. the national minimum 
income and the scope of the NHS, which were the linchpins of Labour’s 
propaganda. Kevin Jeffreys argued that the reforms prospected in the 
White Papers were rather the consolidation of the previous schemes, and 
that, if a “consensus” was to be found, it was rather in the early post-
war period.380 In fact, the Conservatives were not immediately 
convinced of the workability of “integral” universalistic reforms, as 
more emphasis was put on tax break and as in the party resisted old-
fashioned takes on the “individual responsibilities”.381 Once the 
Beveridge Report was exploited in the wartime propaganda, however, 
the government could not back off. The success of the report compelled 
the parties to endorse its main principles. The White Papers seemed to 
have greater support by Tories, as it was more moderate in its extents (it 
talked about “national insurances” rather than “social security”) and in 
the social provisions, especially for unemployment and sickness. 
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Labour’s full endorsement of the White Paper on the NHS resulted from 
its long-lasting claims in that regard.382 While Conservatives partially 
backed the claims of BMA to retain older privileges and the voluntary 
hospitals, the Labour feared the downgrading of the reform to the mere 
strengthening of the health insurances for lower incomes, as the Tories 
had in fact suggested.383  
 These non-negligible differences resulted from the democratic 
dialectics that the war effort did not erase. The parties were preparing 
for the general elections once the war was over, and that led to a more 
vivid discussion on the social reforms; in fact, a very general consensus 
around the main setting of the White Papers was established. The extent 
of the reforms met the programmes of the two major parties. While 
Labour tried to appropriate of the historical and cultural background of 
these reforms, relevant sectors of the Conservatives fully endorsed the 
letter of the two White Papers. Differences laid behind the apparent 
consensus. While the groups of reluctant collectivists” among the Tories 
accepted the reforms proposed by the War Cabinet, the Labour claimed 
for a wider extent of the benefits, also demanding further and more 
radical economic reforms than those advocated by the Conservatives. 
But divergences crossed also within each party. As Cole ironically 
noted, consistent sectors of public opinion and politics still regarded 
the State’s commitment in this field as a rollback of British tradition to 
Nazi or Soviet totalitarian solutions.384 
 
2.3. The ways to full employment in peacetime 
 
2.3.1. The full employment and the policies for the reconstruction 
The proposals on unemployment fell into the debate on the 
reconstruction, quickly assimilated to the broader programme for social 
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security as designed in the Beveridge Report. They dated back to 
previous elaborations, but made a qualitative leap throughout the war. 
British policy-makers realized how disruptive the unemployment was 
for Western societies, since «unemployment was more than a great and 
unavoidable waste. It was symptomatic of the breakdown of a whole 
economic system and one of the propagators of Fascism and of the war 
we are now fighting.»385 The war changed the intellectual framework of 
many groups that in the Thirties claimed for planning policies or 
socialist solutions. The emergence of Keynesianism provided a theory 
to rethink economic policies; however, only during WWII the 
“Keynesian revolution” gathered intellectual and social consensus, 
even if its implementation as public policy was more difficult. Groups 
like the PEP, for instance, endorsed the universalistic social reforms 
and employment policies; the word “welfare” was now explicitly 
matched with social insurances, family allowances, health service, vital 
income and minimum wages, progressive taxation, food subsides. 
Employment policies and redistribution of wealth were part of it: «and 
not only would such a policy be justified on moral grounds. It would 
also assist the elimination of unemployment by effecting some transfer 
of income from the well-off who tend to spend a lower part of their 
incomes to the less well-off who spend a comparatively large part of 
their incomes, so creating a greater demand for consumer, goods and, 
indirectly, for capital goods as well.»386 G.D.H. Cole, former supporter 
of industrial democracy and socialist plans, in 1943 backed up 
governmental policies for full employment, alongside industrial 
cooperation between trade unions and employers. War demonstrated 
how Nazi and Fascist models were not viable ways to solve 
unemployment, and the only way to avoid the overextensions of 
governmental power was to call social bodies and representative to 
collaborate.387  
War represented therefore a Damascene conversion for a whole 
class of intellectuals, politicians, civil servants and economists to some 
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sort of “Keynesianism”, regardless the effective adherence to 
Keynesian views. Beveridge was one of them; his initial lack of 
understanding of Keynesian theory was gradually dwindling off, and 
he eventually developed a close collaboration with Keynes himself in 
the drafting of his book on full employment, published in 1944.388 This 
was not a governmental report, yet the author designed it as a sequel of 
the 1942 Allied and Social Service Report. While the report on the social 
security tackled the Giant of Want, the work on full employment 
addressed the Idleness, another of the “Five Giants” on the road of 
prosperity and freedom. It proposed to intervene in the labour market 
in order to have always more job vacancies than unemployed. In doing 
so «it is concerned with the necessity, possibility and methods of 
achieving full employment in a free society, that is to say, subjected to 
the proviso that all essential citizen liberties are preserved. [...] The 
proviso excludes the totalitarian solution of full employment in a 
society completely planned and regimented by irremovable dictator.»389 
The tasks of democratic societies to maintain full employment were 
complex, as it was impossible to guarantee political continuities and to 
impose coercive wage policies, to force placement of manpower and to 
regulate consumer goods market in democratic regimes. Beveridge 
opposed the retail of the emergency and coercive policies, which 
allowed full employment and quick steer of industrial production 
between 1939 and 1943. Nonetheless, the issue was still to provide 
wartime efficiency during peacetimes.  
The whole report was in fact the attempt to retain free market 
society with economic tools to wage unemployment, unless experience 
showed otherwise. Beveridge borrowed many of the Keynesian 
assumptions. He proposed to act upon the budget in order to 
incorporate new elements in its calculation: private expenditures on 
consumption and private domestic investments; public expenditures 
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covered by taxes and other public revenue, and those covered by loans; 
balance of payments’ equilibrium; the estimated value of the national 
production when achieved full employment. These were part of «the 
ultimate responsibility [...] to set up demand for all the labour seeking 
employment, must be taken by the State.»390 This responsibility did not 
exert leverage only on budget policies. Beveridge proposed also State 
control, and, in fact, foresaw the implementation of a “mixed 
economy”. In his view, the State should extend its control by 
programming public expenditures and by regulating private 
investments; nationalizing the Bank of England, and more generally 
harmonizing the whole bank system to the general State fiscal policy; 
planning the location of the industries, coordinating labour mobility, 
controlling the price of goods and managing foreign trade.391 These 
were the leverages on which ground the policy of full employment, 
which demanded the stabilization of the total expenditure and the 
increase of consumptions. Such a task required a redefinition of the 
boundaries of the State: 
 
«Full employment means ensuring that outlay in total is 
sufficient. Only the State can ensure that. Full employment at 
the rising standards of life made possible by technical 
progress means that the outlay is wisely directed. The State 
cannot escape ultimate responsibility for the general 
direction of outlay by reference to social priorities, however 
much it may be guided in its direction by the preferences 
expressed by citizens, in buying as well as in voting. The 
State cannot undertake the responsibility for full 
employment without full powers. It must adopt neither the 
consumption approach nor the investment approach 
exclusively, but must be free to adjust policy according to 
circumstances, over the whole range of possible subjects of 
spending.»392 
                                                          
390 Ivi. p. 135. 
391  Ivi. pp. 124-193.  
392 Ivi. p. 187. 
169 
 
 
 War experience taught methods and set up mechanisms to 
boost the demand. The challenge after the war was to maintain the 
effectiveness of these policies, while restoring the liberties for which the 
British were fighting: 
 
«It is in accord with the lesson of repeated experience of war 
that full employment is achieved, not by socialization of 
production which even in war is still left largely in private 
hands, but by socialization of effective demand, determined 
by a scale of priorities. That, with a different scale of 
priorities, to suit peace rather than war, with no limitless 
demand for war material requiring rationing and restrictions 
elsewhere, with a restoration of all essential citizen liberties, 
including free spending of personal incomes, is the essence of 
what is proposed here.»393 
 
 The proposals for full employment were expected to stabilize 
post-war societies also from the points of view of the domestic and 
international security. Beveridge recognized that «the policy outlined 
in the Report by-passes the socialist-capitalist controversy.»394 The plan 
for full employment could gather different views – just as 
Keynesianism made by the end of the Thirties – under some policies 
that proved to be efficient during wartime. But full employment could 
secure peace and prosperity also from the international point of view; 
Beveridge hoped the recasting of international trades under 
multilateral (or, at least, bilateral) agreements and regulations. In order 
to avoid uneven balances of trade, Beveridge recommended the 
opening up to free international trades only if all the countries would 
achieve full employment. In this scenario, all countries should adopt 
measures to maintain full employment, pillar of post-war security. 
Otherwise, the openness to international trades would have negatively 
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affected the balances of trade and the internal markets (and especially 
for a country like Britain).  
 The report on full employment, unlike the one on social 
security, was not sponsored by the War Cabinet. Governmental 
proposals departed from Beveridge recommendations, and in fact 
Beveridge’s report on full employment had more impact to 
international opinion than on public policies. However, also within 
governmental bodies the issue of unemployment gained room. The 
“Keynesians” co-opted in the government were concerned ito this topic 
since the very beginning of the war. They did not tackle this issue in the 
same political terms, as Beveridge did (after all, Keynes himself never 
considered the “moral” implications of unemployment). Meade, 
member of the Economic Section, even before the creation of the 
Beveridge Committee proposed to prevent general unemployment 
through income and wage policies, to avoid inflationary spiral after the 
war.395 This was the typical concern of the “Keynesians”, who were 
keen of controlling the raise of inflation, unlike after WWI. 
Unemployment policies concerned – more than the other social 
provisions – both social and economic domains; the governmental 
proposals, thus, resulted as a compromise between the new ideas and 
the “Treasury View”, which maintained more classical options. But if it 
is possible to speak about a “Keynesian revolution”, this occurred 
during wartime, with the 1941 war’s budget and with the employment 
policies culminated in the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy, which 
developed autonomously from the second Beveridge’s report, and was 
published before.  
 
2.3.2. The White Paper on the Employment Policy  
The Economic Section’s concerns for preventing inflation 
resulted in proposals for a strict wage policy balanced by some 
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measure of social security.396 These positions collided with the 
reservations of the Treasury, standing by other measures to stabilize 
the level of public investments.397 In the drafting of the 1944 White 
Paper, these visions clashed; the Economic Section was fully “Keynesian” 
in the detailed measures (e.g. the use of the budget to maintain full 
employment), while the Treasury only apparently opened up to limited 
provisions, as for public works as counter-cyclical measure. “Beveridge 
social reforms” as well as “Keynesian employment policies” came up 
against the Treasury; the proposals on social security eventually stuck 
together the measures of Meade and the Economic Section. A first 
convergence concerned the use of the social insurances as counter-
cyclical measure in the event of a post-war cycle of inflation/deflation. 
Ultimately, the 1944 White Paper was a compromise between the 
“Keynesians” and the Treasury, and were restricted to the budget 
policies to prevent unemployment. While the White Papers were 
influenced by the new ideas, Treasury did not necessarily borrow 
Keynesian principles, accepted only later. On the other side, both 
Keynes and Meade were afraid of inflation and quite critical to 
Beveridge’s definition of full employment at 3%, as they considered 5% 
of unemployment the indicator of the structural unemployment.398 In 
that regard, they rather endorsed Treasury view than Beveridge coeval 
report. 
Employment policies gradually merged with social and 
reconstruction policies. The last White Paper, published in May 1944, 
dealt with all this.399 The paper outlined the policy to maintain a stable 
and high level of employment after the war. It did not establish a 
projected legislation, but rather sought for the conditions to favour full 
employment: high demand of goods and services; expansive policy 
even in a period of expected shortage in the transition from war to 
peace economy. Internal and external demands were considered 
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equally important for the economic expansion; in that regard, also the 
White Paper claimed for the settlement of a new economic and political 
international order through institutions and agreements, as envisaged 
in the Atlantic Charter. Second important point was the retention of the 
total internal expenditure, in the recovery and in the longer-term.  
The brief paper showed how unemployment policy was related 
to a new international order and to the achievement of social security in 
peacetimes. Britain was a country dependent from external trade for 
foodstuffs and raw materials, and had to keep under control the 
balance of payment and the export of goods and services. These 
conditions required international trade co-operation, stable rates of 
change, control of the swings in world commodity prices and 
international agreements to preserve the equilibrium in the balance of 
payments, in order to not upset the internal markets and consequently 
the international trade. Firstly, the paper recommended to implement a 
real international economic policy, renewing the economic relations 
with the Commonwealth. The second pillar was the increase of 
productive efficiency: «during the war British industry has amply 
demonstrated its power to improve the technique of its production, and 
this improvement must continue if we are to solve the problems of the 
post-war years.»400 Post-war policies included industrial research and 
the modernisation of industrial plants, machinery and building, as 
already started during the war. The third issue directly dealt with the 
wartime conditions. In the first quarter of 1944, unemployment 
dropped to only 75.000 individuals from more than 1 million at the 
very outbreak of the war; by the time the Employment Policy was 
published, 23 million of workers were directly employed in the Armed 
Forces, the Civil Defence and in the munitions industries. The 
government calculated that 80% of the employment in the 
manufacturing industries was under governmental control. These 
figures only accounted the sectors directly linked with the war effort, 
not counting the supply chains.  
Such mobilization possibly endangered the transition from war 
to peace, shaking up the occupational trend. The most pressing 
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question concerned the potential patches of unemployment in case the 
industrial system failed to adapt itself quickly to peacetime production 
in two ways: the inflationary spiral generated if the demand outran 
supply or if the consumers bought, while a shortage of good might be 
still present; the imbalance in the reallocation of the civilian production 
in relation with national needs or in the production of unessential 
goods in relation with the essentials. To prevent this dynamic, the 
government proposed a set of industrial and economic policies, which 
overall prefigured public support of the industrial system, if not a real 
intervention in the economic life.  
The end of the war would not have withdrawn the wartime 
policies and controls. As the government converted the industries to 
the war production, it could similarly steer to civilian market. Many 
policies could be implemented in that regard: reallocation of the skilled 
manpower from the munitions to the civilian productions; arrangement 
of a large-scale plan of public works, firstly buildings; disposal of the 
surplus government stocks order to not prejudice the normal 
production and distribution of similar good; retail for a limited amount 
of time of the wartime rationing and price control; regulation of 
governmental factories – which constituted an important part of the 
overall British production – to secure a regulated restoration of 
employment.401 Following Beveridge’s recommendations on the need to 
pursuit the war’s levels during peacetime, the government did not plan 
to abandon some measures of public management of the economy. 
They were directed to achieve a stable level of post-war employment, 
notably during the recovery. In the longer-run, the White Paper 
prefigured a far-sighted and balanced distribution of industry and 
labour. The budget should have taken into account the total 
expenditure of goods and services, the level of prices and wages and 
the balanced distribution of workers among the industrial sectors. 
Stabilization of the wages and total expenditure were tools to prevent 
the rise of unemployment, considering private consumptions, public 
expenditure on current services, as well as private and public 
investments.  
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The stabilization of the five factors constituting the total 
national expenditure was treated quite carefully in the White Paper, 
even if the main concern were the restoration of export, given the 
weaknesses of British foreign balance, and the use of public investment 
in case of the fluctuations of the private investment. Even if Britain 
eventually failed in achieving the foreign balance equilibrium, these 
guidelines marked a turn in the economic policies, now enshrined to 
the aims of increasing national wealth and social security. The same 
went for the policies of labour mobility and the stabilization of wages 
and prices. These prefigured the post-war tripartite neo-corporatist 
practices that involved – even though to a lesser extent – also Britain.402 
While there was no explicit reference to Keynes, the White Paper had 
echoes from the debate in the 1930s, then fostered by the war, to 
eventually become public policy:  
 
«The Government are prepared to accept in the future the 
responsibility for taking action at the earliest possible stage 
to arrest a threatened slump. This involves a new approach 
and a new responsibility for the State. It was at one time 
believed that every trade depression would automatically 
bring its own corrective, since prices and wages would fall, 
the fall in prices would bring about an increase in demand, 
and employment would thus be restored. Experience has 
shown, however, that under modern conditions this process 
of self-recovery, if effective at all, is likely to be extremely 
prolonged and to be accompanied by widespread distress, 
particularly in a complex industrial society like our own.»403 
 
The government committed itself in the regular monitoring of 
the figures concerning employment, production, consumption, national 
income, foreign balance of payments, in order to control the volume of 
employment and the overall state of British economy. These statistics 
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became a tool of economic policy; the collection of data on the 
economic trends was fundamental in the compilation of the national 
budget for employment and total expenditure. The White Paper owed a 
lot to wartime experience: "Keynesian” accountability; industrial and 
territorial planning (as proposed in the Utwatth and Scott Reports); 
social security. All these aspects became political aims for post-war 
new policies:  
 
«We can make a fresh approach, with better chances of 
success than ever before, to the task of maintaining a high 
and stable level of employment without sacrificing the 
essential liberties of a free society. […] The Government 
therefore seek to achieve both work for all and a progressive 
increase in the economic efficiency of the nation, as joint 
elements in a growing national power to produce, to earn, 
and to enjoy the fruits of increased well-being.»404 
 
However, Beveridge had mixed feelings towards the White 
Paper. He welcomed the new principles set up in the document, while 
criticized the detailed policy to pursue them. He remarked the the 
Employment Policy «is the practical proof that the central machinery of 
Government in Britain at last includes an organ capable of expert study 
of general economic problems as the basis of orderly foreseeing 
treatment of them» and, mainly, that «the Paper disposes finally and 
officially of the economic fallacy whose pious acceptance by the British 
Treasury in the past has stood firmly in the way of action by the State 
to maintain employment.»405 As a general agreement was reached on 
general principles, the doubts concerned the practical measures for 
managing the total expenditure. The White Paper recognized that 
employment depended on expenditure, the measures were too limited 
and stuck in the past orthodoxies.  
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Exemplary is Beveridge’s criticism on the trust put on public 
works rather than on the leverage over the private investments. For the 
government, the expansion of public works was a merely anti-cyclical 
measure to compensate the contraction in private investments. Other 
limits concerned the ways to finance employment, as the government 
proclaimed to not be willing to increase public deficit and national 
debt, restating «the old Treasury attitude with self-deception added.»406 
The limited scope of these measures signalled how Treasury and 
governmental circles recognized that free market was not able to self-
regulate, yet they still tackled employment policy with transitory, 
emergency measures. Beveridge argued that his report on full 
employment was beyond these older paradigms; unlike the 
governmental White Paper, his it did not consider the fluctuation of 
private investments unavoidable, nor believed that business 
investments could have been stabilized as long as the greater part of 
industry is in private hands. The Full Employment in a Free Society 
prefigured a long-lasting programme of expansive policies to boost the 
demand, the enlargement of the public sector and the stabilization of 
private investment through a national public authority. This would 
have carried out Keynesian policies to regulate loans and taxation 
policies. The government factually failed, according to Beveridge, to 
inextricably link employment policy with social security, 
demonstrating that: 
 
«The Report, in place of accepting the inevitability of 
fluctuation and aiming merely at offsetting it, accepts the 
necessity of stability, not merely in total expenditure, but in 
each main section. […] The Government’s employment 
policy is a policy of public works planned five years at a 
time, and kept on tap to mitigate fluctuation. It is an anti-cycle 
policy, not a policy of full employment. The policy of the Report 
is a policy of full employment defined as meaning always more 
vacant jobs than idle men.»407 
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Between the 1930s and 1940s Beveridge changed his take on 
how to deal with unemployment.408 During wartimes, Beveridge 
corresponded with Keynes, and the “Keynesians” of the Economic 
Section, notably Robbins and Meade, who also made contributions 
on social insurances.409 The correspondence between the 
economists showed how Keynes, in reality, participated to the 
definition of the post-war policies. He had interest in the financial 
aspects of Beveridge’s plan for social security; social security 
contributions, pensions rates, family allowances and the whole set 
of healthcare provisions could match his own budget and fiscal 
policy proposals.410 Keynes endorsed the design of the Beveridge 
Report, regarding favourably at extending «benefits and 
contributions to the whole population.»411 The Beveridge Report 
was also in accordance with some of the 1939 Keynes’ proposals in 
How to Pay for the War, and notably on the need to compensate the 
post-war wage freezes with social benefits, family allowances and 
reduction of the prices of basic necessities. In that regard, forms of 
“Keynesian” managed economy could adapt to universalist social 
security.  
In his speech draft to the Lords debate, he supported the 
amalgamation of social insurances, family allowances, and 
healthcare service in a single reform. Keynes considered it better 
than a piecemeal approach that equally burdened the budget, 
without providing the necessary rationalization of compulsory 
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schemes. The plan could work even through post-war difficulties 
or without high rates of economic growth. Keynes expected the 
increase of the national income; in the worst case scenario he was 
confident that «British industry can scarcely be more inefficient 
than it was before the war.»412 His main concert was admittedly 
the budget position after the war, and in that regard, he remarked 
more than once how «I always thought, and it will be 
remembered, that the Beveridge scheme was by far the cheapest 
we have ever a hope of getting.»413  
On employment, Beveridge and Keynes had slightly 
different perspectives. Beveridge’s 1944 work combined 
Keynesian postulates with his own ideas, which harked back to 
his 1909 text on unemployment. Beveridge “became” Keynesian; 
he supported the intervention on effective demand to regulate 
employment, and since he departed from his previous trust in free 
market self-regulation. But Beveridge also restated his proposals 
on national planning for the industrial resettlement and the labour 
exchange and mobility.414 Beveridge’s road to full employment 
combined budgetary leverage with “true” planning policy, as well 
as macro-economic analysis with supply-side microeconomic 
interventions. His full employment policy was meant to be 
structural, while Keynes was more concerned on how to counter 
cyclical unemployment after the war, and on how to stabilize 
unemployment between 5% and 3%.  
In reality, Keynes seemed to receive favourably both the 
general lines and purposes of governmental White Paper and 
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Beveridge’s proposals.415 Keynesian budget policy adapted to the 
universalistic postulates of social security, and the two key figures 
of these innovations agreed on some basic guidelines for further 
policies during wartimes. However, there is not a necessary link 
between Keynesian policies and post-war welfare state; Beveridge 
conceived full employment as pillar to ensure the contribution 
basis for social security, while minimizing the number of 
recipients of social aid.416 Keynes was concerned to support the 
effective demand via deficit spending during economic slumps, 
and to secure a rate of unemployment as high and as stable as 
possible. Beveridge, instead, understood Keynesian economics as 
a tool to structurally intervene on employment. His aim was to 
make social security financially sustainable, and in the same time 
to ensure the socio-political integration of the citizens. In his view, 
the “social security” (he never used, nor liked, the expression 
“welfare state”) was a social intervention to guarantee minimum 
incomes, and thus was related to the rights of citizenship. The 
subsequent identification of the British welfare state with 
Keynesianism was due to political expediencies resulting from the 
authoritativeness of the British economist, that allowed social 
democrats (and conservatives) to justify their economic policies 
related to welfare state.417 In fact, after the war the European 
countries undertook other paths than Keynesianism to ensure 
economic growth, and the same “universalism” was variously 
declined by European policy-makers. 
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2.4. From the wartime proposals to the post-war social security 
 
The government was confident to pass the bill on social 
security in spring 1945 (the war was expected to end in winter 1944), 
and estimated that the insurance scheme could have brought into 
operation only in 1947, to become fully operative by 1948. The major 
difficulties concerned the reconfiguration of insured categories, the 
transitional arrangement from older to newer schemes and the 
establishment of the new public machinery in charge of social 
insurances, that also had to take over the records of more than 10 
million of insured from the suppressed Approved Societies. The 
government had to balance the bureaucratic and administrative 
operationalization with the need to not disappoint public opinion’s 
expectations to a quick and throughout implementation of social 
security, also fostered by the propaganda itself. The War Cabinet passed 
interim legislation comprehensive of family allowances, of benefits for 
sickness and unemployment (necessary in the transition from war to 
peace economy) and mainly of the new Ministry of Social Security. This 
Ministry could provide the first moves in the organization of social 
security, conveying the idea that the government did not break its 
promises.418 The political urgency of these measures was remarked by 
the King’s Speech for 1944; in the opening speeches drafts, the Minister 
for the Reconstruction suggested to include references to the future 
social legislation: «you will be invited to pass legislation establishing a 
Ministry of Social Insurance. Measures will be laid before you 
embodying My Government’s proposals for a system of family 
allowances, for an enlarged and unified scheme of Social Insurance and 
for replacing the existing system of workmen’s compensation by a new 
scheme of Industrial Injury Insurance.»419  
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In that year, the Ministry of National Insurance was raised, 
appointed by Jowitt.420 It incorporated the functions of the Minister of 
Health and of the Secretary of State (with respect to national health 
insurance, old age pensions, widows’, orphans’ and old age 
contributory pensions and supplementary pensions, and workmen’s 
compensation) and those of the Minister of Labour and National 
Service for unemployment insurance and assistance. It was the first 
step in the path to the administrative unification of the insurances. The 
bill on family allowances, instead, was passed in 1945.421 The legislator 
linked to the global reform of social security the family allowances; the 
State took charge of their payment, as help to the parents for the full 
maintenance of each child. The benefit was granted regardless the 
income of the families; the allowances – legally payable to the father, 
had a flat-rate benefit of 5£ P/W to each child – were extended also to 
the firstborns for the lower incomes or for families of people on benefit, 
while the general scheme was designed for the large families, making 
social and demographic concerns live together. Their funding through 
the general taxation shifted the burden from the families to the State 
and the community as a whole. Family allowances were not limited to 
cash benefits, but also provided services in kind, notably free school 
meals and milk service. These provisions in kinds, fully universalistic 
as concerning every child, were granted by the Ministry of Education 
and were expected in the range of about £60 million p.a., to be added to 
the estimated £70 million of the cash benefits. Both were valid up to 
school leaving age. These two measures were in fact the only concrete 
pieces of legislation enabled during wartime.  
The road was nonetheless marked; in the run-up to the general 
election of 5th July 1945, the social reforms had a crucial importance for 
the three major parties.422 In all their programmes, the guidelines of 
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social security moved towards social solidarity and universalism. 
Historian Henry Pelling considered Labour’s greater credibility in fully 
carrying forward social reforms at the very basis of Attlee’s landslide 
victory.423 After all, the “New Jerusalem” of Labour’s propaganda was 
achieved through welfare reform and nationalizations. The wartime 
promises could not go back on that; between 1946 and 1947, the main 
reforms were passed: the National Insurance Act, the National Industrial 
Injuries Insurance Act, the National Health Service Act, and the National 
Assistance Act.424 Together, these acts gave birth to the system of social 
security called “from the cradle to the grave”, marking the most 
dramatic break with the traditional British setting and policies on social 
legislation. On one hand, the Labour implemented a consistent transfer 
of national income, 50% higher than the previous period, thanks to 
family allowances, social benefits, and other welfare services. On the 
other, the government did not carry out a more penetrating 
redistribution within British society, because the working class itself 
financed the welfare state both directly and indirectly.425 In its general 
approach to the complex reforms of welfare, the Labour did not 
implement class policies. They rather sought to strengthen the social 
pact of citizenship, shared by the entire British population due to the 
benefits of insurance, to health and social services, free public 
education, equally benefitting both the working masses and the middle 
class. In this big picture, the NHS was – according to historian Keith 
Laybourn – the most “genuine” Labour support to the welfare state. 
The left-wing laborite Minister of Health, Bevan, opted for the 
prominence of the public system, entirely financed by general taxation 
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and available to all, to other more compromise solutions with the 
private healthcare.426 
Alongside the social reforms, the Labour Government 
implemented economic policies that met the macroeconomic needs and 
some of the TUC claims, as for the nationalizations.427 Labour did not 
immediately dismantle the war economy, except for the regimentation 
of the manpower, gradually shifting the emphasis from war production 
to planned recovery; the same demobilisation was achieved taking into 
account the fiscal and monetary control. The government also 
attempted to modernize the industrial structure and to ensure a more 
efficient productive system, accompanying these reforms with a 
“democratic planning”, which may be considered an element of neo-
corporatism in Britain.428 Rather than a more rigorous budget, the 
expansionary economic policy resulted in a fiscal deficit. Labour 
included among its political targets an increase in social expenses 
rather than greater austerity in the economic management of post-
wartime. The commitment of a new “social pact” was no longer 
deferrable after WWII, the confrontation against Nazism, and the Great 
Depression of 1929. This political choice assumed the character of 
strategic repositioning. The “displacement” between the expansion of 
social spending and deficits in the balance of State budget was to some 
extent also endorsed by future Conservative governments, without this 
necessarily leading to a flattening of political divergences under the 
label of “consensus”.429  
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Historiography disputed the effective scope of the “post-war 
consensus” after 1945 and even in the War Cabinet.430 However, it took 
place a certain convergence in British politics and among the social 
interests and organizations, not to mention the enthusiastic response of 
public opinion. It concerned the political and administrative principles 
of social security (universalism, rationalization, nationalization of the 
service). The governmental records of the War Cabinet, and the official 
documents produced by the parties and different organisations seem to 
confirm this tendency. The reform according to the Beveridge’s guiding 
principles (and not necessarily according to the Beveridge Report letter) 
gave expression to the needs of British society. The three White Papers 
handled the long-term issue of the unification of British social policy, 
which featured prominently already after WWI, and especially under 
the pressure of mass unemployment and international uncertainties in 
the 1930s. The Second World War gave momentum to address head-on 
some outstanding problems in Britain, under the label of the 
“reconstruction policies”. This formula pointed at featuring post-1945 
British democracy with the State’s commitment to guarantee social 
security to all citizens, and to set full employment and material wealth 
as political goals. These aims, as we will see in the second part of the 
thesis, were not stranger to the Allied ideological statements, 
summarised in the 1941 Atlantic Charter. Nor were they free of 
considerations related to the post-war international order, the British 
projection over Europe, and the need to contain the Communist threat. 
Social policy did not deal only with internal prosperity, but was also 
matter of international security and balance of power.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
430 See infra n. 101 ch.1; n. 320 ch. 2.  
185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
3. The Vichy Regime: the social policy as collaboration 
 
 
 
 
 The French military collapse within six weeks led to the end of 
the Third Republic. On 16th June 1940, Philippe Pétain replaced Paul 
Reynaud as Président du Conseil, and on 25th June France signed the 
Armistice with the Germans. The causes of the humiliating defeat of 
France were mainly military. However, the opinion that its cause was 
due to the decadence of the institutional system was a widespread 
feeling.431 Already in September 1940, Marc Bloch ascribed the defeat to 
the incompetence of the High Command and of the inadequacy of the 
whole French ruling classes, which in turn shifted the responsibility to 
«the Parliamentary regime, the soldiers, the British, the fifth column.»432 
The Vichy regime was born in the myth of the betrayal and of the 
decadence of France, and grounded its ideology on the need to 
establish a renewed and hierarchical social collaboration among the 
bodies and categories of the nation, in the context of the State 
collaboration with Germany. 
 The Vichy Regime displayed the greatest political and 
ideological activity between 1940 and 1942, when the most consistent 
social and economic reforms were passed, and when the ideology of 
the Révolution Nationale gathered intellectuals and political forces. In 
this period, the Nazi occupant authorities let the regime relatively free 
to enact autonomous social projects, as long as they did not interfere 
with the priorities of the German war economy and production.433 
Vichy social policy pointed at embedding France within the new 
European Order led by Nazi Germany, and this policy of collaboration 
encountered the German embryonic projects for the post-war 
settlement, where France had a role in the European economic 
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community that the Nazis wanted to create.434 The timing of the extent 
of Vichy social projects depended on the war events and on the 
different stages of the German policy to France. In April 1942 Pierre 
Laval was appointed chief of the government, under the pressure of the 
Occupiers, and in November 1942 the Nazis invaded also the territories 
under the control of Vichy Government. Vichy lost any residual 
autonomy, and also the momentum to reforms of the years 1940-2 
ended. By that time, Belin, Secretary of Labour since July 1940, already 
resigned from the Secretariat of State to Labour. Other social reformers 
who contributed to the drafting of the Charte du Travail (the Labour 
Charter) no longer collaborated with the regime, many of them joining 
the Resistance.  
In its second phase the regime abandoned the ambitions of 
social regeneration. By 1943 the dynamics of the “total war” took over 
and the German requests became increasingly more demanding. The 
issue of the forced manpower to send to Germany absorbed the tasks of 
the government, alienating also the last few sympathies from the 
sectors that endorsed the Labour Charter and the 1941-2 social reforms, 
when comprehensive reforms accompanied emergency measures. The 
launch of the Labour Charter by the end of 1941 concluded the main 
period of social reforms under the Vichy regime. 
 
3.1. The Révolution Nationale: ideology and policies between authoritarianism 
and occupation 
 
3.1.1. The search for an autonomous social doctrine?  
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The ambitions of the newborn regime were not merely the 
establishment of a puppet regime. Since the very beginning, Vichy 
ruling classes elaborated new doctrines and political public discourse. 
The regime tried to take what was regarded as an opportunity; the 
effective success of the Révolution Nationale was strictly interlinked to 
the Nazi military successes. The regime hoped that France could play a 
role in the Nazi New European Order when, between 1940 and 1941, 
the victory of the Axis Powers seemed to be more than likely. In 
hindsight, it turned out to be an inherent weakness; the dependence 
from the German wishes undermined since the beginning the 
foundations of the new “pact” that the regime laid down under the 
trinomial Travail, Famille, Patrie (Labour, Family, Homeland). As 
historian Henry Rousso wrote, «National Revolution and State 
collaboration where two sides of the same political projects. The 
renewal at home was in fact totally conditional to the success of its 
“foreign” policy, the collaboration with the Reich.»435  
It is not possible to analyse Vichy social policy and ideology 
outside the wartime context, the occupation and the State collaboration. 
However, the Révolution Nationale represented also the effort to gain 
autonomous space from Nazi Germany. With the New Order, the 
regime shared some ideological features with the other satellites of the 
Axis Power: anti-democratic and anti-liberal discourse; a 
“revolutionary” programme of socio-economic reforms; the struggle 
against capitalism and Bolshevism, searching for a social and economic 
“third way”.436 Through the folds of the State collaboration dwelt also 
the mobilization of the popular masses in the Révolution Nationale; 
alongside the collaboration/subordination of the regime to Germany, 
Vichy proclaimed also the need for a “social collaboration” among the 
different bodies of the society. In Vichy public discourse, the social and 
political collaboration were the pillars upon which recast the nation 
from the moral and material points of view. Its doctrine was rather 
heterogeneous; it did not borrow its watchword only from the far-right 
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traditional Catholicism, generically anti-Republican and anti-
democratic, as for the Action Française. Vichy gathered also the 
parafascist movements or leagues like the Croix-de-Feu, or the Parti 
Populaire Français of the former communist Jacques Doriot. These 
movements had little to do with the traditional monarchists, who 
actually never had the preeminence in the constituencies of the regime. 
Another important group was then represented by the former left-wing 
politicians and trade unionist, like Belin and his group, who – in the 
name of pacifism and anti-Communism – chose the collaboration with 
Germany.  
Corporatism was the official social ideology of the regime. But 
also this concept was only apparently the heritage of the 
“traditionalists”; in the Thirties, the non conformistes and other 
modernizers reflected upon the role of the State and of the intermediate 
bodies in the coordination of the economy. Also many former planistes, 
who referred to Deat néo-socialistes and to Belin Syndicats ! in the French 
trade unions, endorsed corporatism. In fact, nature and goals of Vichy 
corporatism was the bone of contention between “traditionalists” and 
“modernizers”, and between the right-wings and the former trade 
unionists. The Révolution Nationale merged also some representative of 
the non conformiste vague of the ‘30s; the disregard for democratic 
mechanisms and the communitarianism attracted the personnalists like 
Mounier.437 Highly qualified technocrats, they were usually placed at 
the ranks of the regime’s new institutions; François Perroux directed for 
some time the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des cadres d’Uriage, which 
should have trained the frameworks of a new ruling class, filled with 
the ideals of the Révolution Nationale.438 A focal point of all these 
tendencies was the refusal of the social and economic individualism of 
the 19th century liberalism. In that regard, the policies of the regime (but 
not necessarily the “official” ideology) were closer to the elaborations 
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of the Thirties, to such an extent that Mounier, later opponent of the 
regime, proclaimed «the revolution against the individualism.»439 In 
fact, all the trends claiming for some sort of radical and overarching 
revolution were silenced by the further actions of the regime on 
economic and social matters.  
 The charismatic figure of Pétain hold together these different 
tendencies. The official formulation of Vichy social doctrine is due to 
his inner circle and the milieu that gravitated around the Institut 
d’Etudes Sociales et Corporatives; they represented the “traditionalist” 
approach to corporatism. The actual formulation of this doctrine was so 
vague that also the other trends of the regime could endorse it. 
Embryonic forms of the social doctrine and content of the Révolution 
Nationale were present since the very beginning. In a broadcast on 11th 
July 1940, Pétain accused socialism and capitalism for the defeat, and 
the sectional interests for the weakening of the nation, while promising 
to recast France on new social bases.440 The most important discourse of 
Pétain in that regard was the discourse of Saint Etienne on 1st March 
1941, later reproduced in the main part of the propaganda materials on 
social policy. This discourse gave coherence to other previous official 
statements of the Chief of the State, and prefigured the launch of the 
Labour Charter to reorganize the industrial relations on corporative 
basis.  
When the speech was pronounced, the different departments 
were still drafting and bargaining the various draft reforms of the 
Ministry of Industrial Production and Labour (MIP). There was 
agreement on some underlying principles of social policy, but not on 
the actual form to give to these principles; task of the Révolution 
Nationale was to regenerate the body of the nation, and the main goal 
was thus to make the social division and strife disappear. Saint 
Etienne’s discourse implicitly signaled that the regime was “modern” 
inasmuch as abandoned outdated visions of the poverty as individual 
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fault, and the charity-like approaches to the “social question”. He 
solemnly proclaimed that the unfair economic system generated 
misery, fear and social insecurity, and that regime wanted to improve 
the fate of workers through a comprehensive social policy. He made no 
reference to the social insurances or anti-employment measures, as the 
pillar was the reorganization of the labour relations, ensuring social 
concord: «in reality, the cause of the class struggle cannot be 
suppressed unless the proletariat that lives today overwhelmed by his 
isolationism will find in the working community, the conditions for a 
free and worthy life, as well as reason to live and hope. This 
community, is the enterprise. Only its transformation could lay the 
foundation of the organized profession, which is in itself the 
community of communities.»441 Between 1940 and 1941, the regime 
tried to formulate a coherent social doctrine; in fact, this was defined in 
opposition to other ideas rather than as a systematic ideological corpus: 
«the Marshal himself tells us, even before proposing the new 
organization, what this will not be. It rejects Communism, Liberalism 
in itself and in all its nuances of capitalism and individualism, as well 
as class trade unionism. It refuses statism as well, both as collectivism 
and as a way to free the citizens to the personal effort, required to 
participate to the construction of the new France.»442  
It the same time, the Révolution Nationale promoted a “culture 
of the authority” and of social hierarchy.443 It was rather a doctrine of 
obligations than rights: «the new regime will be a social hierarchy. It 
will no longer rely on the lie of the natural equality of men, but on the 
compelling idea of the equality of opportunities to all the French to 
prove their aptitude to serve.»444 In spite of the proclamations of 
equality of opportunity and classless society, the main concern was to 
get rid of the class struggle, with a never faded social paternalism, since 
«the real issue is to abolish the proletarian condition» through 
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«teaching them a fair concept of national community, starting to embed 
the proletarians to the Nation.»445 The Révolution Nationale was not a 
detailed programme, but provided ideological guidelines for public 
policies, based on the anti-individualist re-evaluation of the basic social 
units of the society which pre-existed the State, such as family, Church, 
trade corporations. While not directly linked to the collaboration with 
Germany, the regime ambiguously related its own social policy to the 
adherence to the Nazi European Order. Pétain identified Vichy’s 
ideology whit «the national-socialist idea of the primacy of the 
Labour», since the new order’s social ideology was «part of our 
classical heritage.»446. 
 The public narrative of the regime relentlessly stressed the 
features of the Révolution Nationale. Paul Marion, General Secretary to 
the Information and Propaganda, clarified the relation between 
“National Revolution” and “Social Revolution”:  
 
«In fact, National Revolution and Social Revolution are not 
only complementary ideas, but they represent nowadays two 
sides of the same problems, our resurrection as people and as 
nation. How could we by the way even imagine a social 
revolution without nation? A saturnalia of slaves who, as in 
Russia, break their chains just to get shorter and thicker ones. 
How could a national revolution keep the social inequalities, 
other than being reaction, conservatism, a deception to 
strengthen privileges?»447  
  
 The regime aimed at overcoming the traditional divisions 
between left and right, addressing social issues neither in the 
“materialistic” terms of the socialists nor in those of the paternalists, 
who always had a sectional view over the “social question”. As for the 
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Fascists, Marion stressed the function of the workers in the renewed 
national and social hierarchy, and called into question the “moral” 
proletarian subordination in the capitalistic regime. Not really stranger 
from paternalistic features, his speech underlined that the whole social 
policy of the regime created a new hierarchy at every level, forging new 
mentalities and social relations, as well as a “new man”.448 In Vichy as 
in Fascist Italy, social policy was not disengaged by the idea that the 
social order and the economic relations had to be structurally changed, 
in this sense underestimating social protection as autonomous area of 
social enhancement: 
 
«Probably, a good salary and its increase, as long as the 
prosperity of the enterprise grows, depend first and foremost 
on an efficient social legislation. […] And probably as well, 
the fight against unemployment requires […] some 
legislative measures for a better allocation of the available 
jobs, and for the aid of the corporative associations to those 
that the economic crisis deprived of the livelihood. 
Nevertheless, fair salaries and job security required first and 
foremost a far-sighted and rational organization of our 
industries, as the social reforms are a lure if they do not 
ground on a prosperous economy. Now, a prosperous 
economy demands that the capital investments do not 
depend on the current sectorial interests, that the wealth is 
not accumulated on one side, and missed somewhere else; 
that prices are not established only by maximum personal 
gain, without any regard for the consumers, for the family, 
for the farmers, for the middle classes, for our colonial 
productions, for what is going on abroad. Thus, there is no 
economic growth without organization and public 
management of the economy, taking into the due 
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consideration at once the free play of the appropriate 
individual entrepreneurship and the need of the control, the 
drive of the State, which represents the collective interests of 
the national community.»449 
 
 Social policy was interlinked to the reorganization of the 
French economic life, claiming for a lien (a link) between social and 
economic realms.450 Yet, the terms of this intersection were vague, and 
as a last resort they relied on political shibboleths rather than valuable 
alternative options. According to different positions in the regime, they 
ranged among, “trade union State”, “State corporatism”, dirigisme. The 
lowest-common-denominators of the official social doctrine were the 
rejection of political and social liberalism, and the rediscovering of 
communitarian forms of social relations. Its legislative carryover did 
not affect so much the social insurances, but rather the socio-economic 
organization. In reality, the main social reforms were primarily dictated 
by economic conjunctures, and secondarily by specific political goals; 
between late 1940 and early 1941, the major issue was the abnormal 
level of unemployment that compelled the MIP to put in place income 
support measures and the restructuration of economic and industrial 
policies. In this last policy-area, the Révolution National encountered its 
main limits. The “formal” corporatists of all tendencies lacked of 
ideological firmness, and even of a clear vision of the policies to 
implement. The governmental technocracy disengaged the economic 
reforms from the ideological claims of the regime. The major 
constraints, however, came from the German occupant, which 
submitted industrial policies to their war needs. The Révolution 
Nationale, although claiming for an autonomous political project, 
survived in fact as long as Nazis allowed the regime to keep power.  
 
                                                          
449 Ivi. pp. 7-8. 
450 The link between economic and social institutions, although frequently evoked by the 
intellectuals and representatives of the regime, remained an unclear concept. See J.-P. Le 
Crom, «Comités d’organisation et Comités Sociaux ou l’introuvable interpénétration de 
l’économique et du social», Caen, 2003. URL : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-
00256587/document. 
195 
 
3.1.2. The Révolution Nationale and its constraints: the Nazi occupation and 
the modernization 
 The Vichy social doctrine tried to favor collaboration, to create 
consensus and to legitimize the regime. Between 1940 and 1942, the 
regime hoped that the collaboration could result in a “win-win” 
relationship. From Autumn 1942, it shifted on the ground of the 
complete economic subordination and participation to the German war 
economy.451 The Révolution Nationale was the attempt to mark a major 
break with the IIIrd Republic policies and practices. Under the surface 
of the ruptures in the ideological discourse, the Vichy regime had in 
fact many continuities in the public policies with the former period. 
The most important concerned the technical and administrative 
personnel, as the regime upgraded public and private elites, giving 
them political accountability in the economic departments.452 This 
choice guaranteed the technical competences and the stability in the 
direction of the State after the institutional turmoil of the defeat.  
The role of the technocrats was particularly prominent between 
February 1941 and April 1942, when the Admiral Darlan ruled the 
Vichy Government. Yves Bouthillier at the Treasury, Jean Berthelot at 
the Communications, Pierre Caziot at the Agriculture, Pierre Pucheu at 
the Industrial Production, then at Minister of Interior; they were some 
of the «many “outsiders” that regarded at the collapse of the IIIrd 
Republic as an unexpected opportunity.»453 But high-ranking officials 
and industrialists held also governmental bureaucracy and 
governmental committees. The appointment of big business’ 
representatives clarifies the real orientation of the regime, which, in 
turn, on the propaganda against the trusts tried to build much of its 
consensus over the workers.454 In fact, the intermingling between 
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political and economic interests sharpened opposing visions of social 
and economic policies between different groups and departments. In 
the same time, the German demands required the State management of 
resources, manpower and industrial production. This eventually 
favored State-driven dirigisme rather than the “formal” corporatism. 
While the various supporters of corporatism dreamed about 
contradictory forms of non-statist organization of the professions, the 
economic departments of the government strengthened the role of the 
State: coordination of economic, financial and industrial departmental 
offices; embryonic middle-term investment and infrastructural plans; 
reorganization of the French industrial production according to the 
German model, implementing de facto forms of corporatism, which had 
less to do with the ideas of trade-unionists or “traditionalists”. 
Minister Bouthillier managed to centralize the fiscal policies, 
the foreign trade and the price control. He coordinated all the domains 
of the French economic life, through the Comité Economique 
Interministériel (CEI, Interdepartmental Economic Committee), which 
gathered the five economic Ministries, as well as the departments on 
the infrastructures and the delegate to the Franco-German economic 
relations. Such organism was not completely new, as already in 1935 a 
similar body was appointed. It dissolved in the subsequent steps of the 
occupation, but represented the attempt to harmonize from the center 
the different sectors of national economy. The CEI was only one of the 
different governmental arrangements set up by Bouthillier, especially 
in the years 1940–2, to create an efficient economic apparatus to 
straighten and stabilize the French production.455 The CEI was expected 
to have advisory and supervising functions on basically every 
economic aspect; yet, its main tasks eventually concerned the allocation 
of resources for the industries, and the pricing and wage policy. While 
it was meant to give impetus to economic State-driven dirigisme, it 
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never came up with economic plans, even if the CEI met on almost 
weekly basis. Organisms like the CEI, or the other co-joint board, the 
Conseil d’Études économiques (CEE) – which had tasks of current 
economic surveys and collection of data, and was the transmission belt 
with the private business – were not completely new, neither in the 
history of the French public administration, nor with regard to similar 
structures set up elsewhere in the 1930s. However, they signaled the 
political will to put in place a coordinated and stable State dirigisme, 
that could have survived the juncture of the war.  
Parallel to the CEI, the Délégation générale à l’équipement 
nationale (DGEN, General delegation to national infrastructures) was 
directed by François Lehideux. It produced the first French economic 
ten-year plan, which esteemed credit, raw materials and manpower 
required for the infrastructures and the recovery. According to 
historian Richard Kuisel, «the goals of the plan were not limited to 
economic modernization; Vichy planning was fueled by wide social, 
cultural, and even moral designs, expression of the traditionalism of 
the regime. Equally [the plan] celebrated the family, the social 
solidarity, the countryside values […] it envisaged the improvement of 
the housing, of healthcare, of medicine […]. The ten years plan tried to 
satisfy two opposite visions of the future of France. Imparting the 
economic and technologic “adjustment”, it lashed out the social 
conservatism of the official Vichy ideology.»456 The DGEN did not 
merely propose counter-cyclical measures, but the State-directed 
modernization of different aspects of French public life. The concerns 
for social protection, economic restructuring, and a new moral and 
social order grounded on labour were addressed through the 
redefinition of the role of the State as “planner” also outside economy, 
not unlike the coeval projects elaborated by the Resistance.457 The 
ideological vagueness and political weakness of the Vichy regime, and 
the constraints of the war, made this plan unenforceable. In 1940-1942 
the regime had to meet the demands of the German occupation and to 
face the economic conjuncture; in the same time, it tried to implement 
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far-reaching tools of State’s economic management.458 As a last resort, 
its actions left a heritage: investments and infrastructural plans, 
governmental coordination, public boards for the study, the collection 
of economic data, the integration in the administrative structures of the 
private business. In that regard, Vichy created corporatist co-
participation, which – regardless the effective success of the ideology 
underpinning the Labour Charter – had a carryover in post-war France. 
 The conjuncture eventually affected the choices of the regime in 
the day-to-day economic policies; the government faced shortages, 
forms of requisition, exploitation of goods and manpower. From the 
compelling emergency resulted a renewed way to wage the relation 
between government and industry. The burden of the Nazi occupation 
was overwhelming. The collaboration drained French wealth to finance 
the German war. From 1940 to 1944, France had to pay 631.866.000.000 
of francs, more than 50% of the French GDP in this lapse of time, plus 
other payments related to the occupation. The franc was devaluated in 
function of the German needs, and the German capitals penetrated the 
French enterprises. As for the foodstuffs, raw materials and 
infrastructures, the Nazis plundered the French market and industry, 
which basically worked for Germany.459 As a result of the Sauckel 
plans, which aimed at raking 8 million workers in Europe, France had 
to pay a heavy toll. Between 1942 and 1944, four Sauckel-Aktionen 
required the forced enlistment of manpower to deport to Germany. In 
1943 the Vichy regime created the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO, 
Service of Forced Labour), which subjected all men and women 
between 20 and 29 years to the service in Germany or in France.460 The 
Sauckel-Aktionen required approximately 1 million workers between 
1942 and 1944, but only 600.000 workers were transferred to Germany. 
The measure encountered harsh opposition from the population, 
eventually swelling the ranks of the Resistance, and the regime had to 
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pick the workers from the Chantiers de la Jeunesse Française, which 
substituted the military service.461  
The STO represented the only case, in occupied Europe, of a 
country that deliberately implemented a legislative and regulatory 
framework for the transfer of manpower in Nazi Germany. The regime 
relied on both coercive and persuasive measures. The Milice Française of 
Joseph Darnand, and the paramilitary structures of the Parti Populaire 
Français took the task to stop the draft dodgers.462 The regime used also 
the propaganda to convince the workers, e.g. with the promise to join 
the “more advanced” German system of social insurances and 
provisions.463 By mid-1943, both the Germans and the French tried to 
redefine this matter. In Germany, the Ministry of Armament and War 
Production, Albert Speer, abandoned the mere “plundering model” of 
Fritz Sauckel. He wanted France to boost the production of consumer 
goods, in order to enhance the war production in Germany. On the 
other side, the new Minister of Industrial Production, Bichelonne, 
wanted to revive the economy after the underproduction and 
underemployment of the biennial 1940–1, by restoring the French 
manufacturing industry. He also came out of the Ecole Polythécnique, 
and, alongside Lehideux and Pucheu, represented the trend of the 
modernizers within the government. They thought that the 
collaboration was not merely propaganda but a policy for integrating 
the French productive system within the wider “rational” division of 
the European economic space led by Germany; they hoped that war set 
in motion a long-lasting process of modernization of French 
economy.464 The Speer-Bichelonne agreement made the large French 
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industrial plants Speer-Betriebe, that is, free from the “Sauckel Actions”, 
and increased employment on the German contracts, especially in the 
coal and steel industries. On the other side, the agreement enforced the 
creation of privileged industrial sectors. Far beyond the impending 
dissolution of the regime’s structures, the German compelling 
demands, therefore, contributed to set in motion structural changes in 
French industry and in the approach to economic matters.465  
The reorganization of French industry was preeminent. The 
most important acts to drive French economy were passed within the 
first few months of the regime, while the social laws were submitted to 
a long bargaining within the government. The Comités Professionnelles 
(CO, Professional Committees) and the Office Central de Répartition des 
Produits Industriels (OCRPI, Office for the Allocation of the Industrial 
Products) reshaped the French industrial organization for economic 
branches, quite similarly to German economic structure. At first, the 
CO were a compromise between the German directives and the 
preservation of some autonomy in policy-making for the French. They 
should ease the incorporation of French industries within the German 
economic area in subaltern position. On the other side, this 
reorganization also responded to domestic goals; the CO were expected 
to put in practice the principles of the Révolution Nationale against class 
struggle, liberalism and sectional interests, and they favoured 
industrial concentration and rationalization of the French industrial 
production. The two goals designed a policy of “State corporatism” 
that quickly turned out to be dirigisme.466  
The CO were charged of productive regulation, allocation of 
resources, sell/purchase and repartition of raw materials, statistics and 
industrial surveys. They were mostly composed by technical 
frameworks while the industrial trades had right to representation. 
Hierarchically organised, they gathered the industries for productive 
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branches, and they were placed under the authority of government-
appointed technocrats. Headed by Bichelonne, the creation of the 
OCRPI just after the formation of the first OC made even clearer the 
dirigiste shift that the regime undertook. The MIP could exert leverage 
over the whole industrial production, as the OCRPI allocated industrial 
resources on national scale among the different CO, which 
redistributed them to the enterprises of their branches.467 As a result, 
Vichy’s “true” corporations resulted in the industrial repartition, useful 
for State-planned policies, as «the direction of the industry works 
through some new State structures to ensure an authoritarian reallocation. 
This machinery copies with conjunctural constraints due to shortages, 
burdened by German needs. But it was also conceived by the 
experts/rulers to ease the French industrial renovation within the New 
Europe, inevitably dominated by German economy.»468 On the other 
side, the CO eased the concentration of the industries, vertically framed 
in public organisms that coordinated private business, and placed 
under the management of the MIP. Vichy economic policies 
strengthened the industrial trusts, and intermingled governmental 
structures with big business.469 
The Vichy elites took the emergency as an opportunity to put in 
place structural reforms. However, since the very beginning they had 
different view on how to recast French economy. The rifts crossed both 
the “traditionalists” and the “modernizers”, lumped together by the 
distrust in the laissez-faire economy, but divided on the ways to 
overcome it. Two main hypotheses were at stake: dirigisme and 
“formal” corporatism. These views found room in the different 
departments of the government. Due to this political conflict, Vichy 
economic policies probably never had coherence; they combined 
elements of dirigisme, as for some of the abovementioned inter-
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departmental structures and plans, with a corporatist framework. 
Furthermore, the CO would have later overlapped the launch of the 
Labour Charter and newer “industrial families”. In that regard, 
economist Charles Rist spoke about an “integral confusionism” with 
regard to Vichy economic policy.470 In reality, external conditions (the 
German demands, the economic slump and unemployment after the 
defeat), and the political dialectic within Vichy help to explain the 
regime’s economic policies, and how they crossed the social policies. 
Margairaz and Rousso defined Vichy’s economy neither corporatist nor 
dirigiste, but rather “administrated economy”.471 Their evolution 
followed the stages of the German war economy, and also industrial 
modernization concerned mainly the industrial branches more related 
to war production. Without decisively opting for neither of the models, 
Vichy achieved forms of corporative coordination with the industrial 
branches, through the CO. These co-joint committees, nonetheless, for 
the main part excluded workers’ representatives, reducing the 
“corporative” collaboration to a bargain between State and employers. 
On the other side, the State increased functions and controls, e.g. with 
the first embryonic supply-side plans of selective investments. As I will 
argue in the second part of the chapter, a similar uncertainty affected 
also the implementation of the major social reforms; also in this case the 
“confusionism” was due to opposite visions with regard to the social 
and political organization of new State. And also in this case, the 
cleavage concerned the overhaul of the social solidarity along 
“corporative” or “State-administrated” lines. 
The epicentre of this conflicting projects was the MIP. The 
Ministry passed from the representatives of the trade-unions to the 
technocrats. Under the direction of the State Secretary of Labour Belin, 
the MIP tried to integrate the workers within the CO, which he 
considered half a step in the achievement of a real corporatism, as they 
were «conceived to face urgent needs, but showed to be incomplete 
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and flawed […] it has necessarily to lean on organized professional 
groups […] and also gets an extension on the social plan […] it has to 
be integrated with a coherent professional organization, a real 
corporative organization.»472 Belin’s corporatist view in reality never 
took form, and this accompanied his fall from grace. With the direction 
of Bichelonne from 1942 to 1944, the MIP was more concerned to 
coordinate policy of higher production and manpower. The “formal” 
corporatism as social collaboration «constitutes a perspective rather 
than a reality.»473 It was the very pillar of Vichy’s social propaganda, 
but the regime was could not put into effect the Révolution Nationale, 
not even in the agricultural sectors.474 The economic collaboration 
between State and enterprises was nonetheless implemented. The form 
of corporatism enforced in France configured a sort of “State 
corporatism”; the OCRPI centrally managed the production of the 
different industrial branches, which did not correspond to the 22 
“professional families” of the Labour Charter. The mechanism of 
coordination/conciliation involved big business and finance, which 
from the economic collaboration had everything to gain, and crushed 
the resilience of the workers, formally excluded from the CO.475 Vichy’s 
“corporatism” was neither the romantic ideal of the “traditionalist”, 
nor the trade-unions’ State; it was pursed as long as it was functional to 
the German war economy, and it was carried out by the French 
collaborationist elite (whether wholeheartedly or not), well reflected by 
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Bichelonne, who had a close personal relationship with his German 
counterpart Speer.476  
 The regime reconsidered the industrial production on national 
basis: coordination the strategic industrial sectors, allocation of 
investments and resources and collection of data on the national 
economy. The conjunctural policies and the war constrain led to the 
extension of governmental offices and pawed the way to post-war 
plans. The policies enacted did not replace the system of private 
industries, but fastened industrial reconstruction, modernized the 
productive processes, supported the industrial sectors. technocratic 
establishment. The economic policies of the Vichy regime partially fell 
outside the assumptions of the Révolution Nationale. The many faceted 
technocratic milieu shared with the regime the fear of the class 
struggle, and imposed its own vision of the State, in accordance to the 
German needs. They seized the opportunity of the defeat to carry out in 
substantive terms the ideas raised during the 1930s. The institutional 
offices in charge of the economic management, the corporatist 
structures of coordination and the research centres and think tanks 
operating with governmental departments were formally dismantled 
or purged of the more compromised collaborators. But the “legacies” of 
Vichy went beyond the regime’s four years political experience and its 
own ideology. As François Denord and Paul-André Rosental 
underlined, they were related to a longer-run change started in the 
1930s and culminated in the 1950s, which «started with the 
institutionalization of the social and economic interests’ representation 
with the State. It had been strengthened under Vichy with the 
introduction wide-ranging technocratic management tools. It reached 
its apogee under the Fourth Republic, and notably through the 
“structural reforms” adopted by the Liberation.»477  
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The reforms of the social insurances had a similar trend, 
combining the influence of the debates in the 1930s, the contrasting 
ideological goals of the regime and the needs to face the conjuncture. 
Part of the social legislation survived to the regime, because it was 
disengaged from the social doctrine of the regime, dealing rather with 
the rationalization and expansion of social protection, which during 
wartime was enhanced from the administrative point of view. 
 
3.2. The social insurances between attempts at reform and continuities
  
3.2.1. The Secretary of Labour and the attempts to a global reform  
The Vichy regime never officially promote a coherent plan on 
social insurances; at least, not in the same terms of the British reports 
and White Papers. Ideological reasons might explain this lack of political 
initiative. The social policy was another field where the cleavage 
between the ideological discourse of the Révolution Nationale and the 
incremental administrative policies were clear. While the regime 
tended to identify social policy with corporatism, social insurances 
developed autonomously from the Labour Charter. However, from 
1940 to 1942 the major promoter of both was the trade unionist milieu. 
Belin, the former leader of the Conféderation Générale du Travail (CGT, 
the French Trade Unions), brought some of its members to the 
Révolution Nationale to collaborate with the regime.478 Belin’s Minister 
corresponded to the major legislative effort in social policies and to the 
attempt to effectively link economic with social policy, as the former 
trade unionist milieu relentlessly claimed.479 Belin tried to combine the 
reorganization of the labour market in “vertical” structures, as 
prefigured in the Labour Charter, with the extensions of the social 
protection and provisions for the workers. This policy would have 
actually resulted in increased powers for the employers, while the 
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workers (deprived of the trade unions) were expected to be placated 
with more social benefits. Belin found in the État français the possibility 
to put in place the overcoming of the class struggle, finding the “third 
way” between capitalism and the hated Marxist doctrines and parties.  
 In the first months of his office, Belin tackled on its own 
initiative the global reform of social insurances, due to the war 
upheavals and the French administrative conditions after the armistice. 
The difficult economic and social conditions after the defeat and the 
German occupation worsened the social and health needs of the 
population. The administrative fracture between Occupied and 
Unoccupied Zone affected the functioning of the mutualist framework 
of the French social insurances. They made more difficult to provide 
benefits and created differences between various funds. Moreover, left-
wing organizations managed many mutualist funds, and the repression 
often cut the granting of the benefits.480 The regime deployed a set of 
policies that met the conjuncture issues and more structural 
innovations, moving towards the strengthening of public social 
insurances and assistance.  
On 1st September 1940, Belin presented with Laroque and 
Alexandre Parodi – the two fathers of the post-war social security – a 
thorough reform projects, covering social insurances, family 
allowances, and paid leaves. The draft extended the repartition to all 
the social insurances, taking over good part of the financial tasks from 
the private sector and strengthening the inter-generational social 
solidarity inherent to the repartition.481 Belin handled the social 
protection through the «modification of the collection of the 
contributions and of the administrative organisation of the funds, 
which will lead to relevant savings in the administrative budget of the 
social insurance authorities. […] the contributions for the social 
insurances, the family allowances, and the paid leaves will be subject to 
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a single lump sum.»482 The proposals innovated the French system, 
because recommended the unification of the different insurances in one 
single contribution, with their centralization and the partial 
nationalization. The reform also changed the mechanism of collection 
of the employers’ contributions and the functioning of the local 
authorities in charge of the benefits.  
However, the project can hardly be compared to the British 
plan of two years later. The draft retained the different contributory 
rates according to each category; farmers and industrial workers, for 
instance, contributed respectively for the 3% and the 5% of their 
salaries, and the State’s contribution did not concern industrial 
workers. There was no shift towards flat-rate universal benefits, nor the 
framework of a tripartite equal contributions. It did not even foresee 
any public healthcare service, even if the contributory burden for the 
sickness benefits decreased and the invalidity benefits were 
increasingly assimilated to the healthcare insurances. The project 
provided a wider access to medical treatments and preventive 
measures. After five years, the insured had the right to enjoy the old-
age pensions in case of permanent disability. As for family allowances, 
paid leaves, and the benefits for maternity, death, and diseases, the 
reform operated an important simplification of the voluntary societies, 
whose functions were taken over by the Caisses départementales de 
solidarité (Local funds of solidarity), gathered in a national federation 
that coordinated at a central level the management of these benefits.  
The attached draft decree complaint the inefficiency, 
fragmentation and costs of the current social protection. The report 
recognised that the French social protection lacked of homogeneous 
principles: sickness, maternity, invalidity, old-age felt into compulsory 
insurance paid by employers and workers, combined with social 
assistance in charge of the State; self-employed and other categories 
had no public schemes; industrial injuries insurance relied on 
employers’ liability and were in fact contracted via private assurances; 
family allowances had no consistent public schemes, and 
unemployment was tackled with assistance measure. The report 
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proposed to «overhaul it in a simple, clear, efficient and integrated 
system.»483, and mostly to establish a basic common principle, that is, 
«the idea of a bond of solidarity among all the workers against all the 
social risks. […] The insurance should not be individual, but collective, 
and should be the relief of all the workers for all the workers. And 
workers does not mean exclusively the salaried, but also all the “low-
incomes”, all those who, both salaried and self-employed, make their 
primary livelihood from their daily work.»484 This solidarity had little 
to do with the 1942 British universal principles, equally encompassing 
all the citizens as national community. The goal was to ensure social 
protection for all workers (as a right of the workers and not as a right of 
citizenship), but unlike the British reforms they tried to achieve it via 
occupational social insurances rather than the contributions of the 
whole community. More than on national basis, social solidarity 
deployed “in concentric circles” and was exercised per territorial and 
professional sectors:  
 
«It seems particularly needed to give a professional basis to 
protection against the social risks, still retaining, of course, 
inter-professional and national solidarity through doable 
mechanisms of compensation. The goal to achieve is to 
develop, in the framework of the corporation, an integrated 
system able to ensure via the contribution and collaboration 
of workers, employers, self-employed, the protection of all 
the lower incomes against all the social risks, the 
unemployment as well as the sickness, the old-age as well as 
the industrial injuries.»485  
 
The report linked the establishment of a thorough system of 
social protection with corporatism, considered the necessary 
precondition for the implementation of the new social insurances. That 
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is the reason why the report distrusted solutions defined «too over-
hasty», which « risk to create confusion and even to delay the put in 
place of the new mechanisms. The professional organization is still to 
embryonic to incorporate within also the social insurances.»486 The 
refusal to move forward global solutions was motivated by the need to 
enact progressive piece-by-piece reforms that could be progressively 
integrated within the corporative system. The project introduced only 
the first step in such a framework, which had the triple goal to simplify 
the administration of the social insurances, to shift a major burden to 
the employer in its financing, and to enlarge the provisions for the 
workers.  
Belin wanted to dismiss the older mutualist and voluntary 
institutions, to be replaced by a single local authority (the Caisse de 
Solidarité Unique, which had in the board representatives of the 
employers and the insured designated by the Ministry of Labour) in 
charge of the unified management of social insurances, family 
allowances, death grants, paid leaves, and maternity benefits. Old-age 
pensions and invalidity benefits were managed by a national public 
authority, the Caisse Générale de Pensions. The employers had thus to 
pay only one contribution for all risk categories, and the workers had 
no longer to affiliate to different schemes. This was a major reform in 
the framework of the French social protection, but was not 
universalistic; the contributions were neither flat-rate nor calculated on 
the national minimal income, but their uniformity was related to each 
enterprise. In addition, the State contributed as third part only for the 
farming professions, and without providing an equal tripartite 
contribution (the fiscal burden moved to the employers and the State 
paid the equivalent of 3/4 of workers’ contribution).487 The period of 
sickness was postponed beyond the six months and its scope was 
extended. Sickness benefits covered all the treatments, including 
surgeries and dental cure, for the worker and his family, and the rate of 
                                                          
486 Ivi. p. 4. 
487 CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «Projet de Loi portant réforme des legislations sur les Assurances 
Sociales, les allocations familiales, et les congés payés», p.3. 
210 
 
the refund for the cures was established by the State.488 The same went 
for unemployment benefits; the law proposed six-months benefits at 
the rate of 3.000 francs for the workers registered to the Employment 
Office, but did not establish compulsory insurances.489 With the 
exclusion of unemployment benefits, however, the reform marked a 
clear distinction between social insurances and social assistance, as the 
recipients of social benefits could not apply for the same benefits via 
public social aid. The draft project devoted the greatest importance to 
the national old-age pensions for all salaried workers, also for those 
who did not fulfil the regular contributions, with an increase of the 
rates from 3.000 to 4.500 francs to the retirement age, at 60 years old. It 
was a measure of solidarity, because the whole community paid social 
pensions for the lower incomes in order to guarantee the subsistence 
level. It was also to a greater extent a universalistic provision, as all the 
salaried had the right to enjoy it. But not even this proposal marked 
any turn towards full universalism, as the self-employed and other 
categories were not originally concerned, even if further extensions 
both in the rates and for the recipients were prefigured in case of 
economic slumps. The major concern underlying this reformulation 
were demographic and counter-cyclical; as the French population aged, 
the government had to guarantee healthy old-ages to lower incomes, 
which could also be retrained for specific minor jobs, allowing the 
younger, constituting the contribution base, to be normally employed 
in industrial and agricultural sectors.490 
The draft passed under the offices of the Caisse des Dépôts et 
Consignations (CDC, Deposits and Consignments Fund, in charge of the 
financing of the social insurances), which formulated different 
reports.491 The various administrative sections of the social insurances 
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(old-age, sickness, industrial injuries, etc.) agreed on the general 
principles underpinning the project: reduction of the funds and their 
coordination under national and public authority; unification of the 
social insurances under similar funding mechanism (splitting between 
risk categories for repartition and capitalisation); integration of 
industrial injuries, family allowances, and paid leaves in the general 
compulsory social insurances; clear-cut division between assistance 
measures and social insurances; establishment of “moderate” social 
solidarity towards specific categories, e.g. old-age pensions. The French 
social protection was considered defective in many regards. The CDC 
recommended to create a single fund for each risk category and 
funding mechanism: «the freedom of choice of the insurance […] 
resulted in a great number of funds, and this plurality caused at once 
the dispersion of the organizational efforts, issues in the interpretation 
of the rule, overlapping of in the attributions of the funds, oversupply 
of the payments.»492  
The regime-change seemed to be the right time to overcome the 
fragmentation of the social protection. The context was quite different 
from Britain, but the aims were similar; addressing the incremental 
stratification of the social legislation through overarching reforms, 
unitary and centralized actions, rationalization. Social insurances, 
family allowances and paid leaves grew with «various institution, and 
nothing, mostly the logic, justify the flowering of these different 
authorities.»493 The CDC was in favour of a public unified fund, to 
«coordinate the fragmented efforts of activities to a common goal.»494 
The scattered voluntary funds led to dispersion of benefits and 
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growing expenditures. Facing increasing burdens, the only viable way 
was to address the reform with an holistic view: 
 
 «The effort of rationalization represented by the project here 
sketched out is only the first step in the achievement of a 
wider feat of the overall reorganisation of the social 
legislation. The paid leave and the family allowances did not 
consistently differ from the social insurances covered by the 
repartition system. […] We conceive for this analogy the 
possibility to merge these two insurances in one fund. In 
place of the various institutions now existing, we could 
create only one authority, a wide Repartition National Fund, 
gathering all the services of social assistance and insurance. 
This rationalizing centralization will not exclude by the way 
the needed direct contact with the recipients, as this National 
Fund will branch in the departments in local authorities that 
provide the payment of the benefits to the insured. By doing 
so, the worker will deal with only one institution for every 
event or accident of his life. On his side, the employer will 
find in this institution a simplification of his tasks, because 
with just one contribution he will get rid off all his 
obligations as far as the social insurances are concerned.»495  
 
 The hustle of the first months are due to the great reforms in 
the pipeline at the MIP; every reform of the social protection was 
conditional to the reforms of the industrial relation. The CDC 
recommended «to totally and completely overhaul the guidelines on 
which the law on the Social Insurances was formulated»,496 that was 
inadequate from organizational and financial points of view. Any 
minor adjustment was ineffective in a system that had a liberal setting, 
and indeed, «if this reform had to be studied from now, it will not be 
operational unless some other foundation will be laid down, as [the 
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reform n.d.a.] is conditional to another reform, that is, the reform of the 
labour system. Only when the new juridical framework of the labour 
organization will be clearer, we can redefine how the worker will be 
ensured against all risks.»497  
Notwithstanding the agreement on the lacks of the French 
social system, the CDC and the Treasury rose administrative and 
financial doubts. Precisely because the Labour Charter was still a draft, 
the reform was judged too hasty for the management of the funds, the 
fiscal burden for the employers, the calculation of the contributory 
years. The immediate expenditure from the employers/workers 
contributions was estimated in 4 billion francs, worsened with the 
expected tightening of contributory base. Belin presented the reform as 
an occupational, intergenerational and national pact of solidarity, but 
other reports remarked that it resulted in the transfer of income from 
the workers to the retired. The “national solidarity” was limited to the 
categories of salaried workers, and did not involve the whole of 
citizens, especially in the financing mechanisms. The reform was 
defined as fee paid by the salaried to finance the pensions, while all the 
non-salaried categories in fact were exempted from it.498 The critical 
reports also showed outdated views on social policy, as for the 
“individual liability”. They feared that the transfer of resources without 
contribution records resulted in the overlapping of insurance and 
assistance, discouraging self-initiative and upward mobility, as the 
better paid categories had the heaviest fiscal burden.  
The case with industrial injury insurances is illustrative. In 
Britain, their integration in the compulsory scheme was one of the key 
innovations. The Vichy regime refused this proposal, due to the 
shifting financial burden to the whole community, the contribution on 
national basis without considering the specific risks for different 
industrial branches, and the contributory-based system that replaced 
the previous system of compensations. The reports agreed on the fact 
that the current conditions did not allow the implementation of a global 
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and all-inclusive reform.499 Unlike Britain, in the France submitted to 
Nazi Germany and to economic and fiscal constraint, they suggested 
considered “progressive” and “gradual” steps.500Also the Treasury’s 
accounting offices recommended to implement single pieces of 
legislation, and notably those long overdue, such as the old-age 
pensions, and to wait for the Labour Charter before passing any reform 
of social insurances.501 The Ministry of Finance prepared alternative 
reforms, more limited in the benefits for the pensions, with a lesser 
impact on the longer-run on the budget. It was less generous for the 
parameters to join the pensions, for the years of contributions and the 
regulations of the entry into force of the new scheme.502 The 
counterproposals between the two Ministries – defined in a note of the 
CDC both «rather vague and sometimes obscure in place»503 – led to 
minor rehashes of the original project of the MIP, which did not change 
its setting.504 Belin regretted the opposition that he considered due to 
ideology rather than to economic evaluations. The economic 
departments frightened the burdens and the objective difficulties to put 
in place such ambitious project in a country ruled by two 
administrations.505 But the harshest criticisms came from the vested 
interests. They opposed any “state-controlled centralism” in the 
management of social insurances, resulting in a unnecessary 
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bureaucratic burden without any social benefit. They were supported 
by the Minister of Finances Bouthillier, who feared the implementation 
of a new administrative apparatus, which in his view recalled 
“collectivist regimes”.506  
The barrages from political circles and from social actors 
induced Belin to withdraw (or to put it on hold) the original project. 
The Vichy regime could not prevail over vested interests and lacked of 
popular support to all-inclusive social reforms, unlike the mobilization 
and fully support of British public opinion to the 1942 social security 
plan. In the same year, Belin proposed a new reform on the functioning 
of the mutual and local funds. Between January and March 1942, the 
Secretary of Labour unilaterally proposed a comprehensive reform 
encompassing social pensions, change in the funding social insurances 
from capitalisation to the “pay-as-you-go”, compulsory insurances 
against unemployment, and regulation of the employment of married 
women.507 Unlike the British interdepartmental joint-committees, the 
Secretary of Labour tried to mount a takeover to pass the reform. The 
other departments criticized timings and methods of a reform which 
they considered as «following the ideas of certain officers of a single 
Ministry, without even taking into account the collective interests and 
the general doctrine which the other administrations represent.»508  
The new draft legislation adapted the 1940 proposals to the 
new embryonic forms of corporative organizations created with the 
1941 Labour Charter. Some administrative simplifications reneged; the 
territorial overhaul of the authorities in charge of social insurances and 
family allowances, as well as the health insurance companies, 
overlapped Caisses territorialies (the local insurance funds, which by 
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nature are inter-professional) and Caisses professionales (the 
occupational insurance funds, broken down by category). The workers 
had to affiliate to the Caisses professionales, while those who did not 
belong to any professional branch (or “family”, in Vichy corporatist 
lexicon) had to join the unique Caisse territoriale in each district. The 
project affiliated all the salaried workers of the same factory/branch to 
the same social insurance fund, and the local occupational insurance 
funds complied with the new corporative industrial organization.509 
The previous factory mutual funds were retained, since «it would be 
unusual, in the moment when we are trying to create solid business 
communities to eliminate the same funds that allow to partially achieve 
them [the business communities n.d.a] even before the Labour Charter.»510  
The retention of occupational funds did not necessarily clash 
against the unification and rationalization of the administration of the 
social insurances authorities. Belin’s plan responded to the same needs 
of simplification that were felt in Britain. The legislation drafts before 
March 1942 tried to be more consistent to this aim; the opt out 
prefigured in the first proposal disappeared, proposing to unify the 
different insurances: «the insured persons are affiliated for sickness 
benefits, maternity allowances and death grants to the Fund in the 
circumscription where they work. Only one social Fund is allowed to 
operate in each territorial circumscription. […] The circumscription of 
the Funds is established by the Secretary of State to the Labour.»511 
While the British projects relied on the nationalization of the 
compulsory insurances, Belin wanted to interwoven the social 
insurances with the corporative professional organization. In his view, 
the State’s extended coordination did not contradict Vichy’s 
corporative institutions, which actually rooted on the mutualist 
framework of the French social insurances: «the essential arrangements 
of the text we hereby present for your signature, and which deals with 
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the structure itself of the social insurances authorities, address similar 
concerns. In the moment when, under your highest authority, the 
Labour Charter comes into force, this reform aims mostly at affirming, 
in the realm of the management of the social protection institution, a 
coherent principle of social action.»512 While in Britain the reforms of 
the social insurances broadened the rights of citizenship, Belin’s reform 
owed a lot to French traditions and the rhetoric of the Révolution 
Nationale. The mutualist pluralism was the heritage of previous 
sectionalist environment, while the new political climate rearranged the 
occupational schemes in coherently corporatist institutions: 
 
«Nowadays, the National Unity that you achieved put an 
end to the rule of parties, and the Public Powers are no 
longer reduced to compromise solutions. These multiple 
institutions created without any comprehensive plan must 
therefore give way to a coherent network that supports the 
main social actions that you encourage. This regrouping – in 
line with the most current concerns – implies a simpler and 
more rational administrative structure. In that regard, the 
creation of the Caisses territoriales constitutes to us the less 
expensive solution, the one that fit the most to the needs of 
the insured, and the most favourable to social reconciliation. 
The Caisses territoriales will now work within the framework 
of the Labour Charter, since their administration will be 
entrusted to the representatives of the employers and of the 
workers from the Social Committees. Furthermore, it seems 
necessary to complete this reform by strengthening in the 
same time the powers of the Secretary of Labour on the 
management of the new funds.»513 
 
In 1940, such reform of social insurances was mostly drafted 
under the urge of the defeat. It addressed primarily the issue of 
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unemployment, and the Labour Charter was not drafted yet. In 1942 
the context was different, as it was about to make the “social 
revolution” effective. The management of social insurances passed to 
the representative of the corporative bodies, under the supervision of 
the central Secretary, which prompted the directives of the social 
policy.  
Also this draft reform encountered criticisms. The 
commentaries delivered to Pétain’s Cabinet opposed two views, 
grounded on criteria which are enlightening of the divergences 
between the British approach and the continental solutions. The reports 
recommended to retain the occupational setting, as adopted in 
Germany and in the USSR, as well as to not indulge in any étatisme, 
since «in France, we live under a regime of freedom, and of private 
insurance companies, which sometimes already are and, in any case, 
might be organized under occupational schemes.»514 Belin tried to make 
“State-centred” administration and corporatism live together, but the 
reports remarked how a stronger public management of the social 
insurance stood against Vichy’s doctrine. Behind the ideological screen 
emerged the traditional anti-statism: corporatism and individualism 
(declined in the terms of “self-relief”) were two sides of the same coin. 
The reform was criticized because it levelled contributions and benefits 
regardless the incomes and professional categories; all the workers 
were «placed on an equal footing by the standard desks of the public 
administration.»515 This outcome – at the very core of the British 
reforms – was unacceptable for the regime, which promoted the 
“equality of opportunities” framed in a corporative hierarchy of 
competences and role. In that regard, the “corporative” criticisms had 
some similarities with the supporters of laissez-faire individualism in 
Britain. They feared the «suppression of the intermediate institutions, 
organized within the framework of the natural business communities 
and of the professional families, managed by the insured themselves 
with the freedom, the responsibility, the diversification that this implies 
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when the management is still fit for the human realities, for the specific 
needs and uses of every profession.»516  
The nationalization of social insurances was regarded as a 
“totalitarian” solution, stranger to the French traditions. The necessary 
simplification should have not led to the “individualization” of the 
relationship of the insured with the State:  
 
«in the moment when the Marshal made it clear the 
centrality of the natural intermediate communities between 
the State and the individual, the project [of Belin, n.d.a.] 
speeds up the suppression the institutions, which already 
correspond to this aim. It replaces a monstrous bureaucratic 
and uniform public machinery to the voluntary companies 
where, freely, the salaried are gathered according their 
occupation. Under the sway of this public organization, the 
salaried will be left alone before the State and they will be no 
longer part of the workers’ natural communities, which have 
to be in the same time the framework of their activities and 
the shield that, interposing between them and the State, 
secure their freedom.»517 
 
The legacy of the previous social policy affected marked the 
divergence between universalist and occupational approaches. The 
governmental circles did not support the complete unification of the 
social insurances; they related to very framework of the 1928-30 
reforms as sufficient means to create a pluralist (in their words, 
“corporatist”) «climate of solidarity and social reconciliation.»518 The 
centralization of the service was considered opposite to corporatism, as 
«this unification will lead to the most regrettable duality: for the same 
working population, two institutions are now working without any tie 
to each other: the former (the Social Insurances) rigorously State-driven 
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and unitary; the latter, designed on a corporative basis (the social 
institutions related to the Labour Charter.»519  
The circles of the Secretary of Labour did not see incongruences 
between the reorganization/unification of the local and mutual funds, 
and the implementation of the Labour Charter. They stressed the 
coherence between corporatism and greater uniformity in the 
management of the insurances. The reform interwoven the Social 
Committees and the single-territorial authorities, coordinated by the 
State but managed by the representatives of workers, employers and 
technical frameworks.520 In reality, the reform did not deal with the 
specific ideology of the Révolution Nationale, but rather with a logic of 
administrative and political simplification. In that regard, the principles 
underpinning Belin’s prospected reform did not differ from those 
stated by the Beveridge Report nor from the path undertaken by Fascist 
social legislation, and culminated in 1944: 
 
«At present, even if the administrative services have some 
uniformity at regional levels, the authorities that manage the 
risks have been created without any general plan; primarily 
concerned about gathering the insured claiming under the 
same [occupational n.d.a.] affinity, they freely developed their 
bases in the same territorial circumscription, where their 
services overlap and duplicate, while everything should be 
put in place to ensure which only one institution, which has 
to be of public order, could take forward the best possible 
cooperation of the policies according to the same method and 
uniformity. This must be the rationale of the reorganisation 
of the different authorities and funds that currently manage 
the social risk, which this project tends. From now onwards, 
a single authority will take in charge the insurance-related 
business within the same territorial area. The social insured 
will no longer be the object of requests from private 
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companies that manage similar and overlapping 
functions.»521 
 
Neither this note, nor the draft of legislation is explicit on the 
nature of this “reorganization”, whether through the creation of a 
single national (or regional) public authority, or through the simple 
coordination of mutual and private funds. The opponents to the 
reform, nonetheless accused the project to «suppress al the existing 
social insurance funds, and create in their place a new network of 
territorial funds which, de facto, if not even de jure, are public 
authorities.»522 Also this draft reform did not have legislative 
carryovers. Proposed few months before Belin’s resignations, the 
double failure of his project marked the end of the most important 
attempts to reform social insurances under Vichy.  
 
 
3.2.2. A piecemeal approach between emergency and broader reforms 
 The failure in implementing a coherent reform did not prevent 
to pass limited provisions. The most part of the administrative and 
legislative measures from 1939 to 1944 were concentrated in the first 
years: the extensions and simplification of compulsory schemes; the 
reform of the insurance local authorities; the coordination among 
separate funds, with the exception of agricultural insurances; industrial 
injuries; family allowances; the population under Nazi administration; 
the workers in Germany; the mutual organizations.523 Directly related 
to the need to secure the pursuit of the benefits were the law to grant 
the benefits for the workers called to army or for those who could no 
longer receive them due to the war, or the social benefits for the 
families of war prisoners.524  
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In the first two months the regime passed regulations on the 
redefinition of the districts of competence of the local authorities.525 The 
occupation, the huge number of dispersed and prisoners, the 
administrative displacements, and the loss of insurance cards and 
dossiers imposed to reconfigure the administrative geography of the 
local funds. All these provisions were no longer related to working 
activities, but became assistance benefits for the subsistence of the 
families during wartime. The criteria of affiliation to the local funds 
changed; the benefits were no longer paid according to the place of 
employment (as many workers were prisoners, dispersed, or relocated 
to Germany) but to the place of residence of the family. The 1945 
reforms of the sécurité sociale under Republican regime retained this 
new configuration of the benefits.526 Other laws operated in continuity 
with the last IIIrd Republic projects. The insurances for farm workers, 
whose local funds were separated from the general compulsory 
schemes, passed under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture 
in 1941.527 The separate schemes in the trade and in special sectors of 
the industry were instead amalgamated to compulsory schemes; the 
Decree of 17th July 1941 operationalised the Decree-Law of 1935 in this 
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aux assurés sociaux, anciennes prisonniers de guerre, l’attribution des prestations 
maternité à leur retour de captivité», JO, 13 juin 1944. 
525 «Arrêté du 19 aout 1940 modifiant les circonscriptions des services régionaux des 
assurances sociales», JO, 20 aout 1940; «Arrêté du 19 aout 1940 concernant le paiement 
des prestations par les Caisses d’assurances sociales et les nouvelles circonscriptions des 
services régionaux», JO, 20 aout 1940. 
526 J.-P. Hesse, «Les assurances sociales», in Philippe-Jean Hesse, Jean-Pierre LeCrom 
(eds.), La protection sociale sous le régime de Vichy, Rennes, Presse Universitaire de Rennes, 
2001, pp. 31-84, p. 38. 
527 «Loi du 5 avril relative au fonctionnement des lois sociales et familiales en agriculture 
(gestion des assurances agricoles)», JO, 18 avril 1941. 
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domain.528 The administrative changes set in motion by the war also 
improved the pre-war legislation, which tended to the unification of 
the schemes. After the failure of the global reforms of social insurances, 
between 1941 and 1942 specific insurances were improved without, 
however, unitary vision. The regime intervened in all the risk 
categories (sickness, disease, old-age pensions, industrial injuries, 
unemployment), but the reforms hardly were interrelated as they 
would have been a few months later in Britain, and they faced 
resistance in the mutualist frame of the French insurances.  
The loi du 6 janvier 1942 was a step to greater uniformity of the 
sickness benefits.529 The benefits covered all the workers, regardless 
their employment and type of remuneration. The “simplification of the 
contribution”, as declared by the law, affected the mutualist system, as 
the link between benefits and contributions was weakened. The 
benefits were now related to the status of worker, and not to that of 
insured worker. By the end of the same year, the benefits includied the 
foreigner miners and the soldiers in this provision, and moving 
towards “universal” coverages.530 Anyway, this reform had less to do 
with citizenship-based social rights. The new recipients were rather 
“assisted-insured”, because enjoyed sickness benefits regardless their 
contributions.531 The extension to wider categories recalled the National 
Assistance in Britain, where the needy and the poor unable to pay for 
their own security received social benefits. This was an effective policy 
of social solidarity, even if the French reform retained differences 
between contributory categories, and did not establish minimal vital 
income, thus lacking of real universalistic features. More than on 
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“political” intent, the extensions of sickness benefit lied on emergency 
conjunctures.  
This dynamic affected good part of Vichy social policy, as for 
industrial injuries and unemployment, fields where traditionally the 
French social protection relied on assistance measures rather than 
contributory insurances.532 As seen, the regime did not reform the 
industrial injuries insurance, as the regime had rather to combine cash 
benefits with daily priorities and advantages.533 War brought about the 
major innovations; for the industrial injuries due to war events, the 
government set up special compulsory funds, which were effectively 
flat-rate, paid by the State and the employers through a National Fund 
of Solidarity for the wartime risks. 534 More complicated was the 
situation in the areas under German administration. For the French 
workers applied the German legislation (as in Alsace and Lorrain, or 
for the French labour in Germany), agreement between France and 
Germany (as for the Occupied Territory), or even specific contracts (as 
for the Todt organization). The government tried – without success – to 
overcome the resistance of the private assurances for more uniformity 
and centralization of the industrial insurances for the workers in 
France, while the workers in Germany fell into the German social 
legislation. 
The absence of compulsory insurances against unemployment 
in France led to specific approaches to this risk. The regime improved 
the previous setting which lapped the public assistance, as a national 
public agency provided the funding to the local authorities. The 
government addressed unemployment policy in function of the current 
conditions, and relying on public works and coercive measures to meet 
the needs of the occupants and tried to increase productivity. In 1940, 
the regime tackled the rise of unemployment after the military defeat 
(more than 1 million units, mostly in the Occupied Zone) monitoring 
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the labour market: public works, banning of multiple jobs, regulation of 
female labour, and unification under the same authority of job 
placements and unemployment agencies.535 This latter was particularly 
important as reformed the mechanisms of unemployment provisions; 
the former local and central authorities were replaced by State-
managed local bodies, in charge of benefits and allocation of 
manpower, later called Services regionaux et départementaux de la main-
d’oeuvre (Regional and departmental services for the manpower).536 The 
enjoyment of the benefits was conditional to the acceptance of the job. 
Overall, these measures constituted an important and coherent piece of 
legislation; altogether, they became laws on 11th October 1940, probably 
scheduled to connect with one of the major Pétain’s speeches, where he 
solemnly proclaimed that: 
 
 «All the Frenchmen have the same right to work. One can 
imagine that, in order to ensure the exercise of this right and 
the sanction of this duty, a deep revolution is needed in all 
our outdate industrial vehicle. After a transitional period, 
during which the capital works have to be developed and 
spread above the territory, we will be able, in an organized 
economy, create sustainable industrial plants where 
                                                          
535 «Loi du 11 octobre 1940 Simplification des procédures d’expropriation pour 
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everybody will find his role and fair salaries according to his 
skills.»537  
 
Vichy primarily intervened on the labour market and the local 
reallocation of manpower, rather than compulsory schemes. 
Unemployment concerned mainly the Occupied Territories, but the 
Commisariat à la lutte contre le chômage (Committee on unemployment), 
advocated by Belin and directed by the former non conformiste Henri 
Maux, operated since 1941 over the whole country. The Committee 
adopted two different approaches, functional to the different places in 
the German war economy; in the North, under the supervision of 
Leihdeux, they relied on public works and infrastructures, while in the 
South operated a wide programme of re-training unskilled workers on 
the territory.538 By the end of 1943, this Committee merged with the 
Commissariat à la main-d’oeuvre française en Allemagne (Commission on 
the French manpower in Germany), with the STO, and with the 
Direction of the manpower.539 The establishment of a national authority 
in charge of the French manpower, at home and in Germany, 
accompanied the progressive integration of the French industries in the 
German area and the strengthening of State dirigisme after 1942.540 The 
measures for the reallocation of the manpower in Germany, such as the 
job re-training for unskilled labour and the social assistance for French 
workers, resulted from bilateral agreements.541 These policies 
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contributed to mitigate unemployment, which was however absorbed 
with the integration of the French industries in the German “total war”. 
The regime tried to give coherence to its action against unemployment, 
using local structures (which had also a role in monitoring the 
population), and central authorities, which elaborated national 
planning policies.       
Between 1940 and 1942, without abandoning the idea of a 
global reform, the MIP proposed projects on specific target-areas:542 
old-age pensions, family allowances, paid leave, and allocations de 
salaire unique. The public pensions for lower income workers and old-
age unemployed originally concerned all unemployed and insured 
aged 60 or plus, and over 70 y.o. non-insured. The cost of the reform 
varied according to the number of workers involved in the plan and to 
the contingency of the economic recovery; in the first ten years it was 
expected to range between 1,5 and 2 milliards, which required the 
financing of the scheme through the contributed capital of the fund, 
and the shift to the repartition.543 The project aimed at «first and 
foremost fighting unemployment and at completing the trilogy of the 
projects that were drafted at the same regard (allocation of the 
unemployed – female labour – accumulation of jobs).»544 In subsequent 
drafting, this goal progressively watered down, encouraging the skilled 
workers over 60 y.o. to keep working. This signalled the shift in the 
aims of the reform, which came to tend to genuinely guarantee the 
means of subsistence for lower incomes.545  
                                                                                                                               
Général à l’action sociale pour les français travaillant en Allemagne, rattaché au 
Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail», JO, 12 janvier 1944. 
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543 CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5 « Ministère de la Production Industrielle et du Travail. Cout de la 
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544 CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5 «Ministère de la Production Industrielle et du Travail. Note sur 
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Such reform was a matter of dispute for long time during the 
IIIrd Republic; Pétain could with good reason state that his government 
“keep its promises, also those of the others”. This piece of legislation 
took up previous haphazard measures of social solidarity towards on 
old-age pensions, whose reorganization was made necessary by current 
needs. The 1928-30 reform of the social insurances did not originally 
include complementary public pensions for lower incomes, who often 
fell into the public assistance. In the 1930s complementary insurances 
were proposed via the Fonds de Majoration et Solidarité, charged of the 
management of the social insurances.546 Right before the outbreak of the 
war, different proposals by mutualist organizations and by the 
Parliament recommended to integrate the contributory pensions with 
compulsory insurances, or to combine new compulsory pension 
insurances for wage earners and self-employed with benefits in kind 
and assistance measures.547 The 1941 reform of the Allocation aux Vieux 
Travailleurs Salariés (AVTS, Old-age pensions) took up from the pre-
Vichy era: it dealt with solidarity quests, with the ageing population, 
with the composition of the labour market, and with the financial 
mechanism of the social protection. These four aspects of the reform 
were in fact interrelated, as the social pensions were submitted to 
demographic and economic trends that might affect their financial 
sustainability. In addition, the different sectors of the social protection 
were now more systematically tied, as the social insurances grew in 
importance:  
 
«What is the future of the Social Insurances? It will be related 
to the demographic situation. We assume that the pension 
beneficiaries will increase as the contributors will decrease. 
[…] But there is an important point, that is, the absolute (if 
not relative) increase in the number of number of old people. 
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The Government pursues, at once, a family policy which will 
undoubtedly allow to increase the birth-rate, and later of the 
workers, and other social and health policies to eliminate 
diseases: […] The sickness benefits it would be futile to 
develop the sickness insurance is now coordinated, it is no 
longer limited to ensure relief in case of interruption of work, 
but it is also preventive. […] it would be futile to develop 
sickness benefits, to try to eliminate diseases, to tend to 
provide a better old-age for workers if we do not provide, on 
the other side, the possibilities to enjoy their retirement at its 
fullest.»548 
 
With the AVTS, the French system shifted from the 
capitalisation of the funds to the repartition of the contributions. Unlike 
Britain, the French reform of the old-age pensions was not achieved in 
the framework of the global restructuring of social insurances, nor via 
the complete unification and centralization of the insurances, but 
through a different mechanism of financing. From the investments 
incomes, the workers could enjoy social benefits through the 
contributions of the gainfully employed. Different funding mechanisms 
had important political implications, which concerned also the British 
reforms.549 The capitalisation constituted the very framework of 
voluntary insurances, favouring private business and mutualism; this 
system implied the “moral self-education” and the “personal saving” of 
the insured. On the other side, it required monetary stability, while in 
1941 the Franc lost 65% of its value in comparison to 1936, devouring 
wages, pensions and personal savings. Lower pensions became 
inadequate, also facing the shortages. The long-overdue shift to 
repartition, supported by Belin and his collaborators Francis Letter and 
Laroque, was meant to be a fairer measure, as partially secured 
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pensions from inflation and centralized the management of the 
pensions to State authorities: «in a nutshell, the regime of repartition 
allows an highly sustainable and unified financial action, and the 
achievement of a thorough simplification that, from the administrative 
point of view as well as for the insured, will give to the law an 
applicative flexibility that was lacking in the old regime.»550 After seven 
drafts, the law on the AVTS resulted from a compromise: reduction of 
1/3 of the beneficiaries, raising retirement age from 60 to 65 years, and 
increase of social contributions.551 The reform concerned the workers 
over 65 y.o. regardless their affiliation to compulsory insurances, to 
separate funds, and even the non-insured, since the State contributed in 
the funding. These latter were eligible if they paid contributions for at 
least 5 years and if they have not adequate economic resources. The 
measure encompassed also disabled people and unemployed who fell 
into the social assistance.  
The AVTS only concerned social pensions for salaried workers, 
but Belin tried to generalize the funding by repartition and to make the 
benefits available to all the workers. In accordance with the CDC, the 
MIP drafted a decree to suppress and centralize all the 115 
departmental capitalisation funds in a single repartition fund.552 The 
decree extended the repartition and the unification of the funds to all 
the insurances, but could not overcome the resistances of private 
business and the same government.553 Eventually, only the AVTS were 
financed via repartition. In 1942, the MIP tried to include also the non-
salaried and self-employed within the AVTS. However, the Ministry of 
Finances opposed its financial burden and the difficulties to move 
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towards a fully “universalistic” system of old-age pensions.554 The 
AVTS was not the forerunner of post-war social security. It was limited 
to the old-age pensions and it was due to emergency circumstances 
rather than a thorough plan of global reform, even if it came directly 
from the 1940 draft project on the social insurances. It was expected to 
favour the early retirement of 1,5 million of farm and industrial 
workers of which only 1/3 actually paid the due contributions. These 
low incomes competed with younger workers for job places and 
assistance services.  
In the subsidiary, it fulfilled the propaganda aims of the 
regime, and, as recognised in governmental reports, «the law of 14th 
mars 1941, which institutes the old-age pensions, has the features of the 
social assistance to the greatest extent as the benefits are granted to 
beneficiaries who never joined the general compulsory schemes.»555 The 
AVTS had the recurrent features of Vichy’s social legislation; it 
combined emergency measures and longer-term issues of the French 
social protection, it lied somewhere between social protection and 
public assistance, and it tackled the social reforms in piecemeal 
approach.  
 
3.2.3. Family and healthcare policies: traditionalism and modernization 
Four goals moved the action of the regime in the health, family 
and assistance policy: dealing with the emergency, achieving 
progressive administrative centralization, strengthening the regime’s 
consensus, and establishing some ideological guidelines. The social 
assistance had a particular place in the regime propaganda. France 
experienced food and goods’ shortages, and the difficult recovery from 
war’s material aftermaths. An efficient assistance safety net was crucial 
for the regime.  
The circumstances of the occupation had a key role in some 
sectors of the assistance and health. The German invasion caused in 
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May and June 1940 the displacement of nearly 8 million people in total, 
mainly French citizens, including 2 million Parisians, and refugees 
from Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The internally 
displaced people moved from the North to the South, with many 
organisational problems for public structures already overstretched by 
the war. In June 1940, subsequent waves of civilians crossed the 
country to reach the rural departments and the big cities of the South-
West, while nearly 2 million soldiers were captured and transferred to 
Germany.556 The major concern of the regime in 1940-1 was 
nevertheless the rise of unemployment. As seen, it underpinned Belin’s 
reform drafts and the AVTS; but unemployment affected also the 
family and healthcare actions. The stopping production of the army 
industry caused the rise of unemployment to 1 million in the North in 
few weeks. They were 2 million in all the country; as there was no 
compulsory scheme against unemployment, they usually fell into 
assistance programmes. As for the records of the departmental funds, 
the defeat caused organisational upheaval in the health structures. 
Besides the damages to the hospital facilities, the civilian and military 
medical staff was decimated. The health structures lacked of the staff 
facing the emergency, as only 5.000 general practitioners were available 
in 1940 out of the 20.000 in 1939.  
The administrative split did not ease the task of regaining 
control of the situation. The regime had to deploy quickly a set of 
emergency policies. These were not merely limited to sudden short-
term initiatives, but had wider-ranging goals. For the relief to the 
internally displaced people, the poor families, the needy, and the sick 
or injured persons were strengthened both the assistance and social 
insurances. In favour of war victims, dislocated, people affected by war 
disasters, kids of bombed cities, the State granted subsidies for the 
accommodation and utilities, foods and supplies, or cash benefits 
calibrated in function of the dependants of the recipients. These 
allocations were conditional to controls on the “social behaviour” or to 
the acceptance of the job proposed. The provisions were progressively 
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enlarged for the benefits and categories, but, in many cases, they were 
temporary benefits granted for six months.557  
The regime intervened more vigorously in the reorganization 
of the humanitarianism, exploiting the pre-existing organizations for 
the propaganda, relating social assistance to the consensus. Vichy 
encouraged the creation of different humanitarian organizations, 
whose the most important were the Secours National, direct expression 
of the official doctrine, and the Croix Rouge Française. Both were 
integrated in the regime, and worked alongside other associations close 
to the French far-right, as for the associations of the Croix-de-Feu or the 
Comité ouvrier de secours immediate. The regime could never completely 
control these organizations, but set in motion the “nationalization” of 
assistance reliefs, which previously was rather matter of local 
authorities or philanthropic private charity. The regime never 
institutionalized “State humanitarian aid”, but infiltrated in their 
structures and administrations, mainly composed by public officers. 
The intermingling between private and public structures widened the 
tasks of social assistance and politicized their action, as they became the 
vectors of the social doctrine of the regime.558 The social action served 
to tie assistance relief and benefits up with consensus and loyalty to the 
regime. 
 Family and healthcare policies were also buckled to ideological 
goals. The regime favoured birth-rates and promote the family as one 
of the three cornerstones of the Révolution Nationale, as «the new regime 
politicize the familial by making of this question the embodiment of its 
own social and political philosophy, at the same time organicist and 
corporatist, anti-republican and pre-revolutionary.»559 Vichy wanted to 
recast the communitarian moral values that it considered destroyed by 
the III Republic, creating a new moral order through a precise family 
model. Concretely, also in this policy area the regime resumed the tools 
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of the Republican regime.560 Vichy combined family allowances with 
complementary assistance and even criminal-law measures, such as the 
death penalty against the abortion, which was now considered «a crime 
against the society, the race, the State».561 The regime put in place at 
once birth-rate and moralistic family policy, both concerns that crossed 
the familyist and natalist movements in the interwar France.562 Family 
policy was conceived as an autonomous policy area: «Vichy privileged 
the family approach to social policy. Vichy, that is, mainly the pétainistes 
and the Catholics (especially the social Catholics), the theorists of the 
National Revolution that considered “The Family” the political subject 
par excellence, the only possible field for politics between 1940 and 
1942.»563 Altogether, it followed four guidelines: the benefits for the 
family were increasingly unrelated to contributions and to the incomes 
and the work of the beneficiaries; the “national” (racial) basis of this 
policy (not so evident in other fields of the social insurances); the clear-
cut gender division of labour; the attempt to calibrate the legislation in 
accordance with the extraordinary conditions of the years 1940-4.  
The government passed legislation on the family allowances 
between 1940 and 1943.564 No coherent and unitary projects lied behind 
this legislation, but the regime had to regularize the legislation in 
accordance with special conditions, as for the measures enacted to 
contrast unemployment, which required the reallocation of male 
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workers.565 The recalculation of the allowance rates according to the 
workplace instead of the place of residence was no stranger to the need 
to provide «an incentive to relieve congestion from the big cities, and to 
return to the agricultural life.»566 Family allowances where thus granted 
also disabled, injured, unemployed, prisoners and the French workers 
in the German firms, and it was also proposed to index family 
allowances to the current average wages. All these provisions, being no 
longer contributory-related, required an extra burden by the State.567  
The government got over financial constraints, unlike for social 
insurances, as family allowances served to strengthen social fabric in 
exceptionally harsh times: «if they [the family allowances nda] do not 
ensure the subsistence of the children and of the woman, these latter 
are compelled to work and to leave alone the children, or else the 
breadwinner is bound, to support his family, to withdraw a consistent 
part of his minimum vital income, which in turn becomes too low to 
provide to his essential needs, food, accommodation, clothing, and 
else.»568  
In 1941, the Allocation de Salaire Unique (ASU, allowance for 
single earnings) was a complementary benefit granted by the State to 
the young couples until the second year of marriage, where only one 
                                                          
565 AN, F/22/1510, «Ministère de la Production Industrielle et du Travail. Circulaire aux 
Messieurs les Directeurs des Caisses de Compensation d’allocations familiales. 18 janvier 
1941». 
566 BDIC, Q pièce 4.995, «Comité d’études pour la France. Complément à l’étude n.9. 
Amélioration du régime des allocations familiales. 10 septembre 1941», p.1. 
567 AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. les Présidents des 
Conseils d’Administration des Caisses de Compensation et des Services Particuliers 
d’Allocations familiales. 11 avril 1941» ; AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. 
Circulaire à Mm. les Inspecteurs Divisionnaires du Travail et de la Main d’œuvre.16 avril 
1941» ; AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. les Présidents des 
Conseils d’Administration des Caisses de Compensation d’Allocations familiales. 29 mai 
1941». 
568 AN, F/22/1511, « Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Les salaires moyens départementaux 
redeviennent inexactes au lendemain de leur révision. 13 janvier 1942», p.8. See also the 
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236 
 
earned salary.569 The ASU took over the previous benefits for the 
housewives, but additionally granted progressive benefits related to 
the number of children, with a bonus of 5% for each legitimate son.570 
As for the nuptial grants in Fascist Italy, this measure was expected to 
change family behaviours, encourage birth-rates and retain women at 
home. Benefits and recipients of family allowances and other grants for 
natality were generally increased according to each specific situation.571 
In this field, the regime could effectively carry out its ideological 
assumptions, shifting the focus of the allocations from individuals to 
families as “social communities”.  
The projects for family wages for the public servants were 
grounded on demographic statistic and changed according to the 
number of children in charge of the breadwinner: «the regulation 
establishes deduction of the provisions for the public servants that 
should have, given their age, numerous children and that have less 
than 2, and provides increases for those that have three or more.»572 The 
public servants aged more than 35 with 1 or 2 children had their wages 
cut respectively of 15% and 5%, while those who had more than 3 could 
enjoy an increase of 15% and 10% more for any child over the third; 
only the legitimate sons were taken into account for establishing the 
provision. This project tried to change the parameters of remuneration 
of work; from the individual salary it regulated salaries according to 
the “family unit”. The wages were no longer due and determined by 
the work, but by the “social function” and obligations that the citizens 
had before the Nation; to some similar trends was moving in those 
years also the Italian family legislation. Besides the family wages for 
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237 
 
the public servants, the regime improved from previous legislation 
other collateral social provisions: bonus at first birth, aid for the 
accommodation, nursing mother’s allowances, health provisions for 
mothers and for the early childhood, coordination of the special 
insurances for mothers and children with the compulsory social 
insurances for old-age and survivors’ pensions, subsidies for basic 
necessities or clothes, incentives for the families that set up in rural 
areas.573 All these measures were granted to the legitimate sons, 
whether the parents were insured or not.   
The projects for the family social policy of the regime were 
oriented towards the discrimination of unmarried and other “non-
canonical” situations (e.g. the childless widows), who had to support 
increasing fiscal burden for the promotion of the traditional family 
communities. The national “social solidarity” reulted in the transfer of 
incomes from the “unproductive” and infertile elements of the society 
to the fruitful groups, the traditional French families. This mind-set was 
pushed over paroxysm by the familyist supporters, but was deep-
seated in the mentality of that time.574 The social division considered 
task of men to work and provide the economic support to the families, 
while women had the national social function to raise children (and as 
many children as possible), and educate them to the traditional values 
that the Révolution Nationale wanted to inculcate. In a different 
ideological framework, similar goals were shared even in some 
Resistance milieus. For instance, in the departmental reports 
transmitted to the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR, the National 
Council of the Resistance) in 1947, for the reform of the French social 
security. Frequently, these reports remarked that the role of family 
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allowances was to allow women to return at home, and play their 
educational role of the children.575   
Health policy addressed urgent needs, rather than political 
commitment to far-sighted social reforms. Although not as coordinated 
and comprehensive as the British one, the regime tried nonetheless to 
create national organisms dealing with preventive medicine and 
occupational health. The departments of the MIP and the Ministry of 
Health coordinated their actions to enforce safety at work. In 1941, the 
government passed three distinguished laws, which overall compelled 
the enterprises to guarantee safety measures and extended the central 
control on this matter; in every enterprise, the Comités de Securité et 
Hygiène monitored the working conditions and trained workers to 
prevent occupational risks, while a new central office coordinated the 
labour inspectors, under the administrative control of the central 
Direction du Travail.576  
In the same year, the reform of hospitals was, in hindsight, one 
of the first moves towards the nationalisation and extension of the 
service. The law opened-up the right to access to medical treatment to 
all the population whether insured or not, and established three 
different daily tariffs for the hospitalization.577 The laws of 21st 
December 1941 and the decree of 17th April 1943 enabled administrative 
changes that were retained after the war.578 The law concerned the 
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departmental organisation of the hospitals, leading to their greater 
centralisation and nationalisation. The whole of the hospitals 
(excluding psychiatric hospitals) were placed under the control of the 
Commission du plan de l’organisation hospitalière (Committee for the 
planning of the hospitals), a governmental authority that had 
uniformed payloads, obligations and services. The heads of the hospital 
became public officers appointed by the prefects, and no longer by local 
authorities, passing from assistance measures to contrast pauperism to 
more articulated national public policies. This first major reform of 
public health did not have the same scope of the coeval projects for the 
NHS in Britain; while these latter built from the scratch a completely 
free and national health service, Vichy enacted administrative reforms 
to coordinate the system. Moreover, while the British NHS was free 
and available as right to health for all the citizens, the French hospitals 
were opened to all the citizens who, except for the poor and the 
insured, could afford it. Yet, these reforms were a turn in the approach 
to public health, which departed from the residual approach of the IIIrd 
Republic and marked the progressive penetration of the State in the 
health sector. In the opening-up to all the paying citizens, the hospitals 
shifted from to the assistance mind-set to the prevention and the 
medical treatment.  
However, the mutualist setting linked to social insurances 
persisted; the most important national organism in charge of the social 
and health action was the Institut National d’action sanitaire des 
Assurances Sociales (INASAS, National Institute of the Social Insurances 
for the Health Action). Funded by the social insurances, it planned on 
national basis the public health both with preventive and informative 
campaigns, and with the training of doctors, nursery and social 
workers. The INASAS coped with the plethora of figures related to 
social assistance, still close to private philanthropy and self-relief, with 
a limited intervention of public assistance organisms. Its action dwelt at 
the crossroad of public health policies, work-related matter (it had also 
some tasks in coordinating the works of the labour inspectors), 
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assistance policy and the social insurances.579 The INASAS had some 
embryonic elements of “universalism”, as the possible transition from 
the healthcare for the insured to a wider audience of recipients was 
debated.580  
In the report that introduce the draft legislation, the goals were 
more limited; coordinating the action of the local funds, modernizing 
the healthcare services, especially with reference to the tuberculosis. 
For doing so, the INASAS «is provided with important resources, but 
to take into account the origin and the mandatory social purposes of 
these funds, its functioning is under the strict control of the Public 
Powers.»581 The INASAS was closer to the ongoing proposals of 
coordination of the mutual sickness funds in Italy, rather than the 
British NHS, being also expressly directed against the work-related 
diseases and those affecting the lower strata of the population. Yet, 
even this limited solution faced political resistances. The notes 
delivered to the Cabinet of Pétain were critical to the INASAS; it was 
perceived contradictory with regard to the corporative order, as it: 
 
«Highlights a class distinction in the realm of the healthcare, 
by creating a high authority in charge of supervising the 
health only of the salaried workers, in the same moment 
when all the efforts are oriented towards the union, if not the 
fusion of all the classes […]. Considered on the plan of the 
coordination of the social insurances, the project questions 
the principles of the doctrine of the Marshal Pétain. In fact: a) 
it “nationalizes” even more some institutions which were 
already regarded as already too much controlled by the 
State, and which the professions claim as their own sphere of 
action. b) it opposes to the corporative organization, since it 
takes one of its more important functions and since it gives a 
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class-related meaning to an institution which, as for 
everything that is related to the work, should have a 
corporative feature.»582 
 
Also this project was subjected to the cross-fire between the 
opposing visions of the Secretary of Labour and other departments. 
The circles closer to Pétain accused Belin to be a “socializer”, whose 
aims were to increase the role of the State in the management of social 
policy which were previously matter of the professional funds: «on the 
one side, co-joint management of social policy by the different 
professional actors: employers, employees and workers, on the other 
the pro-socialist tendency to control at a national level the most 
important insurances, by excluding the insured, purveyors of the 
funds, from the management of them, and at the expense of the 
creation of other functionaries.»583 The same division undermined not 
only the attempts to the reform the social insurances, but the Labour 
Charter in itself. The draft project on the INASAS, however, showed 
that policy-makers pressed forward the coordination of sickness 
benefits under the supervision of the State, in line with the coeval 
Italian proposals. The British case differed consistently in its scope, but 
rested on the same need to provide a State service. In the same years, 
important European countries were developing projects and debates on 
public, universal, healthcare policy.  
 
3.3. Corporatism and the myth of the social collaboration 
 
3.3.1. The Labour Charter   
The regime linked the social insurance reforms to the launch of 
the corporative system, considered the major measure of social policy. 
This aim was firstly pursued by Belin and his entourage. They probably 
found in the new regime the opportunity to implement the ideas that 
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flourished in the Thirties simultaneously to the crisis of liberalism.584 
The two branches of Vichy social policy, in reality, followed two 
completely different trajectories to achieve similar goals: for the social 
insurances, via the strengthening of the State in contrast to organized 
interests; for corporatism, through the devolution of labour 
organization to the different industrial branches. 
The draft legislation of October 1940 wanted to introduce «a 
complete, ordered, coherent text on the professional organisation.»585 
The draft was split in three parts: the establishment of the professional 
branches; the socio-economic reorganization according to corporations; 
the industrial relations in the professional groups. Each corporation 
had two national federations that represented employers and salaried 
workers. The corporations had regulatory tasks in economic and social 
matters, through the establishments of the Comité Economique 
(Economic Commission) and the Comité Social (Social Commission). 
This latter was in charge of collective agreements, working conditions 
and other «social matters.»586 The previous institutions of the labour 
jurisdiction were adapted to the new joint corporative structures. The 
preliminary drafts focused on suppression of the free trade unions in 
favour of the representation per industrial families, to become a-
political and compulsory intermediate structures; the regulation of the 
trade unions and the settlement of class struggle towards social 
collaboration was the key issue for Vichy’s reformers. In the 
preparatory studies of the Labour Charter, the major reference from 
abroad was Salazar’s Portugal, even more than Fascist Italy or Nazi 
Germany.587 The original project passed through inter-departmental 
counterproposals, the scrutiny of German authorities, the faint-
heartdness of the employers’ associations, the indifference of the 
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workers, the indecisions of Pétain, the astonishment of the 
administrative offices.588  
One year later, on 4th October 1941, the law on the Organisation 
sociale des professions saw the light.589 The text provided the juridical 
framework of the collaboration of productive categories. The preamble 
specified that the trade corporations  determined the regulation of the 
wages, the profit-sharing, the obligations of all the members of the 
enterprises, and the comités mixtes sociaux, which gathered workers and 
employers  and were defined the «cornerstone of the Charter.»590 The 
Labour Charter was part of an incremental legislation to strengthen the 
bond of solidarity and the social collaboration: «the social peace is the 
supreme aim.»591 The law fixed the obligations of the members of the 
enterprises in the respective professional families, as for the banning of 
strikes and lock out.  
The collaboration took place in the Social Committees, 
organised at the local, regional and national level. The Social 
Committees of the enterprises did not have tasks of management of the 
industry (which was rather matter of the national Committees), but had 
voice in all the issues involving the functioning of the enterprise, as 
well as the social activities, self-help and organizations of the workers. 
More complex was the organization of the higher hierarchies of the 
Committees; at a regional level, they gathered between 12 and 24 
representatives distributed among the employers, the workers and the 
other categories. The arrangements for their elections were hierarchical: 
the local Social Committees designated the regional Social Committees 
that elected the national Committees. At higher and intermediate 
levels, they were the effective regulative authorities for the collective 
agreements, the determination of wages, the vocational training, the 
rules for hire-and-fire, the health and safety at work. The Social 
Committees were the core of the social action of the Labour Charter; 
                                                          
588 J.-P Le Crom, Syndicats, nous voilà ! Vichy et le corporatisme, , Paris, Les Editions de 
l’Atelier, 1995, pp. 121-157. 
589 «Organisation sociale des professions. Loi du 4 octobre 1941», JO, 26 octobre 1941, 
n.390. 
590 Ivi. p.1. 
591 Ivi. p.2. 
244 
 
unlike other social and economic policies – which increased the role of 
the State – these Committees represented the autonomous organization 
of the production, within the ideological guidelines set up by the 
State.592 The Social Committees were expected to be the autonomous 
structures were the tripartite “communitarian solidarity” took place; 
through these organization withinin the enterprises, the regime wanted 
the “new man” to be created.593 The Social Committees, had also more 
concrete tasks of social policy:  
 
«In the social and family order, the Social Committees study 
and put into practice all the measures to implement the 
duties of the corporation towards its members: the security 
of an employment through the systematic fight to 
unemployment and through the social provisions for the 
unemployed; The generalization and management of the 
insurances and pensions; the self-help and the assistance; the 
aid to the families, under the moral, material, and intellectual 
point of view; the improvement of the living standards: 
housing, gardens, sport, leisure, arts, general culture, etc. »594 
 
The law overlapped State’s functions; the deregulation of social 
insurances and unemployment benefits were conditional to further 
legislation and agreements between the corporations and the MIP.595 
This did not clarify the apparent contradiction between the attempts to 
centralize the insurances with the new corporative organization. On the 
one side, the Labour Charter tried to deregulate labour and social 
legislation to the corporations, but, on the other, this solution would 
additionally fragment the French social protection in as many 
compulsory schemes as the existing corporative branches. In hindsight, 
both the 1940 draft reforms of the social insurances and the 1941 
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Labour Charter were provisional projects. The MIP concocted them in a 
rush, under emergency situation; they had no a comprehensive idea of 
the society. In the Vichy regime, there was no consensus on some 
common guidelines that could lead social policy. The programme on 
the social insurances was – as for the Italian Labour Charter – a mere 
declaration of principles; the real focus rather concerned the union 
legislation and the new structures for managing the industrial life. As 
noticed at that time, the Labour Charter left unanswered the 
fundamental issues of the nature and tasks of the new category trade 
unions, or the extent of the State involvement in the matters attributed 
to the corporations (e.g. vocational training, labour legislation, social 
benefits).596 
From April 1942 the Ministry of Industrial Production and 
Labour was split in two distinguished departments; Belin was replaced 
by Lagardelle at the Labour and by Bichelonne at the Industrial 
Production. By that time, social policy lost the simulacrum of unitary 
action that Belin painstakingly attempted to give; the dossier on 
corporatism passed under Lagardelle. The hand-over at the Labour 
Department (Lagardelle, Bichelonne, and finally Déat) increased 
uncertainty about the direction to undertake, while the Labour Charter 
became less relevant in public debate and policy-making. Lagardelle, in 
continuity with Belin, stood for the pre-eminence of the “trade unions 
corporatism”. Bichelonne tried to push forward, without success, a 
greater coordination from the centre of the CO with the Social 
Committees, which were slowing taking form in some enterprises. In 
his view, a coordination of the economic and the social corporative 
unities should have be driven by governmental central authorities.597 
Under Déat – critical on the outcomes of the Charter – the 
implementation of the structures of the Charter did not make any 
progress.  
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There was since the very beginning no agreement on the kind 
of corporatism to put in place. The Labour Charter was rather due to 
the need to provide a legislative outcome to the ideological statements 
of the Révolution Nationale. It was, at the same time, characterized by a 
certain degree of improvisation, despite its long elaboration, and 
overlapped many other functions of the State, which were not reformed 
consequently, e.g. the social insurances. The Labour Charter remained 
substantially stranger to the workers, and lacked of consensus. The 
emergency conditions in which it was elaborated, the needs of the 
occupants and the many crop dues at the MIP did not allow policy-
making continuity. The most important limit of the corporative bodies 
created by the Labour Charter was however the lack of an effective 
liaison with the structures of the CO, the only “true” corporatism put in 
place by the regime. Belin wanted to integrate the tripartite Social 
Committees, with specific social tasks (employment and manpower, 
wages, vocational training, safety at work, labour and health 
regulations) within the CO which advocated only to State and 
enterprises the industrial matters; in this sense, the Labour Charter did 
not achieve these goals. On the contrary, the CO, created outside the 
juridical framework of the Labour Charter, took over some of the social 
policies formally attributed to the Social Committees: workers’ 
canteens, leisure and recreational activities, assistance measures in 
favour of the workers’ families.598  
The Labour Charter revived studies and debates on 
corporatism, provided a tool for the regime’s propaganda – which 
could fill with contents the proclamation of “social collaboration” – and 
some organizational heritage, as for the Social Committees themselves. 
They were the joint organisms where corporative activities where 
bargained, and where industrial conflict was settled. At the level of the 
individual enterprises, it concretely meant to organize the socialization 
among workers and the harmonization of the relationships with the 
chiefs of the enterprises, who however were firmly in control of this 
structure, e.g. for the choice of the workers’ representative. Moreover, 
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while the Social Committees had regulatory and advisory tasks, the 
management of the policies (wage policy, hire-and-fire, family 
allowances and social insurances) were delegated to separate 
corporative agencies. The local Social Committees were coordinated by 
two central Offices des Comités Sociaux (Social Committees Offices), 
distinguished in the Occupied and Non-occupied France. They directed 
the «effective propaganda in favour of the Labour Charter and 
particularly to find out satisfactory solutions, for everyone, to the 
problems concerning the establishment and the functioning of Social 
Committees. [...] It is a tripartite centre [sic] of confrontation, 
coordination, and information.»599 The “social collaboration” 
channelled the industrial relationships towards bureaucratic settlement 
tending to favour the industrialists. Studies of the time already 
recognized how such setting was «the legal and compulsory tool of the 
methodical paternalism.»600 In the intentions of the promoters of the 
corporatism, the enterprise was indeed hierarchically defined:  
 
«The enterprise is, on the one side, for its own nature, a 
hierarchical economic community, where, everyone in his 
own place, from the entrepreneur to the manpower, plays a 
bridging function. It turns out that is the chief of the 
enterprise, and under his command the other levels of the 
hierarchy, who organises the labour (production) and the 
distribution (retail) and who provides the fair remuneration 
of the work (wages and benefits of the members of the 
community), and this under the regulations established by 
the professions. The enterprise is also a moral community or 
a natural community of mutual self-help, where everybody, 
regardless his functions, has equal and mutual bonds of 
solidarity with the others. It turns out that are the 
representatives of the different functions within the 
enterprise who organise the self-help in all its forms and who 
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maintain among all a moral environment of true fraternity 
and social solidarity. These representatives of the diverse 
functions constitute the Social Committees.»601  
 
Nevertheless, these organisms passed through a process of 
democratisation and through forms of effective unionisation. As they 
were deprived of management functions, they strengthened their 
representative role, mainly the administration of the social works and 
activities within the enterprises. This role was retained in the passage 
from the regime to the PGFR. It is difficult to assess univocally the 
continuity between Vichy’s corporatist structures and the post-war 
plans of the years; the historical context changed, and the institutional 
actors confronted on how to reorganize French economic life. The 
Social Committees were renamed Comités d’entreprise (Works Councils), 
which had major tasks in the social sphere of the industrial life, and 
advisory and informative functions for economic matters.602 The PGFR 
retained this corporatist structure, but consistently democratized its 
mechanisms, as for the participation of the free trade unions in the 
Councils. Furthermore, the post-war Minister of Industrial Production 
had a certain continuity in the personnel and political guidelines; both 
Vichy’s technocrats and the Minister of Industrial Production from 
1946 to 1950, Robert Lacoste, came from the milieu of the planistes of the 
1930s. In the very beginning, the “new” MIP retained the main 
functions advocated during Vichy. Driver of the national economic 
activities, it was expected to manage the allocation of the existing 
resources, conceive infrastructural plans and coordinate the 
professional trades.  
After the war, the Organisations Professionnelles replaced the 
CO; the State-driven organization of the industries according to 
industrial branches was retained, but these bodies were emptied by 
Vichy’s ideological agenda. The tasks that Lacoste expected to manage 
were taken by the Commissariat Général au Plan (CGP), led by Jean 
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Monnet. Also the CGP had a precedent in the Vichy’s DGEN, but it was 
autonomous and to some extent concurrent to the MIP.603 The CGP and 
the 1946 Plan derived from a slightly different ideology, that had lesser 
to do with the “ideological” planisme of the 1930s. It was oriented to 
face the junctural issues related to the recovery and the modernisation 
of French industry. It combined older and newer economic tools and a 
good deal of pragmatism, which owed to French previous experience 
and to the impulse from abroad, and notably from the American aid 
and “ideology” of productivity.604 The Plan marked a new step in the 
State’s dirigisme, now accompanied by democratic and consultative 
institutions. Trade unions and other professional associations approved 
it, with some resistances in the CGT and mostly in the industrialist 
associations, and had a relevant role in CGP sub-committees.605  
The whole corporatist narrative of the Vichy regime did not 
have consistent political and social legitimization, and the corporative 
structure of the CO was a State-driven measure of constraints, 
conceived to ease and manage the production in the context of the 
German war economy. The Plan, instead, transposed in the democratic 
institutions forms of “neo-corporatist” bargains on the wider economic 
directives (which did not necessarily imply full consensus on each 
detailed measure); this eventually contributed to its political success. 
 
3.3.2. Corporatism(s) in Vichy France: hierarchy, community, and social 
collaboration 
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The socio-economic organisation of industry was the centre of 
the ideological discussion in the regime. The debate on corporatism is 
probably the most indicative of its “pluralism”, as defined by the 
political scientist Stanley Hoffmann.606 The corporatist doctrine brought 
together different strands.  
Corporatism is commonly associated to reactionary doctrines, 
incluing the Catholics, the Action Française, the “traditionalist” French 
far right and single personalities like Maurice Bouvier-Ajam. This form 
of corporatism gathered also support from some milieu of the 
industrialists. They did not have neither revolutionary nor 
“totalitarian” aims; even if anti-liberal, it represented the ideological 
tool to crush the working-class organization, and reassert the primacy 
of the chiefs of the industries. Distrustful of the State, the “reactionary 
corporatists” translated the hierarchical view of the society into the 
industrial relations. Once the market was expropriated by its role in the 
determination of prices, production, wages, the State had merely 
regulative tasks, as the resurgence of the traditional intermediate 
bodies in economic life could regulate the field of the production.  
A second trend gathered the “modernizers”, who to varying 
degrees referred to the experience of the French non conformistes. 
Mounier had an ambiguous stance on corporatism, but in the very first 
years of the regime showed interests for the projects concerning the 
corporatist order. For these intellectuals, the communitarian principles, 
the collaboration and the co-management of the enterprises, and the 
establishment of “organic” democracies were the most relevant features 
of the whole corporatism.607 Perroux was rather interest in the increase 
of productivity through the creation of mixed structures which also 
secured social rest. These positions focused on the technical tools to 
manage and coordinate economic and productive activities, and to 
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overcome class conflict through forms of communitarian 
collaborations.608 These stances were clear in the aim to achieve social 
peace through collaboration, but lesser coherent when it came to the 
role of the State; they advocated the primacy of the corporations in 
determining the functioning of the national economy, but then they 
retained the State as supervisor of the common good. As corporative 
doctrine in the 1930s sought for a “third way” between liberalism and 
State collectivism, for the most part they left unsolved the question of 
the State.  
The former left-wing trade unionists and politicians who 
endorsed planisme in the Thirties had a clearer view of the State with 
regard to the other societal bodies, especially the trade unions. Based 
on Henri De Man’s formulation of planned economy, personalities like 
Déat or Belin came to endorse corporatism.609 Their convergence 
followed different paths, but they were bonded together by the 
revaluation of the role of the State. In Déat, the shift from planisme to 
corporatism intermingled State’s planning authorities and policies with 
corporations as regulatory institutions of industrial relations.610 The 
adherence of whole sectors of the CGT to corporatism was more 
circumscribed. With the outbreak of the war, Belin and his comrades 
claimed for social collaboration through joint representativeness 
between workers and employers. At the beginning of 1940 the planiste 
trends within the CGT were still anti-fascist, even if increasingly critical 
both with traditional trade unionism and democratic institutions. What 
probably marked their repositioning was the failure of the 
collaboration on voluntary basis and in democratic environment, 
mainly for the opposition of the employers.611 In a few months, this area 
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adhered not to fascism, but to corporatism; they supported the official 
ideology of the Révolution Nationale, meant as “class collaboration”.  
There was, therefore, no agreement on the nature, scopes and 
goals of corporatism, in France even lesser than in Fascist Italy. In fact, 
corporatism gathered different milieu around few principles: 
collaboration, social rest, the link between “economic and social 
revolution”. Grasping under the surface of the propaganda, these 
watchwords had different meanings for each political group. 
Furthermore, the Vichy establishment did not even share common 
views on the kind of social organization to choose, or what kind of 
“corporatism” support. Therefore, the whole corporative project was 
already crippled even before being enacted. As profusely 
abovementioned, it is necessary to distinguish the “substantial” from 
the “formal” corporatism. Under Vichy, the former took the shape of 
the “economic collaboration” between the State (and the Germans) and 
some sectors of the employers, with the exclusion – both substantially 
and formally – of the workers. This economic organization was 
deployed by the Ministry of the Economy, in close cooperation with the 
German authorities. Vice versa, the centre of the projects for the “social 
collaboration”, embodied by the Labour Charter, was the MPI.  
The lack of consensus on this project might be measured by the 
conflict between the “trade unionist” of the MPI and the 
“traditionalist” entourage of the Cabinet Pétain. The different drafts 
elaborated by Belin encountered the opposition of other representatives 
of the government, like the commandant Gaston Cèbe. Since 1940, he 
carried out the purge in the public administration and the prosecution 
of the former trade union delegates. They were regarded as leftovers of 
the Popular Front, who could have undermined the deployment of the 
“New State”.612 In the circles closer to Marshal Pétain, the corporatist 
project pointed at reducing even more the weight of workers’ 
organizations, while Belin wanted to restructure the role of the trade 
unions in the new corporatist setting. The “traditionalists” and some 
representatives of the employers prefigured the creation of forms of 
                                                          
612 On the administrative cleansing in Vichy, see M. O. Baruch, Servir l’État français : 
l’Administration en France de 1940 à 1944, Paris, Fayard, 1997, pp. 115-169. 
253 
 
corporatism without the, not even from the “formal” point of view. The 
polythecnicien and representative of the employers Gérard Bardet 
proposed to group the CO according to production sector (agriculture 
and food industry, transports, service sector, primary industry, 
secondary industry). Each industry in these sectors should have created 
two distinguished consultative bodies: the first was the Social Council, 
which gathered workers, technicians and employers, while the Trade 
Committee, in charge of the economic direction of the enterprise, 
excluded the manpower. Both these bodies were submitted to the CO 
and the State’s directives. 
This divergence affected the whole debate before the Labour 
Charter, which resulted in a compromise that suppressed free trade 
unions and gave to the employers a relative autonomy in the decisions 
concerning the business management.613 Notwithstanding these 
differences, “corporatism” became the shibboleth of the regime; before 
1941, as promise to maintain, and, after the publication of the law, as 
tool to gainer the consensus of the working class. The government 
created and paid great attention to different centres and services of 
propaganda, to vulgarize the “official position” on the matter. In all 
this documentation, the official publications of the Bulletins de la Charte 
du Travail, published by the Ministry of Labour under Lagardelle, 
deepened single aspects of the administrative and juridical apparatus 
set in motion by the Charter. These Bulletins tried to orient the main 
decisions, providing the official view of the Ministry of Labour on 
corporatism, and being a “political tool” in the controversy that 
involved the different positions within the Government.614 The Labour 
Charter became the subject of in-depth juridical and organizational 
analysis, especially with regard to the implications of the new 
corporative order in labour legislation and social insurances.615  
                                                          
613 J. Julliard, «La Charte du Travail», in René Remond, Le Gouvernement de Vichy 1940-
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The debate on corporatism involved an handful of intellectuals, 
trade unionists, and technicians. Two groups mainly confronted; the 
trade unionists closest to the Ministry of Labour, and the group of the 
Institut d’études corporatives et sociales (IECS, Centre of Corporative and 
Social Studies) of Ajam, expression of the traditionalist milieu that 
gravitated around the Cabinet Pétain. In a moment where political 
conflict was repealed, the battleground shifted to governmental groups 
and lobbies within. The trade unionists gathered mostly around two 
revues, Au Travail ! in the Unoccupied territories, and L’Atelier in the 
area under German administration. The editorial boards of these two 
revues were composed by figures who had also political roles in the 
government. With different shades of opinion (L’Atelier was indeed 
more critical to the Vichy Government than Au Travail !), both 
supported the action of Belin and Lagardelle and claimed for a main 
role of trade unions – cleared out by any political platform – in the 
corporative system. They regarded at corporatism as an evolution of 
the economic system, where the trade unions were technical and 
representative bodies.616 Lagardelle stressed the key relevance of the 
trade unions in the corporative order, to such an extent that the Labour 
Charter represented the merging of trade unions in the socio-economic 
national structures.  
To the former anarcho-syndicalist, the unions abandoned the 
class theories to give their contribution representing the workers’ 
interests, as “constructive” national forces. The trade unionism was 
also product of the liberalism and the class struggle, and in that regard 
the Labour Charter marked a paradigm shift: «the basic cell will no 
longer be the individual, but the group, which only can free the 
individual. The national community will be like a body, where all the 
parts will spread mutual solidarity.»617 In turn, the renewed unitary 
social policy represented the unity of the nation and its social bodies: 
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«the France of tomorrow cannot take its place in the new Europe unless 
it will be able to gather all the living force in a compact bundle. These 
are the principles [...] that inspire the social policy I now dedicate 
myself.»618 These groups feared the most workers and employers’ class 
struggle; without any support among the workers (Louis Bertin, editor-
in-chief of Au Travail, was victim of an assassination attempt, while 
other collaborators, like Pierre Arnaud, were killed), they also attacked 
the trusts, the reactionary industrialists and the opponents to 
corporatism in the government. In their analysis – which usually 
combined references to the history of the working class to articles that 
enhanced the Nazi social system619 –corporatism was the tool through 
which “economy” intermingled “social policy” (being quite elusive on 
ways and goals of this intersection), overcoming the class struggle 
fostered by free trade unionism.  
Unlike the trade unionists, Bouvier-Ajam considered the the 
Labour Charter as the affirmation of the principles of duty, discipline, 
and work, over rights, interests, and leisure.620 Even before the 
Révolution Nationale, Ajam was an admirer of the corporative 
experiences, and greatly contributed to the activities of the IECS, which 
was founded in 1935, along the lines of Bottai’ Scuola di Scienze 
Corporative. In the 1930s, the IECS provided scientific deepening and 
juridical basis to corporatism; under the Vichy regime it carried out 
“academic support” to the Révolution Nationale. Ajam’s institution was 
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resumed and strengthened by Pétain himself, who wanted it as the 
official cultural centre for the education of a new intellectual and 
political ruling class.621 For the government, this legitimization served 
to fix the doctrine and to play a propaganda role, alongside the other 
agencies created to promote the corporatism and the Révolution 
Nationale. The IECS pursued a policy of propaganda in its broader 
sense. Ajam quickly gathered some important figures of the French 
academia and administration, such as Perroux, Raymond Marcellin, 
Philippe Ariès, Robert Guillermain, Brethe de la Gressaye, and set up 
five distinguished educational courses, directed to different social and 
political groups, with preparatory courses, conferences and specific 
curricula: the Collège d’études syndicale et corporative, the Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes Corporatives, the Cours supérieur, the Cours social, and the Ecole des 
hautes etudes artisanales. The IECS produced a wide documentation 
service: bulletins, revues, essays, libraries, texts of the lessons to study 
and vulgarise the corporative legislation.622 In their publications the 
regulative, juridical and economic principles were usually vaguely 
formulated, but some strong concepts recurred: the reference to La 
Tour Du Pin, the political and economic corporative organisation, the 
distrust for State-driven corporatism, trade corporations instead of 
production corporations.  
The “left-wing” and the “right-wing” differed as to reasons, 
means and goals of corporatism, but converged on some points: the 
hatred to laissez-faire capitalism and individualism, the distrust to 
liberal institutions, the criticism of the inefficiencies of capitalism, the 
fear of free trade unions and class struggle, the aim for a hierarchically 
and organically ordered society and economy. A deeper insight would 
show that also on these points the tendencies of the regime had 
different approaches. The wartime emergency circumstances gathered 
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them on the corporatist project. The ultimate goal of the Labour 
Charter, in the intentions of Belin, was – as he explained many years 
later – to «establish, between employers and salaried, legal relations in 
place of power relations, until then dominant, and directly inherited 
from the dawn of industrialization.»623 The framework of the State 
collaboration gave the opportunity for the manifold Vichy ruling 
classes to bring France into line with the other continental experiences 
of the corporatist “third way”; in fact, with the other authoritarian 
countries and the satellites of the Axis Powers. In that regard, 
corporatism was considered an overarching solution that could have 
modernized the legislation and the socio-economic structures of the 
country.624 
 
3.4. The French social protection from Vichy to the plan of social security 
The Vichy Regime never put in place a global reform of social 
insurances. In Britain, the domestic dynamics of the “total war” 
resulted in a major commitment to social reforms. France, instead, 
experienced economic mobilization in function of the German 
production. Its limited sovereignty did not compel the regime to any 
concession to workers and citizens. The corporatist design served to 
integrate workers in joint structures to ease industrial production, 
depriving them of free trade unions and means of combating.  
Corporatism was only an aspect of Vichy social policy; the 
more promoted, but not necessarily the most important. The 
corporative order as milestone of the whole social policy of the 
Révolution Nationale, but it eventually proved to be ephemeral, in its 
“ideological” aspects. The regime projected and deployed also detailed 
reforms on single aspects of the social legislation, which overall moved 
towards centralization and rationalization. Even if the tendency was 
the administrative unification, it lacked of the universalist impulse, as 
the prospected reforms were not meant as rights of citizenship. The 
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longer-run and conjunctural wartime issues did not let room for more 
reasoned projects:  
 
«The orientation of the social security in the period 1939-1944 
followed a natural development of the legislation, affected 
and accelerated, anyway, by the evolution of the economic 
conditions and by the war events. After ten years of 
experience, the social insurances needed improvements, 
adjustments, and reforms. The increase of wages, the fall in 
purchasing power required a complete change in their 
technical and financial bases. In addition, the war and the 
occupation worsened destitution and undermined the public 
health, imposing new measures. The afflux of the internally 
displaced people from Alsace and Lorrain, [...] led to 
convergence in the two legislations, resulting in a certain 
unification. Finally, the scarcity of raw materials, as papers, 
compelled, even besides considerations of opportunity, a 
simplification of the technical operative aspects claimed from 
the opinion. »625 
 
Rather than ideologically driven by the Révolution Nationale, 
Vichy social measures were stop-gaps to face the emergency and to 
bring to a conclusion previous projects of reform. Under Belin’s 
appointment, the MIP passed the more relevant measures. However, 
also the trade unionists lacked of holistic visions on the social 
insurances, usually seeing the the Labour Charter as the most 
important social action. Under the – not inconsiderable – ideological 
surface, the social insurances followed trajectories along the lines of the 
political elaborations in the Thirties (as for the AVTS, which resumed 
projects dating back to 1935), or traced the route for more coordinated 
reforms. The 1940 Belin’s draft project was probably the closest to a 
comprehensive reform of all the sectors of the social protection, 
including paid leaves and family allowances. Its importance should not 
be overestimated though; it was more likely to provide the guidelines 
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for further reforms grounded on some basic bureaucratic principles: the 
unification and centralization of the insurance funds for each risk 
category and the simplification of the procedures. These administrative 
measures were not accompanied by political implications in the 
citizenship-based social rights. In fact, the whole legislation enacted by 
the regime signalled how the major aim was to support the incomes of 
the family units in a context of social emergency, shortage and 
occupation.  
The ideological scope of Vichy’s social policy should not be 
however belittled. Social insurances and corporatism were two 
distinguished parts in the regime’s public rhetoric, centred on 
corporative solidarity and social collaboration. The AVTS represented 
in the words of Pétain, «the solidarity of the Nation, the solidarity of 
the classes, the solidarity of the generations; solidarity of classes, as the 
pensions are constituted with the contributions of the social insurances 
and they come from the both employers and workers; solidarity of 
generations, as the younger generations paid the contributions for the 
older.»626 This principle was easily applicable also for the social reforms 
in democratic regimes. But Vichy’s official narrative stressed the 
coherence between social protection and other projects, such as 
corporatism and housing policy, and that the new regime achieved 
what «a fake democracy could not realize, after having promised it for 
such a long time».627  
The continuities and ruptures between the III Republic, the 
Vichy regime, and the PGFR are ambivalent. Some of Vichy’s reforms 
were retained in the plan de sécurité sociale, and in some transitory 
measures of the industrial organization.628 What radically changed was 
the approach to the reforms and the ideas underpinning the 1945 plan. 
It only partially moved towards universalism, but politically departed 
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both from the 1940-2 Belin’s drafts and from the IIIrd Republic social 
reforms.629 As I will expose in the second part of my dissertation, the 
1944 Plan de sécurité sociale was the result of a synthesis between the 
political legacy of the French social policy and the wartime innovations 
elaborated in the Anglo-Saxon world. They were also the compromise 
among the different parties of the Resistance. The Programme for 
Action of the Resistance, promulgated in 1944, solemnly proclaimed «a 
thorough programme of social security, aiming at guaranteeing to all 
the citizens the means of subsistence, in all the cases where they are not 
able to obtain them with their work, with the co-joint management of 
the interested organization and of the State. […] A pension that allows 
the old-age workers to earn a decent living in the rest of their lives.»630 
This general programme was vague enough to overshadow differences 
among the parties. The Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP, the 
Christian-democrats) encouraged the «mutualist principles of free of 
association within autonomous funds managed by the insured 
themselves under the control of the State, by developing the collective 
solidarity, without discouraging the self-relief, now fundamental more 
than ever.»631 The Communists embedded social security within the 
strategy of the “structural reforms”, passing immediate reforms, while 
progressively changing the nature of State’s policies. The Socialists, 
equally committed to the “structural reforms”, pushed for a more 
consistent turn towards a more “State-centred” social policy.632 The 
                                                          
629 The pillars of the French sécurité sociale were the « Ordonnance n. 45-2250 du 4 octobre 
1945 portant organisation de la sécurité sociale », JO, 6 octobre 1945 ; « Ordonnance n° 
45/2454 du 19 octobre 1945 fixant le régime des assurances sociales applicable aux assurés 
des professions non agricoles» and « Ordonnance n° 45-2456 du 19 octobre 1945 portant 
statut de la mutualité », JO, 20 octobre 1945. 
630 «Texte définitif du Programme d’Action de la Résistance – 15 mars 1944», in Claire 
Andrieu, Le programme commun de la Résistance. Des idees dans la guerre, Paris, Les Editions 
de l’Erudit, 1984, pp. 168-175, p. 174. 
631 «Proposition de résolution tendant à inviter le Gouvernement à préparer un plan 
complet de sécurité sociale, présentée par G. Tessier», mentioned in C. Andrieu, Le 
programme commun de la Résistance, p.112. 
632 «Proposition de résolution tendant à inviter le Gouvernment à instituer un service 
national de sécurité sociale, présentée par A. Gazier et le groupe socialiste», mentioned in 
Claire Andrieu, Le programme commun de la Résistance. Des idees dans la guerre, p.102. 
261 
 
new Minister Parodi, after the failure of the 1940 all-inclusive attempt, 
now linked social security with the “individual freedom”. The Vichy’s 
Minister Lagardelle believed that “individual freedom” and social 
justice were attainable only in the corporative construction. In Parodi’s 
take, instead, the post-war tasks dealt with the reorganization and 
strengthening of social protection in the democratic systems:  
 
«It was mostly needed to rearrange the different legislations 
that, since 50 years, tended to alleviate the effects of the 
social risks affecting the workers: industrial injuries, sickness, 
maternity, death, invalidity, old-age were all fragmentary 
and haphazard acts, grounded on different juridical 
principles, and resulting in a multiplicity of organisms, and 
in the dispersal of the efforts. The governmental decree 
provides the country of a coherent system of social security, 
which encompasses the social insurances, the industrial 
injuries, and – with a certain autonomy – the family 
allowances. In this framework, other risks may be covered in 
the future. This legislation will put France at the lead of the 
greater industrial countries. [...] will give to our workers an 
increasingly better developed security that will ensure their 
independence and the dignity of their work and their life.»633 
 
 The French social insurances were reformed after the war, with 
the formulation elaborated during wartime as background, by the 
Resistance and – to some extent – by the Vichy regime. The aims for the 
unification were the same than in 1940, but in 1944 they were tackled 
with a more consistent approach. All the previous schemes were 
reduced to a single plan of social security, decisively moving to the 
nationalization of compulsory schemes. The principle of social policy 
changed; in place of the effort to establish “corporative” social 
solidarity, the 1945 plan turn to the whole nation, in order to guarantee 
                                                          
633 A. Parodi, «Allocution prononcée par M. Parodi», in Après la libération, la liberté. Textes 
des allocutions diffusées par la radiodiffusion française au cours de la deuxième émission, le samedi 
22 septembre 1945, pp. 4-5, p.5. 
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the freedom from want. Something similar happened for the industrial 
relations. For Laroque, they were at the basis of the contemporary 
“social question”. His concerns to find a settlement for the industrial 
conflict urged him to collaborate to the first drafts of the Labour 
Charter.634 After the war, he supported the industrial reconciliation in 
democratic and bargained forms of agreements. This liberal setting 
coexisted with some peculiar forms of co-participation of the workers 
and a major role of the State, which Laroque defined «a midway 
between the Soviet authoritarian socialism and the Anglos-Saxon 
liberal organization.»635 This was a sort of “French socialism”, whose 
origins he retraced in the Popular Front governments rather than in 
Vichy’s economic and social reforms.  
Social policies overlapped incrementally, while the ideological 
environment changed; the Vichy regime framed social insurances and 
labour relations in a corporatist and anti-liberal setting, while the PGFR 
owed the new lexicon and ideology of social security to the formulas 
elaborated from the Atlantic Charter onwards. The new social paradigm 
born between the Atlantic shores inspired the principles of the 
Beveridge Report in Britain. It equally influenced the French social 
reformers in 1945, not so much in the detailed policies, but rather in its 
political and social goals. 
                                                          
634 E. Jabbari, Pierre Laroque and the Welfare State in Post-War France, pp.84-98. 
635 P. Laroque, Rapports entre patrons et ouvriers, Paris, Centre de Documentation de la 
Sorbonne, 1948, p.308. 
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4. Fascist Italy from the social legislation to the socialization of the enterprises 
 
 
 
 
At the very outbreak of the war, the regime praises the 
reorganization and strengthening of the Italian social legislation; the 
whole system of social institutions was controlled by the regime and 
conceived as an important way to create consensus. The party reshaped 
the structures of social authorities, exploiting them as an important tool 
of propaganda.636 Mussolini conceived the establishment of 
corporatism and social protection as the achievement of the Fascist 
revolution in the economic and social life. In 1936, at the utmost height 
of the consensus for the regime, and just few days before the 
proclamation of the Empire, he declared that: 
 
«The economy [...] has to secure serenity, welfare, material 
and spiritual improvement to the masses composing the 
Nation, which showed, in these times, their high level of 
national consciousness and their totalitarian assimilation to 
the Regime. In the fascist System has to be shorten, and will be 
shorten, the distances between the different categories of producers, 
which were submitted to the hierarchies of the highest duty and of 
the harshest responsibility. In the fascist economy will be 
achieved that highest social justice, which, from time 
immemorial, has been the supreme goal of the masses in the 
daily and bitter struggle for the basic needs of life.» 637 
 
The core concepts of the Fascist social policy are condensed in 
these few lines: the intermingling between corporatism and social 
                                                          
636 M. Salvati, «Lo stato sociale in Italia: caratteri originali e motivi di una crisi», Passato e 
Presente, n.32/1994, p. 21. 
637 B. Mussolini, «La più alta giustizia sociale. Discorso del 23 marzo 1936-XIV», in Id., 
Mussolini parla agli operai, Roma, Confederazione Fascista Lavoratori dell’Industria, 1941, 
p. 37. 
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policy; the use of the social legislation as a way to change the balance of 
power within society; the role of social policy in the Fascist 
propaganda. In the very framework of the war, this political discourse 
also confronted other models of social reforms, notably the Beveridge 
Report; this was regarded at once as the convergence of Western 
democracies towards the fascist positions, and as an ineffective 
measure to address the “social question”. 
The wartime Fascist legislation went on in continuity with the 
Thirties, until the chaotic years of the RSI. In 1943, the collapse of the 
regime’s structures and institutions marked another turn in the Fascist 
public discourse. The revival of a revolutionary ideology attempted to 
hark back to the origins of the Fascism, in the transition at the very end 
of the war. Public policies and propaganda, however, followed two 
diametrically different paths. Salò puppet government did not 
implement major social reforms; in fact, the RSI could barely save the 
structures of the Italian social insurances from the palling of Fascist 
authorities, and preserve that small amount of autonomy from the Nazi 
occupant. The evolution of wartime social protection under the Fascist 
regime followed two phases; from 1939 to 1943 the government 
implemented wartime legislation and provisions. From 1943 to 1945, as 
the State’s structures collapsed, the promises for a social revolution 
became the only way to gather consensus and close ranks within the 
regime. Also in this case, however, social insurances and other 
provisions carried out with a certain legislative continuity.  
 
4.1. The Fascist social policy to the test of the war 
 
4.1.1. War, “non-mobilization” and social insurances in Fascist Italy  
The enter of Italy into war highlighted the inadequacies of the 
country’s productive system, and the political weaknesses of the 
regime. The consensus faded as the military defeats piled up. Italy, 
unlike other powers involved in the war, did not consistently stem its 
economy to the war production. Historiography stressed the 
dependence of Italy from Germany in the raw materials and energy 
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supply.638 In reality, until 1943, the relationships between the two 
countries were not characterized by the Italian subordination to 
Germany; their economic and trade relationships were regulated by 
agreements on equal terms.639 This was also the case of the transfer of 
the manpower; until 1943 it proceeded on voluntary basis, meeting the 
German needs in the agricultural sectors and high unemployment 
among the Italian farm workers. These agreements prefigured also the 
harmonization of the social insurances for the Italian farm workers in 
Germany, who, in Italy, had separate schemes with regard to the 
industrial workers.640 The reallocation of manpower at home was 
inadequate to the war effort, incomparably weaker than the British and 
German ones.641 Unemployment was still relatively high in spite of the 
mobilization for the war. The data on the overall labour mobilization in 
Italy are not detailed; sector of the armed forces counted nearly 3,5 
million of units in 1943, and manpower was transferred from the 
agriculture and, to a lesser extent, from the light industry to heavy 
industries during the war years.  
The macroeconomic analysis of Vera Zamagni and Petri showed 
that in Italy consistent economic mobilization never took place; the data 
suggest that the productive and administrative actors never even tried 
to commit the country to a long-term war. The impact of the military 
expenditure on the GDP was on the contrary, lower than in any other 
                                                          
638 This historical commonplace was used by the anti-fascist historiography, see F. 
Catalano, L’economia italiana di guerra 1935-43, Roma, Istituto Nazionale per la Storia del 
Movimento di Liberazione, 1969. 
639 M. Rieder, «I rapporti economici italo-tedeschi tra alleanza, occupazione e 
ricostruzione», in Vera Zamagni (ed.), Come perdere la guerra e vincere la pace, Bologna, Il 
Mulino, 1997, pp. 309-345. 
640 Confederazione Fascista dei Lavoratori dell’Agricoltura, Rurali di Mussolini nella 
Germania di Hitler, Roma, CFLA – Ufficio Propaganda, 1939; A. Dazzi (ed.), Accordi fra 
l’Italia e la Germania in materia di lavoro e assicurazioni sociali, 1937-1942, Roma, Tipografia 
Riservata del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1942. Only after 1943 the transfer became 
forced deportation in German industries and lands, reaching the rough esteem of 1,8 
million workers in 1944. See Brunello Mantelli, Camerati del lavoro. I lavoratori italiani 
emigrati nel Terzo Reich nel periodo dell’Asse  1938-1943, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1992. 
641 «Legge 2 ottobre 1942-XX, n. 1286 sulla disciplina del collocamento in tempo di 
guerra», GU, 17 novembre 1942-XXI, n. 272. 
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conflict involved in the conflict: 23% in Italy, 47% in the US, 57% in 
Britain, 76% in Germany. These figures are even more indicative 
considering that Italy was still a relatively backward country if 
compared to the other industrial powers. Also other showed that Italy 
never set in motion an efficient mobilization: the production did not 
expand during wartimes, which was only partially due to the need to 
import raw materials; the private consumptions, already relatively low, 
did not squeeze until 1943; the performance of the arms industry did 
not increase consistently between 1940 and 1943; the public finances 
were under control; inflation rose up to 68% by 1943, being 
uncontrolled after the breakdown of the regime and the expansion of 
the black market in the collapse of the supervisory authorities.642  
The employment figures are slightly different, even if they 
contribute to support the interpretation that the Italian economy 
between 1940 and 1943 was only partially affected by war mobilization. 
Italy did not achieve full employment during wartime; on the contrary, 
by the end of 1943 the number of employed slightly dipped. Yet, in 
some specific sectors, chemistry, mechanical engineering and extractive 
industry, employment rose against the backdrop of an overall 
decreasing number of people in work. This seems to corroborate the 
hypothesis that Italian industry seized the opportunity of the war to 
steer the production in the specific industrial sectors, where the 
wartime industrial policies laced up the trend started in the 1930s, to 
have further development after the war.643  
According to Petri, the Italian economic and technocratic 
establishment operated a precise strategic choice, that is, to not commit 
the industrial structure in the “total war”. Some sectors of Fascism, 
Mussolini before any all, and the governmental technocracy did not 
pursue the same objectives. The latter was aware that Italy could not 
support the effort of a long conflict.644 The country had not financial 
                                                          
642 V. Zamagni, «Un’analisi macroeconomica degli effetti della guerra», in Id. (ed.), Come 
perdere la guerra e vincere la pace, pp. 13-54. 
643 R. Petri, «Innovazioni tecnologiche tra uso bellico e mercato civile», in V. Zamagni 
(ed.), Come perdere la guerra e vincere la pace, pp.  245-307. 
644 Id., Storia economica d’Italia. Dalla Grande Guerra al Miracolo economico (1918-1963), pp. 
158-158. 
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resources, industrial structure, nor wide-ranging designs to create an 
area of trade and economic satellites, which could have allowed to 
wage the war. The regime’s political leadership decided to enter into 
war after that the first successes of the Wermacht presaged the quick 
victory of the war. In the perspective of a speedy end of the conflict, the 
Fascists underestimated the importance of industrial efficiency and 
financial stability to wage a longer “total war”. Not unlike the 
collaborationist milieu in Vichy, also the Italian Fascists considered 
fundamental to jump on the gravy train. 
A comparison with the British war effort would be ruthless, as 
furthermore it would involve an advanced industrial power and a still 
industrializing country. While the British government was able to 
squeeze private consumption, ensuring at the same time the expansion 
of the industrial production in the effort to win the war, the Italian 
ruling classes shifted the focus to longer-run processes of industrial 
restructuring. Considering the figures of the Italian macroeconomic 
fundamentals, every voice followed a descending line, except for the 
public consumptions, which increased until 1943, to dramatically fall 
down as a consequence of the crumple of the Fascist State.645 The 
rearmament programmes in Britain contributed to decrease 
unemployment. Italy, even if participating to different conflicts before 
WWII (Ethiopia, Spain, Albania), did not undertake any consistent 
rearmament. In spite of this permanent state of war from 1935 to 1945, 
the incoming macroeconomic and budgetary data were not massively 
affected by the military mobilization.646  In 1940, Italy entered into a 
war with the major worldwide economic and military powers, without 
even having the structural basis to wage the conflict. Britain had the 
opportunity to collect resources from global markets, or to have access 
to raw materials. Italy, instead, did not have either of these 
characteristic; the country lacked of raw materials and did not have a 
                                                          
645V. Zamagni, «Italy: How to Lose the War and Win the Peace», in Mark Harrison (ed.), 
The Economies of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 177-223. 
646R. Petri, Storia economica d’Italia. Dalla Grande Guerra al Miracolo economico (1918-1963), 
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vast empire to fall back on, leaning on German exports for energy 
supply.  
Many organisationally and political deficiencies worsened this 
structural gap. Britain set up a highly hierarchical governmental 
machinery, while in Italy the reorganization of the executive power 
was defective, even if the legislative instruments for the war 
mobilization were sharpened since 1931. 647 The three Ministries 
involved in the war did not manage to efficiently mobilize the 
resources, also for contradictory political orders from the top, which 
were in the hands of the same person, Mussolini. But political 
incompetence does not explain, or not completely. In reality, the war 
economy also clashed against the industrial planning of the autarky, 
launched between 1935 and 1937, which created a consensus of view 
between public technocracies and big business. The needs to centralize 
the management of the production, energy reserves and the military 
orders fell outside autarkic industrial consortia, and stressed national 
savings and energy policies. According to Petri, from the 1930s 
onwards, a new industrial policy was taking shape, and the war 
mobilization got in the way of medium and long-term projects of 
technological and productive development: «from this point of view, it 
was ex post rational to opt for a low economic mobilization. […] Most of 
the time, in face of contrasting goals, they gave priority to projects 
considered technologically valid in the medium and long-term, instead 
of pushing for war mobilization o for the stock-building.»648  
Italy was unfit to wage a modem war, unable to mobilize 
resource and enlarge its productivity, and defective in the chain of 
command at any level: productive, military and political. While Britain 
changed the features of its executive machinery managing the different 
                                                          
647 Disciplina di guerra e mobilitazione civile. Regolamento per l’applicazione della Legge 14 
dicembre 1931, n. 1699 approvato con R.decreto 15 giugno 1933, n.1176 e modificato con 
R.decreto 28 settembre 1934, n. 1791, Napoli, Pietrocola, 1939; Disciplina di guerra e 
mobilitazione civile. Legge 14 dicembre 1931, n. 1699 modificata dal R. decreto-legge 5 settembre 
1938, n.1731 e corredata di tutte le altre disposizioni legislative dalla medesima richiamate, 
Napoli, Pietracola, 1939. 
648.Ivi. p. 167. See also pp. 125-180. 
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aspects of “total war” (economy, society, policy, etc.), the Fascist 
government was no willing to regiment all the national bodies to 
channel them to the war. The lack of the coordination of the economic 
levers and the importance of the centrifugal forces during the wars’ 
years, led to the acknowledging of the failure of corporatism as socio-
economic model; a leading light of the regime as the former Minister of 
the Economy Alberto De Stefani recognized the demise of corporations, 
which showed not to be able to regulate production, prices, trades and 
redistribution of the wealth.649 
Despite the structural gap of Italy with the major European 
powers, however, the Italian military and political circles were aware of 
the changing features of modem warfare that fuelled the debate in the 
interwar period.650 In 1938, the text Economia Armata was the co-joint 
effort of military and political elites to design the Fascist mobilization 
for the war.651 The generals remarked the need to coordinate scientific, 
industrial, and military apparatus (Badoglio was by that time Army 
Chief of Staff and President of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 
CNR, the National Council of Research). Mussolini, for his part, wanted 
the nation to be prepared for what he considered a confrontation 
between two models: fascisms and liberal democracies.652 The regime 
overestimated the autonomy of food supply generated by the autarchy 
and by the rural policies; Fascists also wrongly believed that 
corporatism inculcated «a discipline of the labour and an industrial 
organization where the employers have such and influence which 
allows them, when the supreme interests of the country are at stake, to 
require efforts, to asked to make sacrifice, to get differentiations 
                                                          
649A. De Stefani, «La riprivatizzazione», and Id., «Il corporativismo e il monopolio», both 
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Tecnici”, 1938. 
652 Ivi. p. 7. 
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accepted.»653 The Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), one 
of the most influent think tanks in Italy, was confident that the 
regulation of the economy carried out by the regime eased the stem of 
the industry to war economy, while countries like Britain would face 
difficulties to mobilize resources in a “totalitarian way”. The Fascists 
reflected upon the structural changes set in motion by the war and its 
social aftermaths. They elaborated some guidelines to secure 
productive efficiency and social rest, as long as «the sacrifice that the 
war requires for the masses will be more easily and more lengthy 
tolerated as the larger will be the trust in the leaders, the belief in the 
need and rightness of the war and the realisation of the fair 
redistribution of the burdens and sacrifices.»654  
They recommended a balanced wartime social policy on labour 
policies and social protection. To override social and productive 
turmoil, the plans proposed three guidelines: regulation of the 
allocation of the manpower; collective agreements, wage policies, 
relations between corporations and State’s authorities; social assistance 
and social protection. This included the strengthening of family 
allowances, unemployment benefits, special wartime social legislation, 
like the survivors’ pensions, and the retail of mobilized workers and 
soldiers’ contributions. They were aware that, to successfully wage the 
conflict, the State had to deploy thorough social actions, to ensure the 
maximum productive effort and to keep the grip on the popular 
masses. The precedent of the Great War made structural some changes 
in the social systems, in Italy as elsewhere.655 The ISPI recommended to 
keep high the social expenditure and to pursue economic and social 
reforms even during wartime, meaning in that way the intermingling 
of public intervention and private entrepreneurship, was also 
considered to be the best way to avoid post-war slumps. In 1940-3, the 
regime faced the reality of a full-scale war; notwithstanding the 
potential, in terms of expertise and legislation, to mobilize the country 
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for the industrial “total war”, Italy did otherwise .656  
Italy was ready to wage a circumscribed conflict lasting 3-4 
months, not the “total war”; and the German overwhelming victory 
against France seemed to provide the opportunity to involve Italy in a 
rapid war on the winning side. A document from the INFPS is quite 
indicative of how the public policy-considerations were affected by the 
idea that the Blitzkrieg could quickly end the conflict in favour of Nazi 
Germany, with limited burden on the countries involved in the conflict. 
INFPS calculated the financial impact of the war on social insurances, 
finding three main areas of intervention and expenditure: family 
allowances, pensions of invalidity and unemployment benefits.657 The 
first supported the loss of revenues of the families of the workers called 
to the army, while special provisions were required for the missing 
soldiers. The pensions of invalidity was expected to be another 
important expenditure item: nearly 100.000 pensions of invalidity were 
directly related to war, comporting an expenditure of 100 milliards per 
years in the first 60 years after the war. As for unemployment benefits, 
the report provided two hypotheses: in case of a limited war lasting 
less than two years, the demobilization would have created 650.000 
unemployed, accounting for nearly 790 milliards for unemployment 
benefits in the first year after the war; for a war longer than two years, 
with a total mobilization of the economic resources, the risk reserves 
could not cover these benefits not even for the one year, considering 
that the unemployment benefits for the workers called to army was 
completely in charge of the State. The same pattern affected the 
allowances for maternity and marriage: they decreased during 
wartime, but would increase immediately after the war, boosted by the 
                                                          
656 F. Minniti, «Piano e ordinamento nella preparazione italiana alla guerra negli anni 
Trenta», Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica, n.1/1990, pp. 1-41; Id., «L’industria degli 
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drafts for the acts for the family allowances and unemployment benefits.  
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birth-rate policies of the regime (e.g. the allowances for the marriage 
enacted just before entering the war). The same additional burden 
concerned the insurances against sickness and disease, and particularly 
those against tuberculosis (170 milliards deficit in case of two years-
lasting war), expected to upsurge during wartime due to the reuse of 
the hospitals for military purposes, while the contributions to this 
insurance dramatically dropped.  
Considering a two-years lasting Blitzkrieg war, the INFPS 
calculated a dramatic increase of social expenditure for the war 
economic and social mobilization. All the risk categories were 
submitted to structural changes in the years after the war. However, for 
unemployment, survivors’ pension, and family allowances, the 
difficulties to evaluate the impact of the war suggested the unification 
of social benefits, regardless the working category of people called in 
army, and an increased social expenditure, to be entirely funded by the 
State. This was also rightly considered a relatively new task; the Great 
War represented only a partial forerunner, since there was not such a 
branched and developed system of social insurances like in the 40s. The 
report provided a draft for the accountability of the social burden of the 
war on the post-war social insurance. The analysis grounded its 
political and financial esteems on the social insurances of the workers 
mobilized for the war, focusing on the loss of revenue caused by the 
war condition. It also focused on the changes brought by the war in the 
labour market, e.g. with the massive introduction of new workers (the 
women) in the industries. Workers who previously might be not 
entitled to social benefits, became thus new recipients of the social 
insurances. The war was expected to enlarge State’s capacities to 
provide social protection, changing the financial burden of social 
insurances and the way they were funded. While some measures of 
contributory unification were considered no longer deferrable, the 
regime did not elaborate any thorough plan to turn the previous social 
system, as for the coeval British debate. The legislation proceeded with 
a piecemeal approach, as the regime, until 1943, considered to have 
already provided a major turn in the social insurances in the decade 
before the war.  
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While structurally inadequate, Fascist Italy reflected upon 
“total war” and its social aftermaths. The Fascist government also tried 
to enhance social policy during the war. This did not break with the 
previous legislation, being rather an incremental process, but 
demonstrated the effort of the regime to not neglect a fundamental 
aspect of “total war”: the home front and the consensus. Especially 
after the publication of the Beveridge Report and its quick diffusion 
through Europe, the ideological contraposition between two different 
social systems became clear in the reception and criticism of the plan by 
the Fascist elites. 
 
4.1.2. The social legislation in Fascist Italy (1939-1942) 
Even if not fully committed to industrial mobilization, also in Italy 
the outbreak of the war brought about the enhancement of measures of 
social protection and social assistance: 
 
«From this subordination derives the orientations not only of 
the economic policy, but also those of the social policy of the 
Nation at the war, to the former closely linked. If the 
economic policy has to tend to figure out new productions, 
to broaden the already existing one, to transform and to 
adapt to the goals of the war the specific branch of the 
industries, to boost the internal production to the maximum 
effort, then the social policy must aim at obtaining from the 
worker the maximum efficiency and the total dedication, 
bringing out the self-sacrifice. Production and labour reveal, 
once again, to be inherently tied factors.»658 
 
Differently from Britain, also in Italy the dynamic of the war 
constricted even more the industrial workforce: working hours, 
regimentation at workplace, imbalances between industrial sectors, call 
to arms. The war required also the assistance to the civilians for the 
emergency, the deployment of social services and healthcare for the 
population, and the assistance to the soldiers’ families. The extension of 
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275 
 
the benefits for the war-related risks, the pensions for the families, the 
stabilization of family incomes marked the expansion of public social 
protection, as: «it is the State that becomes the paterfamilias of the whole 
Nation, assuming the related burden and responsibilities.»659  The 
“totalitarian” dimension of the war required to secure the home front 
and providing social protection in exchange for militarization of labour: 
«it is therefore outlined the social policy during wartime; the necessity 
of the rest at home is required especially in the war’s conjuncture and 
the social legislation reveals to be the most useful tool to favour the 
production and at the same time to meet the needs of the workers and, 
broadly speaking, the popular masses.» 660  
Fascism rearranged social insurances just before entering the 
war, between April and July 1939.661 These reforms amended some 
measures of the 1935 fundamental reorganization of social protection in 
Italy.662 The decree and the law of 6th July 1939 coordinated the 
previous legislation, prefiguring the creation of a Consolidated Law to 
make simpler for the workers to know their rights and obligations. The 
law increased the benefits: the entitlement for tuberculosis and 
unemployment was partially disengaged from the contributory 
records; the insurance contribution were inflation-linked. The law 
enlarged the beneficiaries as well: the retirement age was reduced to 60 
and 55 years for men and women; the compulsoriness was reduced to 
14 years old for all the workers, and was extended also to the upper 
incomes and better paid categories of white collars, from 80 L. to 156 L. 
p/w for the former, and from 800 L. to 1.500 L. p/m for the latter; the 
insurances for farm workers, who did not have unemployment 
insurance, were harmonized to the general schemes, while 
homeworkers and other categories were assimilated to compulsory 
schemes; extension of the benefits to the family of the insuredEach 
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trade category maintained different contributory rates, paid by 
employers and employees with State’s supplementary subsidies. The 
greater uniformity did not prefigure universalism, as the fragmentation 
of compulsory insurances along occupational lines retained different 
benefits for different categories: self-employees, industrial workers, 
homeworkers, farm workers, farm day workers, with further divisions 
among men and women. Discriminatory logics were still present, as for 
the exclusion of some categories of women farmers, who could not 
enjoy any kind of compulsory insurance.  
In the family welfare, the benefits for marriage and natality 
replaced the maternity grants. It did not concern only female workers, 
but also the wives of the workers; this social provision was directed to 
the family as a unit, moving away from the link between the status of 
worker and the enjoyment of social benefits. The new allowances for 
marriage and natality absorbed and unified the previous benefits for 
dependent children and State family aid; the foreigners and the non-
Arian Italian citizens were excluded. The survivor’s pensions equally 
supported the families. Their rates ranged between a half and the 
whole pension of the insured, and supplementary coverages were 
provided also for the survivors without entitlement. The survivors’ 
benefits concerned all compulsory insurances, except for 
unemployment, that was nonetheless calibrated to the number of 
dependent children, and including tuberculosis. This insurance 
characterized the Fascist legislation, aiming at «defending and 
improving the race»;663 it combined insurances with assistance 
measures, e.g. hospitalization and healthcare treatment. Temporary 
compensations were granted to the family of the insured, according to 
the category and contributory division. These provisions were expected 
to «protect the worker, of all the categories, from the risks and the 
special situations of life – it assured him an integral and totalitarian 
protection against the events due to this risks and contingencies – and 
provide for him and his family some provisions, which allow him to 
look to old-age and invalidity with more serenity and quiet. The 
serenity of the worker, the tranquillity of his family, the eradication of 
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the discontent and of the concerns, contribute to the human 
improvement, and therefore to the performance at work. A complex 
benefit, therefore, which – ultimately – advantage the whole Nation.»664 
Overall, the reform was characterized by quantitative and 
qualitative improvements, in the benefit rates and in their extension to 
the household of insured workers. The regime was moving forward a 
greater interlinking between family and social policy; the management 
of family allowances passed under INFPS. The reform also 
amalgamated the different insurances. At the outbreak of the war, 
Fascist Italy extened and harmonized social protection, even if not with 
a comprehensive plan as the Beveridge Report. In March 1942, the 
President of INFPS, Ferruccio Lantini, boasted «the massive System of 
achievements and improvements made by our social and assistance 
legislation, which is among the most advanced.»665 He harked back the 
principles of the 1927 Carta del Lavoro; also the social legislation was 
part of the organic view on labour and social relationships, and it 
transposed the recurring rhetorical themes of Fascism: the new 
corporatist order was presented as the Fascist solution to the crisis of 
capitalism, and as stronghold against Bolshevism; the confrontation 
between liberalism and Fascism, as opposition between “atomistic” 
individualism and corporatism. This was considered the juridical 
framework that regulated the social collaboration: 
 
«Besides the new concepts of freedom and equality, there is 
also the social solidarity, that is, the solidarity among the men 
and among the different professional categories, which are 
no longer considered fighting to death as they represent the 
various conflicting interests of the capitalists and 
proletarians. On the contrary, these classes are put on the 
same footing of collaboration, under the aegis of the State, 
which direct and guide them toward the supreme goals of 
the Nation, achieving for them the principles of a complete 
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and real social justice.»666 
 
The Fascists did not distinguish social protection from the 
“corporative revolution”. The regime established some «broad 
guidelines and the general principles, which inspired the unifying and 
coordinating action to be implemented in social policy.»667 They 
concerned the collective agreements and the industrial relations, the 
assistance, the education, and the social insurances. In fact, 
“corporatist” and “liberal” social insurances differed more for the 
political purposes than for huge differences in the administration, 
which were nonetheless important, especially after 1942. For the 
Fascists, the social insurances were the natural product of the 
corporative system. Social protection was seen as a measure to dignify 
work and to inculcate in the workers the social duty of the labour 
before the nation. The Fascist social legislation did not consistently 
depart from other compulsory schemes abroad, but did not conceive 
social solidarity along citizenship-related bases, but as “corporative”, 
that is, occupational, ties of solidarity, embodied by the Fascist State. 
The war broadened the fascist legislation. From 1939 to 1942, 
family allowances and emergency measure had the major legislative 
improvements.  From the end of 1942 onward, the government enacted 
the twofold increase of family allowances for the workers of industry, 
trade, and workers gone to war.668 The further legislative actions 
adjusted social insurances and family allowances according to the war 
conditions, in a relentless effort to patch and adequate benefits to the 
new situation, while carrying on with the current administration of the 
other insurances.669 In 1941, the regime covered with family allowances 
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also the soldiers missing or interned.670 In the same year, the regime 
established the increase, at the expense of the State, of unemployment 
benefits from 120 up to 180 days in the sectors that fell in 
employment.671 As remarked in the legislation draft, the extension of 
the benefits was due to the imbalances in the labour market created by 
the war and had to be retained also for the recovery, since the measure 
«is solely and exclusively in relation to the economic situation resulting 
of the State of war and in the prevision that the process of 
demobilization and normalization of the national economic activities 
might be achieved within one year from the end of the war.»672Other 
provisions developed autonomously from warlike conditions; the 
sickness and disease schemes significantly increased, while the reform 
of the invalidity and old-age pension shifted the contributory burden to 
the employers, who had to finance them for the two-thirds.673  
At the very beginning of 1943, the regime enacted the Ente 
Mutualità Fascista (EMF, Fascist Mutualist Authority), a building block 
in healthcare insurances.674 Instead than on a central Ministry for the 
Health, the regime relied on a State-owned authority to centralize this 
risk category, in accordance with its general tendency to delegate to 
separate public authorities the management of public policies. The EMF 
was placed under the governance of three distinguished Ministries: 
Corporations, Finance and Domestic Affairs. The reform did not 
progress, like in Britain with the NHS, towards a distinguished branch 
of social policy, as it did not even foresee any autonomous centre of 
public healthcare. However, the law of 11th January 1943 automatically 
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included all the workers of industry, agriculture, credit, trade, and the 
self-employed; for the few other categories, the registration was not 
compulsory. Further decrees established that the EMF absorbed the 
private mutualist funds;675 while the healthcare still relied on private 
sector, the insurances were managed by a single authority, achieving 
an important simplification. Its funding was completely paid by 
workers and employers, being thus far from the principles of the future 
British NHS, which moreover was designed as an entirely public 
service.  
Like for Vichy’s healthcare policy, the tendency was to merge 
the functions of social insurances for the worker and his family, 
medical treatments, and public assistance. The regime never 
implemented regulatory decrees. Even if it remained on the drawing, 
the reform was the last effort of the regime to enforce improvement in 
the social policy. The EMF constituted the third main branch of the 
Fascist social protection. Three public authorities were in charge of as 
many policy areas: the compulsory social insurances (old-age, 
tuberculosis, family allowances, unemployment) administrated by the 
INFPS; the industrial injuries and disabilities to the INFAIL, and the 
healthcare insurances coordinated by the EMF. This configuration of 
the social protection was explained by Bottai: «The Ente Mutalità 
Fascista complements the other great corporatist authorities of the 
regime, signalling the global coverage guaranteed by the regime to the 
workers, concerning the social insurances, the industrial injuries, and 
now, the healthcare.»676 
Just before the collapse of the regime, Fascism committed to the 
modernization of an overarching system of social protection. The 
regime increased the social provisions, in the most sensitive areas in 
terms of political consensus. There was not a coherent pattern of 
reform, except for the war needs, as for the case of the family 
allowances for the workers called to the army. Overall, in the years 
1940-42 the regime did not implement comprehensive reforms. Fascism 
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settled major rearrangements of social insurances just before the war. 
On the other side, as for the Vichy Regime, the regime did not handle 
the matter with a unitary effort. Only with the establishment of the RSI, 
Fascism restated designs of social revolution. But in 1943 social 
protection reached its peak for the extension and structure of the social 
benefit, both those related to the warfare and the “current” affairs. The 
history of the RSI was instead related to the attempt to make a 
qualitative leap in the meaning and the scope of the word “social 
policy”. 
 
4.2. The Republican Fascism and the social revolution 
 
4.2.1. The Italian Social Republic and the construction of the “State of 
Labour” 
With the creation of the RSI, the Fascist ruling class attempted 
to piece together what remained of the former PNF. At the same time, 
the new-born republican Fascism wanted to grip the control over the 
territories under its administration. To do so, the Fascists tried to gather 
the different trends of Fascism, also opening to the political opposition, 
and to define the main guidelines of the party. As stated in the 
Manifesto di Verona, the most relevant document of the Republican 
Fascism, the regime wanted to «stay with the people».677 The renewed 
Fascism wanted to quickly come back to fight and to enact the “social 
revolution”.678 These two goals were intermingled; to carry out the war, 
the regime needed to recast consensus and address the wartime social 
issues. The RSI’s social policy moved along two tracks: the 
restructuration of the socio-economic basis of the country according to 
principles of national and social solidarity; dealing with emergency and 
social assistance, even more compelling as the frontline came closer to 
the territories under RSI control.  
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The Manifesto di Verona fixed the main guidelines of the new 
formed Partito Fascista Repubblicano (PFR, the Fascist Republican Party). 
The second part of the Manifesto was consecrated to social policy. Its 
programme mediated among different constituencies, gathered around 
the new ideological shibboleth of the “socialization”, a concept never 
used by Fascism before 1943. The RSI’s social policy covered three main 
areas; the socialization of industries, the trade unions’ structures, and 
the social insurances and assistance. The Manifesto di Verona stated the 
labour was at the very foundation of the social and political order of 
the republic. The major revolutionary interventions concerned the 
organization of the economy, favouring the labour against the capital 
(and borrowing, after twenty years of corporatism, the Marxian class 
lexicon). The regime combined the retail of private property with forms 
of profit-sharing and cooperative organizations in the factories. The 
article 11 mentioned the State’s ownership to «everything that for 
dimensions or functions goes beyond the interest of the individual to 
enter in the public interest».679 The vagueness of this statement left the 
room for further nationalizations by the hands of the State-owned 
authorities. The favourite form of socialization was the profit-sharing, 
the three-headed factory councils, and the creation of land trusts.  
Other provisions concerned the creation of a single national 
trade union, where the workers of all the categories had to register. 
This trade union incorporated also some tasks and agencies for the 
management of social protection. The article 16 restated that «all the 
huge welfare measures set up by the fascist Regime during twenty 
years are retained. The Labour Charter constitutes in its letter their 
consecration, just as it constitutes in its spirit the starting point for 
further improvement.»680 The Labour Charter was not repudiated, but 
its place in the Fascist narrative changed: from the culmination of the 
Fascist revolution, it became the starting point for further measurers. 
Relatively new, although relevant, policy areas were the housing policy 
and the wage policy. The programme foresaw the creation of an agency 
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to provide own houses for the workers, with the construction of new 
public and social houses or the buy-back of the rental payments. This 
authority had important tasks for the post-war recovery and the 
revalorization of the buildings. The wage policy, instead, was strictly 
related to the war commitment, for the control over the inflation and 
the fight against the black market. The wage adjustment had to reach 
the national minimum income for workers and employees, hand in 
hand with price and market control. 
During the works at the Verona’s Congress in November 1943, 
leading to the Manifesto di Verona, Angelo Tarchi recapitulated the 
benchmarks of Republican Fascism. Tarchi was Minister of the 
Corporative Economy in the RSI, in charge of social insurances until the 
end of the 1944, when the new Ministry of Labour handed over the 
tasks of social insurances, assistance, labour policy and socialization.681 
Tarchi admitted the failure of corporatism during the Ventennio. He 
complained the intermingling between political personnel, 
bureaucracies and the trade unions, and the attempt to regulate the 
social struggle via the merely juridical category of “corporation”.682 He 
designed the outline of the new socio-economic setting of what he 
defined the «Corporative State, or better the State of Labour.»683 The 
RSI promoted the socialization, the participation of all the productive 
categories in the management of the enterprises, the sharing of the 
profits and the harmonisation of the productive activities under the 
framework of a “national economic programme”, bargained by the 
corporative organisms at every level. Altogether, these measures would 
led to the shifting of «the enterprise from epicentre of the social struggle, to 
the core of the total collaboration between productive forces.» 684  
The ultimate goals of corporatism were in fact restated, but 
turned upside down. In Gentile’s “institutional” corporatism, the 
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corporations represented the expression of the productive categories, 
embedded into the State’s structures. Tarchi, instead, prefigured a State 
where the producers were the fundamental socio-economic and 
political cell: «it is in the enterprise where the very foundation of the 
corporative concept is born.»685 Tarchi designed a non-statist socialization, 
where the productive categories co-participated to the productive and 
distributive activities. The national economic planning was ideally the 
result of the collaboration between productive categories and the State, 
which adjusted the outputs to the national programme. 
Complementary, the other pillar of Tarchi’s “social state” was the trade 
union jurisdiction. The only legal trade union deregulated its functions: 
from the national collective agreements to local or sectional 
agreements. The Fascist trade union organized the consensus among 
the workers, and their co-participation in social protection and 
assistance, even if he State retained the management of social 
insurances through its public agencies. With the Manifesto di Verona, the 
regime tried to attract the workers through the two topics that were 
expected to take a hold over the: the economic planning and the 
representation in the State’s bodies.686 
In the confusing process of reconstruction of State’s authority 
two points were clear: the new Fascism was “republican” and “social”. 
The Fascists prefigured a State where social protection was integral 
part of the Constitutional Charter. At least three constitutional projects 
were presented in 1943, by Bruno Spampanato, influent figure of the 
RSI, by Vittorio Rolandi Ricci, and by the Minister and former Director 
of the Scuola Superiore di Studi Corporativi of Pisa, Carlo Alberto 
Biggini.687 This latter attached greater importance to social protection. 
The constitutional guidelines recommended that «welfare laws and 
provisions for all will be implemented, the assistance for the sick, 
maintenance for the disabled person, old-age pensions, fair distribution 
of the labour [sic] and of the remuneration, so to eliminate the 
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exploitation of the work, each will enjoy the fruits of his own works.»688 
The integration of the workers in the State’s structure resulted in the 
new role of the “Senate” [sic], now become «Supreme Body of the 
Labour», as it gathered all the labour’s representatives, whose election 
was determined by social and economic bodies and by the Chief of the 
State.689 The traditional “aristocratic” nature of the Senate was replaced 
by the «supreme assembly of the Labour’s aristocracy»690 Besides social 
protection, the constitutional draft had “progressive features”, 
validated by Mussolini himself: the draft proposed universal suffrage, 
gender political and social equality, abolition of titles and honours, 
progressive taxation, free and compulsory education and scholarships 
for the students, housing owned, reorganization of the national 
healthcare system. The draft also proposed the socialization of the 
industries and large estates, under cooperative forms or with the State’s 
direct control. The other constitutional drafts had similar social content. 
Rolando Ricci, for instance, proposed to create another social authority, 
the Ente Nazionale Edile (National Housing Authority) to promote the 
housing policy, and the transfer of ownership to workers’ families. The 
housing policy was one of warhorses of RSI propaganda, but was 
mainly an antic-cyclical measure; the post-war republican parties used 
the housing policy was used as social and employment policy. 
In the introductive relation to the decree on socializations, 
Minister Tarchi announced the core concepts of the renewed Fascist 
social policy, which had to «accompany the action of the weapons with 
the affirmation of a political idea». 691 The RSI linked social policy to the 
outcomes of the war, regarded as a confrontation between capitalist 
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plutocratic Powers and proletarian Nations and their «new order».692 
The war set in motion structural changes in every belligerent party; 
only through the victory, the Fascist social model could assert itself 
against Anglo-Saxons social reforms and Soviet collectivism. The 
socialization joined social and economic policies, overcame capitalism 
without abolishing the private property, and followed the principles 
«of a higher social justice, of fairer redistribution of wealth, of the 
participation of Labour to the life of the State»693 The core of the reforms 
dealt with the regulation of the production, the social function of the 
enterprises and their management, and the creation of new and more 
centralized authorities, like the Istituto Gestione e Finanziamento (IGeFi, 
the authority managing State’s shareholding, funding and investment 
to the private sector). The relation barely lapped the social insurances, 
focusing on the interlink between social and economic policy. While in 
Britain full employment was regarded as the complementary State’s 
intervention to support social security, the RSI tackled with a different 
approach the issue of the «range of collective needs that the State for 
obvious reasons had to face.»694 The Fascists wanted to regulate 
economy to boost the productivity, and then redistribute the wealth 
with forms of profit-sharing and self-management in industry. The 
socialization was a «powerful tool to discipline the development of the 
production according to criteria of general interests, and no longer 
sectional.»695 In this sense, the decree concerned social policy; the RSI 
deployed a thorough reform of the productive basis of the State into 
which incorporate social insurances. 
Tarchi stressed the political continuities of the Premise to 
Socialization with regard to the whole evolution of the Fascist social 
policy.696 He attempted to give theoretical basis to the socialization. It 
had no theoretical roots in Italian economic though and policies; at best, 
emergency measures rescued the banking system, and, by 1936, the 
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State already hold part of the Italian industrial stocks. Tarchi stressed 
the continuities between the 1927 Labour Charter and the 
socializations, which created a mixed economy where the aapital was 
socialized yet neither nationalized nor suppressed. It was “socialized” 
since the profits were distributed among the different elements of the 
industries. The issue of the private property assumed a certain 
relevance in this debate; one year and half before, the new Civil Code 
defined the property according to its “social function”, in opposition of 
the traditional subjective conception of property.697 According to law 
historian Roberto Bonini, in the Manifesto di Verona stood out the «lack 
of any reference to very recent code, as it [the RSI n.d.a.] already lives in 
another world and out of history (or, at least, to “that” history). […] 
convey us the meaning of the secondment, if not explicit rejection, of 
twenty years of history.»698 In reality, the “place” of property resulted 
from the compromise between the left-wing, and the more conservative 
elements. In the article ten of the Manifesto, the property was «State 
guaranteed» if it is «the result of work and individual saving», and if it 
not «disintegrates the physical and moral personality of other men, 
through the exploitation of the work.» However, the 1942 Civil Code 
was not disowned. The Article 1 of the decree on the socializations 
explicitly declared that «the “labour” takes directly to the management 
of the socialized enterprise. The regulation of the socialized enterprises 
is codified by this decree and related implementing rules, by the statute 
of each enterprise, by the norms of the Civil Code, and by the special 
laws as they do not contradict this decree.»699 The management 
involved all the productive actors of each enterprise, with the co-
operation between the chief and the works councils that gathered 
employees and workers. 
The socialization strengthened the collaboration between 
producers in the basic units of production, as «by embedding the 
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workers in the organism of the enterprises, in order to allow them to 
regulate it, concretely implemented the concept of Labour-
Collaboration.»700 The principles of collaboration were devolved from 
the “institutional corporatism” to a sort of “industrial 
codetermination”; this might recall the German Mitbestimmung.701 The 
corporatist principle of the Carta del Lavoro where transferred from 
governmental institutions to the enterprises, where the intermediate 
bodies guaranteed «the match of the salary with the daily exigencies of 
life, with the productive capabilities, and with the labour productivity.» 
702 For Tarchi, the 1927 Fascist social programme was finally 
implemented in 1944 with the decree on the socialization, thanks to the 
war. It made clear the betrayal of capitalists and conservatives, and 
erased the block of interests, giving the opportunity to «recast among 
the material and spiritual ruins a better Italy.» 703  The war was 
revolutionary due to economic, geo-political reasons, and ideological 
reasons. Tarchi restated the traditional Fascist narrative on WWII; in his 
view, the access to raw materials became fundamental to increase the 
production and put into practice a major redistribution of the national 
income. “Total war” became the way through which achieve the new 
socio-economic structure: «pursue the struggle for winning the war 
until the end; without this is not even conceivable the implementation 
of any kind of social justice, because to lose the war means leave the 
field open to the forces of the capitalist reaction represented by the 
Anglo-Saxon world.»704 The war brought together different topics of the 
Fascist social policy’s conceptualization: the contraposition between 
capitalist empires and proletarian powers; the link between power 
politics and social welfare. The new Fascist State proclaimed itself 
inherently “social” in the sense that its structures resulted from 
renewed industrial and social relations emanated by the “productive 
units”. These “revolutionary” policies and ideology at the foundation 
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of the new State were accompanied by current legislation and 
administration of the social insurances and provisions. 
 
4.2.2. Legislative continuities, revolutionary reforms 
The’s RSI social policy gravitated around two poles: the 
improvement of previous policies and the implementation of structural 
reforms. The latter accompanied the reorganization of the social 
authorities.705 They followed the split of the social and assistance 
authorities between Northern and Southern Italy, with regulatory and 
administrative overlapping. As for the jurisdiction, the INFPS 
continued to operate and provide social benefits only in the Northern 
Italy, until the collapse of the regime.706 The INFAIL and the EMF were 
put under the oversight of governmental special commissioners who 
took over the collegiate management.707 In its overall discontinuous 
law-making, the RSI passed a quantitatively relevant legislation, 50 
decrees from October 1943 to March 1945.708 The main part of these acts 
provided minor administrative adjustments, but other reforms were 
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708 Among the most important laws on social insurances: «Decreto Interministeriale 25 
gennaio 1944-XII, n. 137 - Corresponsione delle indennità di richiamo e degli assegni 
familiari alle famiglie dei richiamati per i quali non è possibile accertare l’attuale 
situazione», GU, 22 aprile 1944, n.95; «Decreto Ministeriale 21 aprile 1944-XXII, n. 173 - 
Norme per la concessione degli assegni di natalità e nuzialità», GU, 10 maggio 1944, n. 
110; «Decreto del Duce 23 maggio 1944-XXII, n.289 - Aumento del 30% delle pensioni 
indirette di guerra», GU, 17 giugno 1944, n. 141; «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 31 agosto 
1944-XXII, n. 603 - Abrogazione del decreto legislative 8 maggio 1944-XXII, n. 194, 
concernente il risparmio obbligatorio», GU, n.229, 30 settembre 1944; «Decreto Legislativo 
del Duce 15 novembre 1944-XXIII, n. 844 - Assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro 
dei cittadini mobilitati per il servizio del lavoro», GU, n. 291, 14 dicembre 1944. 
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more relevant. The legislation kept moving towards the unification of 
social insurances, harmonizing to the global contemporary trend, to 
which Britain had the lead. The acts implemented by the RSI also 
incorporated embryonic elements of the “social revolution”, promised 
in the Manifesto di Verona.  
As for the Vichy regime, the legislation covered some specific 
categories of workers in Germany or for the German enterprises.709 
Conjunctural measures, like family allowances for the missing soldiers 
after 8th September, were submitted to some limitations and 
prerequisites, and administrative streamlined.710 This act revised and 
limited the provisions passed in 1941; as the war carried out, the 
twofold increase of family allowances for the working categories 
excluding the agricultural, were unsustainable for the employers and 
the State, whose contribution for 1943 and 1944 was estimated in 350 
million. The enlargement of the social provisions was difficulty 
manageable from the financial point of view. The Ministry of the 
Finance recommended to uniform the contributions for family 
allowances among the working categories to balance the burden.711 
Financial issues concurred thus to limit the scope of the social 
intervention in some sensitive areas.  
The assistance measures overlapped traditional insurance 
benefits. The Opera Nazionale Mutilati and Invalidi del Lavoro (the 
Assistance for Work Injuried) was placed under the control of the 
INFAIL, as complementary agency; while the INFAIL covered the 
insurance contribution, the Opera provided the social assistance. Tasks 
of this agency were the healthcare, the material and psychological 
                                                          
709 «Decreto del Duce 20 febbraio 1944-XXI1, n.94 - Disposizioni per i pagamenti in Italia 
dei risparmi ai beneficiari indicati dai lavoratori ed impiegati che prestano la loro opera 
in Germania», GU, 29 marzo 1944, n. 74; «Determinazione Intercommissariale 29 
settembre 1943-XXI - Pagamento delle rimesse dei lavoratori italiani in Germania alle 
famiglie in Italia», GU, 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n.35. 
710 ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 785G, «Istituto Nazionale Fascista della Previdenza 
Sociale - Assegni familiari, criteri di massima. 1 settembre 1944». 
711 ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 785G, «Direzione Generale del Lavoro e della 
Previdenza Sociale - Appunto sulla soppressione del concorso dello Stato nella 
maggiorazione degli assegni familiari- Agosto 1943». 
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assistance, the physical recovery, the assistance to the family of the 
disabled and the reintegration into the labour market.712 The law 
integrated assistance and insurance action, concentrating both 
functions in the same authority, which constituted the host centre to 
each risk category. Something similar happened with the management 
of the sanatoriums for the treatment of tuberculosis, run by the INFPS 
for the insured. These were attempts to rationalize the different 
branches of social policy, incorporating the healthcare in the 
compulsory social provisions. After 1943, some serious elaborations for 
the improvement of the healthcare services were proposed. It is a 
stretch to infer echoes from the British debates on the NHS, but the 
traditional Fascist mutualist conception matched with a new approach 
the function of the healthcare policy: 
 
«It is only through the implementation of an universalistic 
[the italics is mine] System that we can create the figures of 
the “state medical” and of the “state sick” [sic], the two 
elements, which represent the technical and economic basis 
of fascist mutualism. “State medical” who behaves, in the 
healthcare assistance, with the ultimate goal of the good of 
the corporative State; “State sick” [sic] who considers his 
own health as a need for the power of the State.»713 
 
Some proposals to extend on national basis uniform healthcare 
provisions with tasks of preventive medicine were at least debated. The 
national healthcare service had «an important political setback through 
the function of propaganda that it could fulfil»714, and this especially in 
the midst of the war. The proposals differed from British universalism 
underpinning the free health system; the Fascists prefigured a national, 
unified, and inclusive healthcare service, placed under the control of 
                                                          
712 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 21 aprile 1944-XXII, n.251 - Istituzione dell’Opera 
Nazionale Mutilati ed Invalidi del Lavoro», GU, 7 giugno 1944-XXII, n. 133. 
713 A. Salotti, L’assistenza sanitaria nell’Ente mutualità fascista: proposta di un metodo, Siena, 
Lazzeri, 1943, pp. 1-2. 
714 Ivi. p. 2 
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the EMF. The national healthcare was still mutualist and corporative, 
and covered only the workers and their family. The access was not 
related to rights of citizenship but to the status of insured worker; 
indeed, it was not founded by general revenues, but by the 
contributions of workers and employers. It was still grounded on the 
central function of the Italian mutualist GPs; the hospitalization, the 
nursing at home and the sick leaves had to be validated by him. These 
further improvements in the healthcare insurances grounded on the 
reform of January 1943, and pushed forward the process of 
centralization of social services.  
Toward greater rationalization moved also the unification of 
the different contributions for industrial workers, self-employed and 
home workers. The unification concerned all the compulsory schemes: 
old-age, invalidity, survivors’ pensions, tuberculosis, unemployment, 
marriage and maternity benefits, work-related injuries, sickness, the 
separate schemes for white collars, and family allowances.715 The single 
contribution covered also the allowances for the workers called to the 
army, the measures for wage supports, and the compulsory trade 
union dues for the inscription to the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro, 
della Tecnica e delle Arti (CGLTA, the national union), the brand new 
compulsory insurance that linked the trade union system to the social 
protection. The employers had the most important charge, except for 
the trade unions due. The act established that, from the second half of 
1944, the workers’ contribution charges were transferred to the 
enterprises, while for the separate pensions funds the charge of 
workers was retained, decreased by a third.716 The administrative 
                                                          
715 «Decreto Ministeriale 20 settembre 1944-XXII - Determinazione delle misure dei 
contributi dovuti, a norma del Decreto Legislativo 10 maggio 1944-XXII, n. 376 dalle 
imprese artigiane e industriali»,GU, 19 dicembre 1944, n.295. 
716 The complete charge of the social contributions, originally limited to the industries 
and craft firms, was later extended to other sectors, «Decreto interministeriale 20 
settembre 1944-XXII, n. 853 - Carico di contributi per le assicurazioni sociali obbligatorie e 
per l’assistenza malattia», GU, 19 dicembre 1944, n. 295. «Decreto Ministeriale 16 
settembre 1944-XXII - Approvazione del Regolamento per l’unificazione dei contributi 
dovuti dalle imprese industriali ed artigiane e dai lavoratori dipendenti», GU, 23 
dicembre 1944, n. 299. 
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simplification was achieved by registering all the contributory records 
into one single work card.717 These administrative changes were 
regarded as «some innovative principles in the field of the social 
security, which are framed into those measures that the government is 
about to implement, meant to give impetus to the social feature of the 
Italian Republic of Labour.»718  
The contributory unification did not merely simplify the 
system, which was now covered by only one employment record. It 
was also in line with the trends of coordination, of the compulsory 
insurances carried out in the European countries, and had embryonic 
elements of “universalism”. The 1944 reform extended the compulsory 
social insurances to all the working categories, prefiguring the gradual 
overcoming of the occupational setting of the Italian social insurances. 
It also embedded family allowances within the system of compulsory 
scheme. This principles «aimed, on the one side, at increasing the 
disposable income of the workers and at improving the insurance 
claims, and, on the other, to bring the workers close in the rights and in 
the duties that came from the work.»719 Another measure was 
comparable to countries like Britain or France; the consolidation of all 
the tasks of social protection within a single Ministry. It was the 
Ministry of the Corporative Economy, until march 1945, when all the 
functions passed to a new-born Ministry of Labour, which also took the 
matters relating to the socialization.720  
The legislative activity carried out until the last weeks also 
addressed the changes brought by the war conditions to the social 
                                                          
717 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 10 maggio 1944, n.376 - Unificazione dei contributi e 
tenuta del libretto di lavoro nel settore dell’industria», GU, 1 luglio 1944, n.152; «Decreto 
Ministeriale 16 settembre 1944-XXII - Approvazione del Regolamento per l’unificazione 
dei contributi dovuti dalle imprese industriali ed artigiane e dai lavoratori dipendenti», 
GU, 23 dicembre 1944, n. 299; Ministero dell’Economia Corporativa, Regolamento per la 
esecuzione del Decreto 10 maggio 1944 n.376 sull’unificazione dei contributi nell’industria, 
Bergamo, SESA, 1944. 
718 ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Agenzia Stefani n.17. 1 luglio 1944-XXII» 
719 Ivi. 
720 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 1 febbraio 1945 - Ordinamento dei Ministeri della 
Produzione Industriale e del Lavoro», GU, 12 marzo 1945, n. 59. 
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insurances: survivors’ pensions, temporary supplementary benefits for 
retired people, and the pensions of invalidities. The principle was to 
retain benefits and allowances for the soldiers, equalizing the period in 
the army as work. The different contribution of the soldiers were then 
inserted in the insurance’s class categories of their previous jobs, to 
calculate the effective burden to the State for granting pensions of 
invalidity and the other social benefits after the war.721 Other RSI’ social 
measures dealing with emergency were the transformation of all the 
restaurant in collective canteens and the requisition and nationalization 
of important sector in the food industry.722 
On the other hand, the harshest times of the war and the 
resurgence of the so-called “Fascist left” radicalized the ideology of the 
RSI. The Commissariato Nazionale del Lavoro (National Labor Office), 
under direct governmental control, assisted the CGLTA in the 
regulation of salaries, working conditions, employment and assistance 
to the workers abroad.723 The CGLTA superseded the previous 
corporative trade unions, as the category organizations were replaced 
by one single union on national basis, gathering in the same 
organization workers and employers. The mechanisms of social 
interests’ representation were thus reshaped; the new “totalitarian” 
national trade union brought together salaried workers (of industry 
and agriculture), managers and technicians of the industries, traders, 
shopkeepers, employees in the private and public sector, artists and 
white-collars. Some specific categories were excluded: «to the capital, to 
the property as source of labour and production, to the business 
                                                          
721 See the different drafts and projects in ACS, RSI/Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Schema 
decreto recante norme per la liquidazione delle pensioni ai superstiti in caso di morte 
assicurati e pensionati dell’assicurazione obbligatoria invalidità e vecchiaia. 21 marzo 
1945»;  
722«Decreto del Duce 31 dicembre 1944-XXIII, n. 298 - Trasformazione in mense collettive 
di guerra di tutti i ristoranti e trattorie di qualsiasi categoria», GU, 4 gennaio 1945, n. 3; 
«Decreto del Duce 4 gennaio 1945-XXI1I, n.1 - Requisizione delle aziende dei grossisti in 
derrate alimentari e delle aziende industriali per la produzione, lavorazione, e 
trasformazione dei generi alimentari», GU, 4 gennaio 1945, n.3. 
723 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 7 dicembre 1943-XXII, n. 843 - Istituzione del 
Commissariato Nazionale del Lavoro», GU, 17 gennaio 1944-XXII, n.12. 
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companies and to the public limited companies as such, no trade union 
representation is recognized.»724 All the social public-owned authorities 
hooked up to the CGLTA, which took in charge some of the functions 
of education, training, assistance and protection of the workers and 
their families.  
The juridical status of the confederation was framed by the 
trade unions legislation, just few months before the end of the war.725 
The legal system allowed to «achieve the active participation of the 
workers to the political, economic, and social life of the State», and put 
into practice the principle that «The Labour, in all its manifestations, 
constitutes the very foundation of the Italian Social Republic.» 726 The 
trade union legislation established the structures and competences of 
the CGLTA, and provided the right/duty of representation of the 
working organizations in the State authorities. The CGLTA had 
hierarchical structures, from the “municipal unions” to the national 
confederation. The national leadership was approved by the 
government, implying the union’s subordination to the State. The aim 
was to regiment and mobilize the workers both geographically and by 
category, guaranteeing what was defined the «uniform worker 
protection» and their participation at any hierarchical level.727 The 
CGLTA also was the transmission belt of the workers’ claims to the 
State; participated to the wage policies, the improvement of the 
production, the cost reduction; regulated the collective agreement; took 
in charge of the social protection, the training, and the assistance; had a 
voice, with a vague formula, in «all the other functions useful to the 
pursuit of the social goals of the Republic.»728 The trade union was also 
allowed to set up parastatal authorities for recreational and training 
activities. The functions related to the social protection were rather 
                                                          
724 «Decreto del Duce 20 dicembre 1943-XXII, n. 853 - Costituzione della Confederazione 
generale del lavoro, della tecnica, delle arti», GU, 2 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 26, p. 122. 
725 «Decreto del Duce 18 gennaio 1945-XXIII, n.3 - Ordinamento sindacale», GU, 26 
gennaio 1945, n.21. 
726 Ivi. p. 111. 
727 Ivi. p. 112. 
728Ivi. p. 112. 
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supplementary schemes, as the compulsory insurances were still 
monopoly of the INFPS..729 The trade union dues were amalgamated to 
the other compulsory insurances and were the only contribution 
completely paid by the workers. The legislation designed a “trade 
union State”, which merged the party, the public policies, the State and 
the unions. The CGLTA penetrated in the socio-economic basis of the 
country also by the functions assigned in the enterprises, regardless 
they were socialized or not. The trade union could set up internal 
committees to settle the individual and collective controversial in the 
factories, advise on the matters of production and create mutual-aid 
organizations. At a national level, the CGLTA established the collective 
agreements within its joint structures workers/employers, and had the 
charge of the Employment Offices on the territories.730  
The trade union legislation corresponded to an ideological 
rationale, pointing at unifying labour authorities and organizations. 
Also due to objective difficulties in the administrative reorganization, 
these projects mostly remained statement of principles or «a time bomb 
placed against the winning Anglo-Americans.» 731 However, they 
account the effort to give a social footprint to RSI puppet government 
in the search for a coherent solution to the “social question”. The 
overall setting of the RSI social legislation was ambiguously related to 
the heritage of the twenty previous years. On the one side, the RSI 
pretended to overcome corporatism. On the other, its effective policy 
could not disregard the former policies. Fascism had apparently 
exhausted its social programme in the corporatism, and after 1943 there 
was no room and no force for further elaborations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
729 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 20 dicembre 1943-XXII, n.853», GU, 7febbraio 1944, 
n.26. 
730 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 2 febbraio 1944-XXII, n.65 - Disciplina del collocamento 
dei lavoratori», GU, 18 marzo 1944, n. 68. 
731  L.Gaeta, A. Visconti, «L’Italia e lo stato sociale», in Gerhard Ritter, Storia dello stato 
sociale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2011, pp. 227-276, p. 249. 
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4.3. The socialization of the industries 
 
4.3.1. The side-slip towards wartime socio-economic totalitarianism 
The RSI passed the socialization of the industries in 1944.732 The 
label “socialization” was apparently suggested by the “pro-
communist” Nicola Bombacci, while originally the Fascists opted for 
the more appropriate definition of “social collaboration”.733 The 
legislative decree established the guidelines, and the creation of a 
mixed economy, where the public and private enterprises coexisted. 
The socialization and the trade union legislation addressed the 
economic organization of the State, but also intermingled social policy, 
and overall created what the regime defined the «new fascist social 
order.»734 
The socialization aimed at incorporating the workers in the 
management of industries and profit-sharing. The measure was 
directed to all public industries and to the private business that had – 
by 1st January 1944 – one hundred employees and one million of 
capital. The different kinds of enterprise had to elaborate a statute in 
accordance with the guidelines established in the first part of the law. 
With few differences, they set up co-joint councils: industrial 
assemblies, management board, board of auditors. These organisms 
guaranteed equal representativeness to the labour (workers, 
technicians, employees) and the capital (shareholders).735 Their statutes 
were validated by the Ministry of Corporative Economy, and then 
published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Sociale Italiana.736 All 
the factories voted the chief of the enterprise, which only in the 
                                                          
732 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 375 - Socializzazione delle 
imprese», GU, 30 giugno 1944, n. 151. 
733 R, Bonini, La Repubblica Sociale Italiana e la socializzazione delle imprese, p. 222. 
734 ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione del decreto del Duce sulla costituzione 
dell’istituto nazionale fascista della cooperazione. S.d.», p. 1. 
735 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 375 - Socializzazione delle 
imprese», art. 3-7. 
736 There is a certain documentary proof that various enterprises had their statutes 
approved. ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221 – Socializzazione dell’impresa, «Agenzia Stefani, 2 
marzo 1945-XXIII» 
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individual enterprise had to correspond to the entrepreneur; in public 
enterprises he was nominated by the Ministry of Corporative Economy 
and by the Treasury, while in the private business was chosen among 
the shareholders, and, for the limited companies, «the chief of the 
enterprise is elected among persons of proven technical and 
administrative capacity within or outside the enterprise.»737 The tasks 
of the chiefs of the enterprises (cut off to workers’ representatives by 
the law) were relevant; he was responsible of the production and of its 
harmonization to «the needs of the general planning of the production 
and to the directive of the State social policy.»738 The most part of the 
Italian industrial base was not submitted to a “true” socialization, but 
rather to the coordination to national productive plans. The social 
collaboration was now devolved from national corporations to each 
productive unit.  
In accordance to Fascist “third way”, the socialization did not 
mean public property nor workers’ control of the enterprise. The State 
took over «the property of the enterprises in the key sectors for the 
political and economic independence of the State, as well as the 
providers of raw materials, energy, or the services required for the 
smooth functioning of the social life, might be assumed by the State by 
the hands of the I.Ge.Fi.»739 It mentioned the Istituto di Gestione e 
Finanziamento (IGeFi, Management and Funding Authority), a public 
authority with a separate incorporate entity (juridically differing from 
IRI and IMI). The IGeFi amalgamated IRI and IMI, and was a project 
supported at least since 1943 by Tarchi; the new authority centralized 
the functions of Fascist public interventionism during the Thirties. The 
rationale rested on ideological and conjunctural reasons: 
 
 «The opportunity to amalgamate the two functions in a 
single organism is clear [...] But the inherent intermingling 
                                                          
737 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 375 - Socializzazione delle 
imprese», art. 9. 
738 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 375 - Socializzazione delle 
imprese», art. 22. 
739 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 375 - Socializzazione delle 
imprese», art.31. 
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between the two activities [...] did not become, as it should 
and could, a way to control the productive activity and to 
replacement of the private property of the capital with the 
public ownership, in all cases where the collective interests 
required it. It is even more opportune, therefore, in the 
moment when we reorganize the socio-economic structure of 
the country, to organically gather the functions of 
management of public capitals, of public participation in 
private enterprises, of medium- to long term financing, in a 
single institute, which will have to, with unitary criteria and 
following the economic directives of the Ministry of 
Corporative Economy, collect the operating surpluses of the 
public enterprises and those of the private businesses where 
it participates. It will use them, alongside with the direct 
saving of the investments, for furthers investments and 
financing operations.»740 
 
In the second half of 1944, only after the law on socialization, 
the RSI enacted the decrees on the regulation and structure of the 
IGeFi.741 It was never operational, but signalled the political will to to 
carry on a more radical policy of centralization of the older economic 
institutions of the regime. This national authority was expected to 
become the only public lending institution that provided credit to the 
whole industrial system, under the directives of the Ministry of 
Corporative Economy, being the fundamental tool to harmonize 
production to the governmental guidelines and national planning. 
The aspects with the greatest implications concerned the 
workers’ profit-sharing. The new organization of the enterprises 
                                                          
740«Repubblica Sociale Italiana – Socializzazione delle imprese. Istituto di Gestione e 
Finanziamento (I.Ge.Fi.)», in R, Bonini, La Repubblica Sociale Italiana e la socializzazione delle 
imprese, pp. 278-292, p. 286. 
741 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce – Costituzione dell’Istituto di Gestione e Finanziamento 
(I.Ge.Fi.), 12 febbraio 1944XXII, n. 269», GU, 13 giugno 1944, n. 137; «Relazione al Decreto 
Legislativo del Duce concernente l’istituzione dell’Istituto di Gestione e Finanziamento» 
in R, Bonini, La Repubblica Sociale Italiana e la socializzazione delle imprese, pp. 298-301. See 
also ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 32/240R/1, «Statuto dell’Istituto di Gestione e Finanziamento». 
300 
 
sparked off a stakeholder economy among all the productive actors of 
the enterprise. It was established in percentage to the yearly 
compensations, and in any case up to maximum 30% of the annual 
global net remunerations to the workers. The surpluses were delivered 
to the Compensation Fund managed by the IGeFi, which devoted these 
surpluses «to social and productive purposes»742, and notably – it was 
suggested – «the preeminent destination to the development of social 
housing»,743 which was the other core social policy area of the regime. 
The repartition of the profit and the joint representation were at the 
foundation of the project of socialization. The act of February 1944 was 
a compromise that let the workers in the life of the industries, yet left 
them subordinate to the employers, who were likely to express the 
chief of the enterprise and enjoyed the main part of the profit-sharing. 
The act intervened on the functioning and representativeness within 
the industries, but, on purpose, did not change the hierarchies, the 
roles, and the balance of economic power between labour and capital. 
And yet, the compromise was achieved not without divergences in the 
elaboration of the draft reform. Mussolini’s Head of Cabinet, Francesco 
Maria Barracu, complaint the «wretched and humiliating» solutions, 
especially for the distribution of profits.744 Tarchi, instead, 
recommended caution and the need to bargain the legislative process 
with the Nazi authorities, and to overcome the resistances opposed by 
the industrialists.745 Other reports accused the inefficiencies of the 
peripheral apparatus for the delay and uncertainties in the reforms. The 
industrial workers were considered sensitive to the socialization, but 
the trusts they apparently still put on the RSI might be disappointed by 
                                                          
742 «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 375 - Socializzazione delle 
imprese», art.46. 
743 «Repubblica Sociale Italiana – Socializzazione delle imprese. Istituto di Gestione e 
Finanziamento (I.Ge.Fi.)», p. 290. 
744 ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/ 221- Socializzazione delle imprese, «Appunto di Barracu per il 
Duce. S.d.», p.1.  
745 ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221/7, «Lettera del Ministro Tarchi al duce. 11/2/1944». 
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halfway reforms.746 The notes sent to Mussolini estranged from reality, 
as already in 1944 the regime completely lost the popular consensus. 
However, they convey how, within different milieus of the RSI, a 
thorough debate developed on limits and extents of the social reforms. 
The contrasts were not limited to dispute between the “left-
wing” and the conservatives, but also between the supporters of the 
socializations and the trade unionists. The former claimed for the 
reorganization of the socio-economic structures, while the latter gave 
pre-eminence to the ratification of the new place of the trade unions in 
the national life. The different views in the government postponed any 
consistent improvement; the trade union legal system, for instance, was 
passed only in 1945.747 While the socialization concerned the economic 
participation of the workers in the industries, the union legal system 
pointed at integrating them in the decision-making of the State, to 
«ensure the legal equality of all the producers and their close 
collaboration within the socialized enterprise; collaborate with the 
State’s authorities for the boost and the improvement of the production 
and the reduction of the costs; bargain the collective agreements; take 
care of the moral and material improvement of the workers, their 
assistance and training; fulfil, broadly speaking, all the other function 
to achieve the social goals of the Republic.»748 The decree also 
prefigured the transition of some of the insurance regulations from the 
State to the trade union. In turn, the Ministry of Labour, not set up yet 
by January 1945, monitored the activities of the CGLTA, which had – 
like the IGeFi – separate incorporated entity.749 The lack of 
independence of the trade union restated the governmental control 
over major aspects like collective agreements, or legal representation. 
The references to CGLTA’s social tasks were vague enough to suggest 
that its only real “social functions” resulted in the recreational and 
                                                          
746 Some reports suggested to start the socialization with the industries of the Jews and 
the other enemies of the regime, see ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221 – Socializzazione delle 
imprese, «Appunto per il Duce. Socializzazione delle imprese. 6 giugno 1944-XXII». 
747 «Decreto del Duce sull’Ordinamento sindacale,18 gennaio 1945-XXIII n.3», GU, 26 
gennaio 1945, n.21. 
748 Ivi. art. 4. 
749 Ivi. art. 8 and 9. 
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after-work activities, by their nature exploitable for propaganda. 
However, the decrees passed too late; within two months the regime 
collapsed, making impossible – like for all the pillars of the RSI social 
policy – to implement the structures of the new social order.  
The Fascist legislation proceeded quantitatively stronger than 
in the first phase of the war, but the related institutions never took root 
on the territory. The disengagement from the intermediations of the 
Ventennio allowed more radical social plans. In turn, the collapse of the 
traditional structures of consensus prevented the implementation of the 
new socio-economic organization. The regime could never extend the 
trade union structures, the very framework of the new totalitarian 
State, in the few areas under its control. The Commissary of the 
Confederazione Fascista dei Lavoratori dell’Industria (CFLI, the branch of 
the industrial workers, the more committed to the social reforms), 
Nazareno Bonfatti, along with the trade union delegates of the major 
Northern provinces (Milan, Turin, Genoa, Venice, Bologna), submitted 
a very critical report on the situation of the RSI’s social organization.750 
They criticized the disorganization of the republican social policy, and 
the failed unification of social, economic and administrative agencies. 
The socializations and the trade unions legal system should delegate to 
the CGLTA the regulation of salaries, work conditions and social 
policy. The deregulation to the CGLTA could have created the “trade 
union State”, the aim of the RSI’s revolutionary syndicalism. This also 
corresponded to the “totalitarian” unification of the social and labour 
issues both for the administrations and the policies: 
 
«We have to arrive at the centralization of all the social and 
economic leverages, in order to ensure, on minimum waste 
of energies and means, the unity of the management and of 
the policies’ guidelines. The discipline of the basic issue 
concerning the labour and the prices, for example today 
divided and fragmentary, it has to be brought back to a 
unique level of intervention, constituting the most adequate 
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tool to promote, coordinate, and realize the social politics of 
the new Republican State.»751 
 
To achieve the totalitarian trade union State, the central 
organisms of the CGLTA claimed for the taking-over of the corporatist 
social institutions. They also wanted to participate to the administrative 
and account activity of the three-headed fascist social security (INFPS, 
INFAIL, EMF). While these institutions directly concerned the life of 
the workers, they were outside their own control. The cleavage 
between the social functions of these authorities and their management, 
was even aggravated by their temporary receivership that contradicted 
the guidelines of the Fascist social policy on the deregulation to the 
trade unions. The CFLI claimed for the implementation of the co-joint 
direction of the social authorities between government and trade 
unions, a first step towards the intermingling of “social” and 
“economic” policy, and the totalitarian trade union State. 
Similar limits also concerned the daily administration at local 
level. Other notes sent to Tarchi underlined the disbandment of the 
trade union organisms within the RSI, just few months after their re-
foundation.752 The CFLI indulged in class revolutionary mind-sets and 
focused on the organizational aspects, but they did not recognize that 
all the social institutions of the regime – except the assistance and 
emergence organizations – had no longer popular support. They 
denounced the decomposition of Fascist trade unions, and the failure of 
the Fascist social policy; yet, they found the causes in the corruption or 
in the bourgeois betrayal against the Fascist social revolution.753 This 
signalled the decoupling between the regime’s organisms and its social 
basis. On the eve of the Liberation, their dispatches conveyed very well 
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the idea on how was received the «fascist revolution of the 
socialization».754 The project aborted in the mobilization of intellectual 
and political resources, and had very little popular support. In 1945, the 
institutional bodies for the socialization did not exist yet: «the 
socialization is considered a very insignificant aim, it has basically no 
importance!!! [...] unfortunately, we are back to the usual routine; 
babbling, babbling and bad faith, improvisation and overall lack of 
preparation.»755 No less discouraging was the support to the 
Republican Fascism: 
 
«Going around the collective canteens in Milan I approached 
the working people, workers, technicians, profession, etc. but 
mostly workers, with whom I talked long time, fathoming 
their morale. I had the clear impression that they are 
diffident, if not indifferent, to the success of the republican 
social program. They say, Mussolini was not able to get rid of 
the groups and men who will do anything to undermine the 
socialization, whose program in their hands is slipping away 
day by day, turning from red to white.»756 
 
This mistrust in the RSI action rebounded in the strangeness of 
the regime to factories and to the workers, even if the lack of consensus 
of the working classes was dropping since the beginning of the war. 
The RSI’s social and labour institutions were empty boxes, which fed 
the regime’s self-referential rhetoric. Few days before the crumble of 
the regime, the inspectors in the factories could note nothing but the 
void around the Fascist trade unions.757 
The regime tried with the laws on the socialization and the 
trade unions to take forward the reorganization of the “State of 
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Labour”, broadening the social and economic rights of the workers. 
These policies had to be bargained with  the German authorities, which  
– unlike the French case in the years 1940-2 – scrutinized the socio-
economic measures of the RSI, that the Nazis viewed with suspicion. 
The protected factories and companies were directly controlled by the 
German authorities, and on their juridical status the Ministry of the 
Industrial Production could substantially execute the German 
commands.758 A similar subordination concerned also social policy. 
Many problems arose with regard to the status of the Italian military 
prisoners or missing soldiers, and their enjoyment of family and soldier 
allowances. They were submitted to a broad spectrum of different 
situations, making difficult to uniform their legislation after 1943; it 
also concerned the jurisdiction of the Italian territories annexed to the 
Nazi Reich as well as all the integrative provisions related to the war 
and to the status of the RSI with Nazi Germany. 759   
The Ministry of the Corporative Economy operated in a context 
of shortage of raw material, inflationary spiral, low productivity, lack 
of manpower. The burden of the social insurances and of the new social 
measures did not match the financial situation of the RSI; the charge of 
the contributions to the enterprises, the end to the layoffs and 
especially the policy of wage increase revealed unsustainable, if 
effectively implemented. Given the difficult intermingling of the social 
goals of the regime with the harsh economic situation and the 
desperate political position of the RSI, the government had to balance 
the retain of the social legislation with the necessity to not overburden 
the economy. The Ministry’s proposal figured out a way to relieve the 
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industries from the workforce surplus, ensuring at the same time a 
«minimum vital income»760 for the workers, and their reallocation for 
reconstruction works. The redundant workers were treated as 
“temporary unavailable”, retaining their workplace in the enterprise, 
but being available to tasks of war reparation and disburdening the 
enterprises submitted to war legislation. The “temporary unavailable” 
workers were entitled of the minimum vital income (40 L. p/d for the 
men, 20 for women and men under 18 y. o.), funded for 15% directly by 
the enterprise, for 35% by the social insurance, and even for 50% by the 
State. All the current social provisions cumulated the minimum wage 
of “temporary unavailability”. The Ministry also proposed the increase 
of family allowances increase to 30% in all industrial sectors, moving 
towards unified benefits regardless the working categories; the draft 
decree equalised upwards benefits and contributions between 
industrial workers and employees.761  
The rationalizing processes were also dictated by the 
emergency; the RSI tried to find a compromise to carry out the 
production avoiding economic upheavals and to mitigate social unrest. 
The agencies for the planning of the public works adopted coercive 
measures, as for the labour’s militarisation which was hierarchically 
regimented in “battalions”: 
 
«With these measures, I believe that it is possible to give a 
precise address to the employment workers in every 
province, by relocating them to aims related, directly or 
indirectly, to the war production and the military needs. In 
the same time, the enterprises are relieved from a consistent 
part of the surplus workers, who otherwise they [the 
enterprises n.d.t.] would be forced to keep in service, with the 
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related burden, and they shall be, thus, enabled to rely on 
excessive increases of production costs. The financial 
problem is thus solved with an equal distribution of the 
burden among the enterprises (which nowadays are totally 
charged of it), the social protection authorities and the State 
»762 
 
Due to the exceptional war conditions, the regime planned 
employment placement and the first wave of nationalizations, which 
attempted to deploy a thorough economic policy.763 With the 
incorporation of the Labour supervisory authority, the War Production 
supervisory authority and the Prices supervisory authority, the 
Ministry of Corporative Economy got all the leverages of economic and 
social. A unique political head supervised social and economic policies, 
which the regime considered a single matter, and ensured a shred of 
autonomy from the German ally/occupant: «such a fragmentation 
contrasts with the need to have an unitary policy that the control of the 
production, the distribution, and the consumption must have [...] it is 
needed to oppose as much unity of directives and of action on the 
Italian side to avoid that, as it is happening, the action of Italian 
authority is completely emptied and replaced by the German 
organisms.»764  The RSI tried to maintain the gain autonomy in the 
purview of the productive cycle, especially over the warfare 
production. However, the Germans exercised control over the Italian 
industry, including the socialization, which, unlike the French Labour 
Charter, directly affected German economic demands.765 The uptake of 
different function in only one Ministry was also related to precise 
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domestic choices; for instance, the Labour Supervisory Authority was 
suppressed, as it «leads to the emptying of the trade unions, which are 
expropriated if their principal functions with regard to the regulation of 
the labour matters [...] and reduced to mere subsidiary bodies of the 
Labour Supervisory Authority.»766 
In the social assistances services, the policy of the regime had 
two phases. Initially, the PFR resumed the regime’s previous 
institutions, and grouped them together in a single National Assistance, 
called Opera Nazionale di Assistenza, put under the party’s direction. The 
PFR claimed to centralize every aspect of the political and socio-
economic life of the country. In fact, this measure was needed due to 
the breakdown of the State also in periphery and to wider assistance 
tasks: displaced, disaster-stricken, casualties, relatives of the fallen and 
missing soldiers, the inmates and compulsory workers in Germany, 
and all the people who had no access to basic necessities and 
healthcare. The party alone could simply not deal with such a task.767  
Indeed, the PFR quickly lost the monopoly on the assistance sector, 
while the former Fascist local and sectorial assistance took back their 
importance: the Enti Fascisti di Assistenza (EFA, Fascist Assistance 
Authorities, to varying degrees coordinate at a central level by a 
National Authority), and mainly the OND. Both authorities were 
gradually disembodied from the offices of the party from the beginning 
of 1944. Very soon it became evident that the different cases and 
categories required the hive-off of the various jurisdictions and 
administrations of the social assistance. The ramification of these 
authorities gave the task of the military social assistance to the OND, 
while other provisions, such as those for the familis of the soldiers were 
still matter of the civilian social assistance. It was not only an 
administrative split, as the regime tried to «achieve also an important 
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political goal: to promote a deepest intermingling between the morale 
of the working class and of the soldiers, whose working class were 
meant to be the highest and better representatives.»768 And on this 
basis, it is probably to understand the effort of the OND also for the 
propaganda, as I will investigate in further detail in the second part. 
 
4.3.2. The myth of the left-wing Fascism and the extent of the socializations in 
the RSI  
The RSI had a similar pattern to that of the Fascist regime. The 
incremental improvement of social schemes was accompanied by a 
public discourse that exalted the “revolutionary” features of the Fascist 
policies. The regime devoted a primary attention to the social change; 
few days after the birth of the Republic, Mussolini pronounced from 
the “Headquarter” a discourse that gravitated around three 
watchwords: “Italy”, “Republic”, “Socialization”.769 Fascism could 
integrally achieve its social programme after being released from the 
conservative elements: monarchy, army, bourgeoisie. The republican 
order pawed the way to a “national” socialism: «because it makes of 
the Labour the only subject of the economy, but it refuses the complete 
levelling, [...] With this, we point at involving the best elements of the 
working class. The capitulation of September marks the infamous 
liquidation of the bourgeoisie as ruling class.»770 Fascism restated its 
“third way”, a formula that was worn out, yet still used in articles and 
pamphlets of propaganda.771  
The Fascist propaganda set in motion a public narrative that 
considered the Republican Fascism a “return to the origins”, and the 
socialization as the natural development of corporatism.772 In this 
discourse, the war pushed social policy towards more revolutionary 
outcomes, as it promoted the confrontation between “proletarian 
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Nation” (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) and “plutocratic powers” 
(Great Britain, US, and even USSR). The Fascist provisions to guarantee 
social equality were challenged by the Anglo-Saxon imperialist war; to 
be protected, they had to make a “revolutionary” qualitative leap. The 
labels and claims of the propaganda did not change between the 
Ventennio and the new republican regime. The Fascist public discourse 
still overlapped social protection and the economic organization of 
production and labour: 
 
«The socialization aims at achieving this very noble 
principle. The highest social justice is a formula whose 
characters were defined by Mussolini when he mentioned “a 
fair salary, job security, a decent home” for all the working 
class. Throughout these twenty years, is very well-known the 
commitment of fascism to concretely implement these 
watchwords: the collective bargaining agreements, the social 
housing, the growth of the assistance thanks to the 
development of the social insurances (and in this last field 
we should remember how the opulent and democratic 
Britain, taken as a model by all the antifascists of different 
political ideas, pretended to make the most important 
concessions to the working class by promising the set of 
social reforms of the Beveridge Plan, all while Italy already 
implemented the same reforms).»773  
 
The war and the collapse of the Italian institutions led some 
sectors of the Fascism to think about a renewed Fascist State, enabling 
laws that a hierarch from the first hour like Alessandro Pavolini 
defined not merely «social», but more appropriately «socialist.» 774 
Social insurances, trade union legislation and socialization 
were regarded as the culmination of a «massive social legislation»,775 
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implemented throughout twenty years. The RSI pointed at 
transcending even the British plans for social security, as «revolution is 
not reformism; it goes indeed far beyond the reform of the legislation 
and has to completely renovate the system as a whole.» 776 Fascism set 
out to come back «to its own revolutionary origins in all the sectors, but 
first and foremost in the social one that is the foundation of the 
individual life and of the community.»777 The label “social policy” 
assumed a different meaning in the RSI propaganda; while the British 
specifically referred to the Beveridge Report or the governmental White 
Papers, in the RSI the debate on social policy was at once wider and 
vaguer. For good part of the Fascist ruling class, the RSI was a 
revolutionary experience that overcame capitalism, to which the social 
security programmes à la Beveridge were considered integral part. The 
decree of the socialization was seen as the peak of a path inherent to the 
Fascist revolution and to the Italian history.  
In reality, the socialization was stranger to the Italian political 
and social culture, but the Fascists referred to Mazzini’s social thought, 
which opposed to Marx’ classism at the time of the I International. He 
claimed for “spiritual” forms of socialism that integrated the working 
classes in the national community; his exploitation be the Fascist 
propaganda was quite understandable.778 The RSI’s new deal of was 
also seen as a return to the “Fascism of the origins” and as a logical 
prosecution of Ventennio’s corporatist policies. Even if corporatism 
showed its limits in changing the socio-economic relations, the 
socialization resumed the same anti-plutocratic themes of the regime.779 
The rupture/continuity with the Ventennio and with the history of the 
Italian nationalist social though were endorsed by Mussolini himself, 
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who used to attach copies of the Constitution of Mazzini’s Roman 
Republic, from which the RSI borrowed also the name.780The RSI’s 
mythology on socialization lacked of an in-depth political elaboration. 
Corporatism could boast a relatively long tradition, even beyond 
Fascism, while the socialization seemed from the very beginning a 
watchword hastily invented to rejuvenate Fascist social programme. It 
gathered different tendencies within the regime, the revolutionary 
“left-wing”, the elements that represented the institutional continuity 
with the Ventennio, and the “intransigents” within the PFR, like 
Pavolini, Roberto Farinacci, Guido Buffarini Guidi, who considered 
social policy in the merely terms of social control.    
Very few groups tried to elaborated further the social doctrine, 
usually outside the circles of power of the RSI. The most committed 
were undoubtedly the left-wing Fascists and the trade unionists, who 
were not majority in the constituency of the regime, but were active in 
the collateral centres of study and propaganda. They arose 
autonomously from governmental directives, which nonetheless was 
always kept abreast of their activity.781 There are not many documents 
on the activities of these centres, which were aligned with the official 
stances. The Centro di Studio per i problemi della socializzazione, set up in 
Milan in 1944 by the Unione Fascista dei Lavoratori dell’Industria (UFLI, 
the industrial). This study centre developed a wide debate to «study, 
coordinate, develop and promote the initiatives and the issued related 
to socialization [...] with the purpose to orient the public opinion on 
these same problems.»782  These groups never reached a wide audience, 
even if they included in the debate the industrialists, or other political 
tendencies, as the Catholics.783 They assumed that liberalism, as 
demonstrated by the Anglo-Saxon debate on social security, was no 
longer a paradigm, but was shifting to «a new social economy, without 
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the expropriation of the goods and to the collectivization of the 
production.»784 The concentration of interests and management of the 
economy through the corporative bodies allowed the State to 
«intervene and assume the management function of the economy. This 
is what is happening not only in Italy but in good part of the world.» 785  
The war condemned the laissez-faire paradigm, while the 
socializations «overcome once for all the conflict between Capital and 
Labour.»786 Private property and forms of “social” capitalism were 
retained, but were submitted to the national interests and transformed 
from within. The workers “quantitatively” occupied the work councils 
and “qualitatively” enlarged their importance in the productive 
process. The socialization pre-empted capitalism: 
 
«And if this organization of the industries will assume, as I 
do believe, totalitarian aspects, capitalism as doctrine and 
spirit will be buried. Will be buried not as a result of the 
decree of the State, but for the capacity and will of the 
workers themselves; in this way, the Labour will be subject, 
and not object of the economy [...]. The motto “to create an 
higher social justice” found in the decree on the socialization 
not only its juridical settlement, but also its economic value, 
and its social meaning.»787 
 
The war accelerated the «the real fascist democracy of 
Labour»,788 changing the economic relations among individuals and the 
juridical relations with the State, because the workers/producers 
became the social citizens and managers of the social economy: 
 
«Capitalism, just for this ties to profit and individual gain 
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proportionate the production to consumption through an 
highly fragile distributive System. Collectivism, disengaged 
from profit and individual gains could possibly in the future 
better balance production to consumptions, but the 
production will always be grounded on standard types. This 
ultimately means that the standard of life will keep 
moderate, or less modifiable, while capitalism was able to 
create a growing standard of life for more and more 
categories of population, as demonstrated by economic 
history. [...]The Anglo-Saxon capitalism (liberalism in 
politics) and communism are mistakes through which the 
human conscience passes in the current stage of history. The 
first points at the wider freedom in the individual economy, 
while the second at the negation of any kind of individual 
economy. The current and most urgent historical task 
nowadays is to be able to start the economic and juridical 
regulation of the relation between Capital and Labour.»789 
 
The socialization harmonized the economic relations among 
productive categories and redistributed wealth and private profit in 
function of the national planning and needs. As capitalism showed 
unable to reform itself, the confrontation was rather with collectivism. 
Unlike Bolshevism, the Republican Fascism «forge the Capital towards 
some form of moral, juridical, and economic collaboration with the 
Labour, coming thus to the current socialization, which is a concept of 
equilibrium among Capital, Labour, and State.»790  
The intellectual and former trade unionist Ugo Manunta 
identified socialization with corporatism, opposing trade unionists’ 
classist positions, which were emerging in the republican regime. 791 
Manunta stressed the continuities between the RSI and the social 
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achievements of the Ventennio; the socialization was the «expression, on 
the economic level, of the inherent and natural solidarity between those 
who contributed to the productive process.»792 He supported the 
creation of company unions instead of the professional unions, which 
retained the dualism Capital/Labour and were expression of the 
“egoistic” interests of each category. The war allowed to make the 
breakthroughs in this reconfiguration of the trade unions’ structures, 
which Manunta considered at the core of Fascist doctrine: 
 
«Fascism already was an anticapitalist doctrine; but its action in 
this sense was systematically hindered by a set of obstacles, which 
maintained ambiguous the primary goals of the revolution. From 
8th September, the anticapitalism, which has never been erased by 
the fascist flag, became the principal purposes of the 
governmental action. From this, descends all the provisions, 
which are leading us to a definitive clarification of ideas and 
institutions.»793 
 
The company trade unions gathered all the productive actors 
regardless their role and hierarchy in the self-governed enterprise. The 
company union became “real” corporation: «the social question will no 
longer torment only one class, but [its solution] will become the goal 
towards which all the classes naturally tend, seeing in this the ultimate 
and real aim of the human efforts.» 794 According to Manunta, the 
“trade union cell” was the true totalitarian corporation. Thanks to the 
socialization, unions and factories became a unitarian productive 
centre, making superfluous any other productive State agency or 
authority. With the socialization, the economic factor (the factory) and 
the social actors (the union) became a unique totalitarian entity. The 
labour self-government was firstly realized in the enterprises to 
permeate the whole national economic organization, structured in 
different cells of self-managed industries coordinated by the State, 
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which regulated the production through planning. To Manunta, this 
solution overcame corporatism: «we should substitute the older system 
with a new order. If it is true that capitalism could be banned, then we 
should necessarily overcome also the dualism of classes.» 795  
For the “left-wing” Fascism, the RSI was the chance to get back 
at the working masses. In their analysis, the regime crumbled because 
it carried out a harmless polemics against the bourgeoisie, without 
implementing any revolutionary action that ensured the loyalty of the 
working class to the regime. This consideration, asserted by important 
representatives of the RSI, as Manunta, Concetto Pettinato, Bruno 
Spampanato led to different conception of social policy. Throughout 
twenty years, the regime effectively implemented compulsory schemes 
of social insurances, but did not include the working class in the State, 
if not in “formal” terms. This component regarded at the RSI as bridge 
between Fascism and the working class, reweaving the threads of a 
collaboration on socio-economic bases rather than juridical regulations. 
This trend coexisted with the governmental technocrats, like Tarchi, 
Barracu, Biaggini, who were in favour of major social reforms; rather 
than pushing for revolutionary actions, they bargained the socialization 
with the Germans or tried to reduce their scope through corporatist 
compromises. This group drafted the reforms and was charged of the 
legislative action. A third pole was represented by the PRF, headed by 
Pavolini. While the trade unionists claimed for a totalitarian social 
revolution and the governmental circles ensured “corporative 
continuities”, the Republican party dealt with assistance tasks. The PRF 
interpreted Verona’s declaration to “stay with the people” in the light 
of the war emergency conditions and of the need to mobilize the 
population. The party tried to take over the functions on the territory of 
the previous Fascist assistance agencies, weakened by the events 
following the 25th July 1943. The pressure from the PRF for interwoven 
its structures with the assistance competences clashed against the 
militarization of the party decided by Mussolini in mid-1944, and the 
indifference, if not hostility, of the population.796  
                                                          
795 Ivi. p. 12. 
796 R. D’Angeli, Storia del partito fascista repubblicano, Roma, Castelvecchi, 2016, pp. 81-107. 
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Besides the divergences in the Fascist establishment, the debate 
on the socializations was disconnected from the social and political 
reality of the Northern Italy. Historian Giuseppe Parlato wrote that the 
“social left” under RSI was, if not a myth, a minority unable to orient 
the policy of the regime, controlled by other contituencies: «the left [...] 
had never the strength to succeed against the five enemies that in 
reality were the true players of the republic: the government of the RSI, 
worried about socialist or collectivists drifts; Pavolini and the project of 
the party’s hegemony; the world of labour, that varied between distrust 
and open hostility; the industrialists, less than eager to listen to those 
who claimed for the expropriation of the means of production; the 
Germans, perplexed by forms even embryonic of collectivism and 
mostly against the autonomy from the ally that many representatives of 
the left manifested.»797 The socialization was the retaliation against the 
former block of interests – the industrialists, the monarchy, the 
conservative middle classes – that now «faced with the prospect of the 
integral communism in case they reject and fight a social regime that, 
with a more balanced view, tries to reconcile the functions of all the 
elements of the production.»798 This feeling probably was shared by the 
whole RSI’s establishment, including the sectors that were side-lined in 
the years of mass consensus. These positions suggest the (wrong) 
acknowledging that the outcome of the war in Italy would have been 
revolutionary either in Fascist or in Communist sense. They also reveal 
that Fascism could no longer elaborate original social doctrines to 
replace the fall of the corporatist myth. The regime could not go 
beyond the “third way”: «as the socialization resumes, thus, the 
revolutionary programme of the corporatism, it stands out on the one 
side as the overcoming of capitalism, and on the other as more human 
and comprehensive solution than communism.»799  
The rhetoric of the socialization was filled with regret for the 
                                                          
265 G. Parlato, La sinistra fascista. Storia di un progetto mancato, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, p. 
3003, see pp. 289-302. 
798 ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221/7 – Socializzazione delle imprese, «Nota per il Duce. 30 
giugno 1944-XXII», p.1. 
799 Ivi. p. 6. 
318 
 
“betrayal” of the middle classes and the “plutocracy”, and the 
disappointment for the apathy of the working classes, ungrateful to the 
social provisions put in place by the regime. On the other hand, the RSI 
restated the principle of the social collaboration; transitioning from 
corporatism to socialization, it only changed in its legal framework, 
from the juridical regulation to the self-regulation in the industries, via 
joint commissions. The resurgence of the “left-wing” Fascism under the 
RSI had more to do with the war contingencies than with social 
revolutions freed from institutional counterbalances, as the Fascist 
propaganda relentlessly claimed. In the passage from the regime to the 
RSI, Fascism lost credibility, consensus and a good part of its official 
intellectuals, like the philosopher Gentile or Bottai. Even if the RSI had 
first ranks technicians and politicians, they could simply not elaborate a 
thorough social doctrine that hold on the popular masses suffering for 
the terrible war conditions, when the country became the frontline of 
the conflict. More than ideological elaborations, other factors should be 
taken into account; among these, the payback of what remained of the 
Fascist ruling class and the need to close ranks of the stiff supporters of 
the republic. The propaganda did not have any grip on the population, 
and, in reality, did not even probably work on the paramilitary 
troopers that savagely fought alongside the Third Reich, who now had 
other reasons to combat than the achievement of the never made Fascist 
social revolution. 
 
4.4. The legacy of the Fascist authorities in the Italian post-war social 
protection 
  
The events of the war did not mark effective ruptures in the 
Fascist social policy. From 1939 to 1943 the regime implemented a 
wartime legislation and strengthened the previous insurances. After 
1943, even if the institutional collapse freed the components previously 
“silenced” by the regime, the RSI had important political, 
administrative and military continuities with the previous regime.800 
The continuity of political and administrative personnel led to 
                                                          
800 L. Ganapini, La repubblica delle camicie nere, Milano, Garzanti, 2010. 
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continuities in public policies, reducing the scope of the socialization. 
While the RSI carried out an ambiguous discourse of rupture with the 
Ventennio, the social legislation retained its setting, which referred to 
the 1935 reform of the social insurance and to the 1939 reorganization 
of the social legislation.801 The RSI, in the Fascist narrative, was indeed 
the logical prosecution of twenty years of social policy, freed from the 
obstacles that prevented the «achievement of its very high social 
purposes.»802 Fascist public discourse moved alongside two tracks: on 
the one side, the Fascist doctrine never changed from the 1919 San 
Sepolcro speech to the RSI; on the other, political turmoil and “total 
war” allowed the complete deployment of the Fascist social revolution: 
«the fundamental act on the socialization. It is, that is true, a new 
milestone, but on the background as heritage to which we do not 
renounce there is the path we difficultly undertook;»803 The continuity 
in social policies from 1926 to 1944 was clear in the final goals of the 
1944 decree; ensuring social rest and class collaboration.  
After 1943 and the “betrayal” of the capitalists signalled, 
implicitly, that classes existed, and that «thus it is necessary that the 
State intervenes in the midst of the struggle, by eliminating the 
dominance of the Capital and by giving to the Labour an effective force 
and function.» 804 The purposes of social collaboration and submission 
of class interests to the nation were approached differently; from the 
juridical corporative framework to the intervention on the structures of 
the economy, in the production and management of the enterprises. 
The decree on the socialization, although dealing with the economic 
                                                          
801 ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Appunto per il Consiglio dei Ministri. 
Schema di decreto legislativo che reca norme per la liquidazione delle pensioni ai 
superstiti in caso di morte di assicurati e pensionati dell’assicurazione obbligatoria 
invalidità e vecchiaia. 10 gennaio 1945»; ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Bozza di 
decreto del Ministro Segretario di Stato per il Lavoro di concerto con il Ministro per le 
Finanze. 5 gennaio 1945». 
802 «Ventennale sviluppo logico della dottrina fascista», Brescia Repubblicana, 23 February 
1944-XXII. 
803 Ibidem. 
804 «Le basi della nuova economia», La Corrispondenza Repubblicana, January 1944, pp. 
102-104, p.102. 
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reorganization of the productive basis, actually had a deep social 
function, to some extent comparable to the “link between the social and 
the economic realm”, which was the motto of Vichy’s “left-wing” trade 
unionists. The socializations implied a closer collaboration between 
workers and employers, but instead of being mediated by national 
corporative organisms, was achieved directly in the factories. The 
collaboration was not carried out on equal basis; the State claimed to 
put the workers in the conditions to manage the factories and to 
participate to the profit-sharing.  
This change was entailed by different factors: the retaliation 
against the industrial establishment (and for good part of the fascist 
ruling class this reason was between the lines); leaving a “time-bomb” 
behind the reconstruction to the Allied and the democratic parties after 
the unavoidable defeat; a mere tool for the propaganda of the puppet 
regime, which otherwise had no “political” justification to exist.805 All 
these aspects help to explain the RSI’s more pronounced social 
programme. But there was probably also the need to revive the “Fascist 
social revolution” that constituted a good part of the 1919 original 
programme and that too many times had been delayed.806 By restating 
the “third way”, the regime had a double goal: on the one side, the 
concrete elevation of the material conditions of the worker, thanks to 
social protection and the participation to corporate profits; on the other, 
the reconfiguration of the social relations and class representation had 
also the purpose to better serve the interests of the “State of Labour”. 
Only when co-opted to the management of the enterprises, «the worker 
will no longer represent an antagonist and hostile element, only 
concerned to assert his own class interests.»807  
On the legacy of the previous social policy, the war set in 
motion more radical dynamics. Differently from Britain, in Italy the 
                                                          
805 L. Gaeta, A. Visconti, «L’Italia e lo stato sociale», in Gerhard Ritter, Storia dello stato 
sociale, p.249. 
806 R. De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 1883-1920, Torino, Einaudi, 2005, pp. 419-560, 
see the documentary annexes: «Programma dei Fasci di combattimento (1919)», pp. 742-
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807  Le basi della nuova economia, p.103. 
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processes of social change were not driven by the socio-economic 
mobilization; they resulted from precise ideological goals, only 
partially related to the re-emergence of the trade unionist sectors of 
Fascism. The socialization was the only reform that promoted a unitary 
action to the RSI’s social policies, as it was inextricably interlinked to 
the national economic planning and to the trade union legislation. 
These institutions referred to the technocracy of the Ministry of 
Corporative Economy, also charged until 1945 of the social insurances, 
that in this sense had the “totalitarian” control of the social and 
economic leverages.808 This centralization matched the needs of the 
(German) war and the new deal undertook by Fascism. Such ambitious 
project of social and economic reorganization revealed impossible to 
achieve in the context of the dissolutions of the State structures as Italy 
became the battlefield of a “Liberation and civil war”809 and when the 
consensus to the regime dramatically dropped. 
The socialization did not survive to the regime; unlike for 
instance the French CO or Social Committee, not even the framework 
of these structure was put in place. The elaborations and projects faded 
as the regime dissolved. The rhetoric of the “red revolutionary 
Fascism” – still present nowadays in the Italian far-right and fostered 
for years by the autobiographies of the RSI’s protagonists810 – should be 
distinguished by the public policies implemented, just like social 
legislation has to be discerned from Fascist ideology. What survived to 
                                                          
808 ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 83/652/1, «Ministro per la Produzione Industriale. Disciplina della 
produzione e della distribuzione dopo lo scioglimento delle organizzazioni sindacali dei 
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809 C. Pavone, Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità della Resistenza, Torino, Bollati 
Boringhieri, 1991. 
810 The RSI still fascinates some milieu of the Italian “new” far-right. This experience, and 
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historical works. See C. Ozella, Socialfascismo: dal programma di San Sepolcro alla 
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Fascism, was good part of the economic and social public authorities 
set up from the beginning of the Thirties onwards, like the INPS, the 
INAIL, the IMI and the IRI. Their birth was only partially linked to the 
dynamics of the regime, and the post-war Republican social institutions 
retained elements the Fascist social protection, first and foremost the 
occupational framework.811 Fascism took over the liberal social 
protection, by extending, rationalizing and unifying the social schemes. 
This tendency, was not just Fascism’s prerogative, as all the major 
European countries in those years enacted measures to strengthen and 
unify the social insurances.  
This incremental process pursued also in the transition from 
the regime to the democracy. As elsewhere in Europe, the Italian anti-
fascist parties knew the last innovation on social security, and 
elaborated reform proposals. However, they did never tackle this issue 
with a global plan of reform, not even comparable to the British post-
war reforms or the French plan of the sécurité sociale. Due to the 
peculiar geo-political and economic conditions of post-war Italy, the 
country lacked of any consistent universalistic turn at least until the 
‘60s. The Italian system of social protection remained occupational, 
while the Fascist social agencies were democratized. These latter, far 
from being an inherently corporatist “product” of the Fascist ideology, 
were rather part of the policies put in place to face the structural crisis 
of the Thirties almost everywhere. They passed through the war in the 
new democratic context; freed from the Fascist ideological 
superstructures, they proved to be pliable enough to adapt to the new 
principles of the post-war social security.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
811 A. Cherubini, Storia della previdenza sociale in Italia (1860-1960), Roma, Editori Riuniti, 
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5. The wartime social systems: State’s universalism and corporative 
solidarity 
 
 
 
 
A comparative view on the wartime social legislation and 
projects prevents from generalising mono-causal explanations, and 
confirms the relevancy of the policy legacy and path dependence as 
decisive factors in the evolution and ruptures of social policy. Cleansed 
by propagandistic statements (which concerned all the three case-
studies), the prospected reforms rooted on solid legislative and 
historical backgrounds. In Britain, the Beveridge Report originally 
pointed at rearranging the garbled system of public/private schemes, 
increased in the harshest years of the Great Depression. The only 
completely new provision was the NHS, whose exact features were still 
to be clearly fixed by 1942. In the Vichy regime, the pre-existing mutual 
interests had a fundamental role to block the reforms.812 Their pressure, 
and the political rivalries in the government, scuppered the attempts at 
achieving a more coherent system. In Italy, not even the transition from 
the regime to the RSI marked a real break in the legislation. The two 
major social reforms continued along the lines of the law-making in the 
1930s, retaining the traditional corporatist setting, as for the mutualist 
national authority for the healthcare. 
Within this lump of interwoven administrative practices and 
legacies, the war constituted a moment of transition, regardless the 
sides in conflict. It has been written that «in virtually every rich or 
middling income nation, on the Allied side, there is a clear sense of 
demarcation: the welfare state before the war, and after the war. 
Existing programmes were made more generous and older provisions 
limiting coverage to the indigent or to industrial workers were 
generally removed. The common denominator was that after the war, 
social umbrellas opened up, sheltering the middle classes as well as the 
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working classes.»813 In reality, the Axis and its satellites did not escape 
from the same tendency; the evolution of social protection posed some 
general political and administrative issuess that crossed the borders 
between political systems. Without underestimating relevant 
divergences among Britain, the Vichy regime and Fascist Italy/RSI, 
equally important convergences might be retraced in some general 
guidelines and administrative arrangements.  
Everywhere, bone of contention was the tendency to centralize 
of compulsory schemes; the rationalization and uniformity of 
contributory mechanisms and benefits; the progressive taking charge of 
wider social risks by the States. More radical divergences concerned the 
scope of these reforms, which dealt with different conceptualizations of 
“social solidarity” and “citizenship”. In Britain, the State-managed 
compulsory insurances encountered less resistances in comparison to 
what happened in the Vichy regime, while in Italy the compulsory 
occupational schemes managed and coordinated by the State-
controlled INFPS and INFAIL was not even questioned under the RSI. 
In the comparative summary on the policies between 1939 and 1945, I 
cross-correlating the data of the three previous chapters, fleshing out 
convergences and divergences, with the use of comparative tables. In 
this preliminary conclusion I focus on the wartime years. I will return 
to the extent and the limits of the “paradigm shift” in the third part, 
scrutinizing the influence of “universalism” in the post-1945 social 
reforms in France and Italy. 
 
The stratification of European social legislations and the ways to address the 
“social question” during wartime 
Between the 1930s and the 1940s, residual compulsory schemes 
coexisted with a plethora of competing mutualist funds, which 
fragmented and made unequal the access to social protection. At the 
eve of the war, policy-makers had to address their increasing financial 
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burdens and administrative inefficiency. In the 1930s, Britain coped 
with unemployment by implementing a case-by-case basis legislation. 
The borders between “insurance” and “assistance” often faded; public 
authorities resorted to the institutions which traditionally provided aid 
for the poor to relieve the workers who lost their incomes due to 
unemployment. The aftermaths of the Great Depression could 
undermine the political legitimization and social fabric.814 The 
appointment of the Beveridge Committee in 1942 enshrined in the huge 
debate of the 1920s and 1930s that focused on the need to ensure social 
harmony and industrial collaboration.815  
Already in 1914, the industrialist and social reformer Rowntree 
(who took part to the Beveridge Committee) considered unemployment 
the greatest danger to Britain, as it affected the moral, physical and 
psychological conditions of the nation, and weakened the social 
cohesion. Rowntree regarded at unemployment not merely in economic 
terms, but in its social consequences: «I do not wish to introduce 
religious phraseology into an economic essay, but our national life is, 
after all, built on ideals. […] by harmonious co-operation – a co-
operation in which every individual is of vital importance to the State, 
and the State is of vital important to every individual.»816 Nearly thirty 
years later, the Beveridge Report pointed at guaranteeing the vital 
income and subsistence standards, which, it was argued, the pre-war 
social insurances could not ensure. The three main assumptions were 
the overhaul of the older system and of the “sectional interests” grown 
in its shadows; the incorporation of the social insurances within a 
wider «comprehensive policy of social progress»;817 the renewed 
collaboration between State and individual.  
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These three points could have hypothetically been subscribed 
also by Fascist and Vichy’s reformers. The first two aspects, because 
they resulted from longer-run and structural transformations of the 
social insurances, independently from the political systems; the last 
one, instead, because the war contrasted two opposite approaches to 
face the “social question”. In Britain, as well as in Italy and France, 
every reform of the social insurances encountered resistance from the 
vested interests: private business, mutual funds and trade unions, 
whether “free” or “corporative” ones. The history of the wartime social 
reforms also concerns the greater or lesser success of the State to 
impose itself as principal actor of the social protection with regard to 
voluntary/mutualist insurances. In all the countries were proposed 
“new pacts” between State and citizens. The coordination among the 
different social policy areas and their link with forms of State’s 
interventionism in the socio-economic processes was shared by the 
British reformists as well as the French or Italian technocrats.  
 
The British and French projects in comparison 
In Britain, the Beveridge Report aimed at eradicating the “Want” 
from British society. This goal was expected to be achieved through a 
plan that covered all the citizens without upper income limits, 
providing to all same benefits for same contributions, without 
underestimating different working conditions: «it is a plan all-
embracing in scope of persons and of needs, but it is classified in 
application.»818 Important administrative changes were suggested: the 
unification of the social insurances in respect of contributions and 
professional categories, from the public servants to the housewives; the 
simplification of their administration under a single political centre; the 
supersession of separate compulsory schemes and local/private funds; 
the attribution to the Friendly Societies and the trade unions of the 
management of public sickness benefits; the creation of a separate 
national health service, unrelated to the insurance contribution but 
made available to every citizen.  
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While encountering resistances from the vested interests, trade 
unions and some political circles, the universalistic reforms were 
accepted thanks to a greater political legitimization that neither the 
Vichy regime nor the RSI had. Beveridge himself recognized that the 
War Cabinet initially seemed to not endorse the report in its entirety. In 
his view, the sudden urge of the war should have led the government 
to overcome financial uncertainties, ideological resistance and lobbyism 
from the private business:  
 
«The Government’s procedure loses the great psychological 
effect that might have been produced on the people of this 
and other countries by full and courageous acceptance of a 
policy of freedom from want. It raises inevitably doubt 
whether preparation will in fact proceed as rapidly on a plan 
that is hypothetical as on one for which there is commitment. 
It leads finally to the certainty of continuing controversy, to 
risk of danger to national unity and to apparent or real 
dissipation of energies required for prosecution of the war. 
All this could be avoided and the whole issue settled out of 
hand by acceptance of the principle that, in allocation of 
resources, provision of a national minimum for subsistence 
has priority over all purposes other than national defence. 
That is a principle which, I suggest, the Government of 
Britain should now accept as a directive from the democracy 
of Britain. A second directive is that the Government should 
take all necessary steps for the maintenance of employment 
after the war, being prepared to use the power of the State so 
far as necessary for that purpose, subject only to the 
preservation of a limited list of essential British liberties, such 
as worship, speech, association, choice of occupation, and 
personal spending. In these two directives I believe are set 
the main lines of our home front policy for the reconstruction 
period. Acceptance of the first directive would remove all 
difficulties in the way of full and final acceptance of the Plan 
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for Social Security for abolition of want which is in my 
Report.»819 
 
The climate of “total war” overcame in Britain the same 
unsurmountable resistances that made impossible under Vichy to come 
to a comprehensive reform, even if the French drafts had not such a 
broad scope as the British one. [TAB.4 and TAB.5] The divergences 
between the Beveridge Report and the first governmental proposals 
involved matters of principle. Beveridge considered fundamental the 
amalgamation of the older Workmen’s Compensation in the 
compulsory industrial insurances, entirely funded by general taxation. 
He wanted this risk take out from the private competitive business and 
the juridical contentious, to make it a public universalistic service. He 
also eagerly supported the cost-of-living adjustment of flat-rate 
benefits, notably old-age pensions and children’s allowances, against 
the hesitation of the Treasury. It was not a mere matter of bookkeeping 
of the public accounts, but the bone of contention that involved the 
scope and goals of post-war social security. As the whole report was 
built around the key concepts of national minimum and vital income, 
the governmental initial rejection of the benefits’ correlation to 
subsistence level would have invalidated the objectives intrinsic to the 
reform:  
 
«My Plan is not simply a plan to develop social insurance: it 
is a plan to give freedom from want by securing to each 
citizen at all times, on condition of service and contribution, a 
minimum income sufficient for his subsistence needs and 
responsibilities. It interprets, as any democracy must 
interpret, freedom from want to mean, not a claim to be 
relieved by the State on proof of necessity and lack of other 
resources, but having, as of right, one’s own income to keep 
one above the necessity for applying for relief. My Plan takes 
as its aim abolition of want. The Government in regard to 
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pensions wholly, and in regard to children’s allowances and 
to unemployment and disability benefit to a lesser extent, 
abandon that aim.»820 
 
Vichy’s social reformers twice tried to pass a legislation that 
could overcome the former schemes. The 1940 all-inclusive reform was 
dismissed due to political resistances and financial concerns. In the  
 
TAB.4 Draft reforms and governmental proposals on employment 
policy in Brain, 1944 
Employment policies: 
 
Employment policies: 
 
- State responsibility for full 
employment (“more vacant 
jobs than available 
workers”); 
- A structural plan to achieve 
full employment; 
- Frictional unemployment: 
3%; 
- International Trading 
Arrangements (full 
employment, balancing of 
international accounts, 
stability of economic policy); 
- National budget used to 
ensure every year the total 
outlay to set up the demand; 
control and transfer of 
industries and manpower 
according to national plans. 
 
- Governmental responsibility and 
aim for high and stable 
employment; 
- Primarily concerned with the 
prevention of mass 
unemployment after the war; 
- Frictional unemployment: 3-5%; 
- International collaboration and 
trade agreements to support 
exports; 
 
 
 
- Anticyclic macroeconomic 
policies; microeconomic 
interventions on industries and 
manpower. 
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TAB.5 Draft reforms and governmental proposals/reforms on social insurances and healthcare service in Britain, 
1942-1944 
Proposed reform Governmental proposals/reforms 
1942 Beveridge Report:  
Social insurances:  
- universalism (all citizens against all risks in a single 
insurance); 
- flat-rate contribution/benefits; 
- tripartite funding;  
- Ministry of Social Insurances;  
- Insurances benefits at a real subsistence rate (free from 
want through social insurances); 
- Indefinite period for sickness benefits without means-
tests; unemployment benefits unconditional for six 
months, then training benefits. 
 
Healthcare:  
- Separate, free and universal national health service.  
 
1944 White Papers: 
Social insurances:  
- universalism (all citizens against all risks in a single 
insurance);  
- flat-rate contribution/benefits;  
- tripartite funding;  
- Ministry of Social Insurances; 
- Lower insurance rates and duality social 
insurance/social assistance in the scheme; 
- Sickness benefits turned into invalidity benefits after 
three years; 30 weeks unemployment, then assistance 
under certain conditions. 
 
 
Healthcare:  
- NHS fully and freely available to all the citizens. 
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TAB.6 Draft reform and legislation in France, 1940-1942 
1940 first draft reform: 
- Unification of social 
insurances, family allowances, 
and paid leaves in a single 
contribution, with same 
contribution system; increased 
State’s contribution for 
sickness benefits 
- Progressive centralization of 
mutualist/voluntary funds; 
- Public pension for lower-
income old-age workers 
(AVTS). 
1942 second draft reform: 
- Central coordination of 
mutual funds 
- Territorial reorganization of 
occupational funds 
- Unification of sickness 
benefits, family allowances 
and death grants 
1941 AVTS: 
- No comprehensive reform 
of the social insurances; 
 
 
 
 
 
- Retention of mutualist 
system; 
- Public pension for lower-
income old-age workers 
(AVTS). 
 Reform rejected 
 
 
same year when the Beveridge Report was published, Vichy did not seize 
the last opportunity to implement a relatively wide reform of the social 
insurances. As in Britain, the transition from the voluntary sector to the 
State’s coordination was difficult; the drafters expected resistances 
from the private companies and some sectors of the government. 
Unlike Britain, the French reformers did not take to the extreme the 
rationale of the proposal. While the White Papers proposed the 
suppression of the Approved Societies and the limitation of the role of the 
Friendly Societies, in France the MIP advanced a less radical solution: 
«the affinity-based reunification, in the local realities, would allow to 
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give an immediate solution to all the problems arisen from the too 
many local funds currently operating. [The reform n.d.a.] would 
perpetuate the advantages inherent to the typically French regime, 
which is characterized as such: free choice of the schemes by the 
insured, huge administrative autonomy, coordination in the same time 
flexible and firm.»821 Even so, Belin’s project encountered 
insurmountable difficulties that led to its dismissal, as the Chief of the 
State himself rejected the project.  
The reform was considered «State socialism», that «radically 
delete the variety and multiplicity (which by the way must be 
considered excessive) of the private business that is currently ensuring 
the provisions to the social insured. He wants instead to centralize and 
unify as much as possible.»822 This was ideologically irreconcilable with 
the Révolution Nationale, because introduced major elements of State’s 
control, clashing against the role that the new intermediate bodies – in 
1942 were roughly hewn – were expected to play.823 Belin’s project was 
not considered suitable to address any of its goals, which did not differ 
from those of the British or Italian social reformers: simplification, 
unification, savings.824 Vichy’s “corporative” stand did not opened up 
to citizenship-based universalist reforms and encroached on the pre-
existing occupational setting of the French social insurances, in many 
regards retained after 1944–5. This combination made politically 
impossible to reform in a “vertical sense” the French social protection; 
the concern of vested interests and professional categories against the 
reform met the anti-centralist claims of good part of Vichy 
establishment, which reached ideologically-biased paroxysm.825 While 
                                                          
821 AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur l’organisation administrative des assurances 
sociales, s.d.», p.4. 
822 AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Secrétariat d’état. Lettre du 5 mars 1942», p.2. 
823 AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur un projet de loi relatif à l’organisation des caisses 
d’assurances sociales, 8 mars 1942», p.1; see also the dossier AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, 
«Notes sur un projet de creation de cause unique territorial d’assurances sociales». 
824 AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Examen technique de quelques principes énonces par l’éxposé 
des motifs ou resultant des téxtes du projet». 
825 AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur un projet de loi relatif à l’étatisation des assurances 
sociales, 8 mars 1942»; AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur un projet de loi relatif à 
l’étatisation des assurances sociales, 8 mars 1942»; AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Lettre du 
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Belin did not see contradiction between corporative industrial relations 
and centralization of social insurances, other constituencies of the 
regime defended traditional free mutualism.  
Vichy’s approach slightly differed from the British ones for the 
social function of compulsory schemes: «The protection which is so 
granted must not refer uniquely to the individual. It has to be 
addressed directly to the social group in itself. In that regard, we can 
retrace two essential functions: the healthcare protection, and the creation 
of an effective link of solidarity between the different social groups.»826 
The social rights were granted as member of professional categories, 
rather than as citizens. Social solidarity deployed along the lines of the 
industrial “natural communities”, preventing the bureaucratisation of 
the social protection and easing the creation of interclass solidarity 
within each community: «conceived as such, the Social Insurances can 
be one of the fundamental elements in the path of the collaboration, 
which is necessary to inculcate within the whole national community, 
and above all between the active members of the working 
communities: employers, employees, and industrial workers.»827  
Between 1940 and 1942 the MIP set up minimum public 
schemes (the AVTS) or more coordinated policies supervised by the 
State. The 1940 and 1942 reforms lacked of the coherence of the British 
plans, but attempted to seize the conditions to enact projects that could 
not be addressed with the same radicality in peacetimes. The cross-fire 
of vetoes and the minority positions of trade unionist within the 
government blocked them. The entourage of Pétain represented the 
entanglement of vested interested that had everything to lose from an 
all-inclusive reform. The private healthcare companies, the voluntary 
                                                                                                                               
Conseil Central de la Fédération des Syndicats des Maîtres-Imprimeurs de France au 
Directeur du Cabinet Civil de Monsieur le Maréchal de France Chef de l’État Français, 23 
mars 1942»; AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Lettre du Chef Départemental de la Légion de 
l’Ardèche à Monsieur le Maréchal, 27 mars 1942», and many other similar 
correspondence sent by the mutual and private companies to the Director of the Civil 
Cabinet. 
826 G. de Lagarde (ed.), Les assurances sociales peuvent-elles et doivent-elles s’adapter à la 
nouvelle Organisation corporative ?, Paris, 1941, p. 6. 
827 Ivi. p.8. 
335 
 
family welfare and the representatives of the mutualist funds opposed 
to the overhaul of what was called “the traditional French free of 
choice”. Not even after the war the plethora of mutualist actors was 
overcome. However, in a couple of years the political and international 
context radically changed due to the spread of new ideas and the 
military victory of the Allies; what had not been possible to accomplish 
in 1940 and 1942, was achieved in 1944. The differences between the 
1940-2 Belin’s projects and the plans of sécurité sociale should not be 
underestimated, but some goals were similar, and good part of the 
technical personnel was by no means stranger to Vichy’s plans of social 
reforms.  
 
The “Fascist” social reforms in a European perspective 
For the Italian case, the lack of documentation on the 1944 
legislative arrangements made more difficult a direct comparison with 
the wartime debates in Britain and France. There is no archive of the 
Ministry of Corporative Economy nor of the Ministry of Labour, so I 
crossed the data from single records. Until 1943 Italy did not experience 
any institutional breakthrough as occurred in France. The social 
legislation followed a linear trend since 1931, utterly in line with other 
European tendencies; the three different laws of 1935, 1939 and 1944 
progressively systematized the Italian social protection towards 
unification and centralization. [TAB.6] As for the Vichy regime, and 
unlikely the British case, the Italian action only partially resulted from 
structural changes due to the war. “Total war” affected Fascist policy-
makers rather from an ideological point of view. The reform of 1935 
constituted the foundation upon which the other acts made further 
amendments, within the framework of the general principles of the 
Labour Charter:  
 
«The National Fascist Institute of the Social Insurances is an 
autonomous authority with its own legal personality and 
independent management. […] The Institute has the purpose 
of implementing, within the limits set by its competence, the 
principles established by the Labour Charter, coordinating its 
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own action to the one of the other corporative bodies, of the 
professional associations, and of the assistance authorities. It 
is inspired by the Fascist conception of the social protection 
as the highest embodiment of the principle of reconciliation 
of the productive factors.»828 
 
The appointment of Bottai as first President of the INFPS 
signalled the regime’s effort to promote a coordinated policy between 
industrial relations and social insurances. His successor, Bruno Biagi, 
had a similar curriculum; Undersecretary of the Corporative Economy, 
he was an important theorist of corporatism and employment policy.829 
He promoted studies and legislation on family allowances, social 
medicine, social insurances, tuberculosis benefits.830 In the “official” 
compendia, social protection, union legislation, social assistance and 
corporatism were regarded as separate branches of social policy: 
«unitarily conceived and organically implemented, the social protection 
had in Italy a linear progression» – and the lines of this development 
were corporative – «the social protection undertook a remarkable and 
logical path under the impulse of the corporative collaboration and of 
the solidarity, which is the highest expression of this collaboration.»831  
As in Vichy, social solidarity did not spread primarily among the 
individuals as “citizens”, but firstly among the individuals as member 
of the same corporations. Fascist theorists transposed the corporative 
doctrine of interclass collaboration in the social protection. In reality, 
the two aspects developed autonomously from each other. 
 
                                                          
828 «Perfezionamento e coordinamento legislativo della previdenza sociale. Regio 
Decreto-Legge 4 ottobre 1935-XIII, n.1827», GU, 26 ottobre 1935, pp. 1-2. 
829 B. Biagi, Lo Stato corporativo. I Il sindacato. II la corporazione, Roma, Istituto Nazionale di 
Cultura Fascista, 1934; Id., Gli strumenti dell'azione corporativa di intervento diretto, Firenze, 
Casa editrice Poligrafica Universitaria, 1938; Id., Lineamenti dell'ordine corporativo fascista, 
Bologna, Zanichelli, 1939. 
830 For the writings of Biagi as President of the INFPS, see infra pp. 204-206. See also B. 
Biagi, Prolusione e discorso di chiusura al congresso della previdenza sociale, Bologna, INFPS, 
1935. 
831 PNF, La politica sociale del fascismo, p. 115. 
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TAB.7. Reforms of the social insurances in Fascist Italy (1935, 1939 and 
1944) 
Year  
1935 - The INFPS became public-law institution with legal 
status; 
- Coordination of all the compulsory insurances under 
the INFPS. 
1939 - The INFPS is charged of the family allowances, and 
supplementary measures to income integration and 
support. 
1944 - The social contributions are unified in a single card; 
- Shift in the contributory burden from the workers to the 
employers. 
 
The creation of national social authorities improved former 
institutions and resulted from the specific political choice to not 
overcome sectional interests. The regime privileged the coordination of 
the mutual funds rather than the nationalization of the insurances, as 
proposed by the unionist leader Edmondo Rossoni.832 Between 1932 
and 1933 the creations of the INFPS and the INFAIL encountered 
Bottai’s suggestions towards major centralization: «our legal 
framework is ambiguous, as the insurances are compulsory, but there 
is free choice of the fund. It is about seeing whether maintain this 
setting or move consistently towards the compulsory insurances as 
State’s task.»833 The propensity for public insurances might clash 
against corporatism, as weaselling noticed by the industrialists’ 
associations; the regime moved in a direction that had more to do with 
coordination and rationalization, than with specific principles of 
“corporative doctrine”. The Italian legislation in the Thirties was not so 
                                                          
832 Correspondance between Rossoni and Mussolini, mentioned in F. Bertini, «Il fascismo 
dalle assicurazioni per i lavoratori allo stato sociale», in Marco Palla (ed.), Lo Stato fascista, 
Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 2001, pp. 177-314, cfr. pp. 213-214. F. Cordova, Verso lo Stato 
totalitario. Sindacati, società e fascismo, Soveria Mannelli, Il Rubbettino, 2005 
833 G Bottai, «Tre questioni in discussione sulle assicurazioni sugli infortuni», Il Lavoro 
fascista, 10 giugno 1932, mentioned in F. Bertini, «Il fascismo dalle assicurazioni per i 
lavoratori allo stato sociale», p. 235. 
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much the result of Fascist revolution’s achievement. It was part of the 
Euro(American) response to the economic and political turmoil of the 
1930s, which compelled the States to figure out amendments to the 
previous schemes.  
Not all the countries addressed the Great Depression in the 
terms of the “nationalization” of the services (as for the Dutch or the 
same French cases).834 But the reforms of social insurances became 
topical: the British 1934 Unemployment Act, the US 1935 Social Security 
Act, the Italian legislation between 1933 and 1935, the Swedish 
Folkhempolitik and the pension reform in 1937, the prospected Robert 
Ley’s single pension scheme in Nazi Germany, the debate on State’s 
social pensions in France, the Danish 1933 Social Reform Act. These 
projects called into question the previous residual settings, even if they 
did not challenge the occupational framework of social insurances. In 
Italy, the regime operated the progressive uniformization in a 
piecemeal fashion: more consistently on unemployment, old age, 
invalidity benefits and industrial injuries, while sickness and healthcare 
policy remained matter for mutualism, even if the regime introduced 
compulsory insurances against tuberculosis and set up public sanatoria 
managed by the INFPS.835  
The 1935 reform assigned to the INFPS the management of the 
funds for the compulsory insurances with the exception of the 
industrial injuries. Like elsewhere, they were object of separate 
jurisdiction and only in 1944 Britain amalgamated this risk category 
                                                          
834 G. Ritter, op. cit., pp. 103-114. For other “peripherical” countries, see the contributions 
in S. King, J. Stewart (eds.), Welfare Peripheries. The Development of Welfare States in 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe, Bern, Peter Lang, 2007, and particularly C. 
Nottingham, P. De Rooy, «The Peculiarities of the Dutch: Social Security in the 
Netherlands», pp. 39-66; J. H. Petersen, K. Petersen, «Shake, Rattle and Roll! From 
Charity to Social Rights in the Danish Welfare State 1890-1933», pp. 149-179; P. Markkola, 
«Changing Patterns of Welfare: Finland in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries», pp. 207-230; G. Esping-Andersen, «The Making of Social Democratic Welfare 
State», in Klaus Misged, Karl Molin, Klas Åmark (eds.), Creating Social Democracy. A 
Century of the Social Democratic Labour Party in Sweden, University Park, The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1992, pp. 35-66. 
835 S. Centonze, La tubercolosi dal punto di vista social ed azione dell’Istituto Nazionale Fascista 
di Previdenza, Padova, Società Cooperativa Tipografica, 1942. 
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within social security. The INFPS reported to the Minister of the 
Corporations; the regime did not set up a separate and specific minister 
for the social protection, as its functioning was expected to fall within 
the scope of the corporative organizations. This represented also an 
exception to the rationalization of supervisory centres, and did not get 
rid of the administrative fragmentation: the Minister of the Interior and 
the Minister of the Colonies shared important tasks of control.  
The law of April 1939 left unsolved major problems; huge 
differences in the schemes for each salaried category persisted, 
exacerbated by further sub-categorisations for specific categories, 
especially in agriculture (agricultural salaried workers and 
sharecroppers did not have compulsory insurance yet), which 
constituted a relevant part of the whole of Italian manpower. The 
reform left healthcare a matter of mutualist funds or public assistance 
authorities. On the other side, the regime introduced new benefits and 
categories, as for the survivors’ pensions and the extension of social 
protection to the whole family unit, which would have been so 
important also in Vichy’s social legislation and in the British plans. The 
reform tended to a larger uniformity between industrial workers and 
employees, which nonetheless paid the contributions to different funds 
and with different benefits. The contributory mechanisms remained 
unchanged, as «half of the contributions for invalidity and old age, 
tuberculosis, unemployment, marriage and natality is to be provided 
by the employer and half by the worker.»836   
In 1944 the regime unified the contributions and extended them 
to all the salaried workers in the craft and industrial firms, still 
excluding self-employees and farm workers. The project was already 
discussed between 1940 and 1942, in studies that recognized that «the 
older world is leaving and a newer one is coming.»837 The INFPS 
tackled a problem of all the European social systems; the fragmentation 
                                                          
836 «Modificazioni delle disposizioni sulle assicurazioni obbligatorie per l’invalidità e la 
vecchiaia, per la tubercolosi e per la disoccupazione involontaria e sostituzione 
dell’assicurazione per la maternità con l’assicurazione obbligatoria per la nuzialità e la 
natalità – Regio decreto-legge 14 aprile 1939 -XVII», GU, 3 maggio 1939. 
837 V. Soldà, L’unificazione dei contributi, Genova, Società d’Arte Poligrafica, 1942, p.4. 
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in different funds that overlapped functions. Without prefiguring any 
universalistic turn, the prospected solutions were closer to the coeval 
British elaborations than Vichy’s reforms: «an efficient unification 
should be pursued along the lines of the establishment of a single 
contribution, to be determined with single criterium, on a single 
contributory basis, and to be carried out with a single payment to a 
single authority.»838 The unification did not concern the whole of 
citizens nor to the mass of the salaried workers, albeit the report 
recommended to «level the benefits among all the categories of 
workers.»839 It concerned each “corporative” (occupational) category as 
«all the employers, the employees, the workers of all the similar 
industries may form, respectively, a single category.»840  
More than on political reasons, the reforms grounded on 
practical considerations similar to those behind the British and French 
projects; the streamlining of the administrative proceedings, which 
made confusing the payments of benefits and comported important 
financial burdens. Also the political goals did not depart so much from 
the British or French plans; the reform was expected to legitimize the 
political system through its social institutions: «the success of the 
proposal would basically be a success of the Fascist corporative and 
trade unionist organization, because the reform enshrines, as 
mentioned, on the trade union regimentation and on the activity of its 
[corporative n.d.a.] organization, which is compelled to collaborate even 
more closely with the public and parastatal administrations, assuming 
new functions of general interest to serve the Nation and the 
Regime.»841 The INFPS recommended gradual approach to 
progressively harmonize the contributory system. The coming of “total 
war” also in Italy – although under different forms than in 1941 Britain 
– probably accelerated the legislation under the RSI. This process 
concerned also the single employment records for all the contributions; 
present since 1931 in Italy, they were extended to the non-industrial 
                                                          
838 Ivi. p. 11. 
839 Ivi. p. 13. 
840 Ivi. p. 14. 
841 Ivi. p. 52. 
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categories in 1944.842 It was needed to track the insured when their 
corresponding funds were falling outside the RSI’s jurisdiction or the 
workers displaced from their original work circumscription. 
Nonetheless, this reform was completely in line with European trends; 
the principle “One card, one stamp, all benefits” was an administrative 
goal and a slogan widely used by social reformers in Britain and at the 
time of the plan de sécurité sociale in France.843 
 
Universalist vs corporatist approaches: the case with healthcare policies 
During the war, the three social systems, with significantly 
different backgrounds, converged on some common grounds. All 
attempted to coordinate some of the main sectors of social policy. In 
Britain, from the works of the various Committees of the Ministry of 
Reconstruction emerged a coherent approach to social and economic 
issues; the Beveridge Report and the subsequent White Papers addressed 
these areas with a uniform method. Compulsory insurances, industrial 
injuries, family allowances and the NHS constituted what was defined 
in the political and technical lexicon “social security”, and the policies 
for full employment were the corollary to protect the individuals from 
the loss of income. Under the Vichy regime, the MIP twice attempted to 
pass a more limited all-inclusive reform, as it did not prefigure the 
overcoming of the occupational setting in a universalistic scheme of 
public compulsory insurances. Both drafts combined the corporatist 
framework with an extended role of the State: on the one hand, the 
coordination of the mutual funds and the unification of contributions, 
family allowances and paid leaves; on the other, the provision of 
minimum public pensions that envisaged a major State’s commitment 
in the future. In the healthcare policies, the government refused any 
approach that implied public involvement beyond the occupational 
health. The mutual protection was preferred to universalist reforms. 
                                                          
842 «Unificazione dei contributi e tenuta del libretto di lavoro nel settore dell’industria. 
Decreti Ministeriali 20 e 16 settembre 1944-XXII», Biblioteca Legale della Gazzetta del 
Popolo, pp. 12-20. 
843 Social Insurance, Including Industrial Injury Insurance. One Card, One Stamp, All Benefits. 
Brief Guide to the Government’s Plan, London, 1944. 
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Relevant divergences were present on the more detailed 
mechanisms, as for the contributory system. The tripartite funding of 
post-1945 British social security was not a completely new concept, 
even if the equal contribution and the corresponding flat-rate benefits 
were innovations. In the Italian or French social protections this setting 
was residual, or even non-existing, for State’s contribution. The 
technical solutions did not merely hide divergences – although might 
not be so radical – in the way to conceive the “citizenship” and to 
implement “social solidarity”. The equal tripartite contribution relied 
on a double principle: the traditional principle of self-protection against 
the risks and the State’s participation through the general taxation as a 
citizenship-based social solidarity. The income support was no longer 
exclusively matter of the individual, but the whole community took in 
charge of the minimum vital incomes of their members. This qualitative 
leap was particularly evident in the industrial injuries benefits and in 
the NHS, both funded by the national community. For the former, the 
war played a crucial role in the equalization of the wounded soldiers in 
the frontline with the injured workers in the workplace. But just in the 
field of the healthcare policies, the differences between the corporatist 
and the citizenship-based approaches became relevant; they provide a 
good case study to grasp the “inherent” divergences in the rationale of 
the wartime reforms. 
Neither in Italy nor in France the healthcare reform was strictly 
interwoven to those of the social insurance, as it was in Britain. In 
France, with the 1941 Charte hospitalière the hospitals no longer assisted 
exclusively the poor, but opened up to all the citizens who could afford 
the costs of treatment. The regime also tried to intervene on sickness 
benefits and private healthcare structures, similarly to the EMF in Italy. 
The creation of the INASAS was expected to supervise the mutualist 
healthcare structures and to take direct control of the outpatient 
facilities.844 It also managed public structures for the insured, not 
differing that much from INFPS’s sanatoria against the tuberculosis. 
The INASAS concerned only the insured, and was not opened to all the 
                                                          
844 AN, 2/AG/499/C.C.80, «Projet d’Institut National d’Action Sanitaires des Assurances 
Sociales, 25 Novembre 1941». 
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citizens; yet, it encountered political resistances within the government, 
which opposed some «major objections in principles» as it was feared 
the creation of a «vast and powerful State’s structure.»845 Similar 
discussions were taking place in Britain, with the suppression of the 
Approved Societies, and in Italy, with the EMF. But the political conflicts 
under Vichy weakened the healthcare reform; it was feared that the 
INASAS «organized a thorough public administrative system 
dedicated to healthcare, to the preventive medicine, and to the 
treatment of the diseases only of the workers subjects to the social 
insurances, while all the Frenchmen, whether employers, self-
employed, or salaried, should benefit of the same sanitary measures.»846  
Not even the reform of healthcare in Italy, while providing one 
step ahead in the administrative coordination, prefigured the 
qualitative leap of the fully universalist healthcare. The 1943 law 
completed the trend started in 1935. The regime articulated social 
policy along three main branches: compulsory insurances (including 
family allowances, managed by the INFPS), industrial injuries and 
healthcare. By 1943, the regime expected to supervise and manage 
them through three distinguished public authorities, even if the EMF 
could only start its action. Alongside the provisions to protect 
maternity and childhood, it was moved by demographic and power 
considerations.847 But not even this aspect was inherent to Fascism; the 
1906–14 Liberal Welfare Reforms were passed due to the concerns on the 
decline of the “national efficiency” in the international scenario and on 
the poor physical conditions of British citizens/soldiers.848 Also the 
social reformers of Free France in 1942 linked healthcare policy to 
French imperial role. Even in the peaceful Sweden, the social 
                                                          
845 AN, 2/AG/499/C.C.80, «Note sur la loi portant creation d’un Institut National d’action 
sanitaires des Assurances Sociales, 10 Novembre 1941», p.1. 
846 Ivi. p.2. 
847 S. Baravalle, Maternità ed infanzia e previdenza sociale, Vercelli, Edizioni SAVIT, 1939.  
848 G. Searle, «“National Efficiency” and the “Lesson” of the War», in David Omissi, 
Andrew Thompson (eds.), The Impact of the South African War, London, Palgrave, 2001, 
pp. 194-211.  
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democracy was committed to eugenic enhancement.849 Also in this case, 
therefore, the breakdown was not a consequence of the ideological 
differences between “totalitarianisms” and “democracies”. 
In Italy, the management of the sickness benefits and medical 
treatments faced the resistances of mutual sector, which only gradually 
accepted the progressive coordination and simplification that by 1939 
was in the making through the suppression of the Business Sickness 
Funds.850 Neither the EMF nor Vichy’s hospital reforms are nearly 
comparable to the launch of the NHS in Britain; designed from scratch, 
it was funded by the whole national community, took over the mutual 
funds and was expression of principles of social solidarity that crossed 
political and status differences. [TAB.7] The Fascist regime never 
produced a coherent declaration of intents as the British White Papers. 
Yet, a propensity to reform according to similar political rationale 
might be retraced from the early 1930s to the very end of the war. The 
State was progressively taking functions and control of the mutual 
social insurances in more centralized funds; as in Britain, and as – with 
more resistances – in France, regardless the institutional ruptures in 
1940 and 1944. Similarly, the transition from the regime to the RSI did 
not change this trend; the systematization of social policies was “too 
structural” to be affected by regime changes and by the misleading 
division between “democracies” and “totalitarian/authoritarian” 
regimes.  
The NHS’s full availability and accessibility marked the most 
consistent departure from the previous policies. In France, the hospitals 
became a service for all the population; yet, they were not a 
universalistic social service, as they opened to those who could afford it. 
 
 
 
                                                          
849 A. Spektorowksi, E. Mizrachi, «Eugenics and the Welfare State in Sweden: The Politics 
of Social Margins and the Idea of a Productive Society», Journal of Contemporary History, 
n.3/2004, pp. 333-352. 
850 F. Bertini, «Il fascismo dalle assicurazioni per i lavoratori allo stato sociale», pp. 280-
288. 
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TAB.8. Healthcare reforms in Britain, France and Italy, 1941-44 
 Reform Provisions 
Great 
Britain 
White Paper on 
National Health 
Service (1944) 
- National Health Service: funded by 
general revenues; fully universalist; 
run by the Ministry of Health; 
- Suppression of the Approved Societies. 
France Charte hospitaliere 
(1941) 
 
 
 
 
INASAS draft 
project (1942) 
- Opening up the healthcare services to 
all the citizens who can afford it; 
- Appointment of the heads of hospitals 
and medical staff by the Prefects (end 
of assistance approach); 
- Supervision of the mutual sickness 
funds; 
- Management of sanatoria and 
outpatient healthcare structures. 
Italy Legge 11 gennaio 
1943- Ente 
Mutualità Fascista  
- Amalgamation of the mutual sickness 
funds (excluding public sector); 
- [Since 1933 the INFPS ran sanatoria for 
the insured and their families] 
 
In Italy, the sanatoria for the tuberculosis were created to assist 
the workers; while in fact good part of the population (the insured 
workers and their families) could enjoy the treatments, for other 
diseases the regime did not operate any effective U-turn.  
All these reforms suggest a “social solidarity” in concentric 
circles; firstly, between the corporative categories, secondarily, and as a 
consequence of the “corporative solidarity”, among the members of the 
nation. The retail of the occupational schemes was claimed to be 
particularly suitable for the corporatist projects in the two regimes. In 
reality, the principles of social solidarity are not in conflict with the 
occupational/corporatist compulsory schemes. The universalist British 
social security did not have consistent carryover in the European 
Continent after the war. But the universalistic principles fuelled 
everywhere the plans of reforms for the post-1945 European 
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democracies. The means and the extent of their spread constitutes the 
third part of my dissertation. 
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Part Three. Wartime Ideas and Policies in a Global Perspective 
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6. Social policy and the home front 
 
 
 
 
 Since the beginning of the war, social policy was exploited to 
strengthen the domestic front. In different context, the three countries 
relied on their respective social programmes to garner consensus. The 
British War Cabinet, as well as the Vichy regime and the RSI, centred 
their propaganda on the promises of a better world and social 
improvement. The belligerent had to bargain the regimentation of 
labour with more social rights and benefits. But this link explains only 
partially the reasons why social policy had such pre-eminence in the 
conflict. Politics already used the promise of new social concessions as 
a tool to keep the population and the army mobilized during WWI.851 
In the years 1939-45, the “social content” of the war assumed a greater 
scope for all sides in conflict. The importance assumed by the plans of 
post-war socio-economic organization shows that WWII was perceived 
as an ideological confrontation between social models.  
The promises of fairer social systems were exploited to 
strengthen the home front but quickly became an instrument of 
propaganda abroad. The Beveridge Report was used by the British 
government to project the message of social renewal abroad. From 1941 
onwards, the Allied war effort incorporated social security and full 
employment as pillars of the post-war international and domestic 
order; for these principles the Allied committed their societies to the 
war. The Axis powers and their satellites undertook a similar effort. 
Under the Nazi European Order, the various fascist and puppet 
governments promoted their own social revolutions. The role of “total 
war” clearly affected the debate in Britain, while the ideology was a key 
element of the last Fascist experience. The effort to keep the country out 
of the conflict, instead, moved the political action of the Vichy regime; 
                                                          
851 A. Gregory, The Last Great War. British Society and the First World War, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, particularly pp. 187-295; G. Procacci, «Popular Protest 
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the war conditions, however, gave the opportunity to implement the 
principles of the “social collaboration”. For the British and – in a 
different shade – Italian cases, the definition of “home front” applies in 
its warlike sense; for Vichy, it rather indicates its search for consensus 
and legitimization in the wider context of the war and occupation, 
which lapped the regime notwithstanding the effort of the regime to 
start thinking the recovery policies within the framework of the post-
war Nazi European Order.  
 
6.1. The British public opinion and the Beveridge Report: towards a new social 
pact? 
 
The British civilian morale has been investigated by a wide 
literature that generally agreed on the firmness of the society when 
Britain pretended to “stay alone” against Nazi Germany in the years 
1940–1.852 With the evacuation of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and the 
German aircraft Blitz from September 1940 to May 1941, the British 
WWII epic was born and carefully exploited by the offices of 
propaganda and by the press, to stay in the collective memories for 
decades.853 Since 1941–2, the topics of propaganda left more room for 
the peace aims and followed the shift in the war events and the 
changing mood of the population. The attempt to give more 
importance to the social features of the war shored up the weakening of 
the British morale by the first quarter of 1942, after the blaze of the 
civilian mobilization of the years 1940-1 was over:  
 
«At this stage of the war public feeling and the public’s 
reactions to the war cannot any longer be taken for granted. 
To study them, to assess them and to adjust our publicity to 
                                                          
852 C. Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1990. 
853 P. Summerfield, «Dunkirk and the Popular Memory of Britain at War, 1940–58», 
Journal of Contemporary History, n.4/2010, pp.788-811; M. S. Alexander, «Dunkirk in 
military operations, myths, and memories», in Robert Tombs, Emile Chabal, Britain and 
France in Two World Wars. Truth, Myth and Memory, London, Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 93-
118; M. Smith, Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory, London, Routledge, 
2000. 
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meet them is now a much more important concern of the 
Government than it was two years ago. Yet this publicity 
cannot be wholly effective unless it interprets the considered 
policy of the War Cabinet as a whole and unless the actions 
of Ministers and Departments generally are consistent with 
it. [...] There has been in recent months a widespread 
decrease in confidence. To some extent this confidence will 
ebb and flow with the course of events, but we should be 
altogether too complacent if we merely waited for a run of 
successes to restore it. There is a prevalent sense of 
frustration. [...] Many people want the war to be over so that 
they can be free to start on something positive and 
constructive for the future. They do not find in our present 
avowed purposes the impulse to a crusade or to a genuine 
fervour of endeavour.»854  
 
The report of the Ministry of Information (MOI) recommended 
to differentiate the topics of propaganda, «not only about the armed 
forces and the war situation but also about production, labour, wartime 
reconstruction and the big problems that affect the life of everyone 
today.»855 The changes in public mind met the assessment that «the 
whole position concerning propaganda in factories seems still to be 
extremely unsatisfactory.»856 The MOI feared to lose connection with 
the workers, afraid of being “betrayed” as it already happened after 
WWI: «it is difficult to exaggerate the growing force of the demand for 
guarantees that “privileges” be not allowed to lose the next peace, as it 
is generally felt to have lost the last one; individualistic capitalism must 
yield place to “controlled” capitalism; we ought to be told what we are 
fighting for, etc. etc. Remarks like this can be heard wherever working 
                                                          
854 TNA, INF/1/679, «Report of the Ministry of Information to the War Cabinet. 
Propaganda at home. 24th April, 1942», p.1. 
855 Ivi. p.2. 
856 TNA, INF/1/679, « Ministry of Information. Propaganda in factories. 27th April, 1942», 
p.1. 
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men gather together.»857 To prevent the dismay of the home front, in 
the first half of 1942 the propaganda services stressed the need to show 
to the workers the direct relationship of their constraints with the war 
effort and with the post-war settlement.858 These considerations were 
accompanied by stronger coordination between central and 
peripherical information offices, and the use of the mass medias. These 
were considered the most efficient way to reach interclass sectors of the 
population; lower-middle and upper classes, male industrial workers 
and housewives. In the factories, such kind of information was 
considered more useful than the press. As the information reached a 
wider audience, it was essential to find out topics that could gather 
peoples’ aspirations: «generally the work of the Regional staffs would 
be infinitely easier if they were working under the inspiration of 
comprehensive policy not only for the war, but for the reconstruction 
period after the war.»859  
The first directives on British social services in Britain 
propagandized the most important speeches of the members of the War 
Cabinet, as the Minister of Labour Bevin, or the plans for the post-war 
settlement to which since the beginning the social insurances were 
related.860 They had the explicit goal to «serve to convince the public in 
this country and abroad of the progress made by British social services 
in wartime.»861 The Minister for the Reconstruction enthusiastically 
approved its contents:  
 
«The material is so admirable that I should like to suggest 
that consideration be given to making it available in 
                                                          
857 TNA, INF/1/679, «Report to the Director of Home Division. Ministry of Information. 
26th April, 1942», p.4. 
858 TNA, INF/1/679, «Summary of Trends in Public Opinion during the period April 20th – 
May 18th 1942», p.3. 
859 TNA, INF/1/679, «Home propaganda. 25th April, 1942», p.6. The italics is mine, 
underlined in the original type-written. 
860 TNA, INF/1/683, «Papers dealing with Reconstruction & Post-War Planning prepared 
by Reference Division. 17th June 1942» 
861 TNA, PIN/8/164, «Letter from Brandon Bracken to Arthur Greenwood. 1st December, 
1941». 
354 
 
published form. I suggest that the sort of thing we want is a 
publication which shows the steps we have taken during the 
war to advance our social services, in spite of the stresses and 
strains of the war, as an earnest of our intention to 
implement our undertakings in the future. I would hearten 
our Allies and fortify the neutrals to know that we mean to 
take the lead in fulfilling our obligations under the Atlantic 
Charter. Such a publication, covering both the pre-war 
situation and war developments, would show a broad front 
of advancement. This, I am sure, would be well worth doing. 
Six months ago I said that Britain (then taking the major 
strain of the war) was the one country in the world which 
had advanced its social services. The picture could be made 
even more impressive to-day.»862 
 
The government hoped to exploit at home and abroad the 
«remarkable expansion of many different kinds of collective social 
provision.»863 The MOI worked together with other departments to 
promote monthly reports on the advancement of the reconstruction 
policies and to monitor the official and unofficial debate on the 
subject.864 The Ministry pointed at accounting the opinion of few 
detailed and doable commitments that government made for after the 
war, rather than promising impractical plans.865 
The meetings of the Beveridge Committee started between 1941 
and 1942. Their results, in November 1942, matched the changing 
climate of the population with regard to war and reconstruction. The 
timing of the Beveridge Report was propitious for providing to the 
public opinion the specific reconstruction policies that few months 
                                                          
862 TNA, PIN/8/164, «Letter from Arthur Greenwood to Brandon Bracken. 21st November, 
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before the MOI recommended. Yet, in the beginning the War Cabinet 
was caught off guard by the report and by the autonomous publicity 
that Beveridge made of it, which arose a not completely expected 
interest in the press and opinion. The government was careful in the 
promotion of the report, as not all the measures were immediately 
enforceable. The Treasury proposed to put emphasis to limited 
provisions, like family allowances, which might be immediately 
introducible, to not create false expectations on overarching reforms 
during wartime.866  
Politics, however, was immediately played around the report; 
in the few weeks before its publication, the War Cabinet was almost 
compelled to chase Beveridge’s activism. There was no agreed strategy 
among departments and Beveridge’s entourage, and the leaking of the 
survey to the press before the publication embarrassed the 
government.867 The guidelines for the publicity were decided by the 
Paymaster General (and future Minister of the National Insurances) 
Jowitt, the MOI and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The MOI was 
expected to be the only governmental agency in charge of the publicity, 
but had to coordinate the summaries of the report to be published with 
the Ministry of Health and with the Treasury, in order to select the 
information. The government wanted to directly supervise the 
propaganda, preventing overlapping or further leaking of 
information.868 This because the Beveridge Report was still a set of 
proposals that did not compel the government. As the War Cabinet did 
not know how the public opinion would have received the text, the 
report was meant to be provisional before the official White Papers.  
 The report found fertile ground among the British opinion, but 
also eager listener within the government and the departments of the 
MOI. In the weeks before its publications and for the months just after, 
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it had an extremely huge press coverage; from the detailed summaries 
on The Times to the local press, the media welcomed the Beveridge 
Report as the cornerstone of the reconstruction plans for post-war 
Britain.869 The recommendations of the government on how to 
“correctly” present the report were achieved. In the civilian distribution 
it quickly became a best-seller in Britain. In the first months, nearly 
250.000 copies of the integral version of the plan and 350.000 of the 
official summary were sold; the plan had a certain success also in the 
US, where 42.000 copies were sold.870 The government disseminated the 
special editions of the report to the army; it became part of the 
programme of educational training; its guidelines were taught in the 
citizenship classes for the soldiers and the Army Bureau for the Current 
Affairs (ABCA) planned to publish its compendia in the official journals 
for the British army, War and Current Affairs. The government later 
stopped these publications, as it judged premature to present the 
Beveridge Report as the official stand on the matter.871  
Since the first days after its publication, the War Cabinet 
monitored the impact of the report to the public with polls throughout 
the country, with special reference to main industrial areas in England 
and Scotland. After two weeks, 95% of the population had heard of it; 
pools figured out that the most interested strata of the population were 
the poorer. There was general agreement on the rates of the benefits, 
whit very few exceptions, and the «overwhelming endorsement of the 
proposal to include everyone in a comprehensive scheme of medical 
services»;872 up to 88% of the public welcomed the free national health 
service. The British population hoped for the effective implementation 
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of the report, the real chances of which, however, were met with 
scepticism. Such massive penetration of the general ideas of the 
Beveridge Report was considered the result of the publicity given by the 
press, by the BBC and by the other media. Other figures concerned the 
reasons of this general support; while the lower incomes hoped in the 
improvement of their economic conditions thanks to the reform, the 
British people «seem to have approached the questions from the angle 
of the public good.»873 The overall positive assessment on the report 
crossed classes and shared the view that the plan increased the war 
effort and constituted the basis for a comprehensive reform of social 
security. Churchill, for his part, considered Beveridge’s «approach to 
social security […] an essential part of any post-war scheme of national 
betterment.»874  
Other independent inquiries, like Cole’s survey of 1942, 
showed a less univocal scenario, where class divisions retained. Under 
the surface of the cooperation and consensus, the traditional bonds of 
class solidarity and self-help persisted among the workers. They 
seemed to be more interested in tangible material benefits and secure 
employment, rather than State-driven welfare reforms. The compulsory 
schemes were not disregarded, but the working class apparently still 
frightened the loss of the unions’ prerogatives in the matter of social 
protection.875 Unofficial surveys like this, although articulated for their 
content and extension, did not invalidate the agreement of the British 
society as a whole on broad principles and guidelines.876 The general 
appreciation for the report did not mean its immediate reception in 
political terms. Its examination involved a detailed work in the 
different departments; the government, in the first months, maintained 
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an ambiguous stance, without committing itself in a complete 
endorsement of the report.877  
This caution did not match the common feeling of the 
population; already few days after the publication, the Home Office 
recognised that «the Chief home topic of the past week has been the 
Beveridge Report. This appears as something revolutionary in the 
social security of all citizens, and the first reactions seem to show 
unanimous approval of the scheme. Many members of the public are 
confidently looking to the Government to bring many of the suggested 
improvements contained in the report into being without waiting until 
the end of the war.»878 The report was seen also as the effective 
implementation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter that was judged 
too vague for an efficient propaganda by the same political warfare 
services. The report was accompanied – especially among the poorer – 
by some almost messianic awaiting for the poverty eradication and the 
freedom from want, especially in old age. The mood of the opinion 
rapidly changed, especially when facing the first political obstacles and 
delays since the very beginning of 1943.  
The dispatches from the Policy Duty Room of the Home Office 
signalled that the public followed the parliamentary debates on the 
Beveridge Report (that the notes reported being nicknamed the “People’s 
Charter”)879 with great interests, being also «the main topic of 
conversation, of course.»880 The working class was apparently in favour 
of its implementation as soon as possible, even during wartime; the 
notes noticed that this resolution encountered some opposition in the 
higher social standings.881 The quick implementation was regarded as 
the opportunity to avoid any tampering to the original proposals and 
to show how Britain was effectively struggling «for a better world».882 
The same notes remarked that in every section of the society – 
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including the Armed Forces – the debate was followed with increasing 
scepticism and hassle; the common opinion was that the government 
was half-hearted towards the plan. The outcomes of the parliamentary 
debates brought people to think that eventually the vested interests 
sabotaged the reforms.  
The delaying in putting into practice social security measures 
after the war made people believe that the government would have 
broken its promises, once the maximum mobilisation for the war was 
no longer demanded. General mistrust was expressed for the private 
insurance companies and the vested interests.883 The publicity made by 
Beveridge himself and the debates in the Parliament did not help 
restore confidence, as «the impression in the country is that the 
Beveridge proposals are not linked by the Government and that every 
effort will be made to see that they do not come into operation.»884 
These feedbacks of a growing eagerness by the opinion accompanied 
the fear of a forthcoming Beveridge’s work on full employment that 
might catch off guard War Cabinet.885 The governmental circles felt 
compelled to start working on the White Papers, expressing the official 
stand on the matter, backing up the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
Beveridge Report, mindful of the overall failure of the projects for the 
reconstruction after WWI.886  
Since months before the publication of the report, the press and 
personalities fostered the attention on social reforms. They borrowed 
the lexicon that later characterized Beveridge’s reforms, and supported 
the messianic await for the work, defined «one of the most memorable 
and exciting documents in our domestic history.»887 In September 1942, 
the future Labour’s Prime Minister Attlee endorsed the works of the 
Committee:  
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«All the various services which have been built up in this 
country, social, educational, industrial, and recreational, […] 
have continued and been extended. That extension and 
amplification has gone on in war-time and, I would add, 
with added impetus and increased pace during these past 
two years. I hope before long that we may weave these 
various provisions into a coherent system of social security 
for all. We hope to establish freedom from want. We are 
awaiting a great report on this subject from Sir William 
Beveridge.»888  
 
The public debate, before and after November 1942, 
inextricably linked the post-war economic reconstruction with the 
social reforms: not only the Beveridge Report, but also the works of the 
other Committees, such as the Uthwatt and the Scott Reports. The 
documentation suggested that the inclusive reform of social insurances 
was demanded by British society and that this was entangled with the 
effort of the war.889 The wait for the outcomes of the Beveridge Report 
was outweighed by enthusiasm and keen interest. The few criticisms 
were usually circumscribed to the financial sustainability of the report, 
rather than to the very principles.890 The report upstaged other 
reconstruction issues, also thanks to the active role played by Beveridge 
and his group in its promotion. From the local to the international 
newspapers, from the tabloids to the economic and political 
newspapers, social security was one of the major topics on the front 
pages. The Times, for instance, devoted single topic issues about the 
report, its principles and sustainability. The endorsement to the reform 
shines through the lines of these descriptive summaries.891  
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The government’s cautions to fully endorse the Beveridge’s 
reforms was overcome by grounds of political expediency by the 
departmental offices. The report was the only detailed piece of 
proposal for post-war reconstruction in the hands of the War Cabinet. It 
had the positive feedback in the population and the support of 
intellectuals, associations, and lobbies. Beveridge himself set up the 
Social Security League (SSL), with the aim «to promote the principles of 
the Beveridge Report».892 It gathered important intellectuals, covering 
the whole range of political positions in Britain: besides Beveridge and 
G.D.H. Cole, many members of the Liberal or Conservative parties 
were at the head of the associations: Violet Bonham-Carter, close to 
Churchill, Sir Eric MacFadyen, Sir Ronald Davidson, Sir Ralph 
Wedgwood, or lifetime social reformers like Rowentree, Joan Clarke, or 
Barbara Wootton. They represented the transversal political area of 
consensus on the social reforms, which allowed the league to keep 
relations with political parties. At national level, the SSL mobilized 
intellectual forces into the discussion, deepening and promotion of the 
report through meetings, conferences, sessions in the universities, 
summaries for the publicity and the press. Its propaganda activity 
developed in synergy with the public departments, as for the 
translation and spread of the propaganda abroad.893 The SSL published 
and translated a huge amount of copies and summaries of the report in 
Hebrew, Japanese, Dutch, Greek, other than copies for the Southern 
and Northern American markets.894 The Beveridge Report had a fruitful 
circulation in the Spanish speaking world, and (unofficial) translations 
of the report were made by the Spanish national agency for the social 
insurances; besides, compendium of the report circulated in the US and 
broadcastings were given in the British Empire. Beveridge gave 
different speeches in the broadcasts for Britain or in the foreign services 
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of the BBC, as for the speeches in the programme L’Angleterre en 
Mouvement of BBC’s French Service.895  
In many cases, the guidelines of the plan circulated thanks to 
the translation and summaries provided by the International Labour 
Office (ILO).896 There are only partial data on the reception of what was 
already considered one of the main documents produced during 
wartime. The correspondence stored at the LSE archives showed – 
according to whichever country – that the summaries were welcomed 
favourably by the audience they were headed, mostly experts and the 
academic environment. Beveridge weaved personally the threads with 
single personalities or institutions on the other side of the Atlantic, 
pursuing a relentless campaign at universities, associations and 
lobbies.897 The main effort still concentrated on Britain, with a precise 
strategy for propaganda to the home opinion.  
Since 1943, the SSL tried to assert itself as the pivot of the vast 
range of the British associations committed with social progress; from 
the feminist leagues to the Christian organisations, from the liberal 
think tanks to the workers’ associations. To do so, the SSL did not 
configure as a political organization, but as a movement to entrench 
universalistic principles to the people, especially striving to convince 
the middle classes that the plan was «a respectable piece of self-
organised self-help and not a form of State charity.»898 The SSL tried to 
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lead back “conservative” constituencies to pro-welfare positions and to 
reinvigorate the morale of those classes which were normally in favour 
of the social provisions. To convince that the report’s implementation 
was in the making, the communication strategy linked it to other social 
provisions enacted by the government, such as family allowances. This 
would have conveyed the idea that the promised reforms were to be 
implemented; mostly, it gave the impression that political consensus 
led the government to fully endorse the report’s proposals, regardless 
this was true or not.  
The efforts of Beveridge’s acolytes to promote the report to 
different constituencies eventually led to a self-perceived agreement on 
some general principles that were matter of concern for Beveridge: the 
spread of social solidarity; the synergy between self-relief and State’s 
action to ensure the minimum vital income for all the citizens as a right; 
the creation of a complete system of social security articulated in three 
main branches (social insurances, family allowances, national health 
system). Their general acceptance by the opinion would have got into 
trouble the government, compelling it to endorse the broader lines of 
Beveridge’s recommendations. While the offices of the Ministry of the 
Reconstruction were still studying the detailed proposals, the War 
Cabinet was mainly committed to manage and orient the circulation of 
the extracts of the report.899 
By the end of 1943 the government was drafting the White 
Papers on social insurances and the NHS; as foreseen by the MOI, 
Beveridge shifted the focus of his action on the means to maintain full 
employment.900 The victory was considered matter of time and the 
debate moved to the retail of the wartime efficiency in peacetime 
economy. Beveridge used the expression of the “Five Giants – Want, 
Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness” on the road of post-war 
reconstruction. It became an iconic formula, reproduced on cartoons, 
pamphlets, posters. Within governmental circles, these watchwords 
provided footprints for policy as well: while Want, Disease, and 
                                                          
899 TNA, CAB/195/2, «W.M. (43), 33rd Meeting, on 22nd February, 1943». 
900 W. Beveridge, «Killing the Fifth Giant. On the Abolition of Unemployment», The 
Listener, 14th October, 1943. 
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Ignorance could be defeated by social insurances, the national health 
policies and the education reforms, Squalor and Idleness were more 
matter of urban, housing, industrial and economic planning policies.901 
Beveridge himself considered the Idleness, that is, large scale 
unemployment, as «the largest and fiercest of the five giants and the 
most important to attack.»902  
The war allowed the State to plan the allocation of resources 
and to totally control the fluidity of manpower.903 After the war, the 
achievement of social security rested on the commitment to promote a 
peacetime policy of full employment. Beveridge called out the 
government to propose already during the war, for: «(a) That, subject to 
leaving untouched the essential British liberties, it will be prepared to 
use the powers of the State to whatever extent may prove to be 
necessary, in order to maintain employment after the war; (b) That it 
has set up an Economic General Staff (a body that doesn’t exist today) 
to prepare a plan or plans for that purpose and to show just what will 
need to be done.»904 In his public speeches between 1943 and 1944, he 
lobbied for planning policy to secure full employment. This was a 
fundamental political goal both for the reconstruction and for the 
projection of Britain abroad during the war: «we shall have, if not a 
second front in Europe, what is at least important in winning the war – 
a second wind. We shall by that belief and purpose have energies 
beyond estimate released for war. We shall be united in combined 
attack on tyranny and savagery abroad and on Want, Disease, 
Ignorance, Squalor, Idleness at home. Let us become united now for 
total war and for a peace different from the last peace abroad and at 
home.»905 The war brought about new ideas and tools to tackle mass 
unemployment; Britain could then wage the last phase of the conflict, 
and stepped in as a model of the socio-economic reconstruction.  
                                                          
901 TNA, T/161/1165, «Note from the Advisory Panel on Home Affairs on Reconstruction 
Problems the Five Giants on the Road. 25th June, 1942». 
902 W. Beveridge, «Maintenance of Employment», in Id., The Pillars of Security and other 
War-time Essays and Addresses, pp. 41-52, p. 43. 
903 Ivi., p.45. 
904 Ivi. p.51. 
905 Ivi. p. 52. 
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The struggle against unemployment was a settle outlook and a 
policy target.906 Since the appointment of the reconstruction 
committees, the success of any post-war plan was linked to the 
maintenance of full employment as first policy goal. No wonder, the 
1944 Beveridge’s work had a great success in Britain and abroad, even 
though it was carried out independently, if not in concurrence with, the 
official White Paper;907 Beveridge and the committees of the Ministry of 
Reconstruction worked on two distinguished papers. The former 
director of the LSE worked together with a group of Keynesian 
economists, such as Joan Robinson, Ernst Schumacher and Nicholas 
Kaldor, who previously collaborated with the Swedish economist 
Gunnar Myrdal.908 He also resorted to independent employment 
investigations, reports and surveys from the Fabian Society, the 
Independent Labour Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Party, the 
Tory Reform Committee, the trade unions, the PEP and other 
organizations.909 The reports did not involve any governmental 
representative, public officer, or civil servant, who were prevented by 
the War Cabinet to participate.910  
When both the reports were published, Beveridge did not hold 
back on criticisms on the White Paper on employment policy, which he 
                                                          
906 LSEA, Beveridge/9A/14, «Fabian Lecture. Budgeting in the postwar world. 27th 
November, 1943»; AA.VV., The Economics of Full Employment. Six Studies in Applied 
Economics prepared at The Oxford University Institute of Statistics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1944; H. Molson, Full Employment and the Budget, London, Signpost Booklets on Post-war 
Problems, 1944; C. H. Ross, The New Plan for Remeding Unempolyment, Buxton, Derbyshire 
Priting Company, 1945; H. Clay, War and Unemployment, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1945. 
907 See the correspondence in LSEA, Beveridge/9A/16/1. 
908 See the report of the “Technical Committee” that worked with Beveridge in LSEA, 
Beveridge/9A/13. 
909 LSEA, 9A/15/5, «The Prevention of General Unemployment by a Group of Fabians. 14th 
February, 1944»; LSEA, 9A/15/7, «Meeting with the Independent Labour Party. 19th 
January, 1944»; LSEA, 9A/15/9, «Employment Investigation Questionnaire (21.10.43)»; 
LSEA, 9A/15/10, «Memo. On Mobility of Labour. 17.12.43»; LSEA, Beveridge/9A/15/12, 
«Meeting with members of PEP. 2nd December 1943»; see also the meetings with the TUC 
Economic Committee in LSEA, 9A/15/14. 
910 See the press cuttings in LSEA, Beveridge/9A/19. 
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considered too much conjunctural.911 Under the surface of the 
consensus, the British politics was not so cohesive; the persistence of 
the different positions on the matter favoured the 1945 victory of the 
Labour Party, which showed to be committed to full employment more 
than the Conservatives. The suggestion to support full employment 
with forms of planning, public control and nationalizations gained the 
TUC and working class’ endorsement.912 The memory of what 
happened after WWI played a role; the same actors that thwarted the 
wartime promises after 1918 (the Treasury, the right-wing of the war 
coalition and the employers’ organizations), were the same to fear 
Beveridge and Labour promises to have “more vacant jobs than 
people”.   
The dynamics of the consensus on social policy in wartime 
Britain were less linear than how they went down in history. 
Presumably, the government was moved to overcome the initial 
hesitation and to accelerate on the path of social security by the positive 
domestic impact of the Beveridge Report. The parties had to take into 
consideration the aspirations of public opinion; the government had to 
keep the pace of the mobilization, while politics was already organizing 
for the general elections immediately after the war. The government 
tried to retain the sole management of propaganda, to calibrate it 
according to the political and financial workability of the White Papers 
proposals. On the other side, there was room for other actors to 
promote social reforms. The MOI tried to orient the press and the other 
medias, but the public debate was never completely erased.  
In the end, Beveridge’s own proposals were commonly 
identified with governmental official papers and assimilated to the 
wider effort of the British government to strengthen the home front 
through promises of social improvements. In the public narrative, and 
– to some extent – in the subsequent literature on the matter, the 
struggle for universalistic social reforms became part of the “British 
                                                          
911 T.S. Newman, Guide to the Government’s Employment Policy, London, Hearths of Oak 
Benefit Society, 1944. 
912 Labour Party, Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1944, London, Labour Party, 1944, 
p.161. 
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epic” of WWII, just as Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. A 
common ground on social policy was eventually found in the policy-
making; what was relevant during the war, was to make believe to the 
widest possible audience at home and abroad that Britain had a 
detailed programme to secure the freedom from the Five Giants. At 
home, it served to garner the consensus of the population, especially 
the lower classes; abroad, it had also specific implications for the post-
war international settlement. 
 
6.2. The Vichy regime: social pacification through collaboration 
  
The Vichy Regime built its public narrative on the military 
defeat perceived as a rupture with the previous political system.913 
Propaganda was fundamental to garner consensus and legitimize its 
institutions; it was managed by General Secretary for Information and 
Propaganda, which passed through different guidancies and goals 
from 1941 to 1944.914 Vichy governance in this field is rather complex; in 
the South Zone the government also financed a vast network of non-
governmental propaganda offices. In the North, they were not even 
authorized by the Germans. These organizations promoted of the 
Révolution Nationale, addressing to different targets. The Service de la 
Propagande Ouvrière (SPO), dependent from the Secretary, was charged 
of the specific propaganda in the factories. The Légion Française des 
Combattants (LFC) was also a fundamental tool of propaganda, chaired 
by Pétain himself. The governmental offices privileged the sectional 
propaganda, culminated with the creation of separate agencies 
addressing to the workers, the employers and the technicians. The LFC 
appealed to the whole “body” of the factories, adopting the typical 
techniques of the movement.915 Besides the propaganda to the workers, 
                                                          
913 H. Rousso, «Vichy, le grand fossé», Vingtième Siècle, n.5/1985, pp. 55-79. 
914 D. Peschanski, «Encadrer ou contrôler ?» in Denis Peschanski, Laurent Gervereau, La 
propagande sous Vichy, Paris, BDIC, 1990, pp. 10-32. 
915 I. Di Jorio, Tecniche di propaganda politica. Vichy e la Légion Française des Combattants 
(1940-1944),  Roma, Carocci, 2006, see the document A. Beauchamp, Conseils d’un militant. 
II. L’organisation des réunions de propagande, Union Départementale des Bouches du Rhône 
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documentation not directed to mass circulation (proceedings of 
meetings and conferences) suggests that the regime tried to hold the 
ranks of its different political trends.  
The Vichy regime adopted mixed methods of propaganda to 
reach vast sectors of the population. The systems of the word-of-mouth 
and the massive use of pamphlets allowed to spread Vichy’s 
watchwords facing objective difficulties in the reorganization of State 
machinery. The British services intercepted a communication from the 
French Secretary of State in 1941, which explained the Vichy’s 
propaganda methods:  
 
«Our propaganda is word-of-mouth. This, discrete, so to say 
anonymous, allows to present to the same persons to accept 
our arguments that they will not listen or read if they would 
address to them with the explicit purpose to “convert” them. 
We try therefore to convince the mass of our ideas and 
topics, some information useful to establish a political 
“climate” and an interpretation of the events, or even of the 
History, suitable for make easier and clearer the action of the 
Government. For this, we gathered the elite of the patriots 
who belong to all the social classes»916 
 
The regime, however, did not neglect the screening of 
documentaries or the LFC’s broadcastings on Vichy’s social policy.917 
                                                                                                                               
de la Légion Française des Combattants et de Volontaires de la Révolution Nationale, 
Marseille, 1942, pp. 152-164 
916 TNA/FO/371/28586, «Paul Banon. Le Bulletin de France – Organe du Comité de 
Propagande sociale du Maréchal. 11 septembre 1941», p.1. 
917 See the reports stored in AN, AG/2/546/C.C.149A ; see also AN, F/22/1776, «Projet du 
film relatif à la Charte du Travail. 1943» ; La Légion des Combattants vous parle. Emissions 
radiophoniques. Mai, Juin, Juillet, Aout 1941, St. Etienne, Editions de la Légion Française des 
Combattants, 1941 ;  La Légion des Combattants vous parle. Emissions radiophoniques. 
Septembre, Octobre, Novembre, Décembre 1941, St. Etienne, Editions de la Légion Française 
des Combattants, 1942 ; La Légion des Combattants vous parle. Emissions radiophoniques. 
Janvier, Février, Mars 1942, St. Etienne, Editions de la Légion Française des Combattants, 
1942. The broadcasting on the Labour Charter are in AN, F/22/1776, «Légion. La Légion 
Française des Combattants et la Charte du Travail (1941-1942)». 
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Not unlike the Fascist regime, the regime built a house of word on the 
commitment to enact a true social revolution, which in reality never 
consistently took place.918 It encompassed education, family welfare, 
social assistance, the “corporatist” celebration of the Labour Day.919 
From 1941 onwards, the social propaganda focused almost exclusively 
on the Labour Charter, which embodied the communitarian principles 
of the Révolution Nationale. Still after three years, when all the promises 
were betrayed, the Labour Charter was the cornerstone of Vichy’s 
public narrative:  
 
«Only authority will guarantee real freedom within the 
framework of labour. Only authority will make it possible, 
when France is freed from the constraints of war, to bring 
down privileges and achieve the social programme I put 
forward at St. Etienne and Commentry. This may be 
summarised in one sentence – to eradicate the proletarian 
condition. That is the aim of the Labour Charter. It was also 
my will to give land workers an organisation that would be 
their own: the Peasant Corporation has been achieved. I am 
fully aware that the application of the laws has not always 
answered your expectations and that blatant social 
inequalities still exist. The extraordinary circumstances in 
which we now live are severe. Do you think I do not carry 
my full share of disappointments and sacrifices? Examine 
your conscience loyally: you will then join those who have 
understood and who, to save the country, now work with me 
to awaken the indifferent, rekindle the courage of the 
                                                          
918 A wide documentation on Vichy’s social propaganda is stored in IHTP, ARC 074-45, 
État français 1940-1944, Charte du Travail; other propaganda documents in AN, F/41/288-
289 ; AN, F/41/297 ; AN, F/41/298 ; AN, F/41/305 ; AN, F/41/306. The overview of the most 
important documentary production of Vichy propaganda in the different essays in D. 
Peschanksi, L. Gervereau, La propagande sous Vichy, pp. 148-223. 
919 IHTP, ARC 074-26, État français 1940-1944, Famille, Eglise, Société ; R. Dalisson, «La 
propaganda festive de Vichy. Mythes fondateurs, relecture nationaliste et contestation en 
France de 1940 à 1944», Guerre mondiales et conflits contemporains, n.3/2002, pp. 5-35, see 
pp. 13-16.   
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lukewarm and break the resistance of the selfish and the 
profiteers.»920 
 
  Immediately after the launching of the law, the Secretary of the 
Labour organized meetings and speeches involving the organization of 
workers and employers, as well as Vichy’s movements and 
governmental authorities.921 The regime also structured appropriate 
offices and centres of information and propaganda; the main concern 
was to reach capillary every single productive category, like for the 
1943 Conseil Supérieur du Travail (Higher Employment Council), a three-
headed structure that provided information to the employers, the 
technical frameworks and the workers.922 
The governmental information network operated mainly 
targeting each specific category. The Centre d’Information des Employeurs 
(CIE, Information Centre for Employers) was the transmission belt 
between the government and the whole of the enterprises, in the 
professional and inter-professional branches of the corporative 
organization, working with the Industrialist Federation. The CIE 
provided official and “unofficial” documentation, collected economic 
data and surveys from the local economic organizations, e.g. the 
Chambers of Commerce, and granted the link with the local 
professional employers’ organizations.923 The Centre d’Information des 
                                                          
920 TNA, FO/371/36074, «Petain’s Broadcast to Vichy and Radio Paris Networks, 4.4.1943», 
p.2. 
921 AN, F/22/1775, «La fonction sociale du patronat ou le patronat cadre naturel de la 
Nation. Conférence de M. Terray du 1er Juin 1942 au Centre des Jeunes Patrons de 
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the reform of the Work Councils and on the role of the trade unions in the corporative 
order. See AN, F/22/1837. 
923 AN, F/22/1839, «Centre d’Information des Employeurs. S.d.» ; AN, F/22/1839, «Note 
sur le rôle des Délégations Régionales du Centre d’Information des Employeurs. 12.7.44» 
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Ouvriers (CIO, Information Centre for the Workers) had training and 
information tasks. It was even more important, as it addressed to the 
workers, the main target of Vichy’s narrative on “social collaboration” 
and of an incremental, although often hazy, legislation that the regime 
needed to publicise as much as possible. In comparison with the CIE, 
the CIO provided a more consistent information folder and 
propaganda, concerning family allowances, social insurances and 
labour legislation.924 It had two distinguished branches; production of 
information on social legislation, and diffusion of brochures, bulletins, 
booklets, meetings, studies via the corporative structures and the 
professional trade unions.925  
The task was ascribed to the role of the public institution of 
labour, as «after 1940, the social life is characterized by the 
precariousness of the existence of the salaried workers, main victims of 
the conjunctures subsequent to the state of war, and by the deployment 
of a new Labour order. The Labour Inspectorates, without forgetting 
their traditional tasks of control, dedicated themselves more 
specifically to relieve the workers’ misery and to put in place the new 
social institutions.»926 But these structures combined information tasks 
with the need to ensure the grip of the regime in the factories:  
 
«Everyone knows the insurmountable difficulties faced by 
the workers who find information. They are in front of an 
imprecise and changeable legislation, and the 
documentation, especially the economic one, has not been 
present in an accessible form so far. In fact, scattered in a 
huge number, something difficult to hand on, and often 
written in abstract form, this documentation could be 
proficiently used only by the experts. [...] It will be the task of 
the CIO to collect the laws, the research studies, the statistics, 
                                                          
924 AN, F/22/1840, «Centre d’Information des Ouvriers. Fiches sociales» ; AN, F/22/1840, 
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and all the economic and social information, to purge them 
of all is superfluous to their understanding, to merge and to 
present them in a clear form that can be assimilated. But its 
role is not limited to the INFORMATION. Its role is – so to 
say – dual: the centre collects and scrutinizes information, 
news, reactions that the correspondents deliver. The 
intelligence obtained, alongside with the survey of the 
Ministry of Labour will be useful for the Public Powers to 
know the situation in each region and each profession and to 
tack stock of the overall condition of the workers.»927   
 
Even before the creation of the Centres for the Information, a 
plethora of other collateral organizations existed; most of them were 
direct expression of the constituencies within the regime. This was the 
case of the abovementioned Central Office of the Social Committee, 
which was not a public authority but was coordinated by the Secretary 
of Labour and had the tasks of «spreading information concerning the 
application of the Labour Charter».928 The Office worked in liaison with 
the other structures for the propaganda, «to inform and train the 
directors of the Social Committees of the Enterprises and the 
propagandists.»929 It published booklets, brochures and monthly 
bulletins directly delivered to the organisms of the workers and the 
employers.930  
The groups in the Occupied Territories had greater autonomy 
from Vichy’s establishment; it was the case with the Centre Syndicaliste 
de Propagande (CSP), which was financed by the Germans. It gathered 
some important personalities of the interwar trade unionism, like 
Marcel Roy, Georges Dumoulin and Georges Yvetot. In the beginning, 
the CSP acted like a cattle prod for the deployment of the Labour 
Charter as quickly as possible; later, it became explicitly critical on the 
                                                          
927 AN, F/22/1840, «Le centre d’informations des ouvriers est à votre service. S.d.» p.4. 
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results of corporatism.931 This became “counter-propaganda” between 
1943 and 1944, as the Labour Charter was reduced to a State’s tool to 
carry out the struggle against the working class and to a bureaucratic 
degeneration of the industrial relations.932 The CSP was close to Déat’s 
Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP), the pro-Nazi movement that 
harshly criticized the outcomes of the Labour Charter as well. The 
fragmentation of the propaganda agencies, similarly to the RSI, led also 
to the use of social policies to conduct struggles of power within the 
regime itself.  
According to Marion, the overlapping of different tendencies 
resulted in a lack of consensus, as the workers were «almost completely 
hostile to the ideas of the National Revolution. [...] easing the work of 
the communists, who exploited the difficulties of the defeat of 1940, to 
encourage the social unrest, and to create a mood of systematic 
opposition.»933 Since 1943, the regime tried to coordinate the different 
groups and to set up new officies, like the Service de la Propagande 
Ouvrière (SPO); to contrast the Communists and to highlight the pro-
worker action of the government, the regime even resumed the classist 
rhetoric. The Secretary of Information recommended to the Prefects 
and the local agencies to shift the propaganda from the projects still on 
paper (Labour Charter) to the effective achievements of the regime: 
collective agreements, social insurances and pensions, family 
allowances, wage increases, which were enacted «following a 
                                                          
931 The revue L’Atelier was the official media outlet of this group. The articles on the 
Labour Charter are countless. A survey of the main articles on this subject from 1941 to 
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1941 ; Id., « La Charte du Travail. Ce qu’il faut admettre, ce qu’il faut rejeter », L’Atelier, 8 
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932 «Opinions sur la Charte», L’Atelier, 15 Novembre 1941 ; « Les travaux de la 
Conférence », L’Atelier, 22 Novembre 1941 ; G. Dumoulin, «Nous ne devons pas torpiller 
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revolutionary procedure that broke with the law of the bourgeoisie.»934 
The SPO, directed by the former Communist and Socialist François 
Chasseigne, was put under the joint control of the Secretaries of 
Information and Labour. It kept government informed on the situation 
in the factories and promoted social policy through specialized press, 
posters, brochures.935 The propaganda policy opted for the opposite 
strategy than the British one; instead of massively relying on the new 
media, the regime chose the traditional channels, whose dissemination 
had nonetheless to be capillary. 
These public/private organizations carried out sectional 
propaganda, considered the most efficient way to promote the new 
socio-economic organization, even if this latter pretended to have 
overcome class distinctions. The LFC put in place an alternative form of 
vulgarisation. They refused class-oriented propaganda, which would 
recognize the resilience of the “proletarian condition”, and deployed 
the propaganda according the general guidelines of Vichy’s social 
doctrine.936 Besides the broadcastings, since 1941 the LFC created the 
Groupes Légionnaires d’Entreprise (GLE), to accomplish the mission of the 
movement to promote in «all the domains, the principles of the 
Révolution Nationale»937 Their action in this field was exclusively 
directed and limited to the propaganda: «to the trade unions, to the 
Social Committees, to the Corporative Authorities, are delegated the 
social and professional tasks. To the Groupes Légionnaires 
d’Entreprise, are delegate the civic action, the propaganda of the 
National and Social Revolution.»938 The GLE attributed the dual task of 
informing and spreading the propaganda to the workers, and pointed 
at creating a national network of agents to promote a capillary inter-
                                                          
934 Ivi. p.5 
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class propaganda. While the plethora of information agencies 
corresponded to the different constituencies of the regime, the GLE 
promoted an univocal ideological vision: “hierarchy and community” 
opposed to class struggle, socialism, communism and paternalism.  
The typical limits of the propaganda of the Légion lied in the 
lack of concrete achievements by the regime, rather than in the 
methods of organization, which were extremely precise.939 The GLE 
recognized that neither the workers nor the technicians showed interest 
for the new dispositions, due to their vagueness and to the presence of 
different organizations, as the trade unionists, that tried to penetrate 
the factories with their own propaganda, which did not necessarily 
convey the “official stance” on the corporatism. To remedy this 
overlapping of contrasting propaganda, the GLE proposed to rely on «a 
group of three or four people, having the real spirit of the MARSHAL, 
of the government, and of the ministry in charge of the new 
institutions, which is able to reply in a very short time to all the 
questions arising in relation to the application of the Labour 
Charter.»940 The report suggested the use of selected personalities, 
picked up among the technicians, ideally the intermediate group that 
joined workers and employers, and relatively less involved in the class 
struggle. These agents had to be completely devoted to the Révolution 
Nationale and their propaganda should have deployed to informal 
channels, such as conversation face-to-face with the single workers of 
the factory. The regime had a hierarchical – but at the same time 
“informal” – structure that could convey the propaganda’s topics to 
every professional milieu.941  The general principles of LFC’s 
propaganda partially clashed with the regime’s general information, 
which tended to adjust the topics of the propaganda according to its 
targets. According to the LFC, without further improvements of the 
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940 Ivi., p.1. 
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corporative doctrine, this kind of propaganda «falls into the class 
struggle again. That is the reason why a general propaganda 
Employers, Workers, Technicians may be pursued.»942  
Vichy’s propaganda relentlessly promoted the replacement of 
the class struggle «with the compulsory and generalized 
collaboration.»943 The Ministry of Information usually linked the social 
legislation to the principles of the Révolution Nationale: the cult of the 
Marshal Pétain, the social collaboration and solidarity, the 
demographic and pro-family ideology.944 For instance, the AVTS were 
related to the imagine of the Marshal who «kept the promises, even 
those of the others, if these are grounded on the fairness.»945 The 
promotion of the new social legislation was also justified as a necessary 
measure of social solidarity facing the French declining birth-rates: «it 
is not possible in a country devastated by the war, affected by falling 
birth-rates, to achieve great things. [...] in order that the older 
generations are allowed to have a good end of their life, it is necessary 
that the younger generations relentlessly work.»946  
More articulated information was addressed to the movements 
of the regime, in order to deepen the features of the “corporatist 
revolution”, hold ranks of its supporters and provide ideological 
coherence to the Révolution Nationale. This was the case of the IECS or 
the Ecole d’Uriage which trained the civic and professional frameworks. 
But this was also the case of the Journées du Mont-Dore. Periodically 
organized by the Conseil d’État, they gathered the different 
constituencies of the regime, to fix the principles of the communitarian 
revolution: Catholics, trade unionists, corporatists, traditionalists, 
                                                          
942 AN, F/22/1776, «Henri Pinaud. Rapport complémentaire sur quinzaine effectués pour 
la Charte du Travail. 14 mars 1942», p. 2. 
943 R. Belin, La politique sociale du gouvernement. La Charte du Travail, Bulletin Spécial de 
Propagande, 1941, p.9 
944 Brochures, and other documents of propaganda are stored in IHTP, ARC074-46, État 
français 1940-1944, Corporatisme; IHTP, ARC074-47, État français 1940-1944, 
Corporatisme (2); 
945 IHTP, ARC 074-26, «P. Pétain, Message sur la retraite des vieux. 14 mars 1941, St.Etienne, 
Editions du Secrétariat Général de l’Information, 1941», p.1. 
946 Ivi. p. 2. 
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participated to the meetings.947 Similarly, the creation of the Ecole 
d’Uriage testified the aims to promote a dual spreading of Vichy’s 
ideology, where the indoctrination of the civil servants and the 
intellectuals had the same importance than the propaganda for the 
masses. The cases of the IECS and the Ecole d’Uriage are somehow 
illustrative of the failure to create a “new State”. Bouvier-Ajam forgot 
about his wholehearted support to Marshal Pétain to become 
Communist in 1946, and the IECS disappeared with the crumble of the 
regime, while many of the members of the Ecole d’Uriage passed to the 
Resistance after 1942.948  
The Vichy regime did not have better luck with the mass 
propaganda. Even the LCF could not effectively penetrate into the 
French society.949 They paid the inaction of the social projects of the 
regime and the inextricable link between the Révolution Nationale and 
the Nazi occupant. In spite of the many efforts to promote the “social 
collaboration”, the regime did not achieve these aims; the British 
reported that «never in the history of France has disunity been so 
strong or the hatred between Frenchmen so violent. At present France 
is not merely divide into two zones.»950 Already in 1941 a real hatred 
set up against the regime, and many French opposed both the policies 
and ideology of Vichy, as «they want to take us back to the Middle 
                                                          
947 A. Cohen, « «Vers la révolution communautaire». Rencontres de la troisième voie au 
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F/22/1776, «Actes des Journées de Mont Doré. 16 au 23 septembre 1943» ; J. Paillard, 
L’A.B.C. du corporatisme, Lyon, Centre d’Etudes Corporatives, s.d. ; La Communauté 
professionnelle. Deuxième Session des Journées d’Etudes de Mont-Doré. 16-23 Septembre 1943,  
Vichy, Secrétariat Permanent des Journées du Mont-Doré, 1943 ;La Communauté du travail. 
Deuxième Session des Journées d’Etudes de Mont-Doré. 16-23 Septembre 1943,  Vichy, 
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1943. 
948 J. Hellman, The Knight-Monks of Vichy France. Uriage 1940-1945, Montreal, McGill-
Queens University Press, 1993. 
949 M. Cointet-Labrousse, Vichy et le fascisme. Les hommes, les structures et le pouvoirs, Paris, 
Editions Complexe, 1987, pp. 69-81. 
950 TNA, FO/371/28432, «BBC Monthly Surveys of European Audiences. France. 15th 
August, 1941», p. 17. 
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Ages, to the days of feudality. […] At the present there is an 
underground revolution, a real hatred against the rulers of Vichy. 
There are here 95% who do not approve of this government.»951 In spite 
of all the efforts of the regime to gather the classes together, the 
cleavages tightened-up: «class is set against class by an unavoidable 
consequence of the policy of June 1940 and the errors that followed. 
The bourgeoisie is terrified to find that, in the working class, “nearly all 
are Gaullists”, especially in Occupied areas, and combine “a desire to 
drive out the invader” with “a fear to see the Popular Front return”.»952 
The working class organizations opposed to Vichy’s provisions, 
especially to the compulsory trade unions, at the core of corporatism: 
«labour shows unwillingness to “co-operate” in Pucheu’s plans for its 
future, […] a deputation in one region of unoccupied France of Free, 
Christian, and Nationalist (La Roque) Trade Unions have recently 
made a statement to Minister of Justice, emphasising their right to 
independent existence.»953 While Vichy’s propaganda failed to garner 
workers’ consensus, regime’s collateral movements demonstrated to be 
the long arm of the repressive machinery: 
 
«an adverse effect upon the workers whom Vichy is trying, 
without success, to placate as well as upon these supporters 
of Vichy who are in despair at the failure of the social side of 
the Révolution Nationale. The Légion has always, because of 
its overtly reactionary character and unpopularity with the 
workers, been out of favour with the Paris press and radio 
which omitted all reference to the ceremony. It may be 
recalled that (I.R.42) Tixier-Vignancourt, Secretary-General of 
the Central Committee for Social Propaganda, in his letter of 
resignation, spoke bitterly of continued interference by the 
Légion. Recent evidence indicates the Gestapo-like character 
of the Service d’Information of the Légion which carries out 
                                                          
951 Ibidem. 
952 Ibidem. 
953 TNA, FO/371/28432, «Intelligence Report No. 47 for French Section, M.O.I. Advisory 
Committee, 19th August, 1941», p.3. 
379 
 
secret enquiries into the activities of Civil Servants and is 
consulted by the Prefects on the appointment of Mayors and 
Municipal Councillors.»954 
 
The dispatches of the Prefects on the situation in the factories 
also reported the disconnection between regime and population.955 
Monthly reports accounted that since January 1942 the Labour Charter 
was received with different feelings by employers and workers. The 
former welcomed it as a way to regulate the class struggle in their 
favour and as «a tool of social revenge.»956 The huge majority of the 
workers were indifferent or hostile, more for pragmatic reasons than 
for ideological opposition. The setting-up of the corporatist structures 
delayed, while the workers were afraid of the drop of salaries and by 
the supply shortage: «in the urban environments, as well as in the 
industrial workers’ communities, the only worry concerns the food 
supply.»957 The penetration of the propaganda was stronger in the area 
under Vichy’s administration than in the Occupied Zone: in the North, 
the rationing of essential goods was stronger than in the South and the 
regime’s social action was limited by the German presence (the LFC 
was not allowed to operate). The Northern factories constituted the 
battlefield of a creeping struggle between the Communists and Nazis, 
who tried to convince the French workers to move to Germany. By the 
end of the year, the daily conditions (unemployment, falling salaries, 
food supply, the announced relève proclaimed by Laval) were still the 
major concern, leaving room for the Communists to «take advantage of 
the dismay that crosses the working class, exploiting at most the 
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955 Comité d’Histoire des Administration chargées du travail, de l’emploi et de la 
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discontent arisen from the two great current problems: the relève and 
the food supply.»958 In 1942 and 1943 the importance of the Labour 
Charter as tool of propaganda dwindled, as also governmental 
priorities shifted from corporatism to the STO. The only leftovers of the 
regimes’ corporatist narrative that showed to have some appeal for the 
workers were the Social Committees of the Enterprises, which 
efficiently worked for the social welfare within the factories.959 Not 
only, they were among the few social institutions of the regime stranger 
– if not opposed – to the STO and the forced labour displacement to 
Germany, which in turn delayed the implementation of the Social 
Committees.960  
By mid-1943, the Labour Charter had increasingly lesser space 
in the reports to the government; the general distrust for Vichy’s social 
policy resulted from endogenous and exogenous factors: the 
mobilization of the manpower for Nazi “total war”; the lack of 
information on the industrial joint organizations (which the 
government tried to remedy with the creation of the CIE and CIO in the 
end of 1943); the absence of trade union organizations to support the 
propaganda and the corporative structures; the delays in the 
implementation of the corporatist organisms. With some differences 
between the Occupied and the Free Zone, the whole of the French 
social classes was not united by the ideology of the Révolution Nationale, 
but by the worries for the rise of the cost of living, matched with the 
stagnating wages and by the fear for the occupying measures on forced 
labour.961 Lagardelle’s resignation from the Secretary of Labour and his 
substitution with Bichelonne, the “architect” of the STO, only alienated 
the working classes from the regime. By the end of 1943, the climate in 
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the factories was considered pre-insurrectionary, due to the action of 
the Resistance parties and to the attempts to lock-outs and strikes.962  
In 1944, the Social Committees were established in almost 
every industry; yet, the unravelling of the corporatist structures did not 
positively affect the industrial relations: «on the one side, the large 
employers who already achieved undeniable social improvements even 
before the war, considered that the Labour Charter will not provide 
any further advantage in comparison with their past initiatives; from 
this, the instinctive resistance to relinquish social organisms that are 
their own. On the other side, the workers tend to consider that the 
Social Committees are completely useless as long as they are not 
platform for their quests.»963 Until the end, the regime addressed 
unevenly the propaganda topic to breach the workers. The “social 
collaboration” and the Labour Charter were expected to be the means 
to conquer their consensus. From the territories, instead, it was 
increasingly more evident that «the issues of the manpower continues 
to be the first main concern of world of labour.»964 The STO became a 
relevant policy area from 1943 onwards, when the French production 
was increasingly integrated in the reconversion of German economy for 
“total war”; the government devoted many efforts to encourage the 
transfer of French manpower in Germany.965 This commitment was 
perceived as a lack of autonomy from the German occupation, 
undermining even more the weak foundations of Vichy’s popular 
consensus.  
Something similar occurred with the farmers, considered the 
main constituency by the regime. From 1943, the dispatches signalled 
that the difficult economic conditions, the forced requisitions and 
deportations alienated the favour of the peasantry. The agricultural 
corporation lost the grip to the farmers, while even in the countryside 
the Communists took advantage of what was defined a situation of 
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«psychological heeling and general dismay.»966 The propaganda failed 
due to the limits of Vichy’s rural social policy; the Agricultural 
Corporation proved to be extraneous to the peasantry, considered 
inadequate to provide supply, and control the black market and the 
widespread frauds to social benefits.967  
Also the agricultural sector suffered from the STO, from the 
economic and the moral point of view. The French manpower was 
drained just when the supply contracted the most, demonstrating the 
incapacity of the regime to pursue an autonomous political agenda.968 
The ranks of the supporters narrowed down simultaneously with the 
increasing penetration of Communist propaganda and Radio London 
broadcastings, which decisively affected the morale of the French 
countryside.969 The information services recognized that this was due to 
the incapacity of the regime to get rid of the wartime conditions: «there 
was for the Marshal a fervour that made possible the unity of the 
peasantry [...] If this zeal would have been exploited with some 
measures to achieve the doctrine and the directives of the Marshal in 
every detail that concern the agricultural life, we could have now in 
them [the peasants n.d.a] some collaborators so loyal and dedicated to 
the governmental action that no propaganda could tear down their 
morale.»970 While in the factories the propaganda faced an objectively 
hostile milieu, in the countryside the regime was not able to hold the 
consensus of social strata that were not prejudicially antagonistic. The 
initial adherence to Vichy clashed against the reality of the material 
constraints; the expectations of the peasantry were disregarded as the 
occupation carried on, and this led to lose their.  
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While the pillar of its doctrine was the overcoming of the class 
struggle, Vichy addressed its propaganda along classist lines, and to 
different productive categories. Among the workers, bombed-out by 
the campaigns in favour of the Labour Charter, the “social 
collaboration” never appealed; the constraints of the German 
occupation and the STO – as for forced displacement of manpower in 
Italy – made evident the limited autonomy of the regime. While its 
actions antagonized the population, the Resistance prepared social 
programmes for the reconstruction, owing some elements to the coeval 
Anglo-Saxon debate on social security.971 Also the construction of a new 
State according to the principles of the Révolution Nationale proved to be 
impossible. Without a real popular basis, Vichy could not even rely on 
a solid intellectual class. The groups that supported the regime were 
lumped together by the myth of corporatism and were divided on 
almost everything else. Corporatism was differently intended by each 
constituency, and the doctrinal synthesis was difficult. The regime 
could not create a loyal administrative class; while the Vichy 
participated to the Nazi Order to legitimize its political power, this 
condition turned out to be a weakness. Good part of the French 
frameworks had “technical” and “a-political” expertise that proved to 
be useful and adaptive to the democratic institutions.  
All in all, Vichy’s political agenda and narrative was tied to the 
success of Nazi’s European plans. The politics of “State” and “social 
collaboration” aimed at guaranteeing to France to remain a power 
within post-war Nazi Europe. Once the fortunes of the Third Reich 
reneged, there was no room for a successful mass political 
mobilization, nor for the creation of new State’s structures and 
personnel according to the doctrine of the regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
971 Henri Michel, Boris Mirkine-Guetzévich (eds.), Les idées politiques et sociales de la 
Résistance (documents clandestins, 1940-1944), Paris, PUF, 1954.  
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6.3. The RSI and the socialization: the “State of Labour” and the collapse of 
consensus 
 
 The British services fully grasped the propagandistic scope of 
RSI’s social proclaims. They caught the qualitative leap of the Fascist 
social programme and its weaknesses, inherently linked to the wartime 
emergency:  
 
«Leaders of the new regime have emphasized its 
representative and revolutionary character, but have been 
unable to conceal its lack of any genuine legal basis. […] The 
central aim of the neo-Fascist leadership is to prolong their 
political domination of Italy. This aim is elaborately but 
ineffectually disguised by the proclamation of radical 
political and social aims, which are set forth in the Verona 
Manifesto and summed up in the official name of “Italian 
Social Republic”. This propagandistic effort has failed to 
conceal the fact that the regime rests solely upon force. 
Strikes, guerrilla warfare, and clandestine political 
opposition clearly demonstrate that the Italian people have 
no confidence in their present rulers.»972  
 
The British considered the puppet government completely 
«bound up with the fate of the German Army in Italy»973, but they 
frightened the heritage of the “revolutionary” regime for the post-war 
settlement, as «the Fascist social legislation may be a source of 
embarrassment to any future regime of a more conservative 
character.»974 The report underlined how the republican ruling class 
was split on its scope and aims, but was overall united in the attempt to 
give «the regime an advanced democratic and socialistic appearance 
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and stressing its permanent achievements.»975 With the Verona 
Manifesto, the Fascist regime also tried to close the ranks of the 
movement. The dispatch devoted particular attention to the social 
programme advanced by the Fascists: «as for the new Fascist party, it 
will, above all, be a workers’ party, a proletarian party, creator of a new 
social cycle. […] we shall accept the social ferment brought about by 
the war and voiced by the people. We shall make it ours and give it 
life.»976 The Fascist propaganda represented its social policy as «the 
most revolutionary measures to be taken by any government since the 
Bolshevik revolution.»977 The British stressed the hiatus between 
“socialist” declarations and the reality:  
 
«The general disparity between announced neo-Fascist 
policies and their realization is particularly evident in the 
social field. […] In effect, however, the socialization decrees 
are so hedged about with provisos and conditions that they 
give much more actual control to the State than they do 
privileges to the workers. Locally and partially, some of the 
provisions have been put into practice, but no general order 
to this effect has been issued. As an instrument to gain the 
support of the labouring masses, the neo-Fascist social policy 
has been a complete failure. The widespread strikes which 
occurred in northern Italy during the first week of March 
have been widely interpreted as an express repudiation of 
the Italian “Social Republic” by the North Italian working 
class.»978  
 
According to the report, the emphasis put by the Fascists on the 
social provisions became vital for the regime, pressed by the war. 
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While politically fleeted, it recognized how sneaky the Fascist social 
narrative could potentially be:  
 
«The Republican Fascist social program, thought it has failed 
to win the allegiance of the Italian working class, is an 
important enemy weapon against the Badoglio government 
and the Allies. Notwithstanding the fact that the Italians 
have gained no real advantages from the new social 
legislation, it is doubtful whether the industrial population of 
the north will be willing to accept any future government 
whose social policy appears less progressive than the one 
offered them on paper by the neo-Fascists. Thus, the prospect 
of having to accept a conservative regime after the defeat of 
Germany may tend to mitigate the opposition to the present 
Social Republic.»979 
 
This could have created troubles during and after the military 
operations, as the Fascist social policy opposed the socially 
conservative Southern part of Italy, controlled by the Allies, and the 
revolutionary RSI in the North. A revolutionary jargon was essential 
for the Fascists to legitimize the new regime; few days after the fall of 
the regime in 1943, the governmental authorities loyal to Fascism were 
aware of the first organized unrest in the factories and the growing 
support to Communism among the working class.980 The reports 
coming from the biggest Northern industrial cities marked out how the 
power vacuum after the 25th July created a situation that was pre-
insurrectional and revealed the Communist hegemony over the 
popular classes. The “left-wing” revolutionary turn of the RSI was not 
merely due to considerations of public order; yet, the awareness of the 
growing radicalization of the masses probably pressed for more radical 
solutions.  
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In reality, what remained of the Fascist ruling class was more 
split than ever on the goals and extents of the socialization, the 
relations with the Germans, the ways to reorganize the State and to 
conducts the war. In such frantic context, the propaganda played an 
ever more prominent role and its organization was matter of intense 
concern. The RSI relied on its older structures to carry out a renewed 
social propaganda. The strategy deployed through three channels: the 
press; the assistance agencies; the Ministero della Cultura Popolare 
(Ministry of the Popular Culture, usually called MinCulPop). The 
reorganization of the propaganda machinery was led by the 
MinCulPop around the Nucleo Propaganda (NP, the Propaganda Unit), 
directed by Giorgio Almirante, leader of the Gruppo Fascista della 
Cultura Popolare (Fascist Group of Popular Culture). 
The MinCulPop was reorganized under the supervision of 
Ferdinando Mezzasoma, who strengthened the departmental 
structures, ensured the loyalty of the employees and radicalized the 
directives for the propaganda. By mid-1944, the MinCulPop took over 
the major Fascist news agencies and newspapers. Mezzasoma wanted 
all the mass-media realigned with the Fascist «revolutionary 
intransigence.»981 Yet, the formal control did not mean the effective 
capacity to impress autonomous policy. The Germans relentlessly 
interfered with the Fascist directive on propaganda, up to the highest 
levels; Mussolini’s articles were also submitted to Nazi censorship, 
while the main part of the Fascist publications and broadcastings were 
forbidden in Germany.982 Fascist propaganda had to compete with the 
Nazi one, which dispelled numerous pamphlets and other publications 
translated in Italian. In spite of the attempt to centralize the 
propaganda, the MinCulPop faced the centrifugal trends at local levels 
and the pre-existing structures of social assistance, which also had 
functions of propaganda, increased by the emergence conditions. 983 
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The press had a fundamental role in the last years of Fascism, 
as the newspapers filled with proclaims the political void of the RSI in 
implementing real policies. The press also allowed to keep the link 
between the centre of the political power and the peripheries, which 
were undergoing a process of “feudalization”.984 In the reorganization 
of the republican structures, the taking-over of the press became 
important to hold ranks, restate the Fascist presence in the peripheries 
and establish a vessel between the government and the population, 
once PNF could no longer be a channel for the consensus.985 The press 
usually misrepresented the scope of the social reforms of the RSI, but 
became the most important place where political debate could develop.  
Two trends emerged: the “intransigents”, like Farinacci, 
Pavolini, Mezzasoma, regarded at social policies merely as a way to 
regulate social unrest; on the opposite, the “left-wing” convincedly 
supported the Fascist new “socialist” deal. This faction was represented 
by influent figures, such as Pettinato, Spampanato or Giorgio Pini. This 
polarization characterized the RSI’s experience, contributing to weaken 
its whole doctrinal coherence. The “Fascistization” of the press only 
partially straightened out the divergences.986 The formerly socialist 
newspaper Il Lavoro, directed for some months by the hierarch Emesto 
Daquanno fully endorsed the RSI’s social policy, supporting structural 
economic reforms and the overhaul of the compulsory schemes.987 On a 
first stage, the newspaper was stranger to the repressive policies of the 
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RSI and Germans, when the major industrial cities were boiling over. 
Later, the tone of the propaganda changed; the articles linked the 
Fascist social revolution to the war, as the conflict was represented as 
the doomsday between two models of society. The other clichés of the 
Fascist propaganda were also present: the republic based on the 
“proletarian forces”, the betrayal of the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary 
war, the references to the “Fascism of the origins”.988 The regime relied 
on these older newspapers of the working class to spread its 
revolutionary social policy.  
The general press watered down these same topicss, to reach 
the Northern industrial bourgeoisies and middle classes – those same 
classes relentlessly accused of betraying Fascism in 1943. Tarchi and 
Mussolini defined the socializations as a renewed “social 
collaboration”, rather than the deployment of a subversive social 
revolution.989 The former secretary of the Communist Party, Nicola 
Bombacci, claimed for a “national” way to socialism, opposed the 
Soviet collectivism.990 The “left-wing” supported non-classist socialism, 
pushing forward the communitarian republic of “workers” in 
opposition to the communist republic of “proletarians”.991 Only the 
socialization allowed Italy to not be exploited by Anglo-American 
capitalism, without falling, in the same time into collectivism. 
Communism and capitalism were associated with the “Jewish plot” 
against the “proletarian Nations”; the “third way” was still the main 
feature of the Fascist social revolution.  
                                                          
988 E. Daquanno, «Fedeltà alle origini», Il Lavoro, 27th January, 1944; Id., «Combattere e 
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989 Errerre [B. Mussolini], «Resistere e rinnovarsi», Corriere delta Sera, September 14th, 
1944; Id., «Constatazione e considerazioni», Corriere della Sera, April 3rd, 1945; A. Tarchi, 
«Stato del lavoro», Corriere della Sera, 14 maggio 1944; Id., «Dal discorso di Dalmine alla 
socializzazione», 21 settembre 1944. 
990 N. Bombacci, «Dove va la Russia?», Corriere della Sera, 19 agosto 1944. 
991 E. Cione, «Repubblica di lavoratori», Corriere delta Sera, February 4th, 1945. 
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The RSI was presented as the outcome of twenty years of 
Fascist social doctrines, freed from all external constraints thanks to the 
war. The achievements of the Fascist revolution were correlated to the 
tide of Nazi Germany in winning the conflict.992 The press kept harping 
on the few points that constituted the lowest common denominator 
that gathered the RSI’s ruling class. In reality, the “left-wing” and the 
“intransigents” argued on the nature of the socializations and the scope 
of the Fascist social policy. The leftists like Enzo Pezzato, Spampanato, 
and Manunta no longer hesitated in overlaying the RSI with “national 
socialism”, opening-up to the mass left-wing anti-Fascist parties, and in 
the same time challenging the Communist hegemony over the 
industrial working class.993 These positions clashed with the right-wing 
area, headed by the pro-Nazi Farinacci, who lashed out at the “socialist 
drifts” of the socializations.994  
In the years of consensus, other organisms fostered the 
regime’s propaganda besides the party and the MinCulPop; this was 
the case of the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro (OND, the Organization for 
Mobilization of the Workers). In the apogee of the regime, it 
contributed to the penetration of Fascist propaganda in the factories 
and to the mobilization of the working classes through leisure and 
recreational activities.995 During WWII, the regime used it to link the 
world of labour with the army, and after 1943 the only institutions that 
retained consensus among the population were the assistance agencies; 
                                                          
992 C. Pettinato, «Prospettive liberali», La Stampa, 4 agosto 1944; Id., «Insipienza», La 
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agosto 1944; Id., «Perché combattere», La Stampa, 2 settembre 1944; A. Colombo, 
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the OND was still structured and had a genuine rootedness among the 
workers, as it was a moment of social interacting in the factories. With 
the suppression of the PNF after 25th July 1943, the OND passed under 
the direct control of the government.996 The RSI relied on its popularity 
among the workers to highlight the continuities between the older 
mass structures of Fascism and the new republican deal.997 The 
National Commissary of the OND, Ezio Pizzi, recognized «the current 
importance of the propaganda weapon [...] to contribute to the Victory 
and to conquer the Italian people to national, social, and political 
principles of the Republic.»998 The OND tried to promote this role in the 
social propaganda of the regime:  
 
«The Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro is present and actively in 
the life of the Republic; it adapted to the need of the war, 
committing above all to the assistance: to the Army, to the 
former prisoners with the shipment of clothes and care 
packages, to the workers in Germany, to the displaced, to the 
disaster-stricken, to the refugees; without forgetting, 
however, the institutional activities, which are the 
foundations and the architectural construct of the O.N.D., 
which could not and would not reason to exist without them. 
Consequently, and given that in these last times it has been 
almost exclusively spoken of the assistance sector, it is 
essential – to not give the impression that we only do 
assistance, leaving all the rest to die – promote as much as 
possible via the press also the institutional activities: the 
                                                          
996 «Decreto legislativo del Duce 23 gennaio 1944-XXII, n.27 – Passaggio al PFR dei 
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manifestos of the activities should be affixed to the most 
important and busy points, the “themes of the propaganda” 
should be made attractive, the photographic documentation 
should be exposed, and every kind of forms of promotion 
should be exploited»999 
 
 These objectives adapted to the new social order, to «potentiate 
the only free and active popular association remained through all the 
crises, and to contribute to lay the strong foundations of the elements 
that will allow to build the society of tomorrow.»1000 The OND covered 
three policy-areas: the material assistance and leisure of workers and 
soldiers; the strengthening of the social fabric; the education and 
training of the workers. The internal directives recommended to 
promote the collateral activities (leisure, culture, sports) through the 
collaboration with the local and national press. Other channels were 
not neglected: leaflets and pamphlets to distribute mainly in the 
workers’ canteen and in the other public areas, loudspeakers, 
documentaries and cinematographic works, distribution of propaganda 
materials in the most crowded areas (e.g. in the bomb shelters), in order 
to reach the wider audience possible.1001 The directives wanted the 
agency to become structural part of the regime’s social policy, using the 
                                                          
999 ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Riservata personale – Ezio Pizzi, Commissario 
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«propaganda weapon […] to contribute to the Victory and to gain the 
Italian Population to the national, social and political principles of the 
Republic.»1002 The war events led to a reconfiguration of OND’s tasks, 
which came to fill a similar role to the charity associations in Britain, 
which were passing through the gradual replacement and coordination 
by the State.1003  
The assistance for the Army covered the biggest part of the 
activities and expenditure, as the OND organized the logistic of the 
assistance, leisure, training and educational activities, the distribution 
of food, basic necessities and care packages, collateral activities in the 
hospitals. Another relevant task concerned the Italian workers in 
Germany, providing canteens and other basic commodities. The OND 
also re-organized the assistance to the prisoners in the German Lagers 
and to the forced manpower to Germany, assisting nearly 180.000 
workers by the mid-1944. Other assistance agencies, such as the Ente 
Nazionale di Assistenza Profughi (the National Refugees Assistance 
Authority) faced the emergency of the internally displaced people.1004  
While the regime decoupled from the Italian society, the OND 
retained the double function of assistance and consensus. On the eve of 
the defeat in 1945, its propaganda machine was working at full throttle, 
addressing primarily the factory workers and the front-line soldiers.1005 
The activities were coordinated by central and local offices, which had 
to «apply to the letter and in spirit the dispositions of the Centre for the 
Organization of the Propaganda to provide to the masses.»1006 and to 
«adequate the OND to the measures that regulate the production and 
the labour in the Italian Social Republic.»1007 The reorganization served 
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1004 ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Relazione sull’attività dell’OND nella 
Repubblica Sociale Italiana dal 1 luglio 1944 al 10 marzo 1945.s.d.» 
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to control peripheral territories, to regularly «catch indicative episodes 
of the mood in favour or against the social policies of the RSI.»1008 The 
workers’ organization could became the backbone of the socio-political 
organization:  
 
«Taking into account the principles of the Manifesto di 
Verona, the establishment of the trade union state, and the 
new direction of the national life expressed by the RSI, the 
OND should move with the times [...] The OND should 
renew according to the social principles of the Republic, 
aligning with the other innovative institutions, and be 
incorporated within the State. [...] The OND must encourage, 
in addition, under the revolutionary point of view, new laws 
and regulations in accordance with the current needs of the 
RSI and to protect the workers against the parasitical and 
exploitative capitalism of those activities that could, and 
should, be delegated, in the name of the new social spirit, to 
the OND.»1009 
 
It was recommended to set up a separate Ministry for the OND 
to avoid overlapping with the Ministry of Labour and the CGLTA.1010 
This role would be consistent with the principles of the Manifesto di 
Verona on the “State of Labour”; not only the State recognized the 
citizenship according to the status of “worker”, but it also directly 
incorporated their cultural education. From party’s emanation, the 
OND became a governmental organism, as the «levelling of the classes 
composing the social strata of the nation»1011 required a totalitarian 
organization outside the workplace. The OND had to merge with local 
authorities and trade unions in the socialized industries, becoming the 
                                                          
1008 ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Il Commissario Nazionale dell’O.N.D. ai 
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1010 Ivi. p.3 
1011 ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Appunto per il Commissario. S.d.», p.1. 
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transmission belt between the government and labour.1012 These 
directives remained statements of principles.1013 The administrative 
confusion led the various agencies to advocate power within the 
republic, overlapping functions with other departments. While the high 
rank officers speculated on the place of the OND in the revolutionary 
State, its daily activity was mostly reduced to the trade-off between 
social assistance and propaganda. The OND depicted quite well the 
decoupling between the RSI’s political projects and the reality, got out 
of hand. 
Fascism addressed its propaganda on the industrial and rural 
working class, as the salaried workers were mainly present in Northern 
Italy. Yet, in early 1945 the regime had to recognize the vacuum around 
it. The British reports agreed that the regime could strengthen its grip 
on the working class only with repression and the forced displacement 
of manpower to Germany.1014 Also the reporting from the prefects and 
the binders to the Italian Ministry of Home Affairs remarked the 
inefficiency of Fascist propaganda in the factories. They signalled 
unanimously the mistrust towards the socializations, the growing 
activity of sabotage and illegal industrial actions, the almost total 
workers’ support to the Resistance and the hate towards Fascism and 
the conscription measures for Germany. The social propaganda 
revealed to be detrimental for the regime; it did not gather the 
consensus of the working class and antagonized the Northern 
moderate bourgeoisie, the middle classes and the small and medium-
size traders: «the measures adopted against the restaurants and the 
aiding and abetting of the cooperatives did not meet the favour of the 
retailers. In the system of massive law-making in this matter [he] sees a 
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serious threat to its class interests and [sees] the slip towards integral 
communism.»1015 The orientation of the population disregarded Fascist 
social programmes: «the working masses here in Turin, all left-wing 
oriented, have already 2.000 Communist activists and members, and 
1200 Socialists. The others are waiting the events to decide, even if they 
are potentially oriented towards some forms of moderate communism. 
[...] the hegemony of the outlaws [how the regime defined the anti-fascist 
militants and the partisans, n.d.a.] is progressively spreading like a 
wildfire, favoured by the attitude of the population, that wants 
whichever end of its many sufferings.»1016  
The brutal repressions and retaliations of Germans and 
irregular troops undermined the civilian morale. The difficulties in 
providing social benefits, the galloping inflation and the wage freezes 
due to the war conjunctures constituted an useful tool for the 
Communist propaganda, as denounced by the Fascist trade unions.1017 
While the structures of political control and social protection of the 
regime were crumbling down, the Communist and, to a lesser extent, 
the Allied propaganda favoured by mid-1944 a diffuse deterioration of 
the relations within the factories, which led to symbolic or more 
concrete individual and collective gestures, as for lockouts, the refusal 
of the OND assistance card, sabotages of the machines directed to 
Germany and ambushes against Nazi troopers.1018  
The dispatches to the Ministry agreed on the fact that «the 
publication of the decree on the socialization did not have any 
impression on the workers, but the employers made no secret of their 
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1016ACS, MI - DGPSDAGR, busta 7/62, «Torino - Situazione politica nelle provincie, 1943-
44. 2 settembre 1944», p.1. 
1017Unione Provinciale Lavoratori dell’Industria di Torino, Riunione straordinaria del 
Comitato Esecutivo. 22 dicembre 1944, Torino, s.e., 1944. 
1018ACS, MI - DGPSDAGR, 7/ 62, «Torino - Situazione politica nelle provincie, 1943-44. 
21.12.1943», p.1; ACS, MI - DGPSDAGR, 4/29/1, «Genova - Questura Repubblicana di 
Genova. Situazione politica ed economica. 19 giugno 1944»; ACS, MI - DGPSDAGR, 
9/02367/1, «Movimento insurrezionale sovversivo maestranze operaie»; ACS, MI - 
DGPSDAGR, 9/02367/2, «Movimento insurrezionale sovversivo maestranze operaie». 
397 
 
disapproval.»1019 The Allied propaganda could penetrate in this climate 
of social discontent, as French and British pamphlets circulated out in 
the open in the bookshops and in the booths.1020 The relentless 
republican propaganda resulted ineffective and even ridiculed; the 
major concerns of the workers were not on the application of the 
socialization, but rather, as everywhere in Northern Italy, on inflation, 
wage freezes, the deportation to Germany.1021  As the traditional social 
and professional constituencies of Fascism unravelled, the socialization 
could not garner workers’ consensus. 
In front of this dual failure, the Ministry of the Interior invited 
the prefects to adjust the sight of the propaganda. To not worry the 
bourgeoisie, it recommended to specify how “socialization” was not 
“State’s control”; once socialized «the “capital” will be neither 
“property of the State” nor its management will be assigned to “State’s 
functionaries”.»1022 On the other hand, to wink at the working class, the 
socialization did not limit itself to simple profit sharing, but 
encompassed a wider «revolutionary process».1023 To workers, it was 
told that Fascism aimed at restructuring the management and 
production in the factories. This also justified the impossibility to enact 
in a short lapse of time such an important reform, which wanted 
nothing less than to transform the «the social and political structure of 
the State, if this corresponds to the supreme necessities of the new 
historical epoch that is looming on the horizon of the world.» 1024  
                                                          
1019 ACS, MI - DGPSDAGR, 5/39/1, «Questore di Milano - Relazione sulla situazione 
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The working class was not considered to be prepared to such a 
reform, and thus it was the task of the regime to actively promote it. 
However, the same prefects and leaders seemed to not be very 
educated, since Buffalini admitted that «from the discussion emerged 
by the way some misinterpretation on the causes and goals of the 
political and social order that the act proposes.»1025 The generic nature 
of RSI’s social policy was due to the need to mediate among different 
constituencies and to target all the social classes. But it did not provide 
a unifying narrative. Fascism undertook the opposite path to the British 
War Cabinet; while Britain gathered through social security all the strata 
of the population, the RSI calibrated the propaganda according to each 
social group. They claimed each time for the “planned economy”, the 
“mixed economy”, the “self-management in industries”, or the “State of 
the trade unions”.  
The population only welcomed the measures that alleviated the 
extremely difficult conditions for the supply of the essential goods and 
basic necessities.1026 But quickly even the assistance agency lost their 
hold on the population.1027 Unlike Britain in 1941–2, the RSI was losing 
the war, and the prominence of Soviet Russia among the Allied 
catalysed consensus to the Communists.1028 The alarmed reports in 1945 
indicated that the overwhelming majority of the workers looked 
forward to the Soviet advance, as a prelude of a wider insurrection to 
overturn the regime. The official commitment to socialize all the 
enterprises with more than 100 employees and more than one million 
of capital «has left quite an impression on the workers, but in turn it 
has not even excited them [...] While the employers were aware of the 
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act, but no actual information is getting out so far. It follows that they 
are waiting for the events as well.» 1029 There was general mistrusts for 
other measures announced, as for the extension of the programme of 
social housing for the workers to the mutilated, the veterans, the public 
employees. The regime could barely hold the grip on the so-called 
“most Fascist institutions”, like the INFPS itself; good part of the 
personnel was not loyal to the RSI and many of them daily listened to 
Radio London.1030 
Such attitude towards every measure of social policy could not 
be seen as isolated from «the current military situation, whereby 
among the masses persists, as said, a sense of hopelessness.»1031 The 
reports remarked how the fascist social propaganda substantially failed 
as the RSI never had any ascending over the working class.1032 All these 
notes passed in plain view of Mussolini himself, who lost every hold on 
the working classes.1033 The dispatches highlighted that «the masses 
obey to the Communists, for some kind of Messianic wait for Great 
Moustache, as is commonly called Stalin» and that «the support for the 
Anglo-Saxons has continuously waned up to become nothing (these 
considerations, of course, apply only to the working class, even if also 
among the other classes the failure of the beachhead has seriously 
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discredited the Anglo-Saxons).»1034 Irrespective of the Anglo-Saxon 
plans of social reforms and their active propaganda in the enemy 
countries, the Italian working class, now framed in the ranks of the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI), was waiting for Communism as 
outcome of the war.  
The British plans, in fact, affected firstly the political and 
administrative ruling classes. The penetration of this kind of 
propaganda had lesser impact on the popular masses. Yet, the RSI 
devoted some attention to the danger of the British propaganda on 
social matters also. The Fascist counter-propaganda appealed to the 
ideological divisions among the Allies, chasing the pro-communist 
radicalization of the working class and opposing the socializations to 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism. The regime equalized the Soviet social 
enhancements with those of the RSI, even encouraging the 
collaboration between Fascists and Communists in the name of 
common pro-labour faith.1035 The prominent Prefect of Milan, Piero 
Parini, proclaimed that Anglo-Saxon capitalists undermined the Fascist 
social revolution; Soviet Russia, which was told having the only other 
socialist constitution except the RSI, abandoned Italy to the 
plutocracies: «London and Washington opposed to the socialization 
because they stand for the social conservatism. Moscow because it does 
not want that the Republic consolidates thanks to its concrete 
revolutionary action.»1036 The victory of the Allied, both the Anglo-
Saxons and the Russian, would represent «a triumph that would 
perpetuate the age of the exploiting capitalism.»1037  
  The RSI passed under its direct control the social propaganda, 
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1037 Ivi. p.4. 
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but the spanning of the assistance agencies did not allow to consistently 
reach the workers. The press propaganda, although managed by 
government, did not convey unitary vision on social policy, as every 
constituency used it to strengthen its own position; the press did not 
start a debate as thorough as the British one. However, the reasons of 
the RSI’s propaganda failure did not lie in the inefficiency of the 
propaganda machinery, which on the contrary was well-oiled. The 
Fascist elites were united around some vague watchwords that did not 
mobilize the working masses. The war turned out to be a social 
revolution, but among the Northern working classes the social change 
was not embodied by the Fascist socializations nor by the Anglo-Saxon 
social security, whose propaganda remained substantially stranger to 
the Italian industries. Unlike the British public opinion, the Italian 
working classes were radicalized and opted for the promises of the 
Communist revolution.  
The RSI addressed differently the propaganda against the 
Anglo-Americans and the Soviets. The formers were the direct enemy 
on the battlefield, while the Communists were the ideological 
benchmark of the Resistance. Against the British and the Americans, 
the RSI did not neglect to consider the social and ideological structures 
of the countries; the propaganda resumed the topic of the “plutocratic 
imperialism” and the confrontation between social revolution and 
conservative capitalism; the cult of the Duce left room to the self-
representation of the international social revolution against capitalism 
and communism.1038 The Fascist narrative officially proclaimed the 
social collaboration, but targeted the workers, moving on the 
Communists in the revolutionary field. The prosecution of the war 
alongside the Nazis was linked to the confrontation between social 
enhancement and conservative reaction. Eventually, the RSI did not 
collect the workers’ consensus and alienated the middle classes; instead 
of a unitary discourse to gather working classes and bourgeoisie, the 
RSI propaganda paradoxically proved to be “classist”, and, unlike the 
British plans for social security, divided even more the country.  
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6.4. Three home fronts: the struggle for victory, the demobilization, the 
civil war 
 
Britain, the Vichy regime and the RSI equally sought for 
political legitimization through social policies; all the sides in conflict 
understood that the war would have led to “revolutionary” outcomes 
and that the post-war political and socio-economic order would have to 
provide new forms social policy. Britain promoted “social security” in a 
free society, while the two regimes claimed for more “social equality”, 
refocusing priority on the social collaboration within a hierarchic 
national community. At home, social policy served to compact the 
different social classes justifying the wartime constraints in the light of 
a better future, and to affirm new “social pacts”. The efficiency of the 
agencies of propaganda played a fundamental role in conveying these 
messages. However, the different geo-political situations of the three 
countries determined the success of the social propaganda at home. 
In Britain, accordingly to the global reorganization of the War 
Cabinet, the MOI, set up in 1935, assumed the tasks of propaganda.1039 It 
sustained the morale of the British population through the publicity of 
the social progress already achieved during WWII and the plans for the 
reconstruction. The government judged fundamental to convince 
people that the war was necessary and just, and that after the 
unavoidable victory of the Allies a new fairer world was to come. The 
directives of the MOI were «translated into a three-fold policy: firstly, 
the replacement of free availability of news and information with a 
regime in which these would be controlled and managed; secondly, to 
provide reassurance of the certainty of victory and of official concern 
for the people’s needs; thirdly, to stimulate patriotic commitment to the 
war and the war effort.»1040  
The MOI was the centre of production, supply and 
transmission of information. The propaganda followed the traditional 
channels and the mass media; cinema, documentaries and mostly the 
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broadcastings of the BBC, which became an iconic aspect of the British 
psychological warfare, and which operated under the control of the 
MOI. The governmental control over the information did not prevent 
the public debate. The press had an important role to pave the way and 
to encourage to put on political agenda the policies for the 
reconstruction.1041 Beveridge himself appealed to the press to promote 
his report, competing to some extent with governmental propaganda. 
The press and the publishers vulgarised the technical content of the 
report; a huge documentation of summaries, commentaries, and 
compendia is stored in the archives. The MOI never implemented a 
“totalitarian” control of the propaganda. Its “pluralist” grip on 
information enhanced the policy-making. Even if the Beveridge Report 
initially went through some resistances, its popular success compelled 
the War Cabinet to provide by 1944 the guidelines of the post-war 
British social policy. Great Britain achieved the most efficient (“total”) 
propaganda; while the consensus in politics and society was not as 
solid as commonly regarded, the alternative centres of communication 
(trade unions, parties, the SSL itself) shared the support to the War 
Cabinet. 
The organization of the propaganda under the RSI and in the 
Vichy regime was partly different. The RSI had the background of 
twenty years of Fascist cultural policy, which affected different fields of 
the Italian public and private life.1042 Until 1943, the Fascism 
propaganda was coordinated by the MinCulPop, created in 1937, and 
relied on different vectors that covered various sectors of society and 
topics. The regime wanted to provide the ideological elements of the 
propaganda to address to the soldiers, the workers, the peasants, the 
families, combining traditional propaganda and mass media.1043 The 
MinCulPop and the OND remained the only two pivots, the latter 
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tending to merge with State’s structures: the intermingling between the 
workers’ organization and governmental machinery was considered 
the outcome of the “State of Labour”, and patched organizational leaks 
after 1943. The RSI redefined the methods of propaganda; the 
exploitation of mass media and the rallies ocean gave way to the press, 
leaflets, posters, etc. The penetration of Radio London was not countered 
by Italian broadcastings, completely under German control, and 
hegemonized by the “intransigents” like Farinacci, relatively not 
interested in any social change. The absence of the Mussolini’s cult of 
personality was replaced by the myth of the regeneration through the 
war and by the shibboleth of the social revolution.  
The Vichy regime adopted a flexible system to promote the 
Révolution Nationale and to create a new ruling class. The General 
Secretary for the Information had the monopoly of the official 
propaganda. The plethora of Vichy’s organizations promoted the 
cultural deepening of the social doctrine, the training of the political 
and administrative elites of the new State and the general propaganda 
for the population. Workers and the peasants were the main target of 
the “mass movement” of the regime, the LFC, and its industrial branch, 
the GLE, which enacted its typical methods of propaganda, the “word-
of-mouth” and the “guide of the opinion”. There was also room for 
broadcastings, documentaries and – to a greater extent – pamphlets, 
posters, leaflets, essays, booklets, which testify the effort to reach the 
workers. While for the RSI the crumble of the former constituencies 
dissolved the unanimous consensus to Fascism, the Vichy regime 
lacked of support by mass parties and unions. In both cases, unlike in 
Britain, the regimes decoupled from the population 
The different outcomes of the propaganda were mainly 
determined by domestic and geopolitical factors. The British public life, 
even during the war years, was mediated by parties and unions, that 
were the transmission belt between government and citizens. The 
Minister of Labour Bevin was typical; former trade unionist, he had the 
complete confidence of the workers. He could pass off the most 
coercive measures on manpower, by promising social rights after the 
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war and the levelling of social inequalities.1044 The British government 
had to fully mobilize the society; the social policy cemented the pact 
among different sectors of British society, and between citizens and the 
State. On the contrary, while Vichy and the RSI claimed for a classless 
socio-economic organization, in reality both pushed forward class 
propaganda. In the Vichy regime, governmental bodies were 
specifically created for the propaganda to the workers, the employers, 
the technicians, the farmers. The RSI relied on major ideological 
concessions to the working class to restore consensus. Both the regimes 
did not garner popular support and gradually lost that of the upper 
classes, frightened by the radicalization of the Resistance movements 
and by the march of the Red Army to the West. The Anglo-Americans 
grounded their public narrative on the restating of democratic 
institutions, social reforms and liberal capitalism. They thus became the 
option to support for good part of the wealthier classes.  
The ruling classes of both regimes were commonly identified as 
puppet governments in the hands of the Nazi occupant. Especially 
since 1943, both provided forced labour to feed the German war 
machine and could not prevent the Nazi retaliation against their own 
citizens. Vichy’s propaganda stressed how the German shield was the 
only assurance to not be overwhelmed by the Anglo-Saxons, as 
«American policy would cause social unrest. […] the American way of 
living is a counterpart of Bolshevism.»1045 In both countries, contrary to 
what the regimes expected, Nazi occupation undermined their 
consensus. There was an increasing hiatus between the regime’s 
promises of a fairer socio-economic order and the reality of the brutal 
exploitation and occupation by the German troopers and local 
paramilitary terror gangs. Especially in Italy, they repeatedly imposed 
summary justice out of governmental control. In Britain, instead, “total 
war” effectively mobilized the population; from 1941 on, the 
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commitment to the war was identified with the struggle for a better 
world for all the British classes and for a leading role of the country in 
the new settlement.  
 Other reason why the British social propaganda succeeded, 
while failing in France and Italy, had to do with their very contents. In 
Britain, the promotion of the socio-economic reforms gathered the 
consensus of popular and middle classes, workers and employers. The 
British propaganda promised a fairer society, where the State secured 
the minimum vital income and committed to full employment; the 
deployment of social solidarity was eased by the wartime climate of 
national unity. The propaganda on the Beveridge Report and the other 
social provisions could merge different social and political sectors, in a 
process also described as «an attempt at “nation-rebuilding”: as part of 
the process of post-war reconstruction, extending and deepening 
already existing forms of welfare provisions in a far older nation state 
with a (at that time) comparatively homogenous population.».1046  
The Italian and French regimes were not able to pursue the 
same goals, for the nature of their social policy: Vichy claimed for the 
“social collaboration” in the factories; the RSI pushed prefigured the 
creation of the “State of Labour”. Not unlike Great Britain, in both 
countries the propaganda pointed at spreading national unity. Their 
message did not work, but had the opposite effect. In France, the 
“eradication” of the proletarian condition and the hierarchy in the 
factories were usually received by the employers as the restoration of 
social order after the years of the Popular Front.1047 The workers never 
took seriously the message of Vichy propaganda; their major worries 
regarded the difficult daily conditions and the coercive measures 
imposed by the Germans, with the connivance of the regime. 
Something similar, but even more dramatically, happened under the 
RSI, where the messy formulation of the “social republic” also alienated 
the support of the former conservative interest blocs of the regime. 
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They felt threatened both by the socializations and by the retaliation 
promised by the most intransigent Fascist representatives. The RSI 
resisted only thanks to the Nazi military presence, while the proletariat 
swelled the ranks of the Resistance, led by the Communists, and the 
upper classes turned to the Allies for more moderate solutions. Italy, 
even more than France, was a breeding ground for Anglo-American 
influence. The social propaganda might not have a great appeal for the 
masses, but the British plans affected the political and technical debate.  
The Beveridge Report and the reconstruction constituted a main 
piece of the British propaganda at home. However, its maximum 
potential was expected for the propaganda abroad, both to the enemies 
and allies. Almost one year after the publication of the report, the MOI 
considered that a new phase of the conflict was opened. It was no 
longer about convincing the public opinion that the Allies would have 
won the war. The task was to frame the British effort for the 
reconstruction and social reforms in the post-war settlement: «it 
became clear some months ago that opinion overseas no longer needed 
to be convinced that the war would be won by the United Nations and 
that interest was, therefore, turning to the views and policies of the 
protagonists. [...] How will Britain withstand pressure from U.S.A. and 
U.S.S.R.? [...] The projection of Britain on a large scale becomes, therefore, an 
urgent item on the propaganda agenda.»1048 
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7. Social policy and power politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The British services defined November 1942 “the month that 
changed the war”, as major military events changed the inertia of the 
conflict; the publication of the Beveridge Report fell into this watershed 
lapse of time.1049 The surge of enthusiasm generated by the report 
became a cog of the British war’s propaganda. Its most remarkable 
aspect was the importance that the British gave to the “projection” of its 
social model abroad, pointing at «showing the social and economic 
injustice of totalitarian rule compared with the imperfect but vastly 
better conditions under a free regime.»1050 The report was part of a 
coherent narrative by the Anglo-Americans, started with the 1941 
Atlantic Charter and continued in the years of recovery and 
reconstruction.1051 The Beveridge Report enshrined in the British policy 
legacy, but its most recent ideological background was the Atlantic 
Charter. For the propaganda abroad, the MOI ran at full strength: «the 
full implementation of the Plan would ensure that the British Social 
Security system, which already in almost every aspect compares very 
favourably with that of any other country in the world (save perhaps 
New Zealand), would easily outstrip, in all respects, that of all other 
countries (again with the possible exception of New Zealand).»1052 The 
information services stressed the importance of the plan in the Allied 
countries, and predicted the reaction in the enemy countries:  
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«While it is likely that the Report will receive favourable 
comment both in the home and allied Press, it is also 
probable that Axis propaganda will use the occasion, with 
distorted quotations from the Report, to draw attention to the 
inadequacies of existing British social services, and try to 
argue that Germany has long possessed services which we 
are only beginning to talk about on paper. Behind these 
arguments will be considerable nervousness about the moral 
effect of the Report in providing a means of filling in some of 
the daps in Allied war aims and exposing the sham of 
Hitler’s New Order.»1053 
 
The British promotion of the Beveridge Report operated on a 
double channel; the mass propaganda and the intellectual circulation. 
Whether directly through propaganda services, or indirectly through 
the debate within the academic, political and cultural milieu, the report 
and the new principles of social security had an impact in the 
Resistance parties and in the societies. Both in Italy and in France, the 
post-war plans and studies for the social insurances referred, more or 
less explicitly, to the new “lexicon” of social security.  
 
7.1. The British projection over Europe: winning the war and building 
the peace 
 
The Atlantic Charter: propaganda for the post-war settlement 
The Atlantic Charter was presented as a democratic revolution 
that promised to bring more social equality; Roosevelt’s four freedoms 
were promoted as the standpoints of the United Nations and the 
achievement of a wider democracy was expected to come out of the 
battlefields of the people’s war.1054 The directives for the propaganda 
were clear: the war effort was bringing about faith and hope in the 
future, and the Allies were committed both to construct a “New 
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World” and to disintegrate Nazism and Fascism.1055 Until the second 
half of 1942, the different aspects of the Atlantic Charter were the main 
references of Allied propaganda in Europe.1056 “Freedom from fear” 
and “freedom from want” were blueprints for further propaganda and 
elaborations on social security.1057 The change of pace in 1942 was 
particularly required by the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), charged 
of the propaganda against the Axis and the countries occupied by their 
troops.1058  
After the end of the Blitz, the British were confident in the 
victory; they had to think about the post-war settlement: «our post-war 
aims must be positive and constructive. […] in terms of primary human 
needs and aspirations. We must think not only politically of States as so 
many separate units, but socially of the individual within those 
States.»1059 The Allies promoted international and internal security, 
which was also «security against those economic cataclysms which 
bring poverty in the midst of plenty.»1060 Once defeated Nazism, the 
main tasks concerned the reconstruction of the international and social 
orders on renewed bases. The PWE recognized that «it is an undeniable 
fact that the Atlantic Charter was a flop in America, in the British Isles, 
in occupied territories and in enemy countries. We have done our best 
with it, but we cannot, if we are to do effective propaganda, go on 
plugging the Atlantic Charter with any hope of success. [...] If we are to 
have the more positive and dynamic propaganda, rightly demanded by 
the Minister, we can only do so if the Government will give us a 
lead.»1061 
                                                          
1055 TNA, FO/898/41, «General Directives. 3rd May, 1942», p. 4. 
1056 TNA, INF/1/679, «Minister’s Paper on Propaganda. 25th April, 1942», p.1. 
1057The Regional Directors of the Propaganda for France, Italy, and Germany, however, 
considered the Atlantic Charter «too vague to have any marked effect on either the Latin 
or Teutonic mind.» The Minister of Information defined it «too academic and vague to 
make a good basis for propaganda.», TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. 
Meeting of the Standing Ministerial Committee. 20th January, 1942», p.1. 
1058 TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Organisation. 27th July, 1942» 
1059 TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. “Never Again….”. 3rd February, 1942», 
p. 2. 
1060 Ibidem. 
1061 TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. 30th January, 1942», p.1. 
411 
 
Initially, the PWE tended to variate propaganda accordingly to 
each national situation. This was the case with the Vichy regime; due to 
its ambiguous international status, it was treated as an occupied 
territory rather than a satellite of the Axis.1062 The British government 
opted for the collaboration with the Provisional French National 
Committee and with the French colonial authorities.1063 They limited 
their initiative, with few space for direct social propaganda to 
France.1064 The dispatches from France suggested a more moderate 
appeal to the working class, complaining the over-importance of the 
propaganda on workers with regard to the other classes, which feared 
the increasing weight of the Communists in the ranks of the 
Resistance.1065 Throughout 1941, the advisory reports suggested to 
address the propaganda to some key points, as for the French forced 
manpower in Germany.1066 While Vichy’s propaganda identified the 
partisans against the occupation with the Communists, the British 
regional directors for France presented a different framework. The 
major aims in France were the material recovery, the end of German 
and collaborationist rules, the restoration of democratic system and the 
Empire, and «a lead from outside towards a better post-war world, but 
no imposition from outside of any particular political formula.»1067 The 
PWE recommended to emphasize the British view in case Free France 
showed unable to implant in French opinion or the divergences 
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between the Allies widened: «there is need to plug as far as possible the 
idea of Great Britain as a leader of democratic and social thought and 
development»,1068 and thus it was suggested to let autonomy to Free 
France in its own topics of propaganda.  
The British propaganda did not reach the French working 
classes. The Intelligence Services for France reported that Vichy 
counterpropaganda stroke the right notes with lower classes, when 
they stressed the “totalitarian” character of the Anglo-American 
capitalism that was expected to be implanted in France and the 
unnatural alliances of capitalists and communists to crush the French 
social order.1069 The informers in France stressed also the importance of 
«“more facts about social development in Britain” and that in particular 
talks “explaining how capitalist Britain can be an ally to communist 
Russia […] we should show the French how Britain works on the 
“social side” and also on the “political side” and that this might help 
them to regain confidence in democratic institutions […] it is essential 
that our broadcasts should ensure the French that they will themselves 
choose the internal policy of France.»1070 The services of Free France 
proposed to direct the propaganda against the myth of the “social 
collaboration”, linking Vichy’s social and economic policies to the Nazi 
exploitation of French resources. Corporatism was presented as an 
imposition of the German model, functional to re-organize the 
production for Nazi demands, making complete the French 
subordination after the military defeat. The British propaganda moved 
in close connection with Free France directives, according to the 
principle that «the social feature of this current total war takes the form 
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of the enemy’s effort to conquer the masses. In Germany, Hitler came to 
power through the masses. […] The demoralization of the French 
masses eased his victory. Fermenting the British working classes 
against the government, he hoped to conquer London.»1071  
By mid-1941, the British propaganda tried to meet more 
consistently the instances of all social classes, without exacerbating 
their cleavages.1072 The British recalibrated their propaganda to the 
French industrial workers and urban middle classes, both submitted to 
a progressive pauperization, sticking to the general principles of the 
Atlantic Charter:  
 
«The Atlantic Charter at the time it was announced was, as 
an event, powerful propaganda. It was very thoroughly 
plugged. Its major striking force, in our opinion, was its 
evidence of growing American participation in the war and 
growing American feeling of responsibility for the post-war 
world. Its points are, of course, timeless, but unless they are 
developed in greater detail and authoritatively, they have no 
longer sufficient sharpness. We do not think the Charter can 
be made “revolutionary”. Nevertheless, all projections of 
Great Britain in terms of existing democratic institutions and 
projected social development should be amplified as far as 
possible in order to meet 3(f) above. Projected social 
developments must be reasonably concrete and in line with 
representative progressive thinking in Great Britain. We do 
not, however, feel that this projection of Great Britain alone 
would serve to “compete” with the pull of Russia as a 
symbol of redemption and hope.»1073 
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Similar considerations concerned the other European countries. 
Before the publication of the Beveridge Report, the efforts of the Anglo-
American propaganda projected some general policies for the 
reconstruction. But the same 1942 report actually rooted in the very 
guidelines of the Atlantic Charter. These political warfare indications 
targeted primarily Nazi Germany, but, on the background, they 
foresaw a first contest with Soviet Russia. The Allied wanted to 
compete on the same ground of the Soviets, and challenge the 
Communists’ hegemony over the working population, 
 
«and especially the industrial working class, which are our 
best allies in the occupied territories and our best prospective 
allies in the enemy countries themselves. Our positive 
propaganda, therefore, should be largely addressed to the 
industrial workers and should deal largely with the 
economic future we intend to create. We must show that we 
seriously mean to satisfy the hopes of working people 
everywhere for a new and better social order after the 
war.»1074  
 
The 1941 memorandum of the Minister of Economic Warfare 
Dalton recognized that the points 5 and 6 of the Atlantic Charter (social 
security, improved labour standards and “freedom from fear and 
want”) lent themselves to an effective social propaganda. This was the 
kind of propaganda that Britain was expected to promote on the 
Continent: 
 
 «The B.B.C French surveys repeatedly refer to the desire of 
Frenchmen to be told “the broad outlines of a programme of 
economic reconstruction in which political liberty would be 
guaranteed”, to set against Hitler’s New Order. It is not the 
business of the P.W.E.to plan this brave New World. But it is 
very much our concern to see that those engaged on post-
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war planning realise its immense importance for our 
propaganda to Europe. We should, therefore, make our great 
interest in the subject known to them, and we should be 
given an opportunity to “put over” to Europe, in a sufficient 
guarded fashion, any proposal of development in the sphere 
of post-war reconstruction which would help our 
propaganda. […]Plans for improved social security, for large 
scale economic developments, for financial reforms designed 
to stabilise employment, will, if sufficiently concrete and 
extensive, be of great value in our propaganda to the 
European masses. On such plans, not only the Minister 
Without Portfolio and various departments of His Majesty’s 
Government, but also the I.L.O., are now working. Even 
better propaganda would be any steps which we take now, 
in war time and in our own country, to show that we really 
mean to go forward and not back when the war is over. 
Thus, to choose a measure backed as yet by no one party but 
by many in all parties, the introduction of comprehensive 
system of Family Allowances would impress the European 
workers more than any number of paper plans.»1075  
 
The main concern was to balance the Soviet military and 
popularity advance to Western Europe, rather than to counter the Nazi 
propaganda. The defeat of the Axis was matter of time, and the Anglo-
American had to promote their view on post-war settlement: «many 
European workers believe now in Russia, only because they don’t 
believe in us. If they felt that we could offer some real alternative to 
Communism, which would combine the benefits of a rising standard of 
life and economic security with individual liberty and the right of self-
government, they would turn to us more readily as a symbol of their 
redemption, especially as we succeed in showing increasing military 
strength.»1076 The concurrence with Soviet Russia in 1941 concerned the 
leadership over the post-war world. The ensuring of the peace was 
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linked to the agreement on the new settlement, for its part linked to 
consensus on new social and economic “universal” principles. This 
worldwide endorsement was conditional to the reliability of both 
promoters of the Atlantic Charter in the implementation, in the shortest 
possible time, of these same reforms at home:  
 
«But if we aim at a more positive and dynamic propaganda, 
this will make a call upon ourselves and will require a like 
effort in our home propaganda. We British must be prepared 
to show that after the war, as during it, we shall show 
leadership. [...] Only if the mass of the British people believe 
that social justice, more closely approached in war than in 
peace, will be maintained here, and even improved upon, 
after the defeat of the Germans, [...] we are to play an 
effective part after the war, we must give our own people 
more solid ground for pride in their country in the quiet less 
heroic days of peace which are to come. They too must have, 
in full measure, all the gifts of the Atlantic Charter. [...] They 
will feel this, if the case is put straight to them, and if they are 
conscious that a new world of social justice is being born, 
where there will be no more mass poverty and mass 
unemployment, and no more chronically distressed areas. 
Given these things, they will be willing, I believe, to lose 
some cherished liberties in return for a real prospect of a long 
period of peace.»1077   
 
Dalton proposed to re-direct the propaganda considering the 
workers as the driving force to overturn the Nazi power. The British 
could garner their consensus through post-war socio-economic 
projects, grounded on the principles of the Atlantic Charter but 
supported by the first effective outcomes to be published by the 
Minister for the Reconstruction, to «“put over” to Europe our proposals 
for the future and our achievements in the present in the field of 
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reconstruction.»1078 This plans were originally meant to compete with 
the Communist ally, in a context of European co-operation where 
Britain exercised the leadership.  
The view of the Labourite Dalton did not necessarily coincided 
with that of the government, even if his guidelines did not depart too 
much from the directives for the propaganda policy abroad. The 
Secretary of the State agreed on the appeal to the working class, as «in 
the occupied countries the broad masses have more of the stuff of 
resistance in them than the bourgeoisie.»1079 The approach to these 
social classes, however, should avoid the traditional “pro-labour” 
propaganda, to promise a better future and support “socially 
enhanced” forms of democracy as an alternative to Nazism and 
Communism. The propaganda had also to better specify the kind of 
“enhancements” they prefigured: social security, education, freedom 
from fear and want were considered «excellent themes», as well as the 
appeal to the Atlantic Charter.1080 The government refused references to 
the “social revolution”, whose extent could not be the same throughout 
all the European continent.  
The central appeal to the industrial working classes and the 
urban “progressive” bourgeoisie did not work for the Nordic countries 
under German occupation, as their social stratification was not centred 
on the working class, or for Belgium and the Netherlands, whose main 
concerns regarded their territorial integrity to be defended from 
Germany in the future.1081 This did not reduce the relevance of the 
social propaganda also in those countries. As few months later the 
same Beveridge underlined in his report, the shared conviction was 
that «reasonable national and international security can be restored, 
and the road to social progress – planned this time on a generous 
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international scale – will again be open.»1082 The international co-
operation should not dispute the British leadership in Europe: «the 
Minister of Economic Warfare stresses the fact that we have got to face 
up to Russian opposition. This competition makes a vigorous and 
creative post-war policy, exploited by propaganda, even more 
necessary. […] In conjunction with the spectacular Russian war effort 
and with the Russian-inspired propaganda for revolutionary after-war 
changes in the social field, this does, […] create a serious danger, unless 
it is offset by a more vigorous lead – both in relation to present 
behaviour and to post-war reconstruction – from here.»1083  
The ineffectiveness of the Atlantic Charter led the British to 
change the directives at the end of 1942, just a few days after the 
publication of the Beveridge Report. They were oriented towards the 
projection of Britain in term of “soft power”: political institutions, social 
progress, British way of life and commitment to the reconstruction of 
Europe: «what we need therefore is to bring to Europe a picture of the 
British, determined at last in their own interests to give Europe the 
same kind of human values and opportunities as they give to their own 
people. The conception of British policy must be made to approximate 
to the conception of the British character.»1084 They should also convey 
the idea that security, peace and progress were firstly in the interests of 
the British power: «we can gain the confident leadership of Europe in a 
way that might astonish many people here.»1085 Britain had to fully 
commit in the Continent, to implement all the social reforms prefigured 
in 1941: «the Atlantic Charter has evoked no response in Europe, not 
because its provisions are not admirable, but because nobody knows 
who is going to see that they are carried out. What people in Europe 
want to know is who is going to look after them. If they felt sure the 
British would do this, the response would be immediate and 
enthusiastic.»1086 The British services considered the previous 
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propaganda ineffective not for the topics (the promise of a new social 
order, as clearly stated in the first report of the Minister of Economic 
Warfare), but because «they bear no relation to policy towards Europe 
as a whole. The only good propaganda is that based on reality, on the 
knowledge that Europe is going to be united under somebody’s 
leadership, a leadership which is experienced and trusted.»1087 The 
suggestion was to carry out policies that were propaganda “by 
themselves”, showing how Britain could take the lead of post-war 
Europe through a set of ideas and policies to reshape European 
democracies and societies.  
The new directives matched the turning tides of the war. By 
mid-1942, Britain had now to state a great design for the aftermath the 
war, providing «a definite indication of the rôle [sic] that Britain is 
prepared to play in Europe when the fighting ceases and of the steps 
now being taken during the war in preparation for that rôle [sic].»1088 
This was of crucial importance for Britain even more as it was between 
the US and the Soviet Union. The government should put forward 
policy areas to improve after the war, both in front of their domestic 
opinion and of the European ones under the German occupation: «by 
giving moral leadership to Britain it will counteract the feeling that we 
are in the background because Russia is providing the fighting and 
America the sinews of war.»1089 The only way for Britain to retain its 
position of great power before the two raising giants was to take the 
lead of the other European countries, by providing international 
security and collective prosperity: «an announcement that H.M.G. were 
prepared to adopt certain standards as part of their domestic policy 
would serve two purposes in Europe: a) that we really meant what we 
said because we had a clear idea of the kind of new society that we are 
fighting for; b) that the standards we wanted for our own people were 
there that we wanted to see introduced in Europe, In order to appeal to 
the maximum number of people those standards cover four main 
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questions – health, housing, nutrition and education.»1090 These projects 
conveyed the idea that Beveridge expressed two years later in his Full 
Employment in a Free Society; the great challenge for post-war 
democracies was to maintain the socio-economic wartime measures in 
the context of the reconstruction:  
 
«The background against which all these or similar 
pronouncements should be made is a continual insistence 
that we do not recognise any essential difference between the 
state of war against Germany’s army and the “peace” during 
which we should continue to fight against the causes of war. 
[…] In fact, any declaration of policy such as the above could 
be summarised by saying that we intend to remain mobilised 
in all spheres, military, economic and spiritual, but after the 
armistice our mobilisation will be for a positive end.»1091 
 
From 1942 onwards, the governmental policies reconsidered 
social policy as power politics, and the Beveridge Report could be 
presented as the major contributions for the post-war society: «Britain 
has mobilised a free people for total war, without destroying its 
freedom. She is determined to retain and adapt this mobilisation, and 
to extend this freedom, in the tasks of post-war reconstruction. It is 
Britain’s mission to show how freedom and planning can be 
harmonised both on the national and the international plane [sic].»1092 
Already by 1942, the confrontation for the hegemony in Europe 
between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians overshadowed the 
Nazi threat. Britain gave up the traditional estrangement to the 
European affairs, facing the spread of Communism over the Continent 
once Germany was defeated and the potential social unrest at home. 
The directives emphasized how the interests of the European countries 
was on the side of Britain, which in turn had to promise «the realisation 
of the age of plenty which science has made possible, we promise not to 
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isolate ourselves from Europe and we foreshadow a social revolution 
as great as and more pleasant than that which Russia has experienced. 
This is the main point on which we can outbid the Russians and we 
should not hesitate to do so.»1093  
 
The Beveridge Report: circulation and propaganda 
Since the very beginning, the information offices understood 
the relevance of the Beveridge Report and its dissemination became part 
of the military operations and of the ideological confrontation. Three 
main directions might be retraced: the first channel concerned its 
circulation across the Atlantic and in other Anglo-Saxon countries; the 
second involved the British Army, as summaries of the report were 
distributed to the soldiers themselves; the third was directed to the 
“traditional” propaganda against the enemy, to gain the support of the 
population of the Axis powers or under occupation.  
The Beveridge Report contained explicit references to the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter and its innovation, being the first 
public report coherently inspired by the concept of “social security”.1094 
It impregnated also the debate and the reflections on this matter in the 
United States. According to historian Maurizio Vaudagna, the 
American reception of the report revived the autonomous and 
“endogenous” reformism in the United States, favoured by the 
recovery of consumptions set in motion by the war economy. This was 
not stranger to the rivalry between the two sides of the Atlantic, to such 
an extent that «Britons began to fear they would be “outbeveridged” by 
American reformers.»1095 The struggle for social reforms cemented the 
so-called “Atlantic community”, and the Beveridge Report, as promoted 
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in America, was one of the tools to re-define the “values of the West”, 
in opposition to Nazi social welfare.1096  
In the trans-Atlantic world, the report was something different 
than the “typical product of British social progress” that was presented 
in the European continent. Beveridge’s lexicon was shared in the US 
and the other Anglo-Saxon countries; from Roosevelt’s “four freedoms 
address” to the idea of making political freedom and economic security 
live together, the Atlantic dialogue affected ideas and policies. The 
Beveridge Report widely echoed in the American opinion; Beveridge 
himself was invited by universities, think tanks and talks overseas, 
while the press devoted wider room to his plan: summaries and copies 
of the report were delivered from Britain to the US, to reach the widest 
audience possible.1097 At the end of 1942, the National Resources Planning 
Board Report on Security Work and Relief Policies published a document 
that moved on the same direction of the Beveridge Report.1098 Both 
proposals internalized the principles of freedom from want, full 
employment, medical care and compulsory insurances to guarantee the 
minimum income. As stated in the reports of the US government: «both 
reports favour the widest possible use of social insurance as the means 
of assuring income maintenance. Both insist that an adequate system of 
public assistance is an INDESPENSABLE SUPPLEMENT TO SOCIAL 
INSURANCE; HOWEVER WIDE [sic] the scope of the latter.»1099 
Roosevelt advocated the discussion of the governmental plans for 
social reforms to the Congress: «because of their basic importance to 
our national welfare during the war and after the war, it is my earnest 
hope that the Congress will give these matters full consideration during 
this session. We must not return to the iniquities, insecurity, and fears 
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of the past, but ought to move forward towards the promise of the 
future.»1100  
These projects rooted on the climate of generalized social 
insecurity of the Thirties and on the ideological confrontation of WWII, 
and owed something to a wider and mutual trans-Atlantic influence on 
the detailed plans during wartime. The circulation of the British plans 
in the United States and in the other countries of the so-called 
“Anglosphere” (that includes Canada, Australia, New Zealand) 
suggests a dual interpretation: a common view of the world to remould 
and the competition to take (the US) or to retain (Britain) the lead after 
the end of the war.1101 A dispatch from the US Embassy in London 
recommended to highlight that the American plan was better defined 
in its details than the Beveridge Report; on the core area of 
unemployment, the American plan recalled the public work 
programmes of the New Deal era, while the British report remained 
purposely vaguer. The reactions of the British Foreign Office and 
Ministry of Information say something on the relevancy of social policy 
in the political debate:  
 
«My Secretary of State thinks that Sir William Jowitt may be 
interested to see […] points of comparison between the 
Beveridge report and a similar report which it is understood 
has been prepared by the National Resources Planning Board 
of the United States. […] Sir William Jowitt might perhaps 
consider it desirable to discuss which with the Minister of 
Information ways of concerting the publicity lines it would 
be desirable to pursue when, as may soon be the case, the 
National Resources Planning Board report is published. The 
Beveridge Report has made a deep impression in the United 
States on Liberals and Conservatives alike, and in different 
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ways it has gained us credit with both. We must be prepared 
for attempts to show that the National Resources Planning 
Board report has out-Beveridged us in various respects 
[…].»1102 
 
 The British activism in the spreading of the report met different 
objectives. In the very framework of “total war”, it tied social changes 
to political reforms and linked the war constraints to the construction 
of a better world. Britain used the report to promote a specific model of 
social security and thus to assert itself in the post-war balance of 
power. These aims affected also the propaganda against the enemies. 
The regional branches of the PWE identified the key points of the 
political warfare, including socio-economic themes to be adjusted in 
accordance to each local condition.1103 Their note accurately analysed 
the possible ways to address British propaganda to the Italian masses: 
 
«The majority of the Italian workers are agricultural, not 
industrial; and, in any case, I have seen no evidence from 
Italy which would suggest that “the working classes, 
especially the industrial working classes…. Are our best 
prospective allies”. All classes have been subjected to the 
Fascist Regime with its all pervading propaganda for twenty 
years; and it is impossible to deny that, during this time, the 
working classes as a whole have secured a certain, one might 
almost say a considerable, increase in their material standard 
of living. Fascist propaganda claims that the Regime “is 
going towards the people” and we know that this claim, 
never entirely unjustified, has been strengthened by 
legislation (e.g. with regard to rationing) during the war.»1104 
 
 The anti-British propaganda of the Fascist regime and the 
different conformation of Italian society suggested an attentive and 
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calibrated propaganda policy for the country. Social propaganda, at the 
beginning of 1942, was carried out in vague terms: «The Atlantic 
Charter if interpreted in terms of “improved social security, of large-
scale economic developments and of financial reforms designed to 
stabilise employment” might, if these were sufficiently concrete and 
extensive, prove attractive to the Italian masses. But the Charter itself is 
couched in such general terms that without such interpretation it is 
bound to arouse that distrust to which I have already alluded.»1105 The 
PWE needed a solid piece of policy to counteract the increasing 
fascination for the Communist model. The value of the Beveridge Report 
was immediately caught by the information services: «first to use it to 
show that the real leadership in social ideas and the genuine “social 
dynamism” lies here, not in Germany; and secondly to use it as an 
example of the technique of social invention and efficient social 
engineering evolved by British democracy.»1106  
The PWE presented Beveridge’s text as a plan rather than a report, 
setting the tone that the British government already presented a 
thorough plan for social security, rather than some guidelines for the 
policy-makers. The main part of the translated versions of the report 
referred to the Beveridge Plan, as it is nicknamed also nowadays. The 
reference to the “plan” as a Government-sponsored paper allowed to 
overcome abroad the troubles that the War Cabinet had before the 
domestic public opinion and to show the British contribution to the 
reconstruction with proposals potentially applicable by all countries. 
Other three features of the report were underlined for the propaganda 
abroad: the relation between revolutionary social change and the 
continuity of the liberal environment and democratic institutions (the 
argumentation was explicitly directed against Nazi and Fascist 
systems, but implicitly casted against Soviet Russia); the report as part 
of a wider policy against mass unemployment; the universalistic and 
inclusive features of social security, opposed to the totalitarian regimes, 
                                                          
1105 Ibidem. 
1106 TNA, FO/T/172/2093, «Overseas Planning Committee (Special Issues Sub-Committee). 
Report of Beveridge Committee on Social Services. Treatment in Overseas Propaganda. 
23.11.1942», p. 3. Italics is mine, underlined in the original type-writing. 
426 
 
emphasising «the Plan’s impartial application to all classes of citizens, 
irrespective of their income level or former contributions, and 
irrespective of any political conditions whatever (in contrast e.g. to 
schemes in Nazi Germany which make a number of security benefits 
conditional on adherence to party doctrine by administering them 
through the Party).»1107 The PWE foreshadowed the creation of 
specialised editions for special groups: compendia, summaries and 
technical analysis on the report for the foreigner countries, which 
significantly contributed to foster the debate on social security after the 
war.  
The propaganda relied on the exploitation of all the media to 
reach the widest possible audience. The BBC, put under the 
coordination of the PWE, was considered the best way to «interpret 
Great Britain, British thought and the British way of life to Europe»,1108 
in a context where the most part of the population was cut off from the 
news of the “free world”. The propaganda on social security and 
employment policies was also spread and vulgarised though 
broadcastings:  
 
«The short-term and the long-term aims of British 
broadcasting to Europe and the best organisation to help us 
achieve those aims. The short-term aim is to assist the Allied 
forces to impose their will on the Axis countries and as 
quickly as possible at the cost of as few lives as possible. The 
long-term aim is to assist the British Government to impose 
their will on all countries and to win the peace, that is to 
bring about an ordered civilisation which is in accordance 
with British ideas, British values, and British needs. Britain’s 
right to struggle to this end is based on the two factors which 
have given her preeminent position in the world, her 
contributions to the ordered progress of mankind and her 
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determination and proved ability to defend that 
progress.»1109 
 
The British hegemony was identified with the progress of the 
world: «the Allies will certainly win the war, whether or not we 
continue to broadcast. We shall have enough tanks, planes and ships to 
do so. But when the peace comes, that is, when the struggle is 
translated into economic, political and other terms, and the word is 
more important than the bomb, broadcasting will be not an auxiliary 
weapon but one of Britain’s major weapons.»1110 
The propaganda to Italy increased in magnitude in 1943, when 
the invasion of the country approached.1111 The guidelines of the 
political warfare wanted to convince the Italian people that the Nazis 
could not shore up the Fascist regime and to persuade them that only 
by collaborating with the United Nations they could secure better 
standards of living and «some dignity and prosperity in the post-war 
world.».1112 Yet, social policy proposals had lesser relevance in the first 
phase of the military campaign.1113 Colonel Stevens – very well-known 
to the Italian audience as the voice of the broadcasts in Italian – 
suggested to undertake a more constructive propaganda grounded on 
the implementation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and on the 
inclusion of Italy in this process.1114 Massive social information was 
suggested since 1942 also by the regional directors for the propaganda 
in Italy, due to the peculiar features of the Fascist policy towards the 
industrial workers:  
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«Until the war this class received material benefits from 
Fascism and there is little or no evidence that the loss of 
political rights was resented except by a very small number 
of the workers. The war and the disastrous results of the 
blockade have robbed them of the material advantages At 
the same time the increasing bureaucratic control inseparable 
from war has brought home with a growing reality the 
essentially oppressive nature of the Totalitarian State. Fascist 
policy has always claimed to “go towards the people” and 
the tendency represented by this claim has been intensified 
in war-time, but in spite of this the fortunes reaped by 
leading gerarchi, the growing evidence of Fascist inefficiency 
and the increasing realization of the results of the present 
policy have all contributed to discredit the Regime. 
Discontent is known to be widespread and any propaganda 
able to bring home the truth of propositions outlined under 
aim A will increase this discontent. As regards aim B our 
propaganda will have less effect on this class, as e cannot at 
present develop this thesis on detailed and definite lines. In 
this connection I would point out the desirability of making 
available for the use of our propaganda to Italy (and 
elsewhere), all results of our own post-war planning as soon 
as they reach a form that can be made public.»1115 
 
The Allied relied on the support of the population after the 
armistice, as the civilians were expected to be hostile to the Germans.1116 
The presentation of detailed social reforms could help the British to 
reach the working classes. The task was not easy one as the Italian 
industrial working class «looks for a solution on Russian lines rather 
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than in terms of the Atlantic Charter.»1117 Similar considerations 
applied to peasantry and farm workers as well as intellectuals and 
progressive middle classes, who shared the fascination for the Russian 
model to the detriment of the Anglo-American solutions. The 
Information Offices for Italy pinned their hopes on the 
moderate/conservative middle class that could endorse the Atlantic 
Charter, which was the compromise solution in the social field. These 
classes were not considered necessarily democratic, yet they no longer 
supported the regime; the Allies relied on their fear of revolutionary 
drifts, then backing up the Anglo-American social projects.1118 The 
watchwords of social progress, democracy and the “four freedoms” of 
the Atlantic Charter were vague enough to potentially reach all social 
classes and political groups, besides the Communists. In the Anglo-
American new order Italy had a place; social progress and 
modernization could be achieved within the framework of newly 
shaped democratic institutions, as «in no European country more than 
Italy can the appeal of “the Century of the common man” be made 
effective: we can and must go beyond the internal social revolution, 
which, before the alliance with Nazism, took place under Fascism.»1119  
The Beveridge Report demonstrated to the Italians that the Allies 
ensured political, international, socio-economic security in post-war 
Europe.1120 They also provided a comprehensive vision that challenged 
                                                          
1117 Ivi. p.4. 
1118 The British services actually also gambled on the aspects of the Atlantic Charter more 
related to the international status and guarantees to Italy in the post-war world. See TNA, 
FO/898/164, «Plan of Political Warfare for Italy. Regional Director’s Appreciation. 20th 
January, 1942», p.3. 
1119 TNA, FO/898/165, «Cable from Washington to Mr. Carroll. Italian’s Section Comments 
on your Draft Italian Plan. 21st March, 1943», p.3. In the beginning, however, the PWE 
recommended to not withdraw the OND and other fascist institutions and policies in 
favour of the workers, TNA, FO/898/165, «Policy and Planning Committee. Principles for 
the Control of Information and Publicity Services during the First Stage of Occupation of 
Italy with Special Reference to Sicily and Sardinia», p.5; see also TNA, FO/898/165, «Plan 
for the Control of propaganda and Publicity in Italy after the Cessation of the hostilities 
and during a period of occupation. 26th July, 1943», p.10. 
1120 TNA, FO/898/167, «Political Warfare Executive. Italian Working Plan for the B.B.C. 
21st May, 1943», but the concept was recurrent in British dispatches and notes». 
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the Fascist institutions as well as Bolshevik perspective, which – 
according to the PWE – was identified by the vast majority of the 
Italian population, especially in the South, with the “chaos”.1121 With 
various shades, the topics of the British propaganda to Italy were 
addressed to the different socio-political sectors, which progressively 
decoupled from Fascism and the alliance with the Nazis.1122 The British 
propaganda widened the rift between the regime and the Italians, 
representing the Allies as liberating force that proposed social 
solidarity and economic security: 
 
«We know that the state of mind of the average Italian is 
largely a vacuum. If we seek to take away from him, as our 
negative task envisages, the present foundations of his life 
(and however corrupt, they do form a kind of foundation 
which he may not wish to lose), we must put something in its 
place. We must “project Britain”, emphasising both directly 
and by inference her future capacity as a leader of a new 
Europe. […] There is endless scope for informing our 
audience of British affairs, in particular those which have a 
striking counterpart in Italy. […] Give him the facts about 
British social insurance, for instance, and provided the 
presentation is correctly related to the known background of 
the listener, the comparison with the Fascist system suggests 
itself.»1123 
 
These lines of propaganda were expected to circulate primarily 
thanks to the broadcastings of the BBC, which the PWE defined the 
“voice of Britain”.1124 Its task was to show that even in the midst of the 
war the British were committed to social inclusiveness, so differently 
                                                          
1121 TNA, FO/898/166, «Political Warfare Executive. Basic Plan of political warfare against 
Italy – Spring 1943. 15th March, 1943». 
1122 TNA, FO/898/166, «Analysis of significant differences in cross-sections of the 
population. 1st March, 1943»; TNA, FO/898/167, «Information required for appreciation of 
Italy. 15th February, 1943». 
1123 TNA, FO/898/166, «Working Plan for Italy: Presentation», p.2. 
1124 ACS, Ministero della Cultura Popolare – Gabinetto, b. 143, fasc. 1004. 
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from the Fascist claims of having realized “the most advanced system 
of social protection”. The broadcasting not only presented the system of 
British values and institutions, but also that social progress could be 
“exported” abroad with the victory of the Allies. To the British social 
project and labour conditions were devoted various broadcastings from 
1942 to the end of the conflict, in the Italian speaking section, called 
Radio Londra; from December 1942 to March 1945, the BBC transmitted 
18 broadcasts on the British plans for social insurances and full 
employment,.1125 They mainly concerned the social situation in Britain 
and the political principles of the social reforms.  
Radio Londra presented Britain as a country that was coming 
out of the war fairer and more attentive to the “social question”; not 
only unemployment dramatically dropped, but the Anglo-Saxon 
countries also asserted that they fought a «people’s war, made to 
defend the people».1126 The Beveridge Report resulted from the popular 
mobilization, depicted as a «great social and political revolution».1127 
The second half of the broadcasts concerned the legislative process of 
the White Papers. The BBC presented the report and the governmental 
papers as two complementary aspects of a unitary reformist process, 
even if in reality they resulted from two distinguished – if not 
sometimes competing – processes. Radio Londra designed a 
contraposition between British social “revolutionary” reformism and 
the “totalitarian” social systems of the Axis: «England will soon 
implement a plan of compulsory social insurances, which aims at 
eradicating indigence and to ensure to its population an adequate 
economic standard of life and of social security. Vice versa, Italy is not 
come out yet of the catastrophe that ran over it.»1128  
The propaganda stressed the different mobilization occurred in 
Britain, which made “its” war revolutionary possible, with regard to 
                                                          
1125For an overview of the broadcastings of Radio London in Italy, see M. Piccialuti 
Caprioli, Radio Londra 1940- 1945. Inventario delle trasmissioni per l’Italia, Voll. 1 e II, Roma, 
Pubblicazioni degli Archivi Centrali di Stato, 1980, pp. VII-CXXXIII. 
1126L.Z. Zencovich, «Full Employment», Radio Londra, lst June 1944, 22.30. 
1127P. Treves, «Beveridge and the House», Radio Londra, 17th October 1944. 
1128L.Z. Zencovich, «Social Insurance», Radio Londra, 26th September 1944, 21.30. 
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Germany and Italy, which were condemned to lose the war. To win the 
popular masses over, the BBC actively fostered the imagine of a Britain 
that stood with social enhancement. Wide room was left to the Labour’s 
representatives’ speeches, giving the impression of a strong 
collaboration with the left-wing forces, comparable to the effective 
collaboration with the Resistance movements.1129 By 1943 the BBC 
propaganda via Radio Londra apparently reached only the urban 
bourgeoisie, in a smaller amount the young and the university 
students, and to an even lesser extent the working classes.1130 This 
observation was limited to the broadcasts in English, as further reports 
showed how «Colonel Stevens’s broadcasts (which are, of course, in 
Italian) have a tremendous following in all classes of the Italian 
people.»1131 The BBC reserved more detailed analysis of the social 
programmes for the broadcastings in English, considered the most 
suitable to project Britain to Europe to specific, educated, audiences.1132 
The topic of the social insurances was probably too complex for mass 
propaganda, which resulted in the vulgarisation of the main principles 
of the 1942-4 social reforms. Summaries were printed in the Italian 
territory for a narrower circulation; leaflets, pamphlets and booklets 
circulated more effectively only from the very last months of the war 
onwards.1133 
By the end of the war, the Allies relied on a variety of channels 
for the propaganda, including Radio Services and press under the 
control of the Psychological Warfare Board (PWB), publications in Italian 
language, wall newspapers, leaflets, books, propaganda shops, 
documentaries and photography, film production and distribution, 
                                                          
1129 TNA, FO//898/41, «General Directive. 30th April, 1944». 
1130 TNA, FO//898/41, «Extract from BBC Memorandum. From Mr. Shepley, Italian 
Intelligence Officer». 
1131 TNA, FO//898/41, «BBC Studies in European Audiences. The European Audience of 
British Broadcasts in English», p.10. 
1132 The broadcasts in English proved to be successful especially in the Nordic countries, 
where English was largely spread, and where the British tried to “persuade them that 
what they still believe to be Victorian England no longer exists”. Ivi. pp. 34-35. 
1133 See various copies and summaries in LSEA, Beveridge/8/58/3. 
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intelligence services.1134 This documentation kept circulating between 
1943 and the first years after the war; the summary and translation by 
Lord Davison, for instance, dated to 1945-6. This was a concise but 
nailed description of the British wartime reforms, accompanied by 
pictures and graphs, extremely intuitive in its understanding; it was the 
direct translation of the edition for the home front in Britain, and the 
same pamphlet was also published in French.1135 These publications 
followed the principle of propaganda on reconstruction, which aimed 
at presenting “objectively” British policies, to «devote much more time 
to the projection of British life and British ideas on the many political 
and social problems which interest both countries […] to debate 
general ideas, post-war problems, the working of democratic 
institutions, etc. In this feature, in particular, the greatest effort should 
be made to abolish any propaganda flavour.»1136  
The Northern Italian proletariat was not reached by the Anglo-
American propaganda, as the British services admitted in 1944. While 
registering the failure of the Fascist propaganda on the socializations, 
the Allies could not intercept their support neither with the 
propaganda nor with the assistance to the Resistance movement, 
regarded as ineffective; the sympathies of the workers, the PWE 
recognized, went to the Soviets.1137 The Allies encountered difficulties 
in fulfilling from the outset the promises of social security in Southern 
Italy. This problem, on a larger continental scale, could have affected 
                                                          
1134 TNA, FO/898/168, «Psychological Warfare Branch – Allied Force Headquarters. Re-
organisation of P.W.B. Italy. 11th January, 1945». 
1135 The British version was R. Davison, Social Security: The Story of British Social Progress 
and the Beveridge Plan, London, G.G. Harrap & Co., 1943; the translated versions are Id., 
Protezione sociale in Gran Bretagna : lo sviluppo dei servizi sociali in Gran Bretagna e il Piano 
Beveridge illustrato con diagrammi, London, G.G.Harrap & Co., 1944; Id., A l’abri du besoin 
en Grande-Bretagne, historique du progrès social en Grande-Bretagne et exposé du Plan 
Beveridge, London, G.G. Harrap & Co., 1944. 
1136 TNA, FO/898/168, «Letter from Mr. Bruce Lockhart to the British Embassy. 2nd 
December, 1944», p.1.  
1137 TNA,FO/898/168, «P.W.E. The political situation in Italy – Early March, 1944. 16th 
March, 1944». 
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the leadership that Britain wanted for itself.1138 The deepening of the 
British social security was matter of relatively smaller groups of 
experts, technicians, politicians and trade unionists; they were the 
prospected policy-makers after the war, and reach them was 
fundamental. Immediately after 1945, the social reforms put into 
practice by the Labour government were discussed in Italy. The debate, 
however, grounded on the wartime circulation and propaganda 
carefully operated by the British government and services. While the 
PWE and the other offices of the MOI did not successfully reach the 
mass of the workers, the ruling classes in charge of the political and 
economic reconstruction could simply not ignore the British experience. 
The spread of the Beveridge Report to these actors would have been 
extremely fruitful, especially in the elaborations after the war. 
  
7.2. The Beveridge Report and its circulation 
The Fascist reception of the Beveridge Report 
The War Cabinet devoted particular attention to the 
dissemination of the plans of social security in Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy; copies, translations, and schemes were addressed to 
personalities, parties, movements.1139 Fascist and Nazi establishments 
reacted to the British propaganda. Two Nazi dispatches on the report 
were found in Hitler’s bunker after the end of the war, providing two 
distinguished views on the British reforms. The first compared the 
British and German systems of social insurances, while the second 
recommended some guidelines to contrast it in the most efficient 
manner.1140  
The first document was written for internal circulation; the note 
explicitly admitted that «the Beveridgeplan is superior to the present 
                                                          
1138 TNA, FO/898/168, «Letter from Roger Makins to the Allied Force Headquarters. 6th 
January, 1944». 
1139 N. Timmins, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State, London, HarperCollins, 
1995, p.25. 
1140 LSEA, Beveridge/8/59, «First German Views on the Beveridge Report. 17/7/61». Both 
the original German documents are attached to the note. 
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German Social Insurance at nearly all points.»1141 Its scope and benefits 
overwhelmed the current German system, which was occupational and 
protected especially the lower incomes; the Beveridge Report instead 
prefigured the universal coverage of all citizens, with equal 
contributions and the increasing role of the State in the founding. The 
second document concerns Nazi counterpropaganda, which suggested 
to not deal with the topic unless the relevance of the plan would have 
assumed vital importance.1142 Otherwise, the counterattack should 
stress that the report was the smokescreen to cover the real war-aims of 
Britain; that within the British society there was no consensus on the 
reforms; that Germany already had a 50 years old system of social 
insurances, while Britain had to wait for the war to address the “social 
question”. Nazi’s main argument, as expected by the MOI, underlined 
that the Beveridge Report borrowed German ideas and policies, and 
redeployed Britain to the Third Reich’s policies.  
This guideline was retained by the German propaganda. The 
Italian translations of a Nazi booklet attributed to the Minister for 
Propaganda Goebbels scrupulously followed the directive of the 
German counterpropaganda set up in 1943. The document stated that 
«the national-socialist State […] was not born during wartime due to 
merely propaganda aims, as the Charters and Beveridge plans, etc. to 
get left in the dust after the war.»1143 The British social provisions were 
overshadowed by the German “Socialist State”, as «England is by far 
the least socially progressed country in the world.»1144 The war opposed 
Nazi Germany and Anglo-American on the field of the confrontation 
between the old laissez-faire and the new “socialist” European order. 
The Nazi social policy addressed the “social question” not with the 
British pro-capitalist palliatives, but overhauling the labour 
relationships: «despite all the repressive measures of the British 
government, the British workers strike because they know that during 
                                                          
1141 LSEA, Beveridge/8/59, «Annexe to PLS – Nr. 363/43 g. Basic Facts Relative to the 
Beveridge Plan. S.d.». 
1142 LSEA, Beveridge/8/59, «Annexe to PLS – Nr. 363/43 g. S.d.». 
1143 J. Goebbels, Nostro Socialismo, Trieste, Deutscher Adria-Verlag G.m.h.H., 1944, p.1. 
1144 Ivi. p.6.  
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the war, even more than in peacetime, they are exploited from their 
ruling classes and deprived of their most elementary rights. The 
German workers, instead, had no reason to strike at all. This war is his 
war; it is fought also and above all for the social progress of his 
country.»1145 Also the Nazi propaganda imaginary identified war and 
social enhancement, and the effort of the workers with the war effort. 
As suggested in the internal directives, the Nazi propaganda avoided 
specific references to detailed points of the report, and focused on 
vaguer comparisons: 
 
«Some months ago, in England, there has been a lot of talk 
about the so-called Beveridge plan. That plan did not contain 
nothing more, but far less than the Bismarckian social 
legislation of the end of the last century. The assumptions of 
the Beveridge plan were already indisputable realities in the 
Whilelmine Germany, that is, when in England the kids still 
worked in the mines with 14 straight hours. If England 
adopted this line during this Second World War, it made it 
only to achieve what Bismarck implemented 60 years earlier. 
But the English plutocracy was not even capable of achieving 
these outcomes. The Beveridge Plan was debated with 
overblown seriousness in the Chamber of the Lords and the 
English press celebrated it as the Magna Charta of social 
progress, but then the business assurances intervened with 
their veto and the social project, baptized with such a lot of 
talk, miserably ended in the bin.»1146 
 
The Nazi narrative grounded on the confrontation between two 
socio-economic models, where the Allies merely came on the Nazi 
positions. The Nazis rejected the principles of the British social security, 
defined a “comedy” as they historically spread individualism and 
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1146 Ivi. p.7. 
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social inequality, which the Nazi revolution opposed.1147  
In Italy, the Fascist establishment reacted in a similar manner. 
There is no documentary proof of specific directives to response to the 
Beveridge Report, but the Italian government was likely to have early 
access to the report.1148 The presence of translated copies were part of 
the circulation of ideas and projects, like the studies on the European 
wartime social legislation or the pamphlets to propagandize the Nazi 
social legislation.1149 In 1942, the INFPS set up special committee to 
carry out a study «on the laws and on the regulatory system as far as 
the social provisions into force in Europe are concerned and on the 
results achieved from the social, moral, and financial point of view, on 
the trends manifested in Europe for the reform of the current systems, 
on the single issues shown up to the attention of the scholars.»1150 The 
committee included the higher representatives of the Fascist social 
agencies and workers’ organization. It was part of the «remarkable 
flowering of institutions and initiatives of this kind; study centres for 
the social and economic post-war settlement are set up.»1151 It mainly 
collected information and legislation concerning the social reforms 
abroad, and provided timely information on the project for after the 
war in each country. The network of observers, committees, labour 
organizations and civil servants helps to explain how the plans 
circulated across the continent.1152  
                                                          
1147 F.O.H. Schulz, Komödie der Freiheit. Die Sozialpolitik der grossen Demokratien, Wien, 
Wilhelm Frick Verlag, 1940, pp. 5-154. 
1148 In the archives of the INPS is stored the complete typescript translation of the 
Beveridge Report. It has not be possible to retrace the office and the date of the translation, 
as there are not notes or other attachments. However, this was clearly a copy for internal 
distribution. INPS, «Assicurazioni sociali e servizi connessi. Rapporto di Sir William Beveridge, 
s.d.». 
1149 B. Biagi, La legislazione sociale di guerra, pp. 9-41; P. Pini, La politica sociale in Germania, 
Roma, Uesisa, 1941; The Nazis published some translations for the Italian audience on the 
condition of the German workers, and the social features of the Volkgemeinschaft, see H. 
Schulz and L. Heyde, La politica sociale del Terzo Reich, Roma, Thule Italia, 2014. 
1150INPS, «Verbali Comitato Esecutivo INFPS del 10 giugno 1942», pp. 7-10. 
1151Ibidem. 
1152 Unfortunately, there are no returns on the effective activities of this committee. 
However, this committee probably worked, at least by collecting data on the social 
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While the Beveridge Report was propagandized with the 
massive use of broadcastings, there are no documentary evidences of 
counterpropaganda campaigns with the mass-media. The EIAR, the 
Italian broadcast service, the military services , and even the Fascist 
news-agency Stefani did not emphasize too much the Beveridge Report, 
nor did they stress these aspects later.1153 Yet, the Beveridge Report was 
well-known; the newspapers and the more specialized press devoted 
great attention to it, belittling its scope; these articles were mainly 
summaries of the plan or commentaries regurgitating propaganda 
statements. The major criticisms did not depart from the German 
directives: the conservative features and limited scope of the report 
with regard to Italian social legislation; the propagandistic nature of the 
watchwords of the plan. Other elements were instead more typical of 
the Fascist general anti-British propaganda: the expansion of the British 
social security at the expense of the colonies; the emphasis on the 
“ideological war” between traditional imperialist powers and 
“younger” proletarian nations.1154 Later, the regime tried to highlight 
the cleavage between the promises of the Allied for social 
enhancement, and the difficulties to implement them in occupied 
Southern Italy. For the Fascist propaganda, this proved that the Anglo-
Americans entered the war to overthrow Fascist social achievements.  
Besides propagandistic trivialization, the Beveridge Report was 
object of more reasoned analyses in the specialist press of the regime. 
The President of the INFPS, Riccardo Del Giudice, developed the main 
“technical” argumentations against it. His analysis moved from the 
assumption that the plan was inherently conservative and tied to the 
need to strengthen the home front. It was conjunctural, without in-
depth elaborations on the historical changes occurred in the interwar 
                                                                                                                               
legislation abroad, as the commission was mentioned in the minutes of the INFPS under 
the RSI. INPS, «Delibere Commisariali Uffici RSI – Dicembre 1943, “Compenso ai 
componenti il Comitato di Studio peri problemi della Previdenza sociale del 27.12.1942-
XXII n.4”». 
1153ACS, MINCULPOP, RSI - Servizio Ascolto Radio Estere. 
1154 «Un cavallo di troia», Costruire – Rivista Mensile di Pensiero e di Azione Fascista, 
n.1/1943, pp. 12-13; see also the notes contained in ACS, SPDRSICR, 19/111/1, «Nota della 
Corrispondenza repubblicana – Churchill il conservatore. 18 marzo 1945». 
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period. The report misinterpreted the real nature of the “social 
question”, and how to address it. Social security was not a mere issue 
of economic stability or minimal income, but: 
 
«an important problem of moral liberty, which overcomes 
the boundaries of every social legislation and point at a 
radical transformation of the society and of its economic 
and political organization, since the formal liberty of the 
liberalism and the abstract equality of the democracy [...], 
let the majority under the serfdom of a substantial economic 
and social inequality. The Beveridge Plan moved from such 
a society, but does not aim at transforming it, and yet tries 
to safeguard it against the danger of the transformation, with 
a conservative and capitalistic program of social 
security.»1155 
 
The Beveridge Report did not redistribute wealth, but simply 
restructured the financial budget of social security, which Del Giudice 
pretended being even lower than the current annual Italian budget for 
social insurances. The flat-rate insurance was considered at the same 
time useless for the higher incomes, and – not without good reasons – a 
tool to weaken the redistributive capacity of the social protection. The 
principles of uniformity and universality failed both in providing social 
equality and in the effective usefulness to meet the needs of each social 
class. Del Giudice recognized that the Beveridge Report was part of a 
wider trend of unification and rationalization of compulosry insurance. 
But instead of implementing a system that could secure progressive 
contributions based on different incomes and contributory 
simplification, the report suggested simpler solution that neglected 
some of the core issues of modem social legislations. According to Del 
Giudice, Fascism tackled the same historical problem from a fairer 
point of view; without furnishing evidence, he declared that Fascism 
was moving towards the funding of the social insurance with the State 
                                                          
1155 R. Del Giudice, «Il Piano Beveridge “dalla culla alla bara”», Assicurazioni Sociali, n. 
l/1943, pp. 1-17, p. 13. 
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budget. This exempted workers and employers from the fiscal burdens 
of their own social protection, as this was a matter of national social 
cohesion.  
The Beveridge Report failed in understanding the new function 
of the social insurances; Fascism wanted them embedded within a 
broader reorganization of the structures and institutions of the State. 
The report still framed social insurances within the liberal capitalistic 
State, while in Fascist Italy social protection was part of the 
“corporative revolution”. As a consequence, the Beveridge Report «as a 
whole, is to be rejected, because it represents a step backwards in the 
politics and technique of the social insurances, because it testifies the 
too egalitarian and materialistic conception of the mankind and of the 
society, because it results in a charitable paternalism, which is linked to 
the legal charity of the non-contributory pensions, rather than the deep 
social transformation in the making nowadays.»1156 Some principles 
were nonetheless accepted: unification of services and authorities; 
creation of a national healthcare system; rationalization of contribution 
and benefits. Del Giudice saw in these measures the acknowledgement 
of the correctness of the German and Italian “totalitarian” policies. 
Fascist Italy was moving to similar solutions since the ‘30s; the 
institution of the EMF, he claimed, already had some embryonic 
elements of the unified healthcare service on national basis.  
The former Minister of the Economy, De Stefani, made similar 
analyses. He criticized the limits in addressing the economic structures 
and the material bases of pauperism. The irrelevancy of the report, in 
line with the traditional British approach to the “social question”, was 
already solved by the Fascist social provisions; Beveridge «did not face 
[...] this issue in economic terms and he only mentions them 
superficially at the very end of his report; otherwise he would have 
dealt with a systemic problem that would have led him directly to 
recognise [...] the right and the duty to work, which constitute the 
consequential development of the corporative regimes.»1157 Like Del 
                                                          
1156 Ivi. p. 16. 
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Giudice, De Stefani also thought that the British report was part of a 
historic moment in social policy, where Fascists had the lead as they 
foresaw a system of social contributions based on the family units 
instead of the individual wage.1158 The British and Fascist social 
insurances differed in the ultimate goals rather than in the technical 
and administrative practices. While the Beveridge Report limited itself to 
the “freedom from want”, the Fascist social protection overcame the 
simple material needs, aiming at creating spiritual solidarity among the 
national community. To him, here laid the main ideological difference 
between Fascism and Liberalism; for the Fascists, the social insurances 
were not «a tool to secure the social rest in favour of capitalism or to 
allow its conservation, but they represent the corporative idea in the 
making in one of its specific sectors.»1159  
All in all, Fascist criticisms failed in identifying the real extent 
of the Anglos-Saxon turn in social policy; the British plans, indeed, 
equally considered the social insurance only a part of a deeper renewal 
of the public policies (NHS and family allowances, full employment, 
housing, social services, urban, industrial and agricultural planning). 
The inaccuracy of De Stefani’s criticisms can only partially be explained 
by the fact that, in 1942, the War Cabinet had not published the papers 
on employment policy yet. Also the British social reformers were 
perfectly aware of the “economic dimension” of social security, and 
they also framed the whole plan of social insurances within a 
“reformed capitalism”; the British projects of social security became 
gradually part of a wider plan of structural reform of economy and 
society.  
Slightly less ideologically biased were the contributions of the 
Catholic groups. They were not-aligned to the regime’s “orthodoxy”, as 
they endorsed the Catholic Social Doctrine. To these milieus were close 
some of the most prominent figure of the post-war left-wing Christian 
democrats, as for Amintore Fanfani, future Minister of Labour and 
Social Security from 1947 to 1950. The Catholics also framed the report 
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in the wider tendency towards the nationalization of social insurances. 
Britain had the lead in this process thanks to its imperial role, as it 
could drop the fiscal burden to the colonies. Social policies were – not 
incorrectly – linked to power politics, because the increase of British 
wealth was achievable only retaining the exploitation of other nations. 
This was one of the watchwords of the Fascist propaganda against the 
Anglo-American “plutocracies”, and one of the reasons why the 
Fascists pretended to be at war: the redefinition of the international 
power relations to ensure the access to the resources to the new 
“proletarian Nations”, to such an extent that «the war against Britain is 
the war of the proletarians.»1160 They also caught the attempt of 
Beveridge’s proposal to advocate to the State most of the tasks, which 
previously were the prerogative of a vast associative network. The 
project tended to the extensions of State’s power; it was not 
“totalitarian” in the Fascist sense of the term, but it showed nonetheless 
how the paradigm in the public policies shifted even in what was 
considered the most liberal European country: 
 
«Indeed, the attempt to embed to the State ail the individual 
interests, and specifically those of the most numerous and 
centrifugal working categories, has its own logic; it is about 
to tie to the interest of the State’s structure the interests of 
all, including those of the underprivileged, merging them 
with the State’s policy, and taking them away from the 
control of the Trade-Unions, by opening different providers 
of many and generous forms of social security and social 
assistance. That project of the public central machine 
administrating day-to-day as much milliard every year as 
they are administrated by the government of a wartime 
Great Power, looks like the authentic product of a 
contractual, materialistic mentality; it is antithetic to the 
idealistic, moral, historical concept of Nation, in a 
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totalitarian contractual relationship, which ties ail the 
citizens and the residents to the political-economic System, 
since ail would have interest not to lose something, and 
thus to support and strengthen the System.»1161 
 
The general Fascist view on the Beveridge Report combined 
ideologically biased assumptions and good insights on the “historical 
context” that gave birth to the British plans, e.g. for the renewed 
importance on the role of the State. Just on this last point and on the 
comparison with the Italian provisions that Fascist critiques lost most 
of their argumentations. De Stefani and Del Giudice identified the 
unification of the contributions and the funding between employers 
and workers in Britain with the Fascist system; in fact, the Beveridge 
Report established the crucial role of the State, much more important 
than in the Italian social insurances. De Stefani, like Del Giudice, also 
claimed that Fascism was moving towards more advanced solutions, as 
for the full financing of the insurances with State budget. In fact, not 
even during the “revolutionary” RSI, Fascism conceived an overhaul of 
the compulsory schemes comparable to the British one, as the reforms 
rather foreshadowed the shifting of contributory burden to the 
employers. The Fascists could proclaim the “superiority” of their 
system only by putting forward ideological points. 
In that regard, the harshest campaign against the British plans 
was carried out by the Critica Fascista. This fortnightly review, possibly 
one of the more relevant in the Fascist press, had a keen interest for the 
social matters. Especially during the war, it accentuated its anti-British 
positions; the contraposition with the British model apparently was 
even more radical than the anticommunism.1162 Bottai himself related 
the success of what he defined the corporatist «social and economic 
revolution»1163 to the “total war” against the Anglo-Americans: «the 
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Anglo-Saxon liberalism and democracy are a doctrine and a philosophy 
to be exported. They are, within a country, or within a coalition of 
countries, an economic policy. Freedom in economy never means 
freedom for all, but freedom for the richest, for the strongest. 
Liberalism is, indeed, the economic policy of the wealthiest nations: the 
class policy of the richest nations against the poorer ones.»1164 Bottai 
dialectically compared, as socio-economic and political model, the 
Anglo-Saxon democracy «unable to solve the issue of the social 
justice»,1165  with the Nazi-Fascist new order, since «the Anglo-Saxons’ 
defence of the democracy became inert and unsuccessful facing the 
revolutionary war carried out by the Axis Powers.»1166 This 
confrontation, according to him, marked in any case the Fascist  victory 
over liberalism. The Allies could never come back to the older laissez-
faire, as proved by the 1942 report, defined «reluctantly Fascist».1167 The 
plan of social reforms borrowed the main Fascist social protection, from 
family allowances to disability insurances, from unemployment 
benefits to old-age pensions.  
The Critica Fascista considered the report more limited than the 
Fascist provisions. The flat-rate contributory guaranteed the “freedom 
from want” through the equal contribution of all the population to 
indemnify the workers/citizens who lost income. The Fascist 
compulsory insurances imposed equal provisions for income-related 
contributions of the insured. This feature of the Italian legislation – 
which in reality was the legacy of the liberal occupational schemes – 
marked the political difference between the two social systems, as the 
Fascist social policies pointed at «enacting the wealth redistribution 
outside the scope and even the goals of the British project.»1168 The 
Beveridge Report was accused of having a low level of redistribution; 
however, this was not the primary goal of the plan but a secondary 
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effect of the social services funded by general taxation. The British 
social reformers delegated the tasks to create more social equality to 
other policies, while the report addressed the issue of the minimum 
vital income. The lack of understanding of the real aims of the plan 
helps to explain the Fascist criticism. The design of the Beveridge Report 
excluded more radical redistributive options, whereas «the social 
insurances are in Italy only one aspect, an attempt within a wider 
project of redistribution of the national income.» 1169 The British reforms 
were inherently limited by a very poor social justice and by a lack of 
any redistributive principle, inbred to their own “universalistic” 
coverage: «the differences between the two systems: the English one 
tends to insure everything and everyone, and thus necessarily to water 
down the benefits of the social insurances, while ours [the Italian n.d.a.] 
to concentrate the advantages of the social security explicitly to the 
working class.»1170  
The administrative rationalization was considered a Fascist 
measure borrowed by the British, as for the management of the 
contributions by a single public authority. The State equal contribution 
in the funding of the social insurances and the moderate redistribution 
through the general revenue were not as effective as the “direct” 
redistribution implemented by the Fascist State (which, in turn, was 
involved to a lesser extent in the funding of the insurances 
contributions). This was the case for the funding of the ONMI via the 
tax on the celibates, a disposed provision of social solidarity and 
demographic politics. Last, the unification of the categories and of the 
contributions represented «the last improvement of the principle of risk 
coverage»;1171 but in 1942 the Fascist government already put into 
practice similar principles of administrative rationalization, like the 
reduction of the costs and the simplification of the services, by the 
unification of the work-related injuries within the INFAIL and by the 
creation of the EMF for sickness benefits.  
The revue Politica Sociale carried out one of the most detailed 
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critiques of the Beveridge Report. The plot did not differ from the usual 
topics, but the magazine captured the link between the British reforms, 
the war and the importance assumed by social policy in the 
confrontation between Allied and Axis, as well as between capitalism 
and Communism.1172 The assessment on the Beveridge Report, however, 
was more articulated, as Politica Sociale distinguished the technical 
aspects of the plan from the socio-political doctrine underpinning the 
report. From a technical point of view, the set of provisions was 
regarded favourably. The review recognized that – after fifty years of 
incremental social policy – the national legislations came to a common 
ground on the administrative practices and coverage of the social 
protection: unemployment benefits, family allowances, old-age 
pensions became standard policy in all advanced countries in Europe. 
These trends seemed to be relentless, even if the Fascists claimed to 
have the primacy in this shift.1173  
What really distinguished the Italian legislation from the 
Anglo-Americans was the political rationale behind the reforms. 
According to the revue, in the capitalist societies with liberal and 
democratic institutions, social policy accompanied the growth of the 
quantitative and qualitative weight of the industrial classes. The Anglo-
American ruling classes were accused of tackling the “social question” 
only from the material point of view: «the social insurances as such 
imply paternalism or opportunism, and a purely materialistic content, 
which suggest this conservative concerns that clearly affect the 
Beveridge plan.»1174 Fascism, on the contrary, integrated the working 
classes on a different level; alongside social insurances, the regime also 
set up the institutions to frame the workers in the State’s structure. The 
main goal of the regime was to redefine the role of the workers in the 
life of the nation, that is, to solve the “social question” from the moral, 
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political and institutional points of view. While the Anglo-American 
plans merely mitigated the social struggle, Fascism solved the class’ 
antagonism through “social collaboration”: 
 
«The social question, which, after a first essentially political 
phase of servants’ uprising, dragged without ideals and 
outcomes on a purely and pettily economic ground, as for 
the claims for higher wages even at the risk of drying the 
sources of the income. [The social question] is eventually 
overcome by an established social order that composes the 
conflicting interests in a system of equilibrium and social 
justice, which are not enforced from the outside, but derived 
from within, from the same organization of the productive 
forces of the Nation.»1175 
 
This approach encompassed all the aspects of modern social 
policy: the economic side (social protection) and the socio-political 
organization (the juridical framework of labour relations).1176 The 
corporatist model, with which Fascism identified its social policy, was 
in the narrative of the regime at the very foundation of the new 
European order, but «logically found the uncompromising opposition 
of the plutocratic countries, where under the surface of the very 
abstract principle of freedom and equality, typical lie of the demo-
liberal regimes, the wildest egoisms dominate, and the capitalist forces 
took over, in fact, the State.»1177 The defence and expansion of this 
model constituted, for the Fascist propaganda, the very core of the 
conflict. The war involved three blocks that represented as many ways 
to address the “social question”. Against Anglo-Saxon liberalism and 
Soviet Communism, «the Fascist and Nazi social regimes represent, 
with their concrete provisions, the dawn of a new conception of social 
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relations.»1178  
As the Fascist pretended to have set in motion a social 
revolution, they accused the Beveridge Report to be a tool of war 
propaganda, set up with a conservative scope. As the war polarised, 
such argumentation became stronger. The Fascist revolution, even in 
the event of military defeat, settled down in European history and 
culture: «we believe in the necessity of the overcoming of the supposed 
democracy of the 19th century (ideological and juridical fiction for the 
benefit of the strongest and the richest) into a real democracy resulting 
from the organization of all the social functions, [...] the most deeply 
innovative and closer to the contemporary social life revolutionary 
achievement, coming from the social and economic experience of the 
last century until the First World War, including of course 
Marxism.»1179 Fascism embodied the Zeitgeist and the social changes, 
while Britain was affected by the 19th century ideological paradigms, 
still permeating politics and society: «this conception according to 
which the individual is still at the very centre of the community, this 
later being conceived not like an organism with a value per se, but 
rather as a number of individuals.»1180 The Fascist understanding of the 
British social reforms, at the very bottom, moved along the line of the 
contraposition between corporatism and liberalism; the ideological 
premises of the Beveridge Report identified the common welfare with the 
individual interests and with the strengthening of the democratic 
institutions: «plan of social insurances tends to secure the individual, 
and, as a consequence, the State.» 1181 While the Fascist social policies 
resulted from a revolutionary process that pointed at shortening the 
social distance, the Beveridge Report was the product of the conservative 
liberal thought that crystallized the social inequalities: 
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«In fact, there is no social evolution, and certainly not the 
“shortening of the distances”: that is because the project, if it 
will be ever implemented, prefigures the compulsoriness of 
the insurances for all: from the plutocrat to the miners. The 
project, after all, does not tend to solve at ail the real social 
crisis that upsets Britain, that is, the permanent 
unemployment. [...] As can be seen, it is always the criteria 
centred on the individuals, and not that of society, to be the 
guiding principle of the project.»1182 
The accuse to secure the old-fashioned laissez-faire liberalism 
had mostly ideological reasons. Social security rejuvenated capitalism 
with political concessions to the working class and with social benefits 
to the citizens. In the Fascist analysis, this retained the capitalist 
exploitation with residual forms of social protection: «it is just 
impossible to eradicate the social ills generated by a certain system, 
without eradicating the system, which generated them».1183 The Fascists 
accused the report to not indicate structural solutions to 
unemployment. The Fascists probably underestimated the interwar 
debate in Britain on this matter and neglected the British social 
legislation against unemployment after the Great Depression. Shortly 
thereafter made their appearance two other important documents for 
the British projection abroad: The Full Employment in a Free Society and 
the White Paper on Employment Policy, whose translated copies are 
stored in the archives of the RSI.1184  
 With the transition to the RSI, the ways to counter the efficient 
means of the Anglo-American propaganda diminished.1185 The regime 
was unable to counter the Anglo-Saxon propaganda on social security. 
In their speeches, the RSI hierarchs often mentioned the British social 
                                                          
1182 Ivi. p. 12. 
1183Ivi., p. 12. 
1184 ACS, SPDRSICR/47/506, «Libro Bianco Inglese»; ACS, SPD - BVBM, «Bollettino n. 158 
- D.P. 6 giugno 1944-XXII». 
1185 ACS, MinCulPop – Gabinetto, b. 143, fasc. 1001, «EIAR». 
450 
 
reforms, without providing any consistent fresh insight to attack them, 
but rather regurgitating the older watchwords, accusing the British to 
not have implemented the promises of reconstruction, social security 
and freedom announced via broadcasting and pamphlets.1186 The 
“plutocratic” restoration in Southern Italy was exemplified by the anti-
labour legislation and the lack of social reforms in the Badoglio 
government. The republican propaganda played on the theme of the 
capitalist plundering war to avoid the affirmation of Fascism as 
alternative model to capitalist imperialism; a war against the Fascist 
social policy, as «the plutocracy was terrified of the “higher social 
justice” announced on several occasions by the Duce.»1187 Recurrent 
topic was the confrontation between social models at the very 
foundation of the war. The Anglo-Saxons would have merely restored 
the older order and the social security concealed the dismantling of 
Fascist social protection.  
The feeble counterpropaganda of the regime could not offset the 
massive Anglo-American campaign. The RSI could not even boast of 
the social policies deployed throughout twenty years to garner the 
consensus of the social classes that by 1943 had already turned their 
back on Fascism. Mussolini’s considerations on the silence (abroad and 
at home) about the Fascist social insurances, allowances, and 
authorities in front of the wartime British reforms sounded – in 
hindsight – like a concession speech.1188 It was as if the Fascist 
establishment trapped itself inside the house of cards built throughout 
the years. They received the British reforms through the lens of 
ideology. They compared them not only to the effective provisions 
enacted by the regime, but mostly in terms of the contraposition 
between socio-economic systems. They could not propose a credible 
alternative that could garner the consensus of wider strata of the 
population, and found themselves isolated and disconnected by the 
opinion and by the most innovative ideas in the field of social security, 
as well as by the spread of Communism. 
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The “transnational total war” and social policies 
 On both sides, the perception was to be involved in a total 
conflict, in the sense that the war encompassed all the aspects of the 
societies. Both the British and the Nazis mobilized their societies from 
the ideological point of view, even before and even more than in 
“structural” terms.1189 To a lesser extent, Italian Fascism and the Vichy 
regime tried to do the same; social policy was part of a “trans-national” 
ideological confrontation. The socio-economic reforms accompanied 
the deployment of power politics, and the unity of the home fronts 
provided the evidence to “fight the good fight”. 
 The Anglo-Americans established the main principles that 
drove their action in the Atlantic Charter; the Beveridge Report itself 
borrowed the lexicon from the conjoint document, which also fixed the 
linchpins of the 1944 White Papers. Its aim was to «bring about the 
fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the 
object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic 
advancement, and social security. [...] after the final destruction of Nazi 
tyranny, [...] all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in 
freedom from fear and want.»1190 The document foreshadowed the 
creation of international organizations to ensure social security at home 
and trade co-operation abroad. The Atlantic Charter designed a post-
war settlement opposed to the Nazi New Order drafted by the 
economic Ministries in Berlin. Although the Germans did not have 
univocal plans for the post-war settlement yet, the Nazi Empire –in the 
first years of the war – could rely on a relatively wide collaboration in 
the occupied countries, fostered by important parts of the 
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establishments and public opinions.1191 The core of the New Order was 
the hierarchical collaboration of the European nations under 
Germany’s leadership; its social content was rather vague, without a 
coherent plan of social policy. Until 1942-4, however, also the Allies did 
not provide a consistent agenda, as the formulations of the Atlantic 
Charter were as vague as the Nazi-Fascist rhetoric.1192  
The Anglo-American document resulted from the previous 
elaborations of national and international organisms. In the same time, 
it decisively affected the orientations of organizations such as the 
International Labour Office (ILO), which endorsed the new proposals.1193 
In 1940, ILO moved its central bureau to Montreal, aligning with the 
Allies; among London, Washington and Montreal flew reports and 
ideas that fuelled the projects of social security.1194 The key concepts of 
the Beveridge Report resulted from the mutual exchange between the 
British policy legacy, the experiences of the countries of the so-called 
“Anglosphere” and the mediation by ILO experts.1195 The works of the 
British government on reconstruction usually went hand in hand with 
the American corresponding plans.1196  
Between 1943 and 1944, the new “ideology” of social security 
was adopted by the international organizations that were expected to 
hold the fate of the new world led by the (Anglo-)Americans: the 
“consensus” linked freedom to social security and greater economic co-
operation (one of the prerequisites at the basis of the 1944 White Paper 
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on Employment).1197 The British plans were the most known documents 
that fixed detailed policies inspired by the new principles. The social 
welfare state intermingled with the new international order and the 
leadership over “Western Europe”, which assumed specific features 
and converging policies under the impetus of the US, in the framework 
of a future confrontation against the USSR.1198 The implications of the 
Atlantic Charter had important knock on effects on British society at 
war. Not that much in terms of direct propaganda; rather, its principles 
met the climate and hopes of important sectors of British society, which 
saw WWII as the ultimate confrontation between two irreconcilable 
models of society. This mind-set was equal and opposite to the rhetoric 
of the Axis powers.  
The impact of the war events on social policy changes was 
cleverly amplified by the messages of the most important 
governmental representatives. The designated Minister of Social 
Insurances, the Laborite Jowitt, celebrated the Beveridge Report in these 
terms: «at a stage in this war when we stood all alone Mr. Greenwood 
appointed a committee to investigate this matter. […] I do claim that 
the government is entitled to its fair share of credit in that among all 
the preoccupations of the war they have found time to address 
themselves to this fundamental problem.»1199 The Minister of 
Education, the Conservative R.A.B. Butler considered that «the great 
scheme the House was debating was not an entirely new plan but a 
logical development of a peculiarly British social experiment. […] 
which involved a great new experiment in social democracy, and 
which would be some recompense for the effort and strain of war. I 
believe that no other country in the world has been able to introduce 
such a vast programme of social reform as we have, and, at the same 
time, defeat one of the greatest tyranny that has ever faced us in our 
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history.»1200 As the Home Secretary Morrison underlined, the White 
Papers marked a qualitative leap in the aims of the social insurances:  
«the proposals embodied in the White Paper constituted a 
revolutionary advance in the whole structure of the 
workmen’s compensation administration, which was 
fundamentally Victorian in its conception and out of keeping 
with modern ideas. The main and truly revolutionary feature 
of the new scheme is that, for the first time, it transfers to the 
community as a whole the responsibility for the casualties of 
industry, and I think and hope that the House will agree that 
it is right that the responsibility for the casualties of industry 
should rest broadly and firmly upon the community as a 
whole.»1201  
 
While the “epic” of the British lonely confrontation against the 
Nazis was more a matter of “memory” than “reality”, the war had a 
deep impact in public mind. The figure of William Temple, Archbishop 
of Canterbury between 1942 and 1944, is quite indicative in this sense. 
He studied in Oxford and was closer to the Labour in the 1930s, and his 
whole life belonged to the sector of the Anglican Church attentive to 
the social reforms.1202 Few months before the publication of the 
Beveridge Report, he wrote one of the most important manifestos of the 
British welfare state, Christianity and Social Order.1203 Temple criticized 
the former economic order and opposed the Nazi warfare state.1204 He 
claimed for economic measures to support families, as well as policies 
against unemployment and economic insecurity, considered «the worst 
evil afflicting the working class in England».1205 He also wanted a more 
important role of the labour in the economic and industrial life, 
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through advisory co-joint authorities and national-scale planning, built 
upon wartime organisms.1206 Temple’s proposals were a compromise 
between the a fairer control of the means of production and the 
retention of democratic freedoms:  
 
«Actual Freedom is realized in fellowships of such a kind 
and size that the individual can take a living share in their 
activities. [...] This has led some Christian social reformers to 
favour the ideals of the “Corporative State”. But this swings 
the pendulum too far. [...] every man is always more than can 
be expressed in all his social relationships taken together. 
The scheme of the Corporative State is therefore as 
unsatisfactory as either Individualism or Communism. Yet it 
contains some truth, as do the other two also.»1207 
 
Temple was one of the first public figures to use the word 
welfare state in opposition to the Nazi power state.1208 His action was 
important in the spreading of the British debate on social policy, and, 
together with the coeval Beveridge Report, generated huge popular 
support for wartime reforms. Greenwood, one of the kingmakers of the 
Beveridge Committee, openly stated that without the war no political 
room would have been there for the unity required to implement such 
vast plan of social security. “Total war” did not merely orient the 
government towards new social policies. It was also a matter of a give-
and-take relationship between State and citizenship. A promise 
subscribed by the government during wartime, which could not be 
betrayed after the war: «we have shown to the world the quality of our 
people, and I think we are right to be proud of the quality of the 
citizenship which they have shown during this war. Our people are 
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entitled to a better deal than they have ever had in the past. It is for us 
now to give them that deal.»1209 
Yet, the peculiar features of the war did not escape the Fascist 
narrative either. The channels of information were left open regardless 
the war. The civil servants analysed the different legislations of the 
countries involved in the conflict, noticing that «in some fields of both 
labour law and social insurances, there is almost the unification of 
principles and goals, while for other relevant rules, the wartime 
legislation presents some peculiarities that come directly from the 
different economic and social situation, and from the different criteria 
chosen to regulate the work.»1210 Since the beginning, Mussolini defined 
the conflict as a war between “proletarian” and “imperialistic” powers. 
The Fascists presented the war in opposite yet equal terms with regard 
to the British narrative. The British regarded Nazi-Fascist social policy 
as a combination of power politics and social provisions, while the 
Fascists considered social security the loophole found by the 
imperialistic powers to retain their leadership and exploit other 
nations. They explained “total war” as the effort to find Italy’s “place 
under the sun”; the replacement of the older European empires was 
seen as the opportunity to gain access to resources, manpower and 
markets needed to deploy Fascist social revolutions. The major part of 
their argumentation against the British plans stressed the link between 
social policy and power politics, as military expansion served to 
achieve domestic wealth and redistribution:  
 
«The idea of Europe, or better of Eurafrica, meets the need of 
social justice, on the international level, as well as the 
corporative idea meets the need of social justice at home; the 
first requirement is a prerequisite for the second one, since 
without a unified Europe, at least morally and economically, 
it is not even possible to imagine a stable solution for the 
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social question within the single countries of the continent. 
[...] This war shows to us Italians that the solution based on 
force corresponds to a greater moral, both on the European 
and national level; this moral overcomes the assumptions of 
liberalism in the quest for an higher social justice for the 
nations, the social groups, and the individuals. It also 
overcomes Communism in the quest for the hierarchical 
international settlement, and for an autonomous and 
responsible social and individual personality [...]»1211 
 
Like in a mirror-image of the British account, the Fascists 
promoted their own narrative of the war for a fairer social and 
international order. This assumption gained momentum in the 
dynamics of the conflict, with the occupation, the Fascist republic and 
the civil war. This acknowledgement constituted directive for the RSI 
propaganda: 
 
«It is not disputed that all the wars led to this outcome: 
elevation of the people, rapprochement of all the social 
classes, and, therefore, to some extent spiritual 
rapprochement of the distances. Since the very beginning of 
this terrible conflict, the Duce defined this war as ideological, 
but the victory of one of the sides in conflict, that brought 
with itself different ideas […] could not eliminate the specific 
racial characters of the nations […]. The Fascist recreational 
organizations, in their numerous tasks, and with an efficient 
merging of the social classes, point at giving to the Italian 
people – with the political concept of the Republic, with its 
regulation that is inspired by the regulation of the RSI – the 
racial factors to give to the Italian workers the strongest 
attachment to its Homeland, and complete in that way the 
education of the Italian citizen in the RSI.»1212 
                                                          
1211 G. Mazzoni, «La guerra e le esigenze della giustizia sociale», Politica Sociale, n.5-
6/1943, p.77. 
1212 ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Appunto per il Commissario. S.d.», pp.1-2. 
458 
 
 
The war merged different topics of the Fascist 
conceptualization of social policy: the contraposition between 
capitalism and social revolution; the link between power politics and 
social welfare; the achievement of the original Fascist programme. This 
explains the Fascist disregard for the British plans; Minister Tarchi 
considered the socialization a more important social achievement than 
any Anglo-Saxon plan for social security: 
 
«The “premise”; therefore, explaining the fascist 
revolutionary thought, achieves the century-old aspiration of 
the world of Labour, opening a wide-ranging scope. It assure 
the workers much more than the hopes raised by the opulent 
England with that miraculous Beveridge plan, which in the 
very end is nothing but a program just technically more 
refined of what Italy had already achieved in the field of 
social assistance and insurances.»1213 
 
        The report was considered residual, while «the Italian Social 
Republic, therefore, presents to the workers a social programme that 
gives the only possible, real and fair solution to the social question.»1214 
Specific aspects of the RSI programme recalled the British slogans for 
veterans and for the families of the workers. Instead of the 1917 
MacMillan’s “home for heroes”, the Fascist regime proposed «the 
welcome home, the guaranteed food.».1215 While the Beveridge Report 
pointed at abolishing want, the project of the socialization wanted «not 
to abolish wealth, but the privileges of wealth.»1216 Fascist socializations 
pointed at boosting productivity in order to redistribute wealth, as «the 
enemy of the worker is capitalism, and not the capital.»1217 Fascism still 
                                                          
1213 Ivi. p.7. 
1214A De Gherardi, La questione sociale e la socializzazione, Padova, Quaderni dellTstituto 
Nazionale di Cultura Fascista, 1945, p. 37. 
1215Ivi. p. 38. 
1216Ivi. p. 38. 
1217Ivi. p. 19. 
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sought for a solution to the “social question” that differed both from 
the Anglo-Saxon universalistic social security and from the Communist 
suppression of the private capital: «the social question does not mean 
the struggle against capitalism or against the employer as technician, 
but it rather means to avoid that both the former and the latter take it 
all for themselves, stealing more from the workers and the consumers 
than the just part, which they are entitled to thanks to their 
contribution to the production.» 1218  
Liberalism transformed labour into a commodity subjected to the 
market rules and set itself up as a religion and a model. It created the 
“social question”, and proved unable to solve it: «it is to put an end to 
all these unfairness that arose the collectivist theories, that is to say, 
communism, socialism, fascism.»1219 The RSI’s “third way” rejected 
State-driven economy, guaranteed private property and individual 
entrepreneurship and created a system of social protection, 
comprehensive of minimum wage, unemployment benefit, 
employment office, old-age pensions, sickness insurances, paid 
vacation, collective agreements: «the importance of what the fascist 
regime made in favour of the workers, can be evaluated when one may 
think to what the worker was before the coming of Fascism, and to 
what the worker is in the opulent Anglo-American plutocratic 
countries where almost none of these provision is implemented for 
him.»1220 The RSI’s socialization shifted the paradigm from the 
“Labour-commodity” to the “Capital-commodity”. The corporate 
profits were shared in money or in social benefits and services, such as 
the housing: «far from abolishing the private property, it favoured 
instead its spread, trying to achieve the goal to turn all into proprietary, 
rather than the goal - humiliating and degrading, as the other 
collectivist parties - to turn all into proletarian.»1221 The workers were 
asked to not be swayed by foreigner models, as the Russian as the 
Anglo-American, but to be loyal to the fascist revolution: «nationalism 
                                                          
1218 Ivi. 21. 
1219Ivi. pp. 23-24. 
1220 Ivi. p. 34. 
1221 Ivi. p. 36. The italics is mine. 
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and social justice are the two fundamental bases of the most genuine 
Italian and Roman idea, which have been merged in the Fascism by 
Benito Mussolini.»1222  
The Vichy regime was also part of the transnational network of 
ideas that confronted from 1939 to 1945. The State collaboration meant 
also participation in the Axis projects for the post-war order.1223 The 
documentation is not so consistent to infer the existence of coherent 
strategies to spread national revolutions under Third Reich.1224 It rather 
proved the existence of an ideological common ground that unified the 
social policies of these regimes and the presence of channels to 
disseminate them.  
The “left-wing” sectors of the regime identified the Nazi “total 
war” with new social and labour relations. Its aftermaths for France 
made social collaboration necessary, and wiped out the former systems 
of social representation: «can they retain their independence, by the 
way more in theory than in fact, in the world of tomorrow? We can 
answer without any doubt that no, and this independently from the 
struggle to death between the capitalist Britain and the proletarian 
Germany.»1225 The Nazi compulsory schemes, the assistance and 
recreational associations, the provisions for the old-age persons and 
families were regarded as the utmost expression of a renewed national 
solidarity within the Volkgemeinschaft. These policies and ideas were 
expected to announce the rise of the new world:  
 
                                                          
1222Ivi., p. 40. 
1223 Laval declared in broadcast of 1942 to put his trust in the German victory to save 
Europe «from Bolschevism», and to allow the establishment of «socialism, everywhere in 
Europe», see P. Laval, Discours radiodiffusé du 22 juin 1942. 
1224 The Italian MinCulPop tried to disseminate the French projects among the countries 
allied of the Axis, ACS, MinCulPop, Reports/32/89/ 1.1070, «La Charte du Travail - in 
lingua francese», where are contained the orders of different copies and pamphlets of the 
Charte du Travail, for the Italian press, and for the other countries satellites of the Axis. 
There is sparse documentary proof of the attempt of the Italian authorities to promote the 
Fascist social legislation and to counter the British social propaganda on the French 
territories, Tout cela, en Italie, a déjà été fait, s.l., s.d. 
1225 «J. Peschadour, «Indépendance Syndicale», n.7, a. 1, 11 janvier 1941, p.1. 
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«two concepts of government, of organization, of 
management of the human labour are facing and dividing – 
unfortunately, we must say – the world. One is older. We 
may say, it is outdated. [...] The other is recent. It as the 
strength and the faith of the young. It is the future. And it is 
already the present. In some countries – France is 
unfortunately some of them – more than one century of 
democratic experience allowed to assess the methods of the 
first, of the older, of the outdated. Five years of National-
socialist regime, in the opposite direction, yielded positive 
results.»1226  
 
For the collaborationists, Nazi occupation allowed the 
deployment of the communitarian principles in France. But this was 
true especially for the Occupied Zone, where the pro-Nazi 
collaborationist milieu had more influence.1227 The comparison between 
the most important revues in the Free and Occupied Zone would 
highlight the different takes on the social organizations: aligned with 
the Révolution Nationale the former, closer to the Nazi policy the latter.  
Like in Italy, Germany promoted its social policy in the areas 
under control, with pamphlets and booklets to exalt the Nazi social 
order.1228 The Germans tried to accompany the military campaigns with 
plans for reconstruction, new domestic policies and international 
settlement. Not even in this case, did the strategy of the Axis differ 
much from that of the Allies. While this documentation might be 
regarded as just another piece of propaganda, it in fact unveils the 
ideological frontlines of the war. All the contenders provided their 
                                                          
1226 J. De La Hire, Le Travail, Les Travailleurs et la Nouvelle Europe, Paris, Editions du Livre 
Moderne, 1941, pp. 80-81. 
1227 See the serie of the collaborationist revue La France Européenne in IHTP, ARC 074-15, 
état français. On the French pro-Nazi Groupe Collaboration and its activities, see Julien 
Prévotaux, Un européisme nazi. Le Groupe Collaboration et l’idéologie européenne dans la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, Paris, François-Xavier De Guibert, 2010. 
1228 O. Karstedt, La politique social de la nouvelle Allemagne, Paris, Fernand Sorlot, 1943. On 
the action of Germany in the promotion of its social policies, see K. K. Patel, «Welfare in 
the Warfare State: Nazi Social Policy on the International Stage», pp. 16-22. 
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solutions to the “social question” as it showed up at that time. The 
plans for the post-war settlement in Italy and France remained limited 
to the inner circle of militants and collaborationist mileu. There was not 
a mass follow-up to the propaganda and the ideas in the occupied 
countries and in the RSI. British society felt to a greater extent the 
collective mobilization, and built upon “total war” the “mystique” of 
the consensus.  
The historian of the welfare state and biographer of Beveridge, 
Harris, recognized how enthusiastically the public at large received 
social security plans, while politics, business, labour and bureaucracies 
diluted their traditional criticisms against State-driven social policies. 
Unlike 1914-18, they regarded more favourably to welfare expansion 
and even to some forms of planning.1229 This political process should 
not be oversimplified; yet, even some British conservative milieus 
accepted State interventionism in socio-economic matters, at least when 
it was clearly distinguished by “socialist goals”.1230 In turn, the official 
British documents served as a “propaganda” tool and triggered a huge 
debate. While the Britain identified the war with the construction of a 
new “social pact”, in Europe the efforts of the Axis did not have the 
same outcome. The European public opinions, not even those under 
Nazi occupation, received nor interiorized the social propaganda of the 
Third Reich.  
 No one in Europe could deny the strong ideological feature of 
WWII; it called into question the relation between citizens and State, 
society and economy. All the sides of the conflict had to supply a new 
idea of citizenship that integrated the mass of citizens better into the 
                                                          
1229 J. Harris, «Some Aspects of Social Policy in Britain during the Second World War», 
Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Wolfgang Mock (eds.), The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain 
and Germany, 1850-1950, London. Croom Helm on behalf of the German Historical 
Institute, 1981, pp. 247-263.  
1230 The Tory Reform Committee stated that «high Protection and Free Trade, 
Nationalisation and Private Enterprise, and similar political shibboleths, which are so 
often elevated into principles, are to us simply tools to be used on a large or small case or 
to be discarded according to whether they promote efficiency or impede it.» Tory Reform 
Committee, Tools for the Next Job – A Policy of Progress through Productivity, London, 
Europa Publications Limited, s.d., p.57 
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State’s life. This was true for the Anglo-Americans and democratic 
movements of the Resistance in the continent and for the Axis powers. 
A Belgian collaborationist wrote that: 
 
«This is not an economic war, something that maybe does 
credit to the humanity. In the end is not even – at least, not 
exclusively – the titanic clash between two imperialisms: the 
dynamic imperialism of the Axis – Germany, Italy, Japan – 
against the static imperialism of Britain and the US, and 
neither the death match between tow political ideologies: 
dictatorship against democracy. All these elements are part 
of this war, but its nature is deeper, and its scope wider. In 
summary, as Hitler rightly said, the issue at stake is the new 
order. This is the reason why this war is really a total war: 
total, under the point of view of the effort, as it mobilized all 
the human and material resources of the belligerent states; 
total under the geographical point of view, as the whole 
world is taking part, directly or indirectly; but it is total 
mainly with regard to its goals, as all the human and divine 
values and our conception of the life is involved. We can call 
it the war of the total revolution.»1231 
 
Even if in Britain the utmost mobilization was directed to the 
war and no major reform was implemented between 1942 and 1945, the 
debate on social security projected the hopes of social enhancement 
over the reconstruction. The political consensus was not achieved in the 
terms of the altruist rhetoric expressed by Titmuss, but there is little 
doubt that “welfare state” was inseparable from “warfare state”.1232 
Governmental dispatches reported that «since the beginning of the war 
there has been a constant demand for a clarification of “what we are 
                                                          
1231 P. E. De Rooy, L’Ordre Nouveau de Hitler, Toronto, Cahiers de l’Ecole des Sciences 
Sociales, Politiques et Economiques de Laval, 1943, pp. 3-4. 
1232 R. Lowe, «The Second World War, Consensus, and the Foundation of the Welfare 
State», Twentieth Century British History, 2/1990, 152-182. 
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fighting for”»,1233 asking for precise policy statements for the 
reconstruction. The extent of the political and social mobilization for 
“total war” prevented to simply return to the pre-war conditions: «in 
some respects this problem is likely to be far more difficult after this 
War than after the war of 1914-1918. This is owing to the more 
extensive mobilisation of the nation and its war resources, coupled 
with large movements of population for security reasons, whilst the 
extensive air raid damage has already resulted in a greater dislocation 
of normal life.»1234 The demobilisation was expected to be problematic 
for its impact on the employment structure and on political issues that 
called into question the relations between citizenship and social rights, 
and their full enjoyment by social actors, like the poor or the women.1235 
Furthermore, the vastness of the reconstruction policies required to link 
the economic necessities of the recovery with social planning, as for 
instance the housing policy or the benefits to support unemployed and 
counter inflation.  
The socio-economic impact of the war does not explain 
everything. Social security was also linked to the challenge of the Nazi-
Fascist model from the 1930s onwards. Mass unemployment 
delegitimized political institutions and weakened the social fabric: 
«unemployment was more than a great and unavoidable waste. It was 
symptomatic of the breakdown of a whole economic system and one of 
the propagators of Fascism and of the war we are now fighting.»1236 The 
British social reformers wanted to prevent the overextensions of 
governmental power, through a new pact between State and 
citizens.1237 The “consensus” was weaker than commonly regarded, but 
                                                          
1233 TNA, INF/1/683, «Ministry of Information. Post-war Reconstuction. 17th June 1942», 
p.1. 
1234 TNA, INF/1/683, «The demobilisation and resettlement of labour (Summary of the 
Second Interim Report of the Official Committee on Post-War Internal Economic 
Problems. 26th January, 1943», p.1. 
1235 S.O. Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939-
1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
1236 PEP, Employment for All, London, Europa Publications Limited, 1944, p. 1. 
1237 G.D.H. Cole, The Means to Full Employment, London, Victor Gollanz Ltd., 1943. 
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the war modified the British political culture and placed Britain in a 
supranational debate on post-war reconstruction.  
This transnational network between the warring parties 
suggest a thinner dividing line than the one depicted by wartime 
propaganda; the Nazis devoted comparative studies to the German and 
British social legislation which escaped from mere propaganda.1238 War 
Cabinet’s endorsement of “social security” principles was not merely 
farce consensus; it proved the commitment to recast British democracy 
on a new basis. The trend was general, but the British case is a pivot in 
any comparison between the wartime social policies for many reasons: 
the pace and consistency of the post-war reforms; the myth of the 1940-
1 resistance as cradle of all the further enhancements in British policies; 
the pure observation that Britain won the war and could foster its own 
social system. Other models existed and their promotion was a 
“chapter” of the wart. Harris stated that:  
 
«nearly all the structural changes that occurred in Britain 
during the Second World War were paralleled by 
comparable changes in all other Western European countries, 
both Allied and Axis, both combatant and neutral. Such 
comparisons can be over-stressed, and each country has had 
its own unique institutional and cultural history. But no 
country in Western Europe has escaped the impact of mass 
social welfare, advanced health care, ethnic migration, 
consumerism and fiscal management; and in many cases 
such trends have been far more extensive than in Britain. The 
wider history of Europe provides an indispensable backcloth 
against which to weigh the extent, meaning and significance 
of social trends and developments in Britain between 1939 
and 1945.»1239 
 
                                                          
1238 M.-E. Krohn, Staat und Sozialversicherung in Grossbritanien und Deutschland, Berlin-
Leipzig-Wien, Deutscher Rechtsverlag Gmbh., 1942. 
1239 J. Harris, «War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front during the Second 
World War», Contemporary European History, 1/1992, pp. 17-35, p.35. 
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 The historical conditions in 1939-45 were not the same as in 
1914-18; the reconstruction plans were wider in their scope and more 
coherent in their political rationale: «the aim of these plans seems to 
consist of the strengthening of the national interest and binding the 
largest possible number of people to the States’ institutions, in order to 
establish within the State a social community and a solidarity of 
interests among social classes.»1240  
Fascist sought for similar solutions, when they stated «only 
War and Labour can save us»;1241 Tarchi considered the plans for the 
restructuration of socio-economic structures under the RSI Tarchi as the 
results of the «struggle that occurs Italy for 20 years [...] aiming at 
achieving at home and on the international stage a new order that 
shortens the [social] distances between individuals as well as among 
people, that implements a more equitable distributive justice in the 
social relations and in those among the States.»1242 These outcomes 
were linked to what Tarchi defined “revolutionary war”. The war freed 
allowed to fully deploy “revolutionary” social policy and to drive 
forward the social unrest under new forms of industrial collaboration. 
But the war was “revolutionary” also because redefined the 
international power relations, as «much greater inequalities and 
unfairness in the redistribution of the international political forces.»1243 
To achieve social justice at home, it was necessary to resettle the 
international order according to the Nazi-Fascist policies.  
This was not dissimilar to the recommendation and hopes of 
the British to rebalance post-war social and economic policies to favour 
the achievement of full employment, in order to restore the 
international trades and to make social security sustainable. Allies and 
Axis shared also the same Messianic and Manichaean jargon. Beveridge 
himself, in a 1944 broadcast for the Italian audience, said that:  
 
                                                          
1240I. M. Sacco, «Considerazioni intorno al Piano “Beveridge”», p. 235. 
1241«Lavorare e combattere», La Corrispondenza Repubblicana, January 1944, p.101. 
1242 A. Tarchi, Premesse per la creazione della nuova struttura economico sociale, Milano-
Venezia, Edizioni Erre, 1944, pp. 3-4. 
1243 Id., p. 6. 
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«The war in which the United Nations are engaged is I 
believe ideological in the sense that it is a war, not so much 
against particular peoples, as against evil spirits of 
aggression, violence and injustice abroad and of arbitrary 
power at home, of which the Germans and the Japanese have 
become the servile instruments. The victory of the United 
Nations will, according to the declarations of their leaders, be 
used to establish a world order in which these evil spirits can 
never again find scope. In that world order, I hope that 
Italian people will, early rather than late, take their part in 
showing that social justice can be reconciled with freedom 
for the individual, that international justice can be reconciled 
with the political independence of nations, that security can 
be reconciled with progress.»1244  
 
7.3.The extent and limits of the “universalist shift” in Italy and France after 
the war 
 
The British plans and the attempts to reform the Italian social insurances 
Neither Fascist nor British propaganda succeeded among the 
population prostrated by the war; the myth of the Red Army 
prospected the coming of Communism. As the Fascist alternative 
crumbled, the moderate solutions proposed by the Allied could not 
replace the promises of the Communist “Heaven on Hearth”. The 
British plans, however, had a deeper circulation to the elites of the 
continental countries; in this way the Beveridge Report entered into the 
Italian debate between the war and post-war years.  
From 1943–4, “social security” was put on the political agenda 
in the liberated part of Italy. In 1944, Badoglio Government set up the 
Commissione Reale per la riforma della previdenza sociale (Royal 
Commission for the reform of social security), which in reality never 
drafted comprehensive reforms.1245 The provisional government tried to 
                                                          
1244 LSE, Beveridge/9B/57, «Broadcast Message to Italian People (Sent at request of 
Foreign Office, 29th December, 1944)», p.1. 
1245 «Regio Decreto del 15 marzo 1944, n.120», GU – Serie speciale, 29 aprile 1944, n.23. 
468 
 
rearrange the compulsory schemes, passing a relatively large number 
of legislation.1246 This is illustrative of the importance gave to this 
policy-area by the Allies. Immediately after the war, the contributions 
of the democratic parties and the study of the foreign models led to an 
important debate on how to overcome the “inadequate” Fascist 
schemes, whose «big picture looked structured, but under the surface 
was hidden an incoherent and ineffective system.»1247 The British social 
reforms were fundamental in this debate; they were received by all the 
parties, but none of them fully appreciated their scope. They served 
mostly as touchstone; the proposals of the Italian democratic parties 
were either more limited, or oriented to a more substantial 
redistribution.  
Italian Liberals remained stranger to the innovations coming 
from the Anglo-Saxon world; the liberal Beveridge regarded at social 
security as the achievement of «more true liberty for all the people.»1248 
Italian Liberals wanted occupational social schemes limited to the 
salaried workers, excluding some risks from the compulsory 
insurances, e.g. family allowances, which Beveridge considered one of 
the pillar of social security. They endorsed some general principles of 
solidarity, accompanied by those of personal responsibility, while State 
intervention had to be limited to cases where the loss of income did not 
result from the will of the individual. The Liberal major representative 
was Luigi Einaudi, economist, Minister of the Budget, Governor of the 
Bank of Italy, and President of Republic. He was, according to the 
Keynesian economist Federico Caffè, an advocate of the «rough 
individualism of the pioneers.»1249 Yet, his “anti-welfare” stance did not 
neglect the theories on social security, which Einaudi criticized for the 
fears of welfare-dependence of the poor. Beveridge himself feared this 
drive, but Einaudi’s take on the matter was biased by the old-fashioned 
                                                          
1246 INPS, Atti ufficiali – Anno 1944, Roma, 1944. 
1247 E. Cabibbo, «I partiti politici e la previdenza sociale», Rivista degli infortuni e delle 
malattie professionali, Fascicolo Unico gennaio-dicembre 1944, pp. 13- 48, p.14. 
1248 W. Beveridge, Why I am a Liberal, London, H. Jenkins, 1945, p.33. 
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liberal moralistic view on poverty. He rather supported the social 
market economy theories for the achievement of more social equality 
without State welfarism.1250  
Einaudi’s criticism of the Beveridge Report suggested a certain 
knowledge of the text. In his view, its main limit was the conception of 
the minimal income as a right of citizenship rather than as a possibility 
of social mobility. He questioned the real existence of such right, whose 
enjoyment in any case depended on the social behaviours of the poor. 
On the other side, he recognized that the universalistic setting was 
more liberal in comparison with the continental legislations, centred on 
occupational insurances and relied on social paternalism. His 
evaluation of social security plans was ideologically biased by the 
traditional liberal views on the matter; for instance, he accepted the 
principle of the industrial injuries benefits, as private insurance 
principle, but strongly opposed any form of unemployment benefit, 
which encouraged the laziness and distorted the principles of free 
competition, to such an extent that «it seems obvious that the State’s 
insurance against unemployment is one of the most dangerous and 
uncertain elements of the whole system of social insurance and 
assistance.»1251 His remarks on the universalistic reforms were 
significant, as Einaudi had an important political role in the post-war 
governments and in the implementation of the social and economic 
policies in Italy between 1947 and 1955.1252  
Substantially different was the approach of the major political 
component of the post-war Italian society, the Christian Democrats 
(DC). The Istituto Cattolico di Attività Sociale (Catholic Institute of Social 
Action, ICAS) was a group of clergymen, intellectuals and politicians; 
the future Ministers and Prime Minister Guido Gonnella and Aldo 
Moro participated in its activities. This group elaborated in 1943 the 
most important Catholic manifesto for the redefinition of the post-war 
                                                          
1250L. Bonini, Economia sociale di mercato, Bologna, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2012, pp. 
217-234. 
1251 L. Einaudi, Lezioni di politica sociale, cit., p. 110. 
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social action; the so-called Codice di Camaldoli combined the Christian 
values of brotherhood with the modern forms of social solidarity.1253 
The Catholics tried to apply the Catholic Social Doctrine not against the 
modem States, as in the original intentions of Pope XIII.1254 The Codice 
redefined the relation between the Christian social commitment and 
the State. The public institutions had to achieve social justice as 
ultimate goal; the social rights were declared inalienable and at the 
democratic foundations of post-war Italy: right to work, fair salary, 
minimum income, social security, healthcare, family allowances, 
housing and full employment.  
It is difficult to retrace explicit references to the British plans, 
but it is unlikely that the ICAS did not know the report. From 
Beveridge, they borrowed the interclass social solidarity; in their effort 
to modernize the Catholic Social Doctrine, they found in the British 
elaboration the most relevant example of liberal and moderate 
reformism. These social reformers opted for the coexistence of public 
insurances and mutualist associations (especially in the field of the 
healthcare), while endorsing the idea that the State had to guarantee 
the minimum income facing up to any loss of income. The Christian 
principles of social solidarity finally matched the modernity, 
abandoning the charity-like policy to be incorporated within the public 
policies of the modem State.  
Immediately after the war, when the circulation of the Beveridge 
Report and mainly of Full Employment in a Free Society spread out, the 
Christian doctrine was decisively and directly affected by the British 
debate.1255 The influence was clear for the “left-wing” Catholics; Giorgio 
La Pira carefully studied the British texts, and participated in the 
drafting of the Codice di Camaldoli. Later, he was deputy at the 
constituent assembly and undersecretary in the Ministry of Labour and 
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Social Security. He also participated to the drafting of the social 
principles in the Italian republican Constitution. He looked at the 
British economic and social policies, considering Keynes and Beveridge 
the two pillars upon which the Anglo-Saxon reformists were creating 
what he defined «the new State: it is the democratic State, where there 
is a place for everyone: where there is freedom for everyone: freedom 
of work, freedom of speech, freedom of dignity for everyone.»1256 The 
British reforms changed the meaning of social policy from the 
degrading and charity-like assistance policies to a comprehensive 
policy of employment and social security. For La Pira, these ideas 
reformulated the democratic pact; the British reforms overcame laissez-
faire capitalism opening up to economic planning and social solidarity, 
without falling into collectivist solutions. The pre-existing Christian 
doctrine was integrated with Keynesian elements, as re-interpreted by 
Beveridge; in this original synthesis, Catholicism met Beveridge’s 
lexicon on the “freedom from want” and the aims to wage the recovery 
retained the wartime policies and tools. The Christian rhetoric met a 
modem understanding of the contemporary issues and political 
tendencies, which overcame what La Pira defined the “agnosticism” of 
the 19th century States towards the “social questions”.1257  
There was a common “mystical” humanitarianism at the very 
foundation of the new social policies, just as for the British Labour’s 
“New Jerusalem”; for his part, La Pira was confident that the social 
protection would solve the “social question” «in tomorrow’s society: 
and on this worldwide action of human goodwill cannot just not come 
down the peacefully blessing of our Father in Heaven.»1258 Social 
solidarity penetrated outside the Anglo-Saxon world and took root in 
different cultural milieus and socio-economic contexts. Social security 
merged with other cultural strands unified by the awareness of the new 
role of the State in public policies. The impact of the British plans 
remained limited to a cultural influence; they mobilized intellectual 
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resources and reformist projects, but they had no immediate legislative 
carryover in post-war Italy.1259 The resistances to more consistent social 
reforms did not come exclusively from the liberal and conservative 
milieus, but also, if for opposite reasons, from the Socialists and 
Communists. 
The influence of the British “social security” was present in the 
social programme of the Patto d’Unità d’Azione (Unity Action Pact), 
with which socialists and communists strengthened their cooperation 
in 1943 and 1944: wage increase, indexing of pensions and allowances 
to inflation, legislation on labour protection, minimum income, 
housing, education reform, public healthcare and universalistic social 
insurances covering all the risk categories. A very similar social 
programme was restated two years later, in a different context, after the 
transition from the clandestine activity to the tasks of the 
reconstruction. Not without ambiguity, the Unity Action Pacts 
regarded the USSR and the «Anglo-American working class 
organizations» as the leading forces in the reconstruction.1260 This did 
not necessarily mean the full endorsement of the British solutions. The 
Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP) proposed the unification of the 
compulsory schemes (INPS) and the industrial injuries (INAIL) in a 
single institute, with the correspondent unification of the contributions. 
But the Socialist proposal consistently departed from the British 
scheme; they wanted the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro 
(CGIL, the Italian trade unions) to control all the aspects of social 
security: authorities, investment of the fund of the insurances, 
management, reforms. The former Fascist institutions were turned 
upside-down; during the regime, they represented the State’s utmost 
centralization, while the Socialists proposed to delegate their direction 
to the unions, and opposed to State-centred reforms that excluded the 
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workers’ organizations. The PSIUP was also against the extension of 
the benefits to all the population regardless their status, coherently 
with their conception of social security, according to which «the 
workers’ solidarity is the basic principle of the social insurances. Their 
structure and management has to correspond to the needs and interest 
of the working class.»1261 Solidarity was limited to the workers; it did 
not involve all citizens of the national community, but spread along 
class-oriented lines.  
The Communists shared the general lines of the Socialist 
proposals, even if they promoted a more inclusive approach, in line 
with its aspiration to become a “people’s party”. For the PCI, the 
“freedom from want” concerned all categories of workers, to achieve 
social solidarity and a better redistribution of the wealth. In their first 
proposals, the Communists advanced the idea of a bipartite funding of 
the social contributions: the employers and the general revenues 
should constitute the tax bases of the social insurances. This hypothesis 
was clearly unsustainable, and even more in the case of the adoption of 
a universalistic system that covered with flat-rate benefits the whole 
working population. The Communists wanted to accompany social 
solidarity as political principle with a dramatic redistribution of the 
national wealth. For this reason, the PCI departed from the political 
goals of British universalism, retaining some technical solutions in the 
administration of the insurances.  
Since the war years, the application of the universalistic system 
was particularly difficult in Italy, due both to ideological reasons and to 
a different socio-economic structure. The democratic social reformers in 
Italy recognized that, after 1945:  
 
 «The analysis of the problem of social security in its current 
orientations and in its future evolution cannot be conceived 
without the study of the fundamental document called 
“Beveridge Plan”, thanks to which Great Britain, first country 
in the world, concretely put in place the fight against want. 
[...] There is anyway an assumption of the plan that seems 
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nowadays undisputable, and this is the need that every 
democratic legislation shall address the problem of the social 
security, as a whole, for all the citizens, to secure, with their 
cooperation and within the national possibilities, the 
protection against extreme destitution.»1262 
 
The most important effort towards the universalistic turn fell 
within the scope of the Constituent Assembly, through the 
establishment of a Commission chaired by the reformist Socialist 
Ludovico D’Aragona.1263 The tasks of the Commission were limited to 
set basic guidelines for the legislator, referring to the principles of the 
Beveridge Report and the Declaration of Philadelphia. The Commission 
proposed the all-inclusive reform for retirement, injury and sickness, 
opening up to free healthcare for limited categories of citizens. Other 
administrative innovations – as for the flat-rate benefits, or the national 
public health system – were not taken into consideration, due to the 
strong differences between categories of workers and geographical 
areas. Any universalistic reform could not ever meet the needs of the 
better-paid job categories.1264 The D’Aragona Report was an important 
reference for the reform of social policies in Italy, but remained a 
statement of principles, never transformed into legislation due to 
financial issues and to political resistance.1265 The debate on the 
reconstruction was inseparable from the issue of social rights, and from 
the re-foundation of democracy on a new basis. The General elections 
of 1948 polarized Italian politics, and delayed the implementation of a 
                                                          
1262 M.-A. Coppini, Prime valutazioni sul costo di un Piano Beveridge per l’Italia, Roma, SELI, 
1947, pp. 5-6. 
1263 A biography of D’Aragona does not exist yet, although he was among the founder of 
the Italian trade unions in Italy. Together with Rinaldo Rigola, in 1927, was among the 
trade union leaders who disbanded the CGIL, and tried to find an agreement with 
Fascismo. Unlike Rigola – who also supported the Labour reforms in 1945 – he never 
collaborated with the Fascist regime, and Ministry in the democratic Republic. See C. 
Cartiglia, Rinaldo Rigola e il sindacalismo riformista in Italia, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1976. 
1264 Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Relazione sui lavori della Commissione 
per la riforma della previdenza sociale (4 luglio 1947 – 29 febbraio 1948), Roma, Atel, 1948. 
1265 G. Silei, «Una occasione mancata? La questione della riforma dello Stato sociale in 
Italia nel secondo dopoguerra», Storia e Futuro, n. 4/2004. 
475 
 
thorough universalistic reform. The PCI diverted attention from the 
reform of social security, claiming for the “structural” reforms (instead 
of the “social” reforms, which were considered a gradualist mid-step 
that did not affect the power relations between classes) and the 
“progressive democracy”.  
The Socialists spent the months before and after the elections of 
1948 in anguish over the nature of the party; the subsequent split 
divided the Italian socialism in two areas, the left-wing PSI and the 
reformist PSDI.1266 The reformists tried to hark back to the most 
advanced principles of social security; besides D’Aragona or Rinaldo 
Rigola, the most important formulation and support to the reforms 
came from Ezio Vigorelli, who was Minister of Social Security between 
1954 and 1957.1267 Vigorelli admitted that Italy was not in the condition 
to implement a plan of the same extent than the Beveridge Report. This 
was due to policy legacy and economic reasons; Italy was a poorer 
country compared to Britain, with limited resources and relatively 
higher unemployment.1268 This did not prevent to tackle the social 
scourges with a comprehensive approach that coordinated assistance 
and insurance institutions. Vigorelli wanted the Italian social security 
integrated in the European post-war trends, of which Britain had the 
lead: the creation of a Ministry of Social Security, the single 
contributory card for all the insurances, the tripartite contribution, the 
coordination of the insurance/assistance authorities. Also Italy could 
implement a modern social security in order, at least, to relief from the 
complete misery of part of Italian population.  
The reformist area quickly became politically and ideologically 
irrelevant; the majority of Italian socialism moved social policy to the 
background. The controversy on social security rather became the 
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pretext to attack head-up the Labour party and the setting of the British 
social security. The PSI characterized Attlee’s social reforms as a 
reactionary intervention that deviated the working class from their real 
objectives. In a way, the criticism of the left-wing Socialists was 
diametrically opposite, yet similar, to that of the Fascists: 
 
«they prefer to stiffen the social relations in a climate of 
security for all: security for capitalists [...]; security for 
consumers [...] security for workers thanks to full 
employment, insurance, etc. “Security for All” [...] That 
security for all that is a natural expression of a s system of 
solidarity, artificially sought in a capitalist regime that is by 
nature based on social contrasts and the consequent 
instability of class relations. [...] they aim to ensure a certain 
“social security” for workers, but never bothers to make 
workers become a political class capable of self-
empowerment and self-government.»1269 
 
While Fascism interpreted the universalistic reforms in the 
ideological terms of the contraposition between “plutocratic” Anglo-
Saxon democracies and corporatist “third ways”, the Marxists regarded 
at social security as a way to regulate the social struggle and, in the 
context of the bipolar war, to split the Socialist International.1270 In spite 
of the wartime considerations of the British policy-makers, the promise 
of social security did not persuade the left-wing parties to align with 
the Western world. The governmental area operated a political 
breakthrough, with the exclusion of the left, and with the support of the 
Liberals. The social Catholics more committed to the social reforms 
became minority in the centrist government, even with Fanfani as 
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Minister of the Labour and the Social Security.1271  
Structural change, full industrialization and economic 
modernization constituted the major targets of the Italian ruling classes, 
who sacrificed social security reforms and wage increase to the 
formation of national savings that could be transformed into 
investments in infrastructure and key industries. 1272  The limits of the 
universalistic turn in Italy were more ideological than practical. 
Already before the failure of the different commissions set up until 
1947, the Beveridge Report clashed against resistances in the two major 
cultures of Italian politics: the Catholics and the Marxists. Both 
prefigured a different society than the liberal Britain, where the social 
rights were embedded respectively within the Societas Christiana and 
within the “progressive democracy”.1273 None of these ideas had liberal 
features, while the liberals themselves, increasingly irrelevant in 
electoral terms, were culturally far from the Anglo-Saxon innovations 
in social security. Yet, the politics of solidarity penetrated in the 
reformist sectors of the Italian elites and stood in the background to 
every attempt at reforming the Italian social policy. The modern social 
security was not implemented immediately after the war; yet, this 
political aim resurfaced every time the Italian governments tried to dip 
into social reforms. 
 
The French “sécurité sociale”: limits and extent of the universalism 
Between 1945 and 1946, France passed the main texts on social 
security. The French social reformers promoted the plan even before 
the Attlee Government, which enacted the core of the British social 
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legislation between 1946 and 1948. According to Nicole Kerschen, 
«there are neither documents nor official declarations, which testify the 
use of the Beveridge report as work tool during the drafting of the 
social security French plan. The fact that the report was never 
completely translated reinforces doubts about its direct influence.»1274 
The biographer of Laroque also underlined how there is no 
documentary evidence of major influences of the Beveridge Report in the 
elaboration of the French plans, whose drafting initiated by the end of 
1944, when all the three White Papers were published in Britain. On the 
other side, Free France did not operate in a glass house. Laroque and 
Parodi had the opportunity to read the original version of the Beveridge 
Report;1275 they could study the basic guidelines of social security and 
full employment policies from the very sources.1276  
By 1942, Free France in London drafted the first plans for the 
reconstruction, establishing different Commissions for the study of 
post-war issues. Social policies fell into the scope of the Third 
Commission, which dealt with economic, financial and social 
matters.1277 The first reports on economic policies, drafted by the 
National Commissary to Domestic Policies and Labour, André Philip, 
proposed the “economic governance” that had less to do with «the 
authoritarian States before the war or the States at war: [...] We cannot 
therefore point at achieving dirigisme or planned economy as such, but 
at creating the general environment, the climate, the limits of the 
minimal control of the economy on the direction considered optimal for 
the achievement of social goals.»1278 Free France sought for organizing 
the economy refusing corporatism as ideology, but retaining “neo-
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corporative” forms of social conciliation in the factories.1279 The 
economic programme pointed at full employment, redistribution of 
income, nationalisation of the key industrial sectors, production 
planning and measures for the “physical health” of the population.1280  
Between 1942 and 1943, the Social Section of the Economic, 
Financial and Social Commission looked into incorporating new tools 
and policies in the French pre-war social legislation.1281 The 
Commission provided working proposals to elaborate the official 
stance of Free France in social matter, and detailed policies in 
accordance with the statement of principles of the Atlantic Charter.1282 
Among its members, there were some of the “Founding Fathers” of the 
plan of social security: the Socialist trade unionist Georges Buisson; the 
directors general of the miners, Laurent Blum-Picard and Tony Mayer; 
De Gaulle’s counsellor Henri Hauck; representatives of the women’s 
organizations like Magdeleine Leroy. The works of this Commission 
ranged from social insurances to public hygiene, preventive medicine 
and vocational training. The discussion inevitably referred to the 
ongoing debate on the social insurances in the Anglo-Saxon world, and 
notably in Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The publication of the 
Beveridge Report did not go unnoticed; the session of 3rd December 1942 
recommended to deliver documentation on it to the study groups on 
French territory, and carried out an analysis of its principles and 
mechanism. Apparently, the group did not receive any copy via official 
or unofficial channels, as the research was mainly based on the 
summaries published by the press. Two members of the commission, 
Vangrévelinghe and Jacques Leyv Jacquemin, provided a summary in 
French with explicatory notes for the French audience.1283  
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The French Commission devoted many accounts to the 
Beveridge Report in the very beginning of 1943, even if few of these 
annotations were grounded on the direct study of the original 
document.1284 Some specific technical innovations and political 
principles were considered to be of general interest outside Britain: the 
universal scope of social security extended to all the citizens through 
flat-rate benefits; the coordination of insurance authorities with 
assistance and healthcare services; the creation of a single political 
centre to manage social security. The acknowledgement of these 
principles did not imply an a-critical adoption of the same model by 
the French;1285 the Commission also pursued a broader study of the pre-
war French legislation and of Vichy’s main social measures, some of 
which «in another context, would constitute without any doubt a step 
forward. On the other hand, others are so fuelled by such retrograde 
mindset, that it is impossible to put any trust to the whole building.»1286 
Some of the reforms pursued by Vichy, as family allowances, might be 
retained, even if the Commission mostly referred to the pre-war 
complex body of legislation. Even if considered relatively wide also in 
comparison to the British one, it had to be updated to the new political 
principles: «firstly, that the principle of social security was not 
recognized as a right for every worker and his family. [...] the law on 
the Social Insurances did not recognize it at all. Therefore, the legislator 
only tried with this law to relieve the worker during the harshest 
time..., to ensure just the slightest bit of security.»1287 The war set in 
motion a structural and political change in the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
to which the French social reformers had to make reference: «a great 
number of politicians of the Allied nations, even prime ministers, 
wanted now to give answers to the questions of the world of labour. 
On the American side, as well as on the British one, among the ideas 
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now rising, the main part has a fundamental principle to ensure social 
security for all.»1288  
All the provisions foreshadowed by the Beveridge Report 
required unitary action to reform the different branches of the social 
protection. This meant to override the mutualist resistance of assurance 
businesses and vested interests, stratified by the incremental French 
legislations, and to reformulate social policies on the basis of the 
national social solidarity. Unlike the Beveridge Report, this was not 
achieved by equal contribution irrespective of the individual income, 
but through compulsory and progressive contributions by all citizens; 
in the proposals of the Centre Syndical Français, accomplish social 
solidarity and security was accomplished through the redistribution of 
wealth. The report of Jean Gendrot proposed to combine the British 
universalistic features with redistributive solutions stranger to British 
plans, as for the commensuration of contributions to the personal 
incomes, or for the “minimum wage”.1289 This differed from the 
“minimum vital income”, which was bone of contention also in the 
British debate. The French resolutions departed from the Anglo-Saxon 
measures; they proposed to index the minimum wage to the overall 
national income, which did not coincide with the minimum vital 
income and was calculated on the male breadwinner salary with other 
integration according to dependant relatives.1290  
By mid-1943, the Commission’s proposals were highly inspired 
by the Atlantic Charter: international organization of the economy and 
trades; social security for all citizens in case of loss income, higher 
levels of productivity and full employment; participation of the 
workers in the management of public, “controlled” or private 
enterprises; free trade unions and freedom to not join any trade 
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union.1291 The Commission provided a modern and comprehensive 
policy in line with the modern debates on social security in Britain, 
without merely copying its universalistic measures. The social 
reformers in London proposed to embed the new principles within the 
previous French setting, and, possibly, to achieve an higher social 
equality than the coeval Anglo-Saxon projects. The Beveridge Report 
rather redefined the policy areas of social policy and the approach for 
its coherent reform: from a piecemeal approach matter of horse-trading 
for private business to State-driven reforms. The climate of the war 
allowed to overcome once for all the resistances of vested interest, and 
achieve “social security” and “freedom from want” also in France.  
The first dissemination channels of the Beveridge Report were 
the translations of the summaries appeared in the British press since 
1943. The integral translation of the plan has never been published, but 
since 1943-4 the first French editions of extracts, commentaries and 
translation were published in Switzerland, and from 1945 also in 
France.1292 The Beveridge Report, however, was already introduced into 
the elaborations of the inner Resistance in France. As historian Jean-
Pierre Le Crom reported, «since 1942, the discussion is no longer 
entirely free: it necessarily refers to the English plan. The Beveridge 
plan, badly known in detail, became a guideline. It is impossible to 
ignore it. It raises the postwar social issues in front of the worldwide 
public opinion. It symbolise the social progress.»1293 During wartime 
years, it was delivered in technical, albeit general, terms to an audience 
of academics, technical experts and civil servants, and it did not 
apparently have a mass circulation. The report had initially a wider 
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diffusion in the Occupied Zone; one of the underground movements, 
the Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM), deepened the analysis of 
specific aspects, namely the nationalisation of the social services as 
blueprint for the future. This was needed because they considered that 
the private business did not pursue the common interest in this 
sector1294 This take inferred a new conception of social policy; from the 
sectional interest and fragmentation to the full deployment of social 
solidarity and rights of citizenship by the State.  
Between 1944 and 1945, the Ministries of National Economy 
and Information as well as study centres like the Institut de Science 
Economique Appliquée (which had an important foreign editorial board, 
including Beveridge, Keynes, Robinson, John Hicks, and Friedrich von 
Hayek) provided detailed studies on the foreign social legislations; the 
Beveridge Report did the lion’s share, but also the reforms enacted in the 
same period by the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia 
were scrutinized in detail.1295 These studies recognized the significance 
of the changes occurred in the Anglo-Saxon world, and more generally 
in the Allied countries. France, with its “plan of social security” laced 
up the trend of the reconstruction. But this commitment did not only 
concern narrow groups of technocrats; quests for social inclusion came 
also from the parties. There is sparse evidence of wider circulation of 
the ideas of the Beveridge Report also in the French society. Immediately 
after the Liberation, the CNR launched the États Généraux de la 
Renaissance Française (Estates-Generals for the French Reconstruction), 
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which in 1945 proposed the programme of the Resistance for the new 
French Republic and the reconstruction. Its works took place at the 
same times of the governmental projects of the PGFR, and involved all 
the French departments; the local committees gathered political and 
trade union representatives, and single personalities. Each local and 
departmental committee had to deliver its proposals (Cahiers de 
Doléances) to the central Commissions. The Commission on the Social 
Progress was directed by the former leader of the OCM, the 
Conservative Maxime Blocq-Mascart. 
The reports named “Social Progress” astonished for their global 
uniformity, in spite of the different geographical and socio-political 
backgrounds. They all proposed a unified and coordinated system of 
social protection, with explicit references in the reports to “social 
security” as goal to achieve in the new France.1296 Their proposals were 
even more advanced than those of Laroque and Parodi, as for instance 
they wanted unemployment benefits in the compulsory insurances. 
The departmental reports claimed for the transition from social 
insurances to social security: single Ministry, coverage of all the 
working categories and family wages and allowances. This last 
proposal matched the new universalistic principles with the traditional 
demographic concerns. Many reports recognized the “structural 
backwardness” of the French social insurances with regard to other 
foreign legislations, due to the overlapping of regional and mutualist 
funds, the deficiencies and inadequacies of the fragmented 
bureaucracies and the vested interests of the private business.1297  
The reform of the social protection had to lace up the trend 
started in 1942; the references to the Beveridge Report served as 
touchstone rather than a specific model, which arguably was not 
known in detail. It was mainly the evocation of some basic principles: 
nationalization of compulsory schemes, industrial insurance and family 
                                                          
1296 The main part of the departmental reports are stored in CHS, CNR, 88/3-CNR-2C2; 
CHS, CNR, 89/3-CNR-2C2; CHS, CNR, 90/3-CNR-2C2. 
1297 CHS, CNR, 88/3-CNR-2C2, «La réforme des assurances sociales» ; CHS, CNR, 90/3-
CNR-2C2, «Considération sur la sécurité sociale dans le passé et le présent» ; CHS, CNR, 
90/3-CNR-2C2, « Rapport de la Commission du Progrès Social » ; CHS, CNR, 90/3-CNR-
2C2, « Rapport sur le Progrès Social ».  
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allowances, administrative centralization. In some cases they 
demanded «the application in France of the BEVERIDGE plan in 
operation in Great Britain.»1298 The proposals for healthcare, which in 
Britain entered into the design of social security, departed from these 
solutions. They were more in line with the consideration of the Social 
Section of Free France in London; public hygiene, leveraging over the 
individual behaviours (fight against alcoholism, prostitution, etc.) and 
special structures to contrast tuberculosis and other major disease. The 
nationalization of the healthcare structures was only mentioned as a 
possibility for the future. The French social reformers and parties did 
not tackle the health policies in terms of rights of citizenship, but still in 
those of public and “national” health. They seemed rather oriented to 
increasingly outdated demographic concerns that equalized the health 
and the number of the population to the international role of the 
country.1299 
The years 1944-6 were favourable for the recasting of French 
institutions on new bases. In 1945, Parodi was appointed Minister of 
Labour; there operated the General Direction of Social Security, where 
the civil servants who collaborated under Laroque’s supervision had 
the necessary leeway to put in action the plan. The conditions of the 
Liberation gave momentum to implement the unitary reform that 
vested interests and financial concerns stopped during the interwar 
period and under Vichy.1300 The working group did not prepare any 
document to fix the main principles and technical aspects of the 
reforms, as for the White Papers. These general guidelines were rather 
exposed in the preambles of the governmental decrees between 1945 
and 1946, and in other speeches and lectures by Laroque at that time.1301 
                                                          
1298 CHS, CNR, 88/3-CNR-2C2, «Progrès Social», p.2. ; see also CHS, CNR, 90/3-CNR-2C2, 
«Rapport pour la commission du progrès social», p.1. 
1299 See the texts of the final proposals for social security and health policies in CHS, CNR, 
81/3-CNR-2C2, «Conseil National de la Résistance, Etats Généraux de la Renaissance 
Française. Proclamation et serment du Palais de Chaillot-10-14 juillet 1945», pp. 31-34. 
1300 P.. V. Dutton, Origins of the French Welfare State. The Struggle for Social Reforms in 
France, 1914-1947, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 208-211.  
1301 N. Kerschner, «L’influence du rapport Beveridge sur le plan français de sécurité 
sociale», p.571. 
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The French reforms gradually integrated the general outlines of social 
security, set up in 1945, in family allowances and compulsory 
insurances for specific categories (public officers, farmers, miners).  
The pattern was similar to British, where the acts passed one by 
one between 1946 and 1948. The guidelines of the reforms linked social 
security to the wider recovery plans, not unlike the British wartime 
debate that had incorporated the Beveridge Report into the tasks of 
reconstruction; Laroque related the achievement of social security to 
plans for full employment and support to the families. But while the 
British social security centred its action on the minimum vital income 
and on the fight against unemployment, the French reformers were still 
mainly concerned with demographic decline and wage policies. 
Unemployment, which affected to a lesser extent France during the 
Great Depression, was not at the very core of the 1944-5 elaborations on 
social security. There were also derogations from universalistic 
principles; the flat-rate benefits were rejected, while the retail of special 
schemes was a breach on the uniformity. Opposite resistances from the 
mutual assurances, the farmers’ associations, the pronatalist 
movements and the trade unions led to autonomous agricultural social 
insurances and family allowances funds, which passed under trade 
unions’ management.1302 The plan of social security did not establish 
the free national healthcare service, but increased the charge of the 
refund for medical treatments, enlarged the access to hospitalization 
and established new benefits, such as the “long sickness”, that 
extended the paid recovery period.1303  
The establishment of the public healthcare was not in the aims 
of the post-war social reformers, and signalled once more how the NHS 
was a peculiarity to the British social reformism; it was also another 
relevant derogation to the nationalization and extension of the 
protection to the whole community of citizens. However, while the 
administrative universalism was not fully achieved, the approach to the 
social protection consistently changed: in the rationale of the social 
                                                          
1302 P. V. Dutton, op. cit., pp. 211-217. 
1303 «La sécurité sociale 3. Organisation médicale et sécurité sociale en Angleterre et en 
France», Institut de Science Economique Appliquée, Paris, 1945, pp. 93-133. 
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benefits, now related to the status of citizens rather than of the 
affiliation to the mutual funds; in the same approach to what now was 
called “social security”, and no longer “social insurances”, which  
previously were not connected in a coherent vision of the social 
policy.1304 Most of the administrative arrangements of the pre-war and 
Vichy’s period remained, but the aims of social policy changed. While 
Laroque and Parodi collaborated with the Ministry of Labour in the 
draft projects of the 1940 all-inclusive reforms, the same former 
Minister Belin recognized that the main influences of the basic 
guidelines should be rather retraced in the universalistic setting of the 
Beveridge Report than in the previous French system.1305 The 
administrative edifice of the post-war French social security had many 
continuities with the previous legislation, but the 1945-6 plan rooted, 
from the ideological point of view, on the universalistic setting that 
spread from the Anglo-Saxon world to all the Western Europe. 
 
7.4. World War II, social policies and propaganda: a transnational history 
 
War was a moment of circulation of ideas and project. The 
British propaganda abroad was not a patch, but a net target. It was 
framed in the wider political elaborations arose between the shores of 
the Atlantic in 1941, and ratified by the Atlantic Charter. This document, 
until 1942, was the main reference for the social propaganda against the 
Axis. The Beveridge Report and other social enhancements promoted the 
Anglo-American idea of the post-war settlement, and – in the 
subsidiary – the leadership of Britain in Europe. 
The MOI clearly understood the political relevance of the 
Beveridge Report, gone down in history as “plan”, as nicknamed by the 
PWE. While the War Cabinet was still considering whether to fully or 
partially accept the guidelines of the report, this was presented as the 
state-sponsored statement of principles for the reconstruction. It was 
the product of the British “institutional” revolution, and the basis for 
                                                          
1304 P. Laroque, «De l’assurance sociale à la sécurité sociale : l’expérience française», Revue 
internationale du travail, n.6/1948, pp. 621-649. 
1305 R. Belin, «Lettre adressée aux Études sociales et syndicales», n. 191/ 1971, pp. 17-18 
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more concrete and detailed policy proposals, after that the PWE 
recognized the failure of the Atlantic Charter in the propaganda on the 
continent. The Beveridge Report, gradually identified abroad with the 
social provisions elaborated by the British government, was 
propagandised via different channels and by different actors. 
Beveridge and the SSL promoted the diffusion of the principles of the 
document, thanks to summaries, schemes, and translations across the 
Atlantic and above.1306 The PWE devoted great attention to the 
diffusion of the pamphlets through paper and broadcast media on the 
social progress in Britain or on the life of the workers during 
wartime.1307 The BBC, and particularly broadcasts like Radio London, 
were expected to “project” Britain and its achievements over Europe, 
strengthening its role as stronghold of democracy, social progress and 
wealth, since «in consequence of the collapse of France, the political, 
moral, and artistic leadership of Europe will be vacant. This leadership 
will certainly be sought in the first place in Moscow or in London […] 
Britain’s prestige after the war will be higher than ever before, and 
there is little doubt that her moral and political leadership will be 
largely accepted in Europe.»1308  
The principles of political freedoms, economic prosperity and 
social security were the cornerstone of the British narrative to impose 
its hegemony in Europe: «the projection of Britain would be the 
legitimate aim of these broadcasts, and would be acceptable to their 
audiences, so long as the Britain which projected stands for the 
principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter, and so long as the political, 
educational, and cultural policies they are asked to follow are based on 
the idea of Britain as a part of Europe, Europe as a part of the world, 
and on the belief that freedom and prosperity and happiness are as 
indivisible as peace.»1309 The new principles of social solidarity 
established in 1941 became useful tools for the Allied rethoric which 
opposed both the Nazi-Fascism (the “racial community” or the 
                                                          
1306 See various material in LSE, Beveridge/8/58; LSE, Beveridge/8/61. 
1307 See TNA, INF/2/30; TNA, INF/2/39; TNA, INF/2/40. 
1308 TNA, INF/1/982, «Memoranda on the future of B.B.C. European Broadcasting», p.1. 
1309 Ivi. p.2. 
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“corporative solidarity”), and Communism (“the dictatorship of the 
proletariat”). 
The Allied propaganda had two aims. In the shorter period, it 
weakened the Axis narrative against the liberal Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism, presenting the Anglo-Americans plains for a fairer society – 
even better than Communism. The second goal was linked to the 
international relations and to the power politics in the post-war 
settlement. To safeguard its position, Britain adhered to the principles 
of the Atlantic Charter which laid down the foundations of policies and 
institutions of the new order. Promoting social security was meant to 
convince the support of the working classes and a doable political road 
map for the European ruling classes. As no one could really believe that 
the post-war world would remain the same, the challenge for the Allies 
was to win the consensus of the population after the war, and to pull 
the rug out of the Soviet expansion. Except for the case of Radio London, 
which reached a significant audience, it may be exaggerated to talk 
about “mass propaganda”; nevertheless, the government encouraged a 
capillary dissemination of the main documents; translations of the 
reports started to circulate immediately after their publishing in Britain 
and the summaries were printed also on the Continent, in Switzerland 
as well as in liberated Italy and in Germany.1310 In the end, the plans 
reached the public officers and parties with new ideas and served to 
inform the Continent of the social enhancement in the making in 
Britain. This strategy had some fruits; the interest in social reforms did 
not decrease after the war, and yet the diffusion of information 
summaries on the British legislation kept flowing after 1945.1311  
The Nazi-Fascists harshly criticized British plans, as the 
attempt to chase their social achievement. In 1939, Hitler declared that 
                                                          
1310 LSEA, Beveridge/8/57, «Nicola Pascazion, Il Piano Beveridge. La Gran Bretagna per tutti i 
cittadini lavoratori, Putignano, 1944»; LSEA, Beveridge/8/57, «Basilio Mauro, Libertà dal 
bisogno (Freedom from Want), Ionia, Milton, 1945»; E.F. Rimensberger, Was ist der 
Beveridgeplan?, Hausenstein, Verlag Olten, 1943; G.D.H. Cole, Der Beveridge Plan.sein 
Inhalt und seine Bedeutung, Zürich, Landesring der Unabhängigen, 1943; W. Beveridge, 
Soziale Sicherheit und Vollbeschäftigung, Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1946. 
1311 Gaetano Stammati, Dal “Piano Beveridge” al progetto laburista sulle assicurazioni sociali, 
Roma, Associazione Italo-britannica, 1946.  
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Britain was at war against the Third Reich because «what they hate is 
the Germany which sets a dangerous example for them, this social 
Germany. It is the Germany of a social labour legislation [...] It is the 
Germany of social welfare, of social equality, of the elimination of class 
differences – this is what they hate! [...] This Germany which grants its 
labourers decent housing – this is what they hate because they have the 
feeling their own peoples could be “infected” thereby.»1312 The Fascist 
narrative was similar, retracing twenty years of contraposition between 
“social” Fascism and “plutocratic” Britain.1313 The Second World War 
represented in their view the logical conclusion of the path undertaken 
by Fascism since 1919. In 1941, Mussolini in Rome solemnly proclaimed 
before the workers that the “higher” social justice among nations was 
the prerequisite to achieve the “higher” social justice among the classes: 
«after the war, in the worldwide social turmoil that will follow with a 
fairer social redistribution of the resources of the world, it should be 
taken into account, and it will take into account, the sacrifices made 
and the discipline of the Italian working classes: the Fascist Revolution 
will make another decisive step to shorten the social distances.»1314 The 
Axis carefully stressed this confrontation between distinguished 
models that determined the socio-economic relations after the war. 
Historian Kiran Klaus Patel stated that «on social policy specifically, 
Italian fascism and Nazism claimed leadership role in reorganizing 
Europe.»1315 In their criticisms, the Fascists did not read between the 
lines the political implications of the Beveridge Report: the establishment 
of the social rights of citizenship. The social policies of the Axis powers 
and their satellites claimed for the “social collaboration” or defined the 
social rights according to racial bonds. On the contrary, the British 
                                                          
1312 Mentioned in K.K.Patel, «Welfare in the Warfare State: Nazi Social Policy on the 
International Stage», German Historical Institute London Bulletin, n.2/2015, pp. 3-38.  
1313 Istituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista, Plutocrazia e Bolscevismo, Quaderni di 
divulgazione, Roma, 1942-XXII. 
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alta giustizia sociale fra le classi. Teatro Adriano, 23 febbraio 1941», in Id., Mussolini parla 
agli operai, p. 40. 
1315 K.K.Patel, «Welfare in the Warfare State: Nazi Social Policy on the International 
Stage», p. 12. 
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report pointed at creating new bonds of social solidarity related to the 
status of “citizen”.  
The British propaganda overwhelmed the Nazi-Fascist 
narrative, but in the very end did not completely succeed in all its 
purposes; the 1942-4 social projects directly opposed to Nazism, but 
also competed with Soviet Russia. The universalistic principles already 
stated in the Atlantic Charter did not hold the grip of the masses. Both 
the Allied and the Axis powers captured the importance of the working 
class as key element to determine the balance of power. Both were 
overwhelmed by the spreading of Communism and by the rise of a 
second wave of popularity of Stalin and Soviet Russia.1316 In the long-
run, the wide diffusion and uproars surrounding the British plans led 
to mixed results in the international status and outlook of Britain. The 
reports of the PWE said that the propaganda of social security served to 
give to Britain the leadership of the Western world in the 
foreshadowed confrontation with Soviet Communism. The promotion 
of the British social policy as possible blueprint for similar reforms on 
the Continent was also related to the need to support the creation of 
more balanced trade relations. In that regard, the government and 
Beveridge’s outlook coincided more than in other policy areas: 
 
«The economic clauses of the Atlantic Charter represent not 
vague idealism but plain business sense. No nation can enjoy 
high and rising standards of life without some trade with 
other nations. No two nations can trade with another without 
becoming linked in a partnership for prosperity or adversity. 
All nations which wish to trade together for economic 
advancement with security must pursue full employment 
together. The united military war of the freedom-loving 
nations against tyranny and barbarism needs to be followed 
by common action, embracing more and more nations, 
against the economic instability which has spelt insecurity to 
                                                          
1316 E.J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, London, 
Abacus, 1995, pp. 225-237. 
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so many millions in the past.»1317  
 
The spread of social security was expected to give moral and 
political authority to Britain, and to create the favourable international 
and economic environment to enact social and economic reforms at 
home. The “revolution” begun in the Anglo-Saxon world became a 
subject matter of transnational exchange, without achieving the 
expected results. Full employment, for instance, became “paradigm” 
for the Western European ruling classes, but this did not mean 
necessarily the implementation of Keynesian policies. In Italy, full 
employment was subsidiary to the boost of production, monetary 
stabilization, and creation of national savings. France adopted policies 
to support employment that also had little to do with Keynesianism. 
The Plan Monnet was rather a plan of industrial investments and 
productive expansion in the expected key sectors of the French 
economy: steal and coal production, infrastructure, housing, 
agriculture.1318  
The same “ambivalence” concerned social security; neither in 
Italy nor in France the democratic governments reset the legislation of 
the previous regimes, with the exception of the laws on corporations 
and socializations. In Italy, this would have meant to dismantle nearly 
twenty years of social actions, which constituted the very framework of 
the Italian compulsory insurances.1319 The recasting of the democracy 
on inclusive basis was attested by incorporation of the social rights and 
the social protection in the Constitutional Charter.1320 The reception of 
the British social security was critically assessed and took into account 
                                                          
1317 W. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society, p.231. 
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oggi (1943-2004), Roma-Manduria-Bari, Piero Lacaita Editore, 2004, pp. 27-72. 
1320 See the article 38 of  the Italian Constitution. Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, 
Roma, Senato della Repubblica, 2009. 
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the structural gaps between the two countries, which made impossible 
similar plans in Italy. The parties mostly retained the political 
principles underpinning the Anglo-Saxon projects. The Italian Social 
Catholics considered it the doable third way between the lawless 
capitalism and Communism; it allowed the coordination and the 
intermingling between social and economic policy, and the affirmation 
of bond of citizenships based on solidarity.1321 More complicated was 
the left-wing take on this subject; while Fascists rejected the 
“plutocratic” British plans because they did not solve class antagonism, 
the Marxist parties objected their conservative features, which 
preserved capitalism and weakened the class struggle. This ideological 
rebuttal accompanied the strong opposition to the Labour Government 
from 1945-51, regarded as the stronghold of the anti-Communist 
international policy in Western Europe.1322  
Alongside ideological and political opposition, the left-wing 
forces put much trust in the myth of the “planning”, which had less to 
do with universalism, but integrated elements of social security within 
more articulated wealth redistribution through progressive taxation.1323 
The harshening of the Cold War in Italy led to ideological polarization. 
Instead of a policy area that favoured the pro-Western options, as 
suggested by British services during the war, social policy became bone 
of contention in the political debate. DC governments reluctantly 
gripped this issue; the universalistic setting was not rejected in 
principle, but was considered not applicable to the Italian economic 
and political situation, determining the withdrawal sine die of any 
coherent project. In turn, the reform of social protection remained in the 
                                                          
1321 D. Parisi, «Riformismo economico anglosassone. La presenza di Beveridge nella 
cultura economica italiana (1943-1950)», in Piero Roggi (edited by), L’attesa della povera 
gente. Giorgio La Pira e la cultura economica anglosassone, pp. 24-47 
1322 The Foreign Minister Bevin was constantly attacked by the Italian Socialist journals 
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Operaio, 22 gennaio 1949; F.A. Ridley, «Laburismo o socialismo», Iniziativa Socialista per 
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1323 C. Pinto, Il riformismo possibile. La grande stagione delle riforme: utopie, speranze, realtà 
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political agenda throughout the whole Cold War; its benchmarks 
would have been the reforms of the old-age pensions and the education 
systems during the Centre-Left Government between DC and PSI in the 
‘60s, culminated with the Labour Statute in 1970 and the birth of the 
Italian NHS in 1978.  
In France, the basic reforms were laid down immediately after 
the war, partially escaping from domestic and international political 
tensions. The PGFR gave birth to the plan of social security, but did not 
erase the legislation of Vichy that achieved the interwar prospected 
reforms.1324 Inclusiveness became the political principle underpinning 
social policy, but, as in Italy, it proved impossible and 
counterproductive to overhaul the previous system, so the reformers 
adapted French social policy to this new principle. As publicly stated 
by De Gaulle, who personally found the Beveridge Report “impressive”, 
«national and social security are, for us, mandatory and interlinked 
goals.»1325 The interpenetration of the aims of social security with the 
previous French social legislation led to a new synthesis, that, in a 
definition that could easily apply also for the Italian case, represented 
«the institutional compromise between the two fundamental historical 
traditions as far as the social protection is concerned: it matched the 
universalistic principles of Beveridge with the compulsory schemes of 
Bismarck.»1326  
Neither Italy nor France turned into integral universalistic 
Britain-like social security systems, but rather incorporated new 
political goals within their specific compulsory schemes. This is the 
reason why the results of the British propaganda cannot be univocally 
assessed. It did not probably achieve the expected results in penetrating 
among the masses nor in securing the role of Britain in the post-war 
international scenario. On the other side, the dissemination of the 
British plans effectively provided working tools for civil servants, 
experts and policy-makers in reshaping the approach to this policy 
area. In the subsidiary, it proves once again that – especially after 1945 
                                                          
1324 AN, 72/AJ/546, «Assurances Sociales. S.d.» 
1325 Christian Pineau, La simple vérité, Paris, Phalanx, 1983, p. 608. 
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– social policy developed first and foremost as State policy, in a strong 
bargaining position with regard to sectional interests and voluntary 
sector. And this also resulted from the Allied “cultural warfare” during 
WWII. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
The evolution of social policy has been an incremental, multi-
faceted, process. Different factors contributed to the redefinition of 
social security after 1945. They resulted from the public policy’s path 
dependence and important political and socio-economic ruptures. The 
comparative analysis puzzles even more linear and generalizing 
stanches. A fruitful approach to understand the new place of social 
security in domestic and international scenarios considers the role of 
the State as principal actor in the expansion of the welfare schemes 
from 1945 onwards. Social policy assumed fundamental tasks in the 
regulation of the social conflict and in addressing the inequalities in 
social statuses among the citizens. The compulsory social insurances 
are related to the breakthrough of industrial capitalism and to the 
“social question” it caused, and called into question the rights of 
citizenship and their extent. But they also concerned even wider issues 
opened up by the collapse of the Old Regime; the breaking of the 
traditional social ties required the reconfiguration of the mechanisms of 
social relief.1327  
Between the 19th and 20th centuries the social protection 
changed in its function of political aims. Until the Second World War, the 
pattern combined upside-down legislative regulation, mutual self-aid 
and uncoordinated State policy. The social insurances were not 
necessarily identified with the rights of citizenship; they rather 
addressed conjunctural issues (unemployment) or concerns not directly 
related to social rights (demographic policies). The watershed moment 
was WWII; Marshall’s classical interpretation of the quantitative and 
qualitative expansion of the social rights of citizenship might be 
                                                          
1327 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
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affected by the British context in the ‘60s.1328 His analysis, however, 
captured a real feature of post-war social welfare; after 1945, the 
democracies reformed the previous schemes and introduced new 
policies to integrate as much citizens as possible in the new “social 
pact”; the enjoyment of the social benefits and services progressively 
became a right. This was not the natural outcome of the “spreading” of 
citizenship-based social solidarity, but resulted from a cumbersome 
redefinition of the borders and the tasks of the Nation-States. 
On the one side, the social legislation carried out as an 
incremental process of coordination and rationalisation of the 
compulsory schemes. This was a long-run political and socio-economic 
change, which did not pass through major ruptures; the social schemes 
even experienced a certain degree of convergence, that nonetheless 
should not be overestimated. The administrative solutions may 
converge, but the various settings retained substantial divergences, as 
for the traditional split between universalistic liberal systems and the 
continental “conservative-corporatist” schemes.1329 The very common 
ground during wartime years was the political will to carry on with 
more coherent and integrated social policies. The policy-makers, in all 
countries considered here, elaborated projects for the overhaul of the 
previous systems; redefining their tasks and extent was the subject of a 
lively debate that crossed the traditional categories of “democracies” 
and “totalitarianisms”.  
On the other side, on ideological differences dwells the great 
divergence between the three case-studies. In the year 1942-5, the 
meaning and scope of social policy was submitted to a real 
“Copernican Revolution”. The British social projects, as well as the 
Italian and French reforms were part of a wider international transfer 
of policies and ideas occurred in the Thirties.1330 After the Great 
Depression, it was no longer possible to recast the laissez-faire 
                                                          
1328 See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and other essays; Id. (edited by), Class, 
Citizenship and Social Development, Garden City, Doubleday and Company, 1964;  
1329 R. Titmuss, Social Policy: an Introduction, London, Allen & Unwin, 1974; G.-E. 
Andersen, The Three Worlds of Western Capitalism. 
1330 K.K. Patel, «Welfare State», in Akira Iriye, Pierre-Yves Saunier (eds.), The Palgrave 
Dictionary of Transnational History, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, pp. 1099-1102.   
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capitalism, nor ignore the popular masses in the re-legitimisation of the 
States. Britain reconfigured social policy according to “citizenship”; the 
State ensured the citizens from the loss of income that might 
undermine social fabric and political institutions. The Italian and 
French regimes, instead, reorganized the relation between State and 
individuals towards forms of “social collaboration”. Vichy pointed at 
achieving corporative and national solidarity, while in the RSI social 
rights were granted to the members of each business unit, as 
productive elements of the national community.  
 I deepened three aspects of the social policies during wartime. 
Firstly, the gradual convergence of the three systems towards similar 
administrative practices and increasing importance of public social 
policy. The second focus is on the wartime projects. In the plans for the 
post-war settlement, social policy had a primary role for the Anglo-
Americans and the Axis powers. The third fundamental feature is 
related to the new dimension and growing importance of the social 
policy in the national and international arena.  
“Social security” was used by the British to legitimize the war 
effort before the opinion at home and to take the leadership on the 
Continent, in opposition to Nazi-Fascism and Soviet Communism. The 
British social propaganda not only had immediate goals related to the 
war, but also wider-ranging aims. Social security was expected to 
legitimize the democratic “social pact” and to contribute to resettle the 
post-war international relations on the ground of pacific co-operation 
among nations. Mutually, the Axis powers grounded their narrative on 
the “new” social policies at home and on the reorganisation of the 
international relations according to this new social order. “Social 
collaboration” as policy goal was equally important for the Vichy 
regime and for the Fascists. It is not stretch to imagine that the reasons 
of the failure of the Axis and their satellites in the implementation of 
their policies and in the conquest of the consensus of popular and 
middle classes, are rather attributable to the military rebuffs from 1942 
on. The military events changed also the mood of the opinion in Europe 
and the “ideological climate” of the war.  
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It is extremely difficult to grasp a single factor that determined 
the wartime “Copernican Revolution”. Diachronically, social 
insurances developed incrementally over time, to such an extent that 
even the 1939-45 projects did not mark a real legislative break. But the 
exceptional war conditions (whether fought or suffered) decisively 
affected policy-makers. From the political point of view, in all the three 
countries the major concern was the end of social strife and insecurity, 
and the strengthening of a new “social pact”. The States became 
increasingly more committed to “social solidarity”, which varied 
according to each political regime and ideology. Vichy’s “corporatist 
solidarity” slightly differed from the ideology that inspired the 
republican Fascism, and of course from the kind of solidarity 
underpinning the British reforms. 
 In fact, “totalitarian” or “liberal” welfare states never existed; it 
would be more appropriate to distinguish between universalist social 
security and occupational/”corporatist” social protection, and the 
corresponding ways to redefine the “social pact” and social solidarity. 
The assessement of the “affirmation” of the British model is extremely 
ambivalent and required multiple levels of analysis. On the one side, 
the “universalist” administrative mechanisms were only partially 
adopted on the Continent; on the other, the core ideas of the 
“universalist social security” penetrated European policy-makers and 
social reformers. They changed the nature of social policy both in the 
immediate years after the war and in the longer-run, as it was no longer 
possible to handle the reform of social protection without taking into 
consideration the universalism inspired by Beveridge’s model. 
 
Policy Convergences 
I approached the topic as a combined provision of political 
legacy and major conceptual ruptures occurred from 1942 onwards. The 
legislative stratification could not be overturned overnight. In the 
Vichy regime, the previous compulsory schemes created acquired 
rights and vested interests, which had a major role in the failure of 
1940–2 Belin’s reforms. Similarly, the RSI could not reset the measures 
enacted in twenty years; its most effective reform was the 
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administrative rearrangement of contributions and insurances, which 
was the logical prosecution of the 1935 and 1939 reforms. As for the 
Beveridge Report, its effective extent could not be assessed univocally; 
after the publication of the report, the Paymaster General argued that 
«there is nothing particularly novel or revolutionary about the 
Beveridge plan. In the main it consolidates and augments existing 
insurance schemes, thus achieving administrative economy. [...] The 
benefits promised are greater than at present but not as much greater as 
people are apt to think.»1331  
More than the technical innovations, the report stood out for 
the political principles it therein asserted. The Beveridge Committee, at 
the beginning, was not expected to draft the ground-breaking text that 
it eventually became.1332 Its follow-up compelled the War Cabinet to 
respond positively to the guidelines of the report. Among the three 
countries here studied, the only one with institutional continuity 
experienced the major breakthrough to a new approach of social policy. 
The subsequent governmental White Papers fixed some linchpins of the 
post-1945 social policy, not only in Britain: the unification in a single 
political and administrative institution of the compulsory social 
insurances; the tripartite contributory system; the nationalisation of the 
compulsory insurances alongside the voluntary schemes; the “freedom 
of want” as leading principle; the coordination of social services and 
assistance; employment policies. The tendential convergence of social 
systems according to these parameters, altogether defined the post-war 
“social security”. The two key innovations, however, did not cross the 
Channel. The flat-rate benefits were usually not adopted in the major 
European countries, which retained Bismarckian schemes. The creation 
of the free and universalistic healthcare service was delayed in Europe, 
in some cases of decades.  
The 1944 White Papers retained the political principles of the 
Beveridge Report, rather than its detailed proposals. Similarly, the 
                                                          
1331 TNA, PREM/89/4/2, «Paymaster General to the Prime Minister. The Beveridge Report. 
11th February 1943», p.1. 
1332 B. Abel Smith, «The Beveridge Report: its Origins and Outcomes», International Social 
Security Review, n.1-2/2007, pp. 5-16. 
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“spreading” of solidarity in post-1945 Europe did not take place 
through the automatic adoption of the universalistic model as 
administrative practice. The new rights of citizenship deployed through 
the juxtaposition of the previous occupational “Bismarckian” schemes 
and the universalistic model as political principle and “social pact”; the 
introduction of elements of universalism within the social protection 
systems eased the socio-economic and political processes in the post-
war advanced capitalist countries.1333 After 1945, the effective 
convergence of the policies is related to the emergence of a precise 
social model that unified public policies and political paradigms. This 
pattern was not limited to Western Europe – characterized nonetheless 
by an increasing integration of its social policies – but stood out as 
worldwide trend, which, once again, crossed political and ideological 
borders.1334 After WWII, it was difficult to rethink the “social pact” 
without amalgamating, to various degrees, the former schemes and 
provisions with citizenship-based benefits and measures. 
 
The social solidarity and the rights of citizenship 
Historian Peter Baldwin, in his historical comparison of the 
post-war social security models in the European continent, stated that 
the continental ruling classes failed in achieving the “solidarity turn”; 
only the Nordic countries and Britain put in place a true universalistic 
and solidarity system.1335 The post-1945 “paradigm shift” did not occur 
with the same extent everywhere. But the abovementioned 
                                                          
1333 H. Wilensky, C.N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare, New York, Russell 
Sage, 1958; F. Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations, Homewood, 
Irvin, 1968. 
1334 See the contributions in H. Kaeble, G. Schmid (eds.), Das europäische Sozialmodell: auf 
dem Weg zum transnationalen Sozialstaat, Berlin, Sigma, 2004, and particularly H. Kaeble, 
«Das europäische Sozialmodell – eine historische Perspektive», pp. 31-50; L. Raphael, 
«Europäische Sozialstaaten in der Boomphase (1948-1973)», pp. 51-73; see also P. 
Kettunen, K. Petersen (eds.), Beyond Welfare State Models. Transnational Historical 
Perspectives on Social Policy, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011, in particularly P. Kettunen, 
Klaus Petersen, «Introduction: rethinking welfare state models», pp. 1-15; C. Conrad, 
«Social policy history after the transnational turn», pp. 218-240. 
1335 P.Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875-
1975, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
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administrative innovations, and mostly the principles of social 
citizenship, reconfigured the relationship between governments and 
citizens. Social security, to whatever extent and typology, was now a 
State policy area and shored up the consensus within the democratic 
societies.  
Vigorelli captured the scope of the “paradigm shift” occurred 
in the political culture after 1942 in Britain, then spread even in 
countries, like Italy, without the preconditions to implement a 
thorough plan of social security. The British plans conceived the 
“freedom from Want” as a right of citizenship, achieved thanks to the 
involvement of the State; these principles were adapted to the different 
conditions of each country. In Italy, they inspired the shift to a more 
consistent commitment of the State in the assistance and social policies: 
 
«the modern assistance is conceived as a collective bond of 
solidarity and springs from the right to life of all human beings; 
[...] and puts all citizens on the same footing in front of the 
need and the distress. [...] Thus, only in an inherently 
democratic regime it is possible to conceive and to achieve a 
system of “social security” which encompasses and commits 
the political and moral values and the material forces of the 
human coexistence, and carries out therefore an authentic 
social revolution.»1336  
 
Similarly, the programme of the CNR in France was clear about 
the principles that should inspire the reform: «on the social plan: [...] a 
comprehensive plan of social security, to ensure for all the citizens the 
livelihood, in any case where they cannot provide them with their own 
work, by a management owned by the delegates of the insured and the 
State; the security of employment, conditions relating to recruitment 
and dismissal.»1337  
The principles of “freedom from Want” were interiorized in the 
post-1945 democracies, while the occupational framework of the 
                                                          
1336 E. Vigorelli, op. cit., p. 10. 
1337 CNR, Programme du Conseil National de la Résistance, Paris, CNR, 1944. 
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continental compulsory schemes gradually adapted to the principles of 
social citizenship. In France, the fragmentation of different schemes 
along occupational lines (with separate insurance schemes for farmers, 
shopkeepers, self-employed) did not prevent the achievement of major 
solidarity. The overdue establishment of the public hospitals was 
equally affected by the 1941 reform and by the need to provide 
universal access to all the citizens.1338 Similarly, the Italian social 
protection never experienced any coherent reform. It rather pursued 
the adaptation to the European trend with a piecemeal approach that 
underpinned the logic of the post-1945 social security. In 1963, the PSI 
joined the government with a wide-scope programme of social reforms, 
including old-age pensions and national healthcare system. Pietro 
Nenni, the leader of the Socialists, proclaimed – borrowing the classical 
definition of the British Welfare State – that his party wanted to achieve 
the welfare state «from the cradle to the grave.»1339  
The answer to the question of the “features” of social security 
after 1945 is not univocal. In administrative terms, the “universalistic 
turn” failed everywhere except in Nordic countries and British 
Commonwealth.1340 In turn, the principles of social citizenship 
gradually spread also through the European continent; they fit to the 
renewed international and domestic context, and came to more 
coherence after the 1960s. The real turning point did not primarily 
concern the administrative setting of the social protection, but rather its 
extent and function in the post-war States, and the idea of the “social 
pact” underlying the “new” social policies. The traditional concerns 
                                                          
1338 In France, like in other countries, the health policy throughout 19th and 20th centuries 
was moved by different concerns, related to public health, prevention of the social ills, 
and social engineering. After 1945, the establishment of the rights to health tied in with 
the social security. See P. Rosanvallon, L’état en France de 1789 à nos jours, Paris, Seuil, 
1990, pp. 128-135 ; V.-P. Comiti, Histoire sanitaire et sociale, Paris, PUF, 1997. 
1339 P. Nenni, Perché i socialisti nel governo. Discorso pronunciato dall’On. Pietro Nenni al 
Teatro Adriano di Roma il 29 dicembre 1963, Roma, PSI, 1964, p.20. 
1340 By the ‘60s the European welfare systems experienced a certain degree of convergence 
for compulsory insurances and other social services, as well as for the social expenditure. 
See H. Kaeble, A Social History of Europe, 1945-2000. Recovery and Transformation after Two 
World Wars, New York-Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2013, pp. 250-270, and particularly pp. 
265-267. 
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about social unrest were juxtaposed to the enjoyment of social benefits 
related to the citizenship.  
In this sense, the 1942 British report and its legislative 
aftermaths after 1945, succeeded where Fascist Italy and the Vichy 
regime failed before and during WWII. Both regimes tackled the “social 
question” combining occupational schemes, corporatism in the 
industrial relations and suppression of individual and social freedoms. 
Both failed in providing effective social solidarity throughout the 
whole national community, as the regimes relied on other forms of 
solidarity/dependence (e.g. the corporations, the party). The analysis of 
the reception of the Beveridge Report by Fascists is illuminating. They 
received the British plans in ideological terms; this bias did not allow 
them to capture the innovative features of the British projects, that is, 
the incorporation of the social protection in the public polices as a right 
of citizenship. They did not catch the “paradigm shift” occurred in 
1942; the British social plans linked the appeasement of social 
insecurity and unrest to a wider social inclusiveness of the State 
policies, which provided the basic minimum income without other 
requirements outside of the citizenship.  
The post-war welfare state did not repose exclusively on the 
confrontation with Communism, just as the wartime social plans did 
not merely confront Nazi-Fascism. It also resulted from the rethinking 
of the very foundations of the “social pact” and the policies to achieve 
it. In Britain, it went down in history as “post-war consensus”, whose 
limits are debated by historiography.1341 But France and Italy did not 
escape from this trend. At the same time that Vichy’s Secretary of 
Labour tried to ensure solidarity within and among corporations, the 
French social reformers in London declared the need to «create 
solidarity, particularly among the insured, but within the society in 
                                                          
1341 D. Dutton, British Politics since 1945. The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Consensus, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1997, pp. 1-85; B. Pimlott, D. Kavanagh, P. Morris, «Is the postwar “consensus” 
a myth?», Contemporary Records, n.6/1989, pp. 12-15; D. Kavanagh, «The Postwar 
Consensus»; more critical with the actual existence of any “consensus” is R. Toye, «From 
“Consensus” to “Common Ground”: the Rhetoric of the Postwar Settlement and its 
Collapse», Journal of Contemporary History, n.1/2013, pp. 3-23. 
505 
 
general.»1342 This single clause sums up the extent and limits of the 
British influence over continental plans: they retained the principles of 
national social solidarity, while opting for the persistence of 
occupational schemes. From the 1945 Plan de sécurité sociale onwards, 
the French policy-makers tried to ensure increasingly more universalist 
elements in the French social welfare.1343  
Italy never experienced a plan of social reforms comparable to 
the British and French ones. Nor had the Italian elites the opportunity 
to access to the original British texts and coeval debates, being the 
knowledge of the Beveridge Report mediated by the Allied information 
services. The reception of the British plans by the Italian reformers was 
even more “second-handed” than for the French ones. Yet, their ideas 
and guidelines penetrated into the Italian debate for decades after the 
war. Also the democratic and anti-fascist parties received innovations 
of the British reports with their own ideological lens; but, unlike the 
Fascists, they retained the elements of social solidarity considered no 
longer deferrable, as stated by the Atlantic Charter and the other 
founding texts of the post-war order.  
 
Social Security and International Order 
These principles did not germinate nor spread from nothing. 
Their diffusion and circulation owed a lot to the deliberate and specific 
choice of the Allies, first and foremost the War Cabinet. The effort to 
ensure the widest circulation possible to the plans of social security was 
inherently related to the wartime conditions. It resulted also from the 
ideological content of the war and from the confrontation with other 
social systems that challenged the traditional approach to the “social 
question”. The publishing of the Beveridge Report was an obligatory 
step; however, its popular success led the War Cabinet to follow up on 
with some official and compelling guidelines for the reconstruction. 
The reaction of the public, in Britain, Europe and across the Atlantic, 
                                                          
1342 AN, 72/AJ/546, « Rapport sur les Assurances Sociales en France », p.25. 
1343 B. Palier, op. cit., particularly pp. 107-165; B. Palier, T. Chevalier, «Welfare State 
Reforms», in Edward J. Mullen, Oxford Bibliographies in Social Work, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2013.  
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was later fostered by the British propaganda machine. Later, the post-
war social welfare apparently mitigated the social conflict, by achieving 
a more inclusive citizenship.1344 The success of the British plans rested 
on this new bond of social solidarity, which had a relevant carryover in 
the wartime propaganda and was able to reach – with mixed results – 
all the social strata.  
The coeval French and Italian public narratives stressed 
respectively the “social collaboration” at the very basis of their actions. 
Domestic and external factors led to the failure of these projects; British 
society was cohesive, as the country was winning the war, while 
French and Italian regimes exercised control over a divided society 
under the yoke of Nazi Germany. Eventually, the Allies overwhelmed 
the Axis powers not only thanks to their military and industrial 
superiority, but also to the new ideas they carried on the horseback. 
Social security cannot be understood outside the context of 
international politics. Not only for the implications of full employment 
on international trade, industrial production and labour market; social 
security designed also a model of socio-economic organization, which 
restored liberal capitalism and democracy. It was also expected to 
challenge Soviet Communism, the other ideological, economic and 
institutional pole emerged from the war.  
By the end of 1941, the British government was confident to 
win the war; they had – unlike in 1918 – to win the peace. They wanted 
to propose Britain as a model for the reconstruction, in terms of 
material relief and social innovations. From this point of view, Britain 
lost her political challenge; the war undermined her international role, 
and from 1941 onwards the country highly depended on American aid 
and loans.1345 Among the continental working classes the success of the 
                                                          
1344 R. Dahrendorf, «Citizenship and Social Class», in Martin Bulmer, and Anthony Rees 
(eds.), Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T.H. Marshall, London, UCL Press, 
1996, pp. 25-48, see particularly pp. 34-40. 
1345 The historian Clive Ponting wrote that «the lesson of 1940 was that Britain was no 
longer a great power […] much of Britain’s post-war economic, defence and foreign 
policy was based on an illusion: an attempt was made to rseassert Britain’s role as a 
major power without the necessary foundations to sustain it.» C.Ponting, op. cit., p. 234, 
see also pp. 196-235 . 
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Red Army contributed to refresh the myth of Communism. The 
political and economic ruling classes, by reaction, oriented themselves 
toward the United States, their model and their ideology.1346 The 
Marshall Plan, whose global impact on the recovery was questionable, 
marketed a political and psychological turn toward economic 
integration, as well as social and political pacification.1347  
Britain deceived itself to take the lead of Western Europe 
thanks to its contribution to the material recovery and thanks to the 
promotion of its renewed socio-economic model. As Milward wrote, 
the European post-war settlement was mostly shaped by the US, that 
furthered «the process of economic recovery in Western Europe, to 
develop a bloc of states which would share similar political, social, 
economic and cultural values to those which the United States itself 
publicly valued and claimed to uphold. [...] the values of so-called “free 
enterprise”, of entrepreneurship, of efficiency, of technical expertise, 
and of competition. These were all brought together in the concept of 
productivity.»1348 These values were not inconsistent with the 
establishment of the welfare state. In the first formulations of the 
British social reformers, social security was rather a protection measure 
to avoid mass unemployment as experienced in the Thirties, and to 
guarantee the minimum vital income in any event. Later, economic 
growth, welfare states, social rights, affluent societies became – 
unexpectedly – the necessary corollaries of the “securing” of the 
Nation-States, strengthening the domestic political consensus and 
favouring the stabilization of the international settlement.1349 But this 
outcome was achieved under the ideological and political American 
                                                          
1346 C.S. Maier, «The politics of productivity: foundations of American international 
economic policy after World War II», and Id., «The two postwar eras and the conditions 
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pp. 90-125. 
1348 A. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, p. 123. 
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hegemony over the “West”, and no longer that of the British one.
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1004; 
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- ACS, OND, «Nota Riservatissima. Appunti per un articolo sul 
dopolavoro d’oggi- 2 febbraio 1945»; 
- ACS, OND/1, «L’OND nella Repubblica Sociale Italiana. 
Numero Unico – Appunto di Ezio Pucci al Dott. Malgiovanni. 
9/3/1945»;  
- ACS, OND/2/ Appunti e prospetti vari, «OND, Ufficio 
Propaganda. Appunti per il commissario. 16/9/44»; 
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e Prospetti vari, «20 anni dell’OND.s.d.»;  
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Al Presidente 
dell’O.N.D. 13 maggio 1944»; 
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «All’Ispettore Generale 
per le Forze Armate – Propaganda del soldato. 10/3/1944»;  
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Appunto per il 
Commissario – “Radio Dopolavoro”.7/1/1945»;  
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Appunto per il 
Commissario.3/1/1945»;  
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Appunto per il 
Presidente – Propaganda capillare nei quartieri popolari delle 
città industriali.5/6/1944»;  
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Il Commissario 
Nazionale dell’O.N.D. ai direttori provinciali. S.d.»; 
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Propaganda per la 
popolazione nei territori occupati. 28/2/1944»;  
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Propaganda. S.d.»; 
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Relazione sull’attività 
dell’OND nella Repubblica Sociale Italiana dal 1 luglio 1944 al 
10 marzo 1945.s.d.» 
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Riservata Personale – 
Ai Direttori Provinciali. 11/2/1945» 
- ACS, OND/2/Appunti e prospetti vari, «Riservata personale – 
Ezio Pizzi, Commissario Nazionale Ai Direttori Provinciali 
dell’O.N.D. Ordinamento organizzativo per la Stampa e 
Propaganda. 24/2/1945»; 
- ACS, OND/7/Propaganda e stampa, «Presidenza Nazionale 
OND. Ufficio Segreteria Generale. 28 febbraio 1045»; 
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- ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Adeguamento 
dell’O.N.D. alla struttura Sindacale della Repubblica Sociale 
Italiana. 12.2.1945-XXIII»; 
- ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Adeguamento dell’OND 
alla nuova struttura Sindacale della Repubblica Sociale Italiana. 
12.2.45-XXIII»; 
- ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Appunto per il 
Commissario. S.d.», p.1; 
- ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Appunto per il 
Commissario. S.d.»; 
- ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Riunione del 
Commissariato Nazionale. Il “Dopolavoro” nella Repubblica 
S.I. 9.2.45XXIII»; 
-  ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Riunione per l’esame 
dell’attività dell’OND in relazione alla compilazione di uno 
schema di progetto di legge. 12/2/1945-XXIII»;  
- ACS, OND/7/Stampa e propaganda, «Schema per un appunto 
di progetto di legge per la ricostituzione l’ordinamento e lo 
sviluppo dell’Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro nella Repubblica 
Sociale Italiana. Marzo 1945»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 785G, «Direzione Generale 
del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale - Appunto sulla 
soppressione del concorso dello Stato nella maggiorazione 
degli assegni familiari- Agosto 1943»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 785G, «Direzione Generale 
del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale - Appunto sulla 
soppressione del concorso dello Stato nella maggiorazione 
degli assegni familiari- Agosto 1943»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 785G, «Istituto Nazionale 
Fascista della Previdenza Sociale - Assegni familiari, criteri di 
massima. 1 settembre 1944»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 785G, «Istituto Nazionale 
Fascista della Previdenza Sociale - Assegni familiari, criteri di 
massima. 1 settembre 1944»; 
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- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Appunto per il 
Consiglio dei Ministri. Schema di decreto legislativo che reca 
norme per la liquidazione delle pensioni ai superstiti in caso di 
morte di assicurati e pensionati dell’assicurazione obbligatoria 
invalidità e vecchiaia. 10 gennaio 1945»;  
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Appunto per il 
Consiglio dei Ministri. Schema di decreto legislativo che reca 
norme per la liquidazione delle pensioni ai superstiti in caso di 
morte di assicurati e pensionati dell’assicurazione obbligatoria 
invalidità e vecchiaia. 10 gennaio 1945»;  
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Bozza di decreto del 
Ministro Segretario di Stato per il Lavoro di concerto con il 
Ministro per le Finanze. 5 gennaio 1945»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Bozza di decreto del 
Ministro Segretario di Stato per il Lavoro di concerto con il 
Ministro per le Finanze. 5 gennaio 1945»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 821 G, «Direzione Generale 
del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale – Elenchi dei fascicoli 
trasferiti in Alta Italia concernenti pratiche generali in corso di 
trattazione. S.d.»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 821 G, «Direzione Generale 
del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale – Elenchi dei fascicoli 
trasferiti in Alta Italia concernenti pratiche generali in corso di 
trattazione. S.d.»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 821 G, «Istituto Nazionale 
Fascista della Previdenza Sociale - Assegni familiari agli operai 
richiamati alle armi e indennità di richiamo agli impiegati 
privati. 14 ottobre 1943»;  
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 821 G, «Istituto Nazionale 
Fascista della Previdenza Sociale - Assegni familiari agli operai 
richiamati alle armi e indennità di richiamo agli impiegati 
privati. 14 ottobre 1943»;  
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 821 G, «Ministero delle 
Corporazioni, Questioni urgenti da risolvere per il trattamento 
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dei richiamati - Collocamento con le autorità tedesche per i 
provvedimenti in materia sociale. 25 ottobre 1943»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 821 G, «Ministero delle 
Corporazioni, Questioni urgenti da risolvere per il trattamento 
dei richiamati - Collocamento con le autorità tedesche per i 
provvedimenti in materia sociale. 25 ottobre 1943»; 
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 821 G, «Questioni urgenti da 
risolvere per il trattamento dei richiamati»;  
- ACS, RSI - Ministero del Lavoro, 821 G, «Questioni urgenti da 
risolvere per il trattamento dei richiamati»;  
- ACS, RSI/ Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Istituto Nazionale 
Fascista della Previdenza Sociale - La previdenza sociale in 
caso di guerra. S.d.» 
- ACS, RSI/ Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Istituto Nazionale 
Fascista della Previdenza Sociale - La previdenza sociale in 
caso di guerra. S.d.» 
- ACS, RSI/Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Schema decreto recante 
norme per la liquidazione delle pensioni ai superstiti in caso di 
morte assicurati e pensionati dell’assicurazione obbligatoria 
invalidità e vecchiaia. 21 marzo 1945»; 
- ACS, RSI/Ministero del Lavoro, 797G, «Schema decreto recante 
norme per la liquidazione delle pensioni ai superstiti in caso di 
morte assicurati e pensionati dell’assicurazione obbligatoria 
invalidità e vecchiaia. 21 marzo 1945»; 
- ACS, RSISPD-CR, 61/630/1, «Agenzia Stefani. Prima riunione 
Direttorio nazionale Pfr.4 marzo 1944»; 
- ACS, RSISPD-CR, 61/630/1, «Agenzia Stefani. Prima riunione 
Direttorio nazionale Pfr.4 marzo 1944»; 
- ACS, SPD - BVBM, «Bollettino n. 158 - D.P. 6 giugno 1944-
XXII»; 
- ACS, SPD - Carte della Valigia di Benito Mussolini, fasc. 21.3-
6.3, «Invito alla riflessione e al coraggio morale»,  
- ACS, SPD – CVB/21.3-1, «Strettamente riservata per Mussolini. 
La decisione di sciopero a Milano e i contrasti nel Comitato di 
Liberazione» 
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- ACS, SPD - CVBM, 21.3-1, «Il contrordine del contrordine nello 
sciopero di Milano. 1 marzo 1944» 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 28/1487 - Confederazione Fascista 
Lavoratori dell’industria, «Per l’Eccellenza Tarchi ministro 
dell’Economica Corporativa. 11 febbraio 1944-XXII» 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 28/1487 - Confederazione Fascista 
Lavoratori dell’industria, «Per l’Eccellenza Giovanni Dolfin - 
Segretario Particolare del Duce. 3 gennaio 1944-XXII»;  
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 28/1487 - Confederazione Fascista 
Lavoratori dell’industria, «Per l’Eccellenza Tarchi ministro 
dell’Economica Corporativa. 11 febbraio 1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 28/1487 - Confederazione Fascista 
Lavoratori dell’industria, «Per l’Eccellenza Tarchi ministro 
dell’Economica Corporativa. 11 febbraio 1944-XXII» 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 28/1487 - Confederazione Fascista 
Lavoratori dell’industria, «Per l’Eccellenza Giovanni Dolfin - 
Segretario Particolare del Duce. 3 gennaio 1944-XXII»;  
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 28/1487 - Confederazione Fascista 
Lavoratori dell’industria, «Per l’Eccellenza Tarchi ministro 
dell’Economica Corporativa. 11 febbraio 1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 92/7700 - Berti Cesare A. Confederazione 
Fascista Lavoratori dell’industria, «Lettera di Berti a Vecchi. 19 
marzo 1945»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 92/7700 - Berti Cesare A. Confederazione 
Fascista Lavoratori dell’industria, «Lettera di Berti a Mussolini. 
24 marzo 1945»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 92/7700 - Berti Cesare A. Confederazione 
Fascista Lavoratori dell’industria, «Lettera di Berti a Vecchi. 19 
marzo 1945»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CO, 92/7700 - Berti Cesare A. Confederazione 
Fascista Lavoratori dell’industria, «Lettera di Berti a Mussolini. 
24 marzo 1945»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 79/650/4B, «Riunioni dei Capi di Provincie 
presiedute dal Ministro dell’interno (10 febbraio e 6 giugno 
1944)», 
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- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Agenzia Stefani n.17. 1 luglio 
1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Agenzia Stefani n.17. 1 luglio 
1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione agli attuali 
provvedimenti legislativi per il collocamento in temporanea 
disponibilità della manodopera non utilizzata presso le 
imprese e per la costituzione di consorzi provinciali per la 
ricostruzione e manutenzione di opere pubbliche. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione agli attuali 
provvedimenti legislativi per il collocamento in temporanea 
disponibilità della manodopera non utilizzata presso le 
imprese e per la costituzione di consorzi provinciali per la 
ricostruzione e manutenzione di opere pubbliche. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione al decreto sul 
passaggio in proprietà dello Stato delle imprese elettriche. S.d.» 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione al decreto sul 
passaggio in proprietà dello Stato delle imprese elettriche. S.d.» 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione allo schema di 
provvedimento per l’inquadramento del Commissariato dei 
Prezzi e del Commissariato del Lavoro alle dipendenze del 
Ministero dell’Economia.S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione allo schema di 
provvedimento per l’inquadramento del Commissariato dei 
Prezzi e del Commissariato del Lavoro alle dipendenze del 
Ministero dell’Economia.S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione del decreto del Duce 
sulla costituzione dell’istituto nazionale fascista della 
cooperazione. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI - CR, 84/656/2, «Relazione del decreto del Duce 
sulla costituzione dell’istituto nazionale fascista della 
cooperazione. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CO, 28/1487 – Confederazione Fascista 
Lavoratori dell’Industria, «Al Capo del Governo. Promemoria 
per il Duce. 8 luglio 1944»; 
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- ACS, SPDRSI-CO, 28/1487 – Confederazione Fascista 
Lavoratori dell’Industria, «Al Capo del Governo. Promemoria 
per il Duce. 8 luglio 1944»; 
- ACS, SPDRSICR, 19/111/1, «Nota della Corrispondenza 
repubblicana – Churchill il conservatore. 18 marzo 1945»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 2/24/1, «Alcune idee sul futuro assetto 
politico e sociale del popolo italiano. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 2/24/1, «Alcune idee sul futuro assetto 
politico e sociale del popolo italiano. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 2/24/1, «Lettera di Benito Mussolini a Carlo 
Alberto Biggini. 27 maggio 1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 2/24/1, «Lettera di Benito Mussolini a Carlo 
Alberto Biggini. 27 maggio 1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 2/24/3, «Precedenti storici e prime idee per 
una riforma del Senato. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 2/24/3, «Precedenti storici e prime idee per 
una riforma del Senato. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/ 221- Socializzazione delle imprese, 
«Appunto di Barracu per il Duce. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/ 221- Socializzazione delle imprese, 
«Appunto di Barracu per il Duce. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/21/8; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/21/8; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221 – Socializzazione dell’impresa, 
«Agenzia Stefani, 2 marzo 1945-XXIII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221 – Socializzazione dell’impresa, 
«Agenzia Stefani, 2 marzo 1945-XXIII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221 – Socializzazione delle imprese, 
«Appunto per il Duce. Socializzazione delle imprese. 6 giugno 
1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221 – Socializzazione delle imprese, 
«Appunto per il Duce. Socializzazione delle imprese. 6 giugno 
1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221/5, «Lettera di Ezzelino Zuliani al 
Duce. 25 giugno 1944-XXII»; 
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- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221/5, «Lettera di Ezzelino Zuliani al 
Duce. 25 giugno 1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221/7 – Socializzazione delle imprese, 
«Nota per il Duce. 30 giugno 1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221/7 – Socializzazione delle imprese, 
«Nota per il Duce. 30 giugno 1944-XXII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221/7, «Lettera del Ministro Tarchi al 
duce. 11/2/1944»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 27/221/7, «Lettera del Ministro Tarchi al 
duce. 11/2/1944»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 32/240R/1, «Statuto dell’Istituto di Gestione e 
Finanziamento»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 32/240R/1, «Statuto dell’Istituto di Gestione e 
Finanziamento»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 83/652/1 «Ministero per l’economia 
corporativa. Trasformazione del Ministero dell’Economia 
Corporativa in Ministero per la produzione industriale. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 83/652/1 «Ministero per l’economia 
corporativa. Trasformazione del Ministero dell’Economia 
Corporativa in Ministero per la produzione industriale. S.d.»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 83/652/1, «Ministro per la Produzione 
Industriale. Disciplina della produzione e della distribuzione 
dopo lo scioglimento delle organizzazioni sindacali dei datori 
di lavoro. 9 febbraio 1945-XXIII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 83/652/1, «Ministro per la Produzione 
Industriale. Disciplina della produzione e della distribuzione 
dopo lo scioglimento delle organizzazioni sindacali dei datori 
di lavoro. 9 febbraio 1945-XXIII»; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 85/657/1; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 85/657/1;  
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 85/657/1; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR, 85/657/1;  
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR,27/21/8; 
- ACS, SPDRSI-CR,27/21/8; 
- ACS, SPDRSICR/47/506, «Libro Bianco Inglese»;  
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- AN, 2/AG/499/C.C.80, «Note sur la loi portant creation d’un 
Institut National d’action sanitaires des Assurances Sociales, 10 
Novembre 1941»; 
- AN, 2/AG/499/C.C.80, «Projet d’Institut National d’Action 
Sanitaires des Assurances Sociales, 25 Novembre 1941»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Analyse de la loi sur l’organisation des 
Caisses d’Assurances sociales, s.d.»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Examen technique de quelques 
principes énonces par l’éxposé des motifs ou resultant des 
téxtes du projet»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Lettre du Chef Départemental de la 
Légion de l’Ardèche à Monsieur le Maréchal, 27 mars 1942»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Lettre du Conseil Central de la 
Fédération des Syndicats des Maîtres-Imprimeurs de France au 
Directeur du Cabinet Civil de Monsieur le Maréchal de France 
Chef de l’État Français, 23 mars 1942»;  
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur l’organisation administrative 
des assurances sociales, s.d.» 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur la loi relative à l’organisation 
des caisses d’assurances sociales, 14 mars 1942»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur la loi relative à l’organisation 
des caisses d’assurances sociales, 14 mars 1942»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur un projet de loi relatif à 
l’étatisation des assurances sociales, 8 mars 1942»;  
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur un projet de loi relatif à 
l’étatisation des assurances sociales, 8 mars 1942»;  
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Note sur un projet de loi relatif à 
l’organisation des caisses d’assurances sociales, 8 mars 1942»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Notes sur un projet de creation de 
cause unique territorial d’assurances sociales»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Nouvelle note sur le projet de loi 
relatif aux assurances sociales, 16 mars 1942»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Loi 
relative à l’organisation des Caisses d’Assurances sociales, 
s.d.»; 
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- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C, «Secrétariat d’état. Lettre du 5 mars 
1942»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C., «Note sur les modifications qu’il parait 
opportun d’apporter au texte propose à la signature du Chef de 
l’état, s.d.» ; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C., «René Belin. Rapport au Maréchal de 
France, Chef de l’État français. 28 Février 1942»; 
- AN, 2AG/499/CC.80.C., «Sécretariat Général à la Famille et à la 
Santé. Note sur la pratique suivie par le Ministère du Travail 
pour réaliser ses projets des réforme actuellement en cours. 
S.d.»; 
- AN, 72/AJ/13, «Ministère du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale. 
L’œuvre législative et règlementaire concernant la sécurité 
sociale pendant la période 1939-1945. S.d.» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/13, «Ministère du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale. 
L’œuvre législative et règlementaire concernant la sécurité 
sociale pendant la période 1939-1945. S.d.» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/13, «Ministère du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale. 
L’œuvre législative et règlementaire concernant la sécurité 
sociale pendant la période 1939-1945. S.d.». 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Assurances Sociales. S.d.» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Commission d’études des problèmes d’après-
guerre. III. Commission économique, financière et sociale» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Commission économique, financière et sociale. 
Salaire minimum. Projet de l’O.C.M. (Paris). 1.6.43» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Compte-rendu de la réunion de la Section 
Sociale et du Sous-Comité économique. 25.8.42» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «L’opinion anglaise devant le Plan Beveridge. 
Janvier 1943» ;  
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «La législation actuelle en Grande Bretagne. Le 
plan Beveridge. Janvier 1943» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Note du Commandant Bernard. S.d.» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Observations sur l’envoi du Rapport 
Beveridge. Janvier 1943» ; 
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- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Problèmes économiques d’après-guerre un 
point de vue français. Juillet 1942» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Procès-verbal. Section Sociale – 25.2.43» ; AN, 
72/AJ/546, «Commission économique, financière et sociale. 
Salaire minimum. 15.6.43» ;  
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Procès-verbal. Section Sociale – 3.12.42» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Rapport Beveridge sur les assurances sociales 
et les services sociaux Allies et Connexes (Traduction de 
l’article du News Chronicle du 2 décembre. 1942)» ;  
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Rapport de Chauvel sur les lois sociales de 
Vichy. 10/g/42» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Rapport sur les Assurances Sociales en 
France» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Résumé des activités de la Commission pour 
l’étude des problèmes d’après-guerre d’ordre économique, 
financière, et social. 31.5.1943» ; 
- AN, 72/AJ/546, «Resumé des considerations générales de la 
Section Sociale sur l’établissement d’un salaire minimum. 
S.d.» ; 
- AN, 72AJ13, « L’orientation de la sécurité sociale pendant la 
période 1940-1945 » ; 
- AN, 72AJ13, « L’orientation de la sécurité sociale pendant la 
période 1940-1945 » ; 
- AN, 75/AJ/546, «Commission d’études des problèmes d’après-
guerre. IV. Section Sociale de la Commission économique, 
financière et sociale» ; 
- AN, 75/AJ/546, «Compte-rendu. 24.4.1942» ; 
- AN, AG/2/548/C.C.149A, «Rapport sur la situation politique à 
l’intérieur du Pays. Mai – Juin 1943» ; 
- AN, F/22/1510, «Ministère de la Production Industrielle et du 
Travail. Circulaire aux Messieurs les Directeurs des Caisses de 
Compensation d’allocations familiales. 18 janvier 1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1510, «Ministère de la Production Industrielle et du 
Travail. Circulaire aux Messieurs les Directeurs des Caisses de 
Compensation d’allocations familiales. 18 janvier 1941» ; 
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- AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. 
les Présidents des Conseils d’Administration des Caisses de 
Compensation et des Services Particuliers d’Allocations 
familiales. 11 avril 1941» ;  
- AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. 
les Inspecteurs Divisionnaires du Travail et de la Main 
d’œuvre.16 avril 1941» ;  
- AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. 
les Présidents des Conseils d’Administration des Caisses de 
Compensation d’Allocations familiales. 29 mai 1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. 
les Présidents des Conseils d’Administration des Caisses de 
Compensation d’Allocations familiales. 30 mai 1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. 
les Présidents des Conseils d’Administration des Caisses de 
Compensation et des Services Particuliers d’Allocations 
familiales. 11 avril 1941» ;  
- AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. 
les Inspecteurs Divisionnaires du Travail et de la Main 
d’œuvre.16 avril 1941» ;  
- AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. 
les Présidents des Conseils d’Administration des Caisses de 
Compensation d’Allocations familiales. 29 mai 1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1510, «Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Circulaire à Mm. 
les Présidents des Conseils d’Administration des Caisses de 
Compensation d’Allocations familiales. 30 mai 1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1511, « Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Les salaires 
moyens départementaux redeviennent inexactes au lendemain 
de leur révision. 13 janvier 1942»; 
- AN, F/22/1511, « Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Les salaires 
moyens départementaux redeviennent inexactes au lendemain 
de leur révision. 13 janvier 1942»; 
- AN, F/22/1511, « Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Projet 
proportionnant les allocations familiales professionnelles des 
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travailleurs salariés à leur traitement ou salaire. 29 décembre 
1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1511, « Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail. Projet 
proportionnant les allocations familiales professionnelles des 
travailleurs salariés à leur traitement ou salaire. 29 décembre 
1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1511, «F. Bouverat, Ancien Vice-Président du Conseil 
Supérieur de la Natalité à Monsieur le Secrétaire d’Etat. Statut 
des fonctionnaires, projet de modification concernant le titre 4 
(rémunération du travail). 1 décembre 1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1511, «F. Bouverat, Ancien Vice-Président du Conseil 
Supérieur de la Natalité à Monsieur le Secrétaire d’Etat. Statut 
des fonctionnaires, projet de modification concernant le titre 4 
(rémunération du travail). 1 décembre 1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1774, «Note sur la Charte de l’Organisation 
Professionnelle. 28 décembre 1940» 
- AN, F/22/1774, «Note sur la Charte de l’Organisation 
Professionnelle. 28 décembre 1940» 
- AN, F/22/1775, «Conférence de M. Terray du 16 Janvier 1942 
aux représentants de la Légion Française des Combattants à 
Vichy» ;   
- AN, F/22/1775, «Conférence de M. Terray du 17 octobre 1942 
aux membres de la Commission Patronale de l’Office des 
Comités Sociaux» ; 
- AN, F/22/1775, «Conférence de M. Terray du 7 Janvier 1942 aux 
Préfets» ;  
- AN, F/22/1775, «La fonction sociale du patronat ou le patronat 
cadre naturel de la Nation. Conférence de M. Terray du 1er Juin 
1942 au Centre des Jeunes Patrons de Nancy» ;  
- AN, F/22/1776, «Actes des Journées de Mont Doré. 10 au 14 
avril 1943» ; AN, F/22/1776, «Actes des Journées de Mont Doré. 
16 au 23 septembre 1943» ; 
- AN, F/22/1776, «Comité Social 17 novembre 1941» ; 
- AN, F/22/1776, «Henri Pinaud. Rapport complémentaire sur 
quinzaine effectués pour la Charte du Travail. 14 mars 1942» ; 
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- AN, F/22/1776, «Légion des Combattants. Charte du Travail. 
Février 1942» ; 
- AN, F/22/1776, «Légion. La Légion Française des Combattants 
et la Charte du Travail (1941-1942)» ; 
- AN, F/22/1776, «Projet du film relatif à la Charte du Travail. 
1943». 
- AN, F/22/1776, «Rapport général du premier congrès des 
groupes légionnaires d’entrerpise. S.d.»; 
- AN, F/22/1780; 
- AN, F/22/1780; 
- AN, F/22/1791, « Emile Girard. Office des Comités Sociaux. 15 
mars 1942 » ; 
- AN, F/22/1791, « Emile Girard. Office des Comités Sociaux. 15 
mars 1942 » ; 
- AN, F/22/1791, « Emile Girard. Office des Comités Sociaux. 15 
mars 1942 » ; 
- AN, F/22/1791, «Note des Comités Sociaux. De l’application de 
la Charte du Travail dans l’entreprise» ; 
- AN, F/22/1791, «Note des Comités Sociaux. De l’application de 
la Charte du Travail dans l’entreprise» ; 
- AN, F/22/1791; 
- AN, F/22/1837 ; 
- AN, F/22/1839, «Centre d’Information des Employeurs. S.d.» ; 
- AN, F/22/1839, «Note sur le rôle des Délégations Régionales du 
Centre d’Information des Employeurs. 12.7.44» ; 
- AN, F/22/1840, «Centre d’Information des Ouvriers. Fiches 
sociales» ; AN, F/22/1840, «Brochures» ; 
- AN, F/22/1840, «Le centre d’informations des ouvriers est à 
votre service. S.d.» ; 
- AN, F/22/1840, «Le Ministre Secrétaire d’Etat au Travail à Mm. 
Les Directeurs des Services Particuliers d’ Allocations 
Familiales. 21 Juin 1944» ; 
- AN, F/22/1840, «Organisation des services du CIO» ; AN, 
F/22/1840, «Listes de diffusion de la documentation du CIO 
(mars 1944)» ; 
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- AN, F/22/1841, «Le Secrétaire d’état au travail à Messieurs les 
Préfets. Rôle de l’Office des Comités Sociaux. 25 juillet 1942» ; 
- AN, F/41/288-289 ;  
- AN, F/41/297 ;  
- AN, F/41/298 ;  
- AN, F/41/305 ;  
- AN, F/41/306; 
- BDIC, fm 273 (6) N 268, «Note concernant l’  « information 
ouvrière ». 15 Septembre 1943» ; 
- BDIC, FPièce 2595; 
- BDIC, FΔrés 741/1, «Travailleurs français en Allemagne» ; 
- BDIC, FΔrés 741/1, «Travailleurs français en Allemagne» ; 
- BDIC, Mfm 273 (5) N 268, «Ministère de l’Information, 
Circulaire sur la propagande ouvrière à MM. Les Préfets Régionaux 
et Départementaux et à MM. Les Délégués Régionaux et 
Départementaux à l’Information, Vichy, Information de l’état 
français, 1943» ; 
- BDIC, Q pièce 4.995, «Comité d’études pour la France. 
Complément à l’étude n.9. Amélioration du régime des 
allocations familiales. 10 septembre 1941» ; 
- BDIC, Q pièce 4.995, «Comité d’études pour la France. 
Complément à l’étude n.9. Amélioration du régime des 
allocations familiales. 10 septembre 1941» ; 
- CDC, 30/4, 17/3, «G. Taillefer, Note pour le directeur général. 
S.d.» ; 
- CDC, 30/4, 17/3, «G. Taillefer, Note pour le directeur général. 
S.d.» ; 
- CDC, 30/4, 17/4, «Note sur le déficit des Assurances Sociales. 23 
avril 1943» ; 
- CDC, 30/4, 17/4, «Note sur le déficit des Assurances Sociales. 23 
avril 1943» ; 
- CDC, 31/2, 17/1, «Projet de retraite des Vieux Travailleurs par 
la Mutualité, 15 juin 1939» ;  
- CDC, 31/2, 17/1, «Projet de retraite des Vieux Travailleurs par 
la Mutualité, 15 juin 1939» ;  
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- CDC, 31/2, 17/1, «Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de 
l’hygiène, de l’assistance, de l’assurance et de la prévoyance 
sociale par M. Le Gorgeu. N. 447. Procès-verbal de la séance du 
15 juin 1939» ; 
- CDC, 31/2, 17/1, «Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de 
l’hygiène, de l’assistance, de l’assurance et de la prévoyance 
sociale par M. Le Gorgeu. N. 447. Procès-verbal de la séance du 
15 juin 1939» ; 
- CDC, 33/3, 17/1,«Projet d’extension de la loi sur le vieux 
travailleurs à d’autres catégories de salaires. Projet écarté par 
les Finances – Novembre 1942» ; 
- CDC, 33/3, 17/1,«Projet d’extension de la loi sur le vieux 
travailleurs à d’autres catégories de salaires. Projet écarté par 
les Finances – Novembre 1942» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, «Projet de Loi portant réforme des legislations sur 
les Assurances Sociales, les allocations familiales, et les congés 
payés» 
- CDC, 33/3-4, «Projet de Loi portant réforme des legislations sur 
les Assurances Sociales, les allocations familiales, et les congés 
payés» 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/1, «Le Ministre Secrétaire d’Etat à la 
Production Industrielle et au Travail à Monsieur le Ministre 
Secrétaire d’état aux Finances (Rapport présenté par Réné 
Belin). 1 septembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/1, «Le Ministre Secrétaire d’Etat à la 
Production Industrielle et au Travail à Monsieur le Ministre 
Secrétaire d’état aux Finances (Rapport présenté par Réné 
Belin). 1 septembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3 « Division des Assurances Sociales. Note 
pour le Directeur Général. 29 aout 1940 » 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3 « Division des Assurances Sociales. Note 
pour le Directeur Général. 29 aout 1940 » 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3 «4ème Division 2ème Bureau. Note au Directeur 
Général. 19 Novembre 1940» ; 
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- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3 «4ème Division 2ème Bureau. Note au Directeur 
Général. 19 Novembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3 «Division des Assurances Sociales. Note pour 
le Directeur Général.12 septembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3 «Division des Assurances Sociales. Note pour 
le Directeur Général.12 septembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, « Division des Assurances Sociale, Réforme 
de la Loi sur les Assurances Sociales. 8 novembre 1940 » ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, « Division des Assurances Sociale, Réforme 
de la Loi sur les Assurances Sociales. 8 novembre 1940 » ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «2ème Division. 3ème Bureau. Note pour le 
Directeur Général. 2 octobre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «2ème Division. 3ème Bureau. Note pour le 
Directeur Général. 2 octobre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «2ème Division. Note pour Monsieur le 
Secrétaire Général. 2 octobre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «2ème Division. Note pour Monsieur le 
Secrétaire Général. 2 octobre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «Ministère de la Production Industrielle et 
du Travail. Rapport à Monsieur le Maréchal de France, Chef de 
l’Etat Français. 21 septembre 1940»; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «Ministère de la Production Industrielle et 
du Travail. Rapport à Monsieur le Maréchal de France, Chef de 
l’Etat Français. 21 septembre 1940»; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «Note pour le Directeur Général. 12 octobre 
1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3, «Note pour le Directeur Général. 12 octobre 
1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3« 4ème Division, 2ème Bureau, Note au Directeur 
Général. 9 novembre 1940 » ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/3« 4ème Division, 2ème Bureau, Note au Directeur 
Général. 9 novembre 1940 » ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/4, «Cabinet du Directeur Général. Note pour la 
Commission de Surveillance (non présentée» ; 
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- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/4, «Cabinet du Directeur Général. Note pour la 
Commission de Surveillance (non présentée» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5 « Note d’observation de la CDC. Projet de loi 
sur la retraite des vieux travailleurs. 26 février 1941 » ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5 « Note d’observation de la CDC. Projet de loi 
sur la retraite des vieux travailleurs. 26 février 1941 » ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, « Ministère de la Production Industrielle et 
du Travail. Cout de la réforme de la législation sur les 
Assurances Sociales concernant la retraite des Vieux 
Travailleurs. 4 novembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, « Ministère de la Production Industrielle et 
du Travail. Cout de la réforme de la législation sur les 
Assurances Sociales concernant la retraite des Vieux 
Travailleurs. 4 novembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «4ème Division, 2ème Bureau, Note pour le 
Directeur Général. 31 octobre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «4ème Division, 2ème Bureau, Note pour le 
Directeur Général. 31 octobre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «7ème Division. Note pour Monsieur le 
Secrétaire Général. 26 février 1941» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «7ème Division. Note pour Monsieur le 
Secrétaire Général. 26 février 1941» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «Note d’observation de la CDC, Projet de loi 
sur la Retraite des Vieux Travailleurs. 9 novembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «Note d’observation de la CDC, Projet de loi 
sur la Retraite des Vieux Travailleurs. 9 novembre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «Nouveau texte du Ministère de la 
Production Industrielle et du Travail de la loi portant réforme 
de la législation sur les Assurances Sociales. 29 octobre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «Nouveau texte du Ministère de la 
Production Industrielle et du Travail de la loi portant réforme 
de la législation sur les Assurances Sociales. 29 octobre 1940» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «Projets de textes successifs relatifs à 
l’allocation aux vieux travailleurs salariés » 
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- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5, «Projets de textes successifs relatifs à 
l’allocation aux vieux travailleurs salariés » 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5,« Le Directeur Général de la Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations à Monsieur le Ministre, Secrétaire 
d’Etat, à l’Economie Nationale et aux Finances. 12 avril 1941» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5,« Le Directeur Général de la Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations à Monsieur le Ministre, Secrétaire 
d’Etat, à l’Economie Nationale et aux Finances. 12 avril 1941» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5,«Ministère de la Production Industrielle et du 
Travail. Note sur l’extension du nombre des bénéficiaires de la 
réforme des assurances sociales. 4 novembre 1940» 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5,«Ministère de la Production Industrielle et du 
Travail. Note sur l’extension du nombre des bénéficiaires de la 
réforme des assurances sociales. 4 novembre 1940» 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5,«Note. 12 avril 1941» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5,«Note. 12 avril 1941» ; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5« Le Secrétaire Général de la Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations à Monsieur le Ministre Secrétaire 
d’Etat à l’Economie Nationale et aux Finances. 29 mai 1941 »; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5« Le Secrétaire Général de la Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations à Monsieur le Ministre Secrétaire 
d’Etat à l’Economie Nationale et aux Finances. 29 mai 1941 »; 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5« Projet de Loi du Ministère des Finances 
portant réforme de législation sociale sur les Assurances 
Sociales. 29 octobre 1940» 
- CDC, 33/3-4, 17/5« Projet de Loi du Ministère des Finances 
portant réforme de législation sociale sur les Assurances 
Sociales. 29 octobre 1940» 
- CDC, L.19/5: Retraite des Vieux Travailleurs, Projet de Loi 
1930 ; 
- CDC, L.19/5: Retraite des Vieux Travailleurs, Projet de Loi 
1930 ; 
- CHS, 88/3-CNR-2C2-13, « Corrèze, Progrès Social »;  
- CHS, 88/3-CNR-2C2-13, « Corrèze, Progrès Social »;  
- CHS, 88/3-CNR-2C2-16, « Drôme » ;  
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- CHS, 88/3-CNR-2C2-16, « Drôme » ;  
- CHS, 89/3-CNR-2C2-38, « Orne, Rapport de la Commission du 
Progrès Social »;  
- CHS, 89/3-CNR-2C2-38, « Orne, Rapport de la Commission du 
Progrès Social »;  
- CHS, 89/3-CNR-2C2-39, « Pas de Calais, Progrès Social » ; 
- CHS, 89/3-CNR-2C2-39, « Pas de Calais, Progrès Social » ; 
- CHS, CNR, 81/3-CNR-2C2, «Conseil National de la Résistance, 
Etats Généraux de la Renaissance Française. Proclamation et serment 
du Palais de Chaillot-10-14 juillet 1945» ; 
- CHS, CNR, 88/3-CNR-2C2, «La réforme des assurances 
sociales» ;  
- CHS, CNR, 88/3-CNR-2C2, «Progrès Social» ; 
- CHS, CNR, 90/3-CNR-2C2, « Rapport de la Commission du 
Progrès Social » ;  
- CHS, CNR, 90/3-CNR-2C2, « Rapport sur le Progrès Social ».  
- CHS, CNR, 90/3-CNR-2C2, «Considération sur la sécurité 
sociale dans le passé et le présent» ;  
- CHS, CNR, 90/3-CNR-2C2, «Rapport pour la commission du 
progrès social» ; 
- Churchill, nemico della Russia, Milano, Nucleo Propaganda, 1945 
- Comitato Direttivo dell’Unione Provinciale Lavoratori 
dell’Industria di Milano, Parole chiare ai lavoratori!, Milano, 
1944;  
- Comité d’Histoire des Administration chargées du travail, de 
l’emploi et de la formation professionnelle (CHATEFP), Extraits 
des synthèses mensuelles des rapports des préfets de Vichy relatif aux 
questions de travail, emploi et formation professionnelle, Paris, 
Ministère du travail, de la solidarité et de la fonction publique, 
2003 ; 
- IHTP ;  
- IHTP, ARC 074-15, état français 
- IHTP, ARC 074-26, «P. Pétain, Message sur la retraite des vieux. 
14 mars 1941, St.Etienne, Editions du Secrétariat Général de 
l’Information, 1941» ; 
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- IHTP, ARC 074-26, État français 1940-1944, Famille, Eglise, 
Société ; 
- IHTP, ARC 074-45, État français 1940-1944, Charte du Travail;  
- IHTP, ARC/1000 – N.27, «Le corporatisme français. Extraits du 
Discours de Maurice Bouvier-Ajam. Paris 1942» ; 
- IHTP, ARC/1000 – N.27, «Le corporatisme français. Extraits du 
Discours de Maurice Bouvier-Ajam. Paris 1942» ; 
- IHTP, ARC074-45, «Etat français 1940-44»; 
- IHTP, ARC074-45, «Etat français 1940-44»; 
- IHTP, ARC074-46, État français 1940-1944, Corporatisme;  
- IHTP, ARC074-47, État français 1940-1944, Corporatisme (2);  
- INPS, «Assicurazioni sociali e servizi connessi. Rapporto di Sir 
William Beveridge, s.d.»; 
- INPS, «Delibere Commisariali Uffici RSI – Dicembre 1943, 
“Compenso ai componenti il Comitato di Studio peri problemi 
della Previdenza sociale del 27.12.1942-XXII n.4”»; 
- INPS, «Verbali Comitato Esecutivo INFPS del 10 giugno 1942»; 
- INPS, Assicurazioni sociali e servizi connessi. Rapporto di Sir 
William Beveridge, s.d. 
- INPS, Delibere Commisariali Uffici RSI – Dicembre 1943, 
«Compenso ai componenti il Comitato di Studio peri problemi 
della Previdenza sociale del 27.12.1942-XXII n.4.» 
- INPS, Verbali Comitato Esecutivo INFPS del 10 giugno 1942; 
- LSE, Beveridge/9B/57, «Broadcast Message to Italian People 
(Sent at request of Foreign Office, 29th December, 1944»; 
- LSEA, 9A/15/10, «Memo. On Mobility of Labour. 17.12.43»;  
- LSEA, 9A/15/14; 
- LSEA, 9A/15/5, «The Prevention of General Unemployment by 
a Group of Fabians. 14th February, 1944»;  
- LSEA, 9A/15/7, «Meeting with the Independent Labour Party. 
19th January, 1944»;  
- LSEA, 9A/15/9, «Employment Investigation Questionnaire 
(21.10.43)»;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/12/22/1, «Press Cuttings, c. March – October 
1942»; 
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- LSEA, Beveridge/21, PC 9, June 1940-September 1941 on Man 
Power; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/21, PC 9, June 1940-September 1941 on Man 
Power; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/27, «ILO Conference – New York, 
Resolution Presented by Government, Employers’ and 
Workers’ Delegates of USA and adopted by the Conferences 
November 1941»; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/51; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/51; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/52, «Letter from Sir George Young to 
William Beveridge, 24th August 1943». 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/52; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/57, «Basilio Mauro, Libertà dal bisogno 
(Freedom from Want), Ionia, Milton, 1945»;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/57, «Nicola Pascazion, Il Piano Beveridge. La 
Gran Bretagna per tutti i cittadini lavoratori, Putignano, 1944»;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/58/2, «ILO, Planes de seguridad social en Gran 
Bretaña, Montreal, ILO, 1942»; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/58/2, «Memorandum on the Beveridge Report, 
Washington D.C., The National Policy Committee, 1943»;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/58/2, «Plan de seguridad social. Informe por 
H.W.Beveridge, 1942»;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/58/2, «Social Insurance and Allied Services 
report by Sir William Beveridge, New York, The MacMillan 
Company, 1942»;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/58/2, «The Beveridge Plan progress in Kenya, 
Nairobi, The Central Home, 1944»;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/58/3.  
-  LSEA, Beveridge/8/58/3; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/58;  
-  LSEA, Beveridge/8/59, «Annexe to PLS – Nr. 363/43 g. Basic 
Facts Relative to the Beveridge Plan. S.d.» 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/59, «Annexe to PLS – Nr. 363/43 g. Basic 
Facts Relative to the Beveridge Plan. S.d.»; 
534 
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- LSEA, Beveridge/8/59, «Annexe to PLS – Nr. 363/43 g. S.d.»; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/59, «First German Views on the Beveridge 
Report. 17/7/61»; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/59, «First German Views on the Beveridge 
Report. 17/7/61»; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/8/61. 
- LSEA, Beveridge/9A/13; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/9A/14, «Fabian Lecture. Budgeting in the 
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- LSEA, Beveridge/9A/15/12, «Meeting with members of PEP. 2nd 
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- LSEA, Beveridge/9A/16/1; 
- LSEA, Beveridge/9A/19; 
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- LSEA, Beveridge/9B/29/1-30/5;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/9B/30/15-22;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/9B/30/23-30;   
- LSEA, Beveridge/9B/30/6-14;  
- LSEA, Beveridge/9B/31/14-24; 
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- LSEA/Beveridge/12/23; 
- LSEA/Beveridge/12/24; 
- LSEA/Beveridge/12/25; 
- LSEA/Beveridge/12/26; 
- NA, AG/2/548, « Rapport Moral. Partie Economique. 15 
novembre 1943 » ; 
- NA, AG/2/548, «Rapport moral pour le mois d’avril et mai. 
Situation politique. 31 mai 1943» ;  
- NA, AG/2/548, «Rapport moral pour le mois d’avril et mai. 
Situation économique. 31 mai 1943» : 
- Pasini, Piero, «Invito alla riflessione e al coraggio morale», 
Corriere della Sera, 6 marzo 1944 
- TNA, CAB 124/831; 
535 
 
- TNA, CAB 124/831; 
- TNA, CAB 76/66 (continued), Social Insurance and Allied 
Service Series. Minutes and Memoranda of the Beveridge 
Report, 1942, «Meetings 6-15»;  
- TNA, CAB 76/66 (continued), Social Insurance and Allied 
Service Series. Minutes and Memoranda of the Beveridge 
Report, 1942, «Meetings 6-15»;  
- TNA, CAB 87/55, «Internal Measures for the Prevention of 
General Unemployment. S.d.»; 
- TNA, CAB 87/55, «Internal Measures for the Prevention of 
General Unemployment. S.d.»; 
- TNA, CAB 87/63, «The Maintenance of Employment, Prefatory 
Note by the Treasury. 16th October, 1943»; 
- TNA, CAB 87/63, «The Maintenance of Employment, Prefatory 
Note by the Treasury. 16th October, 1943»; 
- TNA, CAB 87/76, Social Insurance and Allied Service Series. 
Minutes and Memoranda of the Beveridge Report, 1941, 
«Meetings 1-6 and Papers 1-22»;  
- TNA, CAB 87/76, Social Insurance and Allied Service Series. 
Minutes and Memoranda of the Beveridge Report, 1941, 
«Meetings 1-6 and Papers 1-22»;  
- TNA, CAB 87/77, Social Insurance and Allied Service Series. 
Minutes and Memoranda of the Beveridge Report, 1942, 
«Meetings 1-5»;  
- TNA, CAB 87/77, Social Insurance and Allied Service Series. 
Minutes and Memoranda of the Beveridge Report, 1942, 
«Meetings 1-5»;  
- TNA, CAB 87/78, Social Insurance and Allied Service Series. 
Minutes and Memoranda of the Beveridge Report, 1942, 
«Meetings 16-38»; 
- TNA, CAB 87/78, Social Insurance and Allied Service Series. 
Minutes and Memoranda of the Beveridge Report, 1942, 
«Meetings 16-38»; 
- TNA, CAB/127/177, «A note on Reconstruction, s.d.»; 
- TNA, CAB/127/177, «A note on Reconstruction, s.d.»; 
536 
 
- TNA, CAB/195/2, «W.M. (43), 33rd Meeting, on 22nd February, 
1943»; 
- TNA, CAB/65/21/2, «War Cabinet. Excess Profits Tax. 
Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 13th 
January, 1941»; 
- TNA, CAB/65/21/2, «War Cabinet. Excess Profits Tax. 
Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 13th 
January, 1941»; 
- TNA, CAB/65/33, «Conclusions of a Meeting of the War 
Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Friday, January 
8th, 1943, at 11 a.m.»; 
- TNA, CAB/66/22/19, «War Cabinet. Incidence of Income Tax on 
Weekly Wage-earners. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 17th February, 1942»; 
- TNA, CAB/66/22/19, «War Cabinet. Incidence of Income Tax on 
Weekly Wage-earners. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 17th February, 1942»; 
- TNA, CAB/66/22/8, «War Cabinet. Effect of Income Tax on 
Weekly Wage-earner. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour 
and National Service, 13th February, 1942»; 
- TNA, CAB/66/22/8, «War Cabinet. Effect of Income Tax on 
Weekly Wage-earner. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour 
and National Service, 13th February, 1942»; 
- TNA, CAB/66/8/6, «War Cabinet. Excess Profits Tax. 
Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 28th May, 
1940»;  
- TNA, CAB/66/8/6, «War Cabinet. Excess Profits Tax. 
Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 28th May, 
1940»;  
- TNA, CAB/80/62, «War Cabinet. Chiefs of Staff Committee – 
Possible Action in View of French Situation. 26th April, 1942»;  
-  TNA, FO//898/41, «BBC Studies in European Audiences. The 
European Audience of British Broadcasts in English»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «BBC Studies in European Audiences. The 
European Audience of British Broadcasts in English»; 
537 
 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «Britain’s Right to Speak. 10th May, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «Britain’s Right to Speak. 10th May, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «Draft Directive for the Week 29.11.42 to 
5.12.42»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «Extract from BBC Memorandum. From Mr. 
Shepley, Italian Intelligence Officer»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «Extract from BBC Memorandum. From Mr. 
Shepley, Italian Intelligence Officer»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «General Directive. 30th April, 1944»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «General Directive. 30th April, 1944»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «Note from Mr. Kirkpatrick to Mr. Bruce 
Lockhart. 31 October, 1942», p.2. 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «Note from Mr. Kirkpatrick to Mr. Bruce 
Lockhart. 31 October, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, «Propaganda to Europe during January, 
February and March. January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO//898/41, B.B.C, «Bi-Monthly Surveys of European 
Audiences. Metropolitan France. 11th August, 1943» ; 
- TNA, FO/371/28429, «Intelligence Report No.33 for French 
Section (M.O.I.) Advisory Committee. 6th May, 1941»; 
- TNA, FO/371/28429, «Intelligence Report No.33 for French 
Section (M.O.I.) Advisory Committee. 6th May, 1941»; 
- TNA, FO/371/28429, «Suggestions on Anti-German 
Propaganda by Mr. Huntzbuchler. 18th March, 1941»; 
- TNA, FO/371/28429, «Suggestions on Anti-German 
Propaganda by Mr. Huntzbuchler. 18th March, 1941»; 
- TNA, FO/371/28429. 
- TNA, FO/371/28432 
- TNA, FO/371/28432, «BBC Monthly Surveys of European 
Audiences. France. 15th August, 1941»; 
- TNA, FO/371/28432, «Intelligence Report No. 47 for French 
Section, M.O.I. Advisory Committee, 19th August, 1941»; 
- TNA, FO/371/28432, «Intelligence Report No. 50 for French 
Section, M.O.I. Advisory Committee, 2nd September, 1941»; 
538 
 
- TNA, FO/371/28433, «Political Warfare Executive – Plan of 
Political Warfare for France up to Spring 1942. 13/11/1941» 
- TNA, FO/371/28433, «Political Warfare Executive – Weekly 
Directive for BBC French Services. Week 12th – 19th October, 
1941»; 
- TNA, FO/371/28433, «Propaganda to France, 25th October 
1941»; 
- TNA, FO/371/28433,« Political Warfare Executive – Plan of 
Political Warfare for France. 28th October, 1941»;  
-  TNA, FO/371/28524, Foreign Office, «The Free French 
Movement, December 1941; 
- TNA, FO/371/31533; 
- TNA, FO/371/31533; 
- TNA, FO/371/32080, «Official Bulletins published by the Vichy 
Government»; 
- TNA, FO/371/36070, «Constitutional Basis of the Vichy 
Government»; 
- TNA, FO/371/36074, «French Propaganda. Drafts Telegram to 
Minister of State Cairo analysing French Propaganda for week 
ending 21st August, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/371/36074, «Petain’s Broadcast to Vichy and Radio 
Paris Networks, 4.4.1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Appendix. Principal Features of the German 
Economic Exploitation of the Occupied Territories. A. Northern 
and Western Europe. I. France»;  
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Britain, Russia and Europe – Some long-term 
problems of Political Warfare. 30th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Britain, Russia and Europe – Some long-term 
problems of Political Warfare. 30th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Britain’s Policy for Europe. 17th April, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Britain’s Policy for Europe. 17th April, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Britain’s Policy for Europe. 22nd April, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Britain’s Policy for Europe. 22nd April, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Britain’s Policy for Europe. 22nd April, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Britain’s Policy for Europe. 22nd April, 1942»; 
539 
 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «British Policy for Europe. 23rd November, 
1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «British Policy for Europe. 23rd November, 
1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Low Countries. Memorandum by the 
Minister of Economic Warfare on Propaganda Policy. 26th 
January, 1942»;  
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Low Countries. Memorandum by the 
Minister of Economic Warfare on Propaganda Policy. 26th 
January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Low Countries. Memorandum by the 
Minister of Economic Warfare on Propaganda Policy. 26th 
January, 1942»;  
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Low Countries. Memorandum by the 
Minister of Economic Warfare on Propaganda Policy. 26th 
January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Notes from Mr. Murray to Mr. David 
Stephens. 24th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Notes from Mr. Murray to Mr. David 
Stephens. 24th January, 1942». 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. “Never 
Again….”. 3rd February, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. 30th January, 
1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. 30th January, 
1942». 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. 30th January, 
1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. 30th January, 
1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. 30th January, 
1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. 30th January, 
1942»; 
540 
 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. Meeting of the 
Standing Ministerial Committee. 20th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Executive. Propaganda 
Policy. 30th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Organisation, 27th July, 
1942». 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Organisation, 27th July, 
1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Political Warfare Organisation. 27th July, 
1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Propaganda Policy (P.W.E.) – Memorandum 
by the Minister of Economic Warfare. H.Dalton 6th December, 
1941»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Propaganda Policy (P.W.E.) – Memorandum 
by the Minister of Economic Warfare. H.Dalton 6th December, 
1941»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Propaganda Policy (PWE). Some Notes on 
the Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare. 26th 
January, 1942»;  
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Propaganda Policy (PWE). Some Notes on 
the Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare. 26th 
January, 1942»;  
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Secretary of State. Secret & Personal. 
8/1/1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/13, «Secretary of State. Secret & Personal. 
8/1/1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Examination of Political Warfare Problems 
with regard to Italy in the Light of Military Events and the RAF 
Offensive. 8th January, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Examination of Political Warfare Problems 
with regard to Italy in the Light of Military Events and the RAF 
Offensive. 8th January, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Intervention of Lord Strabolgi. Questions in 
the House of Lord. October 14th, 1943» 
541 
 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Intervention of Lord Strabolgi. Questions in 
the House of Lord. October 14th, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Letter from Colonel Stevens to Mr. Lesper. 
11th February, 1942» 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Letter from Colonel Stevens to Mr. Lesper. 
11th February, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Plan of Political Warfare for Italy. Regional 
Director’s Appreciation. 9th February, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Plan of Political Warfare for Italy. Regional 
Director’s Appreciation. 20th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Plan of Political Warfare for Italy. Regional 
Director’s Appreciation. 9th February, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Plan of Political Warfare for Italy. Regional 
Director’s Appreciation. 20th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Political Warfare Executive. Revised Plan of 
Political Warfare Against Italy. 7th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/164, «Political Warfare Executive. Revised Plan of 
Political Warfare Against Italy. 7th January, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/165 
- TNA, FO/898/165, «Cable from Washington to Mr. Carroll. 
Italian’s Section Comments on your Draft Italian Plan. 21st 
March, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/165, «Cable from Washington to Mr. Carroll. 
Italian’s Section Comments on your Draft Italian Plan. 21st 
March, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/165, «Plan for the Control of propaganda and 
Publicity in Italy after the Cessation of the hostilities and 
during a period of occupation. 26th July, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/165, «Plan for the Control of propaganda and 
Publicity in Italy after the Cessation of the hostilities and 
during a period of occupation. 26th July, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/165, «Policy and Planning Committee. Principles 
for the Control of Information and Publicity Services during 
the First Stage of Occupation of Italy with Special Reference to 
Sicily and Sardinia»;  
542 
 
- TNA, FO/898/165, «Policy and Planning Committee. Principles 
for the Control of Information and Publicity Services during 
the First Stage of Occupation of Italy with Special Reference to 
Sicily and Sardinia»; 
- TNA, FO/898/165; 
- TNA, FO/898/166, «Analysis of significant differences in cross-
sections of the population. 1st March, 1943»;  
- TNA, FO/898/166, «Analysis of significant differences in cross-
sections of the population. 1st March, 1943»;  
- TNA, FO/898/166, «Political Warfare Executive. Basic Plan of 
political warfare against Italy – Spring 1943. 15th March, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/166, «Political Warfare Executive. Basic Plan of 
political warfare against Italy – Spring 1943. 15th March, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/166, «Political Warfare to Italy. Aims and Results, 
March 15th – September 3rd, 1943. 16th October, 1943»; 
-  TNA, FO/898/166, «Political Warfare to Italy. Aims and 
Results, March 15th – September 3rd, 1943. 16th October, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/166, «Working Plan for Italy: Presentation»; 
- TNA, FO/898/166, «Working Plan for Italy: Presentation»; 
- TNA, FO/898/167, «Information required for appreciation of 
Italy. 15th February, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/167, «Information required for appreciation of 
Italy. 15th February, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/167, «Political Warfare Executive. Italian 
Working Plan for the B.B.C. 21st May, 1943, but the concept was 
recurrent in British dispatches and notes»; 
- TNA, FO/898/167, «Political Warfare Executive. Italian 
Working Plan for the B.B.C. 21st May, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/168, «Letter from Mr. Bruce Lockhart to the 
British Embassy. 2nd December, 1944»; 
- TNA, FO/898/168, «Letter from Mr. Bruce Lockhart to the 
British Embassy. 2nd December, 1944»; 
- TNA, FO/898/168, «Letter from Roger Makins to the Allied 
Force Headquarters. 6th January, 1944»; 
543 
 
- TNA, FO/898/168, «Letter from Roger Makins to the Allied 
Force Headquarters. 6th January, 1944»; 
- TNA, FO/898/168, «Political Warfare Executive. Appreciation 
of the Italian Situation. 19th September, 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/898/168, «Political Warfare Executive. Appreciation 
of the Italian Situation. 19th September, 1943»; 
-  TNA, FO/898/168, «Psychological Warfare Branch – Allied 
Force Headquarters. Re-organisation of P.W.B. Italy. 11th 
January, 1945»; 
- TNA, FO/898/168, «Psychological Warfare Branch – Allied 
Force Headquarters. Re-organisation of P.W.B. Italy. 11th 
January, 1945»; 
- TNA, FO/898/41, «General Directives. 17th May, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/898/41, «General Directives. 3rd May, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/954/22A/123/1, War Cabinet. Committee on 
Reconstruction Problems – Official Committee on Beveridge 
Report. January 14th, 1943» 
- TNA, FO/954/22A/123/1, War Cabinet. Committee on 
Reconstruction Problems – Official Committee on Beveridge 
Report. January 14th, 1943» 
- TNA, FO/954/22A/123/3, «War Cabinet. Committee on 
Reconstruction Problems – Official Committee on Beveridge 
Report. 14th January 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/954/22A/123/3, «War Cabinet. Committee on 
Reconstruction Problems – Official Committee on Beveridge 
Report. 14th January 1943»; 
- TNA, FO/T/172/2093, «Beveridge Report: Publicity. S.d.» 
- TNA, FO/T/172/2093, «Chancellor of the Exchequer. Beveridge 
Report: Publicity. 19th November, 1942»; 
- TNA, FO/T/172/2093, «Overseas Planning Committee (Special 
Issues Sub-Committee) Report of Beveridge Committee on 
Social Services. Treatment in Overseas Propaganda. 
23.11.1942»; 
- TNA, FO/T/172/2093, «Overseas Planning Committee (Special 
Issues Sub-Committee). Report of Beveridge Committee on 
544 
 
Social Services. Treatment in Overseas Propaganda. 
23.11.1942»; 
- TNA, FO/T/172/2093, «Overseas Planning Committee (Special 
Issues Sub-Committee). Report of Beveridge Committee on 
Social Services. Treatment in Overseas Propaganda. 
23.11.1942»; 
- TNA, FO/T/172/2093; 
- TNA, GFM 36/597, «Special Report no.IV on Documents Found 
in the Offices of the Fascist Italian Socialist Republic. Reports 
on Various Provinces. S.d.»; 
- TNA, INF/1/679, « Ministry of Information. Propaganda in 
factories. 27th April, 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/679, «Home propaganda. 25th April, 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/679, «Minister’s Paper on Propaganda. 25th April, 
1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/679, «Report of the Ministry of Information to the 
War Cabinet. Propaganda at home. 24th April, 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/679, «Report to the Director of Home Division. 
Ministry of Information. 26th April, 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/679, «Summary of Trends in Public Opinion 
during the period April 20th – May 18th 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Britain and Post-War Reconstruction. 10th 
July, 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Director, Reference Division. The Function of 
the Reference Division in the New Phase of the War now 
Opening. 15/11/43»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Ministry of Information. Post-war 
Reconstuction. 17th June 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Papers dealing with Reconstruction & Post-
War Planning prepared by Reference Division. 17th June 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Post-war Reconstruction. October 19th, 1942»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Proposed plan for the collection of 
information regarding reconstruction matters and the 
preparation of periodical reports. 24.10.41»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Publicity on Reconstruction. 31.3. 43»; 
545 
 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Publicity regarding the planning for 
reconstruction. A note on a Discussion between 
Representatives of the Ministry of Information and the 
Reconstruction Secretariat. 5/7/43»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Publicity. 27th February, 43»; 
- TNA, INF/1/683, «Reconstruction Secretariat to Ministry of 
Information. 19th November 1942»;  
- TNA, INF/1/683, «The demobilization and resettlement of 
labour (Summary of the Second Interim Report of the Official 
Committee on Post-War Internal Economic Problems. 26th 
January, 1943»; 
- TNA, INF/1/685, «Britain and relief to Liberated Europe. 
2.2.46»; 
- TNA, INF/1/982, «Memoranda on the future of B.B.C. 
European Broadcasting»; 
- TNA, INF/13/140;  
- TNA, INF/13/140;  
- TNA, INF/13/141; 
- TNA, INF/13/141; 
- TNA, INF/2/30;  
- TNA, INF/2/39;  
- TNA, INF/2/40; 
- TNA, PIN/11; 
- TNA, PIN/11; 
- TNA, PIN/3/63; 
- TNA, PIN/3/63; 
- TNA, PIN/3/65; 
- TNA, PIN/3/65; 
- TNA, PIN/8/1; 
- TNA, PIN/8/1; 
- TNA, PIN/8/115, «Family Allowances. Memorandum by the 
Treasury. 31st March, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/115, «Family Allowances. Memorandum by the 
Treasury. 31st March, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/115;  
546 
 
- TNA, PIN/8/115;  
- TNA, PIN/8/123;  
- TNA, PIN/8/123;  
- TNA, PIN/8/142, «Workmen’s Compensation and the Social 
Services After the War. 16th August, 1940»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/142, «Workmen’s Compensation and the Social 
Services After the War. 16th August, 1940»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/143, «Letter from William Jowitt to Sir William 
Beveridge. 20th May, 1942»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/143, «Letter from William Jowitt to Sir William 
Beveridge. 20th May, 1942»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/143, «Memorandum. Workmen’s Compensation. 
Points for amendment of the existing Scheme which have been 
raised by the Trade Union Congress in the last two years. 11th 
June, 1942»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/143, «Memorandum. Workmen’s Compensation. 
Points for amendment of the existing Scheme which have been 
raised by the Trade Union Congress in the last two years. 11th 
June, 1942»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/144-149; 
- TNA, PIN/8/144-149; 
- TNA, PIN/8/156; 
- TNA, PIN/8/156; 
- TNA, PIN/8/157, «National Assistance. Note of Conference 
held at the Ministry of Health on the subject of “Disregard of 
Resources”. 14th June, 1944»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/157, «National Assistance. Note of Conference 
held at the Ministry of Health on the subject of “Disregard of 
Resources”. 14th June, 1944»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/162, «Home Office. Police Duty Room. 1st January, 
1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/162, «Home Office. Police Duty Room. 2nd 
February, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/162, «Home Office. Police Duty Room. 4th 
December, 1942»; 
547 
 
- TNA, PIN/8/162, «Home Office. Police Duty Room. 4th 
December, 1942»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/162, «Home Office. Police Duty Room. 5th 
December, 1942»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/162, «Home Office. Police Duty Room. 5th January, 
1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/162, «Home Office. Police Duty Room.27th 
February, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/162, «Home Office. Police Duty Room.28th 
February, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/164, «Britain’s Social Services and the War»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/164, «Letter from Arthur Greenwood to Brandon 
Bracken. 21st November, 1941»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/164, «Letter from Brandon Bracken to Arthur 
Greenwood. 1st December, 1941»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/167, «Comparison of the NRPB report with the 
Beveridge Report. 26th December, 1942»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/167, «Comparison of the NRPB report with the 
Beveridge Report. 26th December, 1942»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/167, «Letter from Foreign Office to Mr. Daish. 18th 
February, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/167, «Letter from Foreign Office to Mr. Daish. 18th 
February, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/167, «To the Congress of the United States. 10th 
March, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/167, «To the Congress of the United States. 10th 
March, 1943»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/42; 
- TNA, PIN/8/42; 
- TNA, PIN/8/48;  
- TNA, PIN/8/48;  
- TNA, PIN/8/49, «Note of discussion on the Time-Table for the 
Social Insurance Scheme. 16th February, 1944»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/49, «Note of discussion on the Time-Table for the 
Social Insurance Scheme. 16th February, 1944»; 
548 
 
- TNA, PIN/8/49, «Problems arising out of the proposed transfer 
to a Ministry of Social Insurance of the responsibility for the 
existing schemes of Health, Pensions and Unemployment 
Insurance. Memoranda by the Reconstruction Committee. 14th 
April, 1944»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/49, «Problems arising out of the proposed transfer 
to a Ministry of Social Insurance of the responsibility for the 
existing schemes of Health, Pensions and Unemployment 
Insurance. Memoranda by the Reconstruction Committee. 14th 
April, 1944»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/49, «War Cabinet. Reconstruction Committee. 
Social Insurance Legislation: Time-table and Machinery. 
Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction. 14th February, 
1944»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/49, «War Cabinet. Reconstruction Committee. 
Social Insurance Legislation: Time-table and Machinery. 
Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction. 14th February, 
1944»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/57;  
- TNA, PIN/8/57;  
- TNA, PIN/8/6, « Procedure for Bringing the Social Security 
Plan into operation. 13rd April, 1943»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/6, « Procedure for Bringing the Social Security 
Plan into operation. 13rd April, 1943»;  
- TNA, PIN/8/60;  
- TNA, PIN/8/60;  
- TNA, PIN/8/65;  
- TNA, PIN/8/65;  
- TNA, PIN/8/79; 
- TNA, PIN/8/79; 
- TNA, PIN/8/80, «The King’s Speeches on the Prorogation and 
Opening of Parliament. Draft. 14th October, 1944»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/80, «The King’s Speeches on the Prorogation and 
Opening of Parliament. Draft. 14th October, 1944»; 
- TNA, PIN/8/87;  
549 
 
- TNA, PIN/8/87;  
- TNA, PIN8/157, «Note by the Assistance Board on the 
Treatment of Insurance Benefits. 15th June, 1944»; 
- TNA, PIN8/157, «Note by the Assistance Board on the 
Treatment of Insurance Benefits. 15th June, 1944»; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/2, «Angus Watson, «The Beveridge Plan», 
Manchester Guardian, 16th December, 1942»; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/2, «Draft Statement on Beveridge Report. 30th 
November, 1942»;  
- TNA, PREM/4/89/2, «Not to the Prime Minister. 12th February, 
1943»; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/2, «Note of the Prime Minister on the 
Beveridge Report. 14th February, 1942»; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/2, «The Beveridge Report and the Public. What 
Britain Thinks of The Beveridge Report as shown by a Gallup Poll by 
The British Institute of Public Opinion, London, 1942»; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/2, The Beveridge Report. Preliminary 
Observations of the Industrial Life Offices, London, 1942; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/2, The Beveridge Report. Preliminary 
Observations of the Industrial Life Offices, London, 1942; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/3, «Extract from W.M. (43) 156th Conclusions, 
17.11.43.»; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/3, «Extract from W.M. (43) 156th Conclusions, 
17.11.43.»; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/3;  
- TNA, PREM/4/89/3;  
- TNA, PREM/4/89/6, «Letter of Lord Woolton to the Rt. Hon. 
Winston Churchill, 21st April, 1944» 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/6, «Letter of Lord Woolton to the Rt. Hon. 
Winston Churchill, 21st April, 1944» 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/7;  
- TNA, PREM/4/89/7;  
- TNA, PREM/4/89/8; 
- TNA, PREM/4/89/8; 
550 
 
- TNA, PREM/89/4/2, «Paymaster General to the Prime Minister. 
The Beveridge Report. 11th February 1943»; 
- TNA, PREM4/89/1, «The Financial Aspects of the Social 
Security Plan. 1st January 1943»; 
- TNA, PREM4/89/1, «The Financial Aspects of the Social 
Security Plan. 1st January 1943»; 
- TNA, T/161/1165, «Note from the Advisory Panel on Home 
Affairs on Reconstruction Problems the Five Giants on the 
Road. 25th June, 1942»; 
- TNA, WO/204/12324, «Office on Strategic Services – Research 
and Analysis Branch, The Italian Social Republic (The Fascist 
Puppet Government). 15th March 1944»; 
- TNA,FO/898/168, «P.W.E. The political situation in Italy – Early 
March, 1944. 16th March, 1944»; 
- TNA,FO/898/168, «P.W.E. The political situation in Italy – Early 
March, 1944. 16th March, 1944». 
- TNA,PIN/8/122;  
- TNA,PIN/8/122;  
- TNA/FO/371/28586, «Paul Banon. Le Bulletin de France – 
Organe du Comité de Propagande sociale du Maréchal. 1941» ; 
- TNA, FO/371/28433, «Political Warfare Executive – Weekly 
Directive for BBC French Services. Week 19th – 26th October, 
1941»;  
- Treves, Paolo, «Beveridge and the House», Radio Londra, 17th 
October 1944. 
- Unione Provinciale Lavoratori dell’Industria di Torino, 
Riunione straordinaria del Comitato Esecutivo. 22 dicembre 1944, 
Torino, s.e., 1944 
- Zencovich, L.Z., «Full Employment», Radio Londra, lst June 
1944; 
- Zencovich, L.Z., «Social Insurance», Radio Londra, 26th 
September 1944, 21.30. 
 
Published documents and laws: 
 
551 
 
- « Les plans de sécurité sociale. Le Plan Beveridge», Notes et 
Etudes documentaires n.111, Ministère de l’Information, 14 Aout 
1945 ;  
- « Ordonnance n. 45-2250 du 4 octobre 1945 portant 
organisation de la sécurité sociale », JO, 6 octobre 1945 ;  
- « L’allocation de salaire unique », Les documents français, 
n.6/1941 ; 
- « Le travail en Allemagne, moyen de diminuer le chômage », 
L’Atelier, n.14, a.2, 8 mars 1941; 
- « Loi du 15 février 1942 relative au durcissement de la 
répression de l’avortement », JO, 7 mars 1942 ; 
- « Loi du 29 mars 1941 Création de l’allocation de salaire 
unique », JO, 11 avril 1941 ; 
- « Loi du 30 mai 1941 sur le pécule de retour à la terre », JO, 31 
mai 1941 ; 
- « M. Belin commente la réforme », Petit Paris, 15 mars 1941 ; 
- « Opinions sur la Charte», L’Atelier, 15 Novembre 1941 ; « Les 
travaux de la Conférence », L’Atelier, 22 Novembre 1941 ;  
- « Ordonnance n° 45/2454 du 19 octobre 1945 fixant le régime 
des assurances sociales applicable aux assurés des professions 
non agricoles» ;  
- « Ordonnance n° 45-2456 du 19 octobre 1945 portant statut de 
la mutualité », JO, 20 octobre 1945 ; 
- «Arrêté du 19 aout 1940 concernant le paiement des prestations 
par les Caisses d’assurances sociales et les nouvelles 
circonscriptions des services régionaux», JO, 20 aout 1940 ; 
- «Arrêté du 19 aout 1940 modifiant les circonscriptions des 
services régionaux des assurances sociales», JO, 20 aout 1940;  
- «Britons, You Owe this Man a Lot!», Manchester Evening News, 
March 21st, 1942;  
- «Centomila parole», Politica Sociale, n.1-2, 1942, pp. 18-19; 
- «Constitution of the Year I, June 24, 1793», Frank M. Anderson, 
(ed.), The Constitutions and other Select Documents Illustrative of 
the History of France, 1789-1907, Minneapolis, Wilson & CO., 
1908, pp. 171-174; 
552 
 
- «Décret du 11 octobre 1940 concernant les allocations de 
chômage», JO, 27 octobre 1940;  
- «Décret du 17 avril 1943 portant règlement d'administration 
publique pour l'application de la loi du 21 décembre 1941 
relative aux hôpitaux et hospices publics», JO, 27 avril 1943 ; 
- «Décret du 17 juillet 1941 relatif à la coordination entre le 
régime général des assurances sociales et les régimes spéciaux 
d’assurance», JO, 10 aout 1941 ; 
- «Decreto del Duce 18 gennaio 1945-XXIII, n.3 - Ordinamento 
sindacale», GU, 26 gennaio 1945, n. 21; 
- «Decreto del Duce 20 dicembre 1943-XXII, n. 853 - Costituzione 
della Confederazione generale del lavoro, della tecnica, delle 
arti», GU, 2 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 26; 
- «Decreto del Duce 20 febbraio 1944-XXI1, n.94 - Disposizioni 
per i pagamenti in Italia dei risparmi ai beneficiari indicati dai 
lavoratori ed impiegati che prestano la loro opera in 
Germania», GU, 29 marzo 1944, n. 74;  
- «Decreto del Duce 23 maggio 1944-XXII, n.289 - Aumento del 
30% delle pensioni indirette di guerra», GU, 17 giugno 1944, n. 
141;  
- «Decreto del Duce 31 dicembre 1944-XXIII, n. 298 - 
Trasformazione in mense collettive di guerra di tutti i ristoranti 
e trattorie di qualsiasi categoria», GU, 4 gennaio 1945, n. 3;  
- «Decreto del Duce 4 gennaio 1945-XXI1I, n.1 - Requisizione 
delle aziende dei grossisti in derrate alimentari e delle aziende 
industriali per la produzione, lavorazione, e trasformazione dei 
generi alimentari», GU, 4 gennaio 1945, n.3; 
- «Decreto del Duce sull’Ordinamento sindacale,18 gennaio 
1945-XXIII n.3», GU, 26 gennaio 1945, n.21; 
- «Decreto interministeriale 20 settembre 1944-XXII, n. 853 - 
Carico di contributi per le assicurazioni sociali obbligatorie e 
per l’assistenza malattia», GU, 19 dicembre 1944, n. 295.  
- «Decreto Interministeriale 21 gennaio 1944-XXII, n.87», GU, n. 
72, 27 marzo 1944; 
553 
 
- «Decreto Interministeriale 25 gennaio 1944-XII, n. 137 - 
Corresponsione delle indennità di richiamo e degli assegni 
familiari alle famiglie dei richiamati per i quali non è possibile 
accertare l’attuale situazione», GU, 22 aprile 1944, n.95;  
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce – Costituzione dell’Istituto di 
Gestione e Finanziamento (I.Ge.Fi.), 12 febbraio 1944XXII, n. 
269», GU, 13 giugno 1944, n. 137;  
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 1 febbraio 1945 - Ordinamento 
dei Ministeri della Produzione Industriale e del Lavoro», GU, 
12 marzo 1945, n. 59 
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 10 maggio 1944, n.376 - 
Unificazione dei contributi e tenuta del libretto di lavoro nel 
settore dell’industria», GU, 1 luglio 1944, n.152;  
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n. 375 - 
Socializzazione delle imprese», GU, 30 giugno 1944, n. 151; 
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 15 dicembre 1944-XXII1, n. 985 - 
Sospensione dei termini in materiadi assistenza sociale nelle 
zone invase dal nemico», GU, n. 32, 8 febbraio 1945; 
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 15 novembre 1944-XXIII, n. 844 - 
Assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro dei cittadini 
mobilitati per il servizio del lavoro», GU, n. 291, 14 dicembre 
1944; 
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 2 febbraio 1944-XXII, n.65 - 
Disciplina del collocamento dei lavoratori», GU, 18 marzo 1944, 
n. 68; 
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 20 dicembre 1943-XXII, n.853», 
GU, 7febbraio 1944, n.26; 
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 21 aprile 1944-XXII, n.251 - 
Istituzione dell’Opera Nazionale Mutilati ed Invalidi del 
Lavoro», GU, 7 giugno 1944-XXII, n. 133; 
- «Decreto legislativo del Duce 23 gennaio 1944-XXII, n.27 – 
Passaggio al PFR dei compiti e delle attribuzioni esercitate 
dall’Ufficio “Organizzazioni Fasciste” della Direzione Generale 
degli Italiani all’Estero del Ministero degli Affari Esteri», GU, 
22 novembre 1944, n.43;  
554 
 
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 31 agosto 1944-XXII, n. 603 - 
Abrogazione del decreto legislative 8 maggio 1944-XXII, n. 194, 
concernente il risparmio obbligatorio», GU, n.229, 30 settembre 
1944;  
- «Decreto Legislativo del Duce 7 dicembre 1943-XXII, n. 843 - 
Istituzione del Commissariato Nazionale del Lavoro», GU, 17 
gennaio 1944-XXII, n.12; 
- «Decreto Luogotenenziale n.6, 5 gennaio 1919», GU, 30 gennaio 
1919, n.25; 
- «Decreto Ministeriale 16 settembre 1944-XXII - Approvazione 
del Regolamento per l’unificazione dei contributi dovuti dalle 
imprese industriali ed artigiane e dai lavoratori dipendenti», 
GU, 23 dicembre 1944, n. 299; 
- «Decreto Ministeriale 16 settembre 1944-XXII - Approvazione 
del Regolamento per l’unificazione dei contributi dovuti dalle 
imprese industriali ed artigiane e dai lavoratori dipendenti», 
GU, 23 dicembre 1944, n. 299;  
- «Decreto Ministeriale 20 settembre 1944-XXII - Determinazione 
delle misure dei contributi dovuti, a norma del Decreto 
Legislativo 10 maggio 1944-XXII, n. 376 dalle imprese artigiane 
e industriali»,GU, 19 dicembre 1944, n.295; 
- «Decreto Ministeriale 21 aprile 1944-XXII, n. 173 - Norme per la 
concessione degli assegni di natalità e nuzialità», GU, 10 
maggio 1944, n. 110;  
- «Decreto Ministeriale 4 febbraio 1944-XXII, n.88», in GU, n.72, 
27 marzo 1944; 
- «Decreto Ministeriale 4 febbraio 1944-XXII, n.89», GU, n. 72, 27 
marzo 1944; 
- «Decreto Ministeriale 8 maggio 1944-XXII», n. 329, GU, 21 
giugno 1944-XXII, n. 144; 
- «Decreto-Legge n. 603, 21 aprile 1919», GU, 1 maggio 1919, 
n.104;  
- «Determinazione Intercommissariale 29 settembre 1943-XXI - 
Pagamento delle rimesse dei lavoratori italiani in Germania alle 
famiglie in Italia», GU, 12 febbraio 1944-XXII, n.35; 
555 
 
- «Die Verfassung des Deutchen Reichs vom 11.August 1919», 
Reichsgesetzblatt, 1919; 
- «Difendere la Rivoluzione per difendere l’Italia», Critica 
Fascista, February 15th, 1943, n. 8, pp. 1-3; 
- «Il carosello della menzogna», La Corrispondenza Repubblicana, 
January 1944; 
- «Il nuovo ordine sociale. Rivoluzione e antirivoluzione», 
Politica Sociale, n. 5-6, 1943, pp. 73-75; 
- «Il tanto calorosamente discusso “Piano Beveridge”», Signal, 
n.17/1943, p.25 
- «La Nouvelle Législation en Grande-Bretagne. 1er partie», Notes 
et Etudes documentaires n.398, Ministère de l’Information, 7 
Septembre 1946 ;  
- «La Nouvelle Législation en Grande-Bretagne. 2ème 
partie», Notes et Etudes documentaires n.398, Ministère de 
l’Information, 7 Septembre 1946 ;  
- «La sécurité sociale 3. Organisation médicale et sécurité sociale 
en Angleterre et en France», Institut de Science Economique 
Appliquée, Paris, 1945 ; 
- «La sécurité sociale en Grande-Bretagne», Notes et Etudes 
documentaires n.969, Ministère de l’Information, 3 Aout 1948 ; 
- «Laburismo e socialismo», Quarto Stato, Febbraio 1950. 
- «Lavorare e combattere», La Corrispondenza Repubblicana, January 
1944; 
- «Le basi della nuova economia», La Corrispondenza 
Repubblicana, January 1944, pp. 102-104; 
- «Le Plan Beveride. 1-6»,, Institut de Conjoncture.. Section des économies 
étrangères, Ministère de l’Economie Nationale, 1945,  
-  «Le syndicalisme se prononce pour la collaboration sociale et 
la collaboration franco-allemande, conditions indispensables de 
la collaboration européenne», in L’Atelier, n. 10, a.2, 8 février 
1941; Grein, Jacques-Richard, «La structure économique du XX 
siècle sera nouvelle», L’Atelier, n.13, a.2, 1 mars 1941;  
556 
 
- «Legge 11 gennaio 1943-XX11, n.138 - Costituzione dell’Ente 
Mutualità Fascista - Istituto per l’assistenza di malattia ai 
lavoratori», GU, 3 aprile 1943-XXII, n. 77; 
- «Legge 12 aprile 1943-XXI, n.455 – Estensione 
dell’assicurazione obbligatoria contro le malattie 
professionali», GU, 14 giugno 1943-XXI, n. 137;  
- «Legge 17 luglio 1898, n.350», GU, 11 agosto 1898, n. 177; 
- «Legge 17 luglio 1910, n. 520», GU, 3 agosto 1910, n.181; 
- «Legge 17 luglio1890, n. 6972», Gazzetta Ufficiale, 22 luglio 1890, 
n.171; 
- «Legge 17 marzo 1898, n.80» GU, 31 marzo 1898, n. 75;  
- «Legge 2 ottobre 1942-XX, n. 1286 sulla disciplina del 
collocamento in tempo di guerra», GU, 17 novembre 1942-XXI, 
n. 272; 
- «Legge 4 aprile 1912, n. 305», GU, 22 aprile 1912, n.96; 
- «Legge 6 luglio 1939-XVII, n.1272», GU, 7 September 1939, n. 
209; 
- «Legge n. 563 del 3 aprile 1926», GU, 14 aprile 1926, n. 87; 
- «Libertà di sfruttamento», La Corrispondenza Repubblicana, 
February 1944, pp. 135-136 
- «Libertà di sfruttamento», La Corrispondenza Repubblicana, 
February 1944, pp. 135-136; 
- «Loi du 1 avril 1898 relative aux sociétés de secours mutuel», 
JO, 5 avril 1898 ; 
-  «Loi du 1 janvier 1944 Création du Commissariat Général à 
l’action sociale pour les français travaillant en Allemagne, 
rattaché au Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail», JO, 12 janvier 1944 ; 
- «Loi du 11 mars 1932 modifiant les titres III et V du livre 1er  du 
code du travail et l’article 2101 du code civil», JO, 12 mars 
1932 ; 
- «Loi du 11 octobre 1940 Institution des Offices de Travail pour 
l’utilisation des travailleurs sans emploi», JO, 27 octobre 1940 ;  
- «Loi du 11 octobre 1940 relative à l’attribution de prêts aux 
collectivités pour le financement des travaux entrepris pour 
lutter contre le chômage», JO, 25 octobre 1940;  
557 
 
- «Loi du 11 octobre 1940 relative à l’interdiction du recrutement 
des femmes mariées dans l’administration», JO, 27 octobre 
1940 ;  
- «Loi du 11 octobre 1940 relative au placement des travailleurs 
et à l'aide aux travailleurs sans emploi», JO, 27 octobre 1940 ;  
- «Loi du 11 octobre 1940 Simplification des procédures 
d’expropriation pour l’exécution d’urgence des travaux 
destinés à lutter contre le chômage», JO, 25 octobre 1940;  
- «Loi du 11 octobre 1940 sur les cumuls d’emplois», JO, 27 
octobre 1940 ; 
- «Loi du 12 avril 1942 appliquant aux militaires au congé 
d’armistice le régime général des assurances sociales», JO, 17 
avril 1942 ;  
- «Loi du 12 septembre 1940 tendant à faciliter l’attribution des 
prestations aux assurés sociaux qui ont interrompu le travail, 
en raison de la guerre», JO, 14 septembre 1940 ;  
- «Loi du 14 mars 1944 facilitant aux assurés sociaux, anciennes 
prisonniers de guerre, l’attribution des prestations maternité à 
leur retour de captivité», JO, 13 juin 1944 ; 
- «Loi du 15 février 1942 Créant une carte de priorité en faveur 
de certains invalides du travail», JO, 5 mars 1942 ; 
- «Loi du 16 février 1943 portant institution du Service du 
Travail Obligatoire», JO, 17 février 1943 ; 
- «Loi du 16 novembre 1943 Renforcement des pouvoirs du 
Commissariat chargé de la répartition de la main d’œuvre et 
rattachement au Secrétariat d’Etat au Travail», JO, 17 novembre 
1943 ; 
- «Loi du 18 aout 1943 Création d’un Commissariat Général 
Interministériel chargé temporairement de la répartition e de 
l’affectation de la main d’oeuvre», JO, 20 aout 1943 ;  
- «Loi du 18 novembre 1942 étendant aux étrangers en 
surnombre dans l’économie nationale le bénéfice des 
assurances sociales, des allocations familiales, des accidents du 
travail et des congés payés», JO, 19 décembre 1942 ; 
558 
 
- «Loi du 21 décembre 1941 portant sur la réorganisation des 
hôpitaux et des hospices civils»,  JO, 30 décembre 1941 ;  
- «Loi du 23 janvier 1941 tendant à faciliter l’attribution des 
prestations d’assurances sociales aux assurés sociaux qui n’ont 
pu cotiser du fait des hostilités ou des conséquences de celles-
ci», JO, 4 février 1941 ;  
- «Loi du 27 septembre améliorant les prestations des assurances 
sociales en ce qui concerne la famille du prisonnier», JO, 16 
janvier 1942 ;  
- «Loi du 31 octobre 1941 portant sur la réorganisation de 
l’inspection du travail et de la main d’oeuvre», JO, 19 
novembre 1941 ;  
- «Loi du 31 octobre 1941 relative à la protection médicale du 
travail», JO, 20 novembre 1941 ; 
- «Loi du 4 aout 1941 Comités d’hygiène et de sécurité», JO, 10 
aout 1941;  
- «Loi du 5 avril relative au fonctionnement des lois sociales et 
familiales en agriculture (gestion des assurances agricoles)», 
JO, 18 avril 1941 ; 
-  «Loi du 6 février 1943 Création du Commissariat Général à la 
main-d’œuvre française en Allemagne», JO, 7 février 1943 ; 
- «Loi du 6 janvier 1942 portant su recouvrement des 
cotisations», JO, 15 Janvier 1942; 
- «Loi du 6 janvier 1942 simplifiant le fonctionnement des 
assurances sociales», JO, 15 janvier 1942 ; 
-  «Loi du 9 avril 1898 concernant les responsabilités dans les 
accidents du travail», Journal Officiel, 10 avril 1898 ; 
- «Looking to the future. Mr. Attlee on the tasks of peace», The 
Times, 7th September 1942; 
- «Manifesto di Verona», in Roberto Bonini, La Repubblica Sociale 
Italiana e la socializzazione delle imprese. Dopo il Codice Civile del 
1942, Torino, G. Giappichelli Editore, pp. 70-72; 
- «Modificazioni delle disposizioni sulle assicurazioni 
obbligatorie per l’invalidità e la vecchiaia, per la tubercolosi e 
per la disoccupazione involontaria e sostituzione 
559 
 
dell’assicurazione per la maternità con l’assicurazione 
obbligatoria per la nuzialità e la natalità – Regio decreto-legge 
14 aprile 1939 -XVII», GU, 3 maggio 1939; 
- «National Relation Labour Act, July 5th, 1935». 74th Congress, 
Ch. 372; 
- «Ordonnance du 3 juillet 1944 Organisation provisoire des 
Services départementaux et régionaux du travail et de la main 
d’oeuvre», JO, 30 aout 1944 ; 
- «Organisation sociale des professions. Loi du 4 octobre 1941», 
JO, 26 octobre 1941, n.390 ; 
- «Perfezionamento e coordinamento legislativo della 
previdenza sociale. Regio Decreto-Legge 4 ottobre 1935-XIII, 
n.1827», GU, 26 ottobre 1935; 
- «Postulati del programma fascista (maggio 1920)», in Renzo De 
Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 1883-1920, Torino, Einaudi, 
2005, pp. 746-748; 
- «Programma dei Fasci di combattimento (1919)», in Renzo De 
Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 1883-1920, Torino, Einaudi, 
2005, pp. 742-745;  
- «PSI e Labour», Mondo Operaio, 22 gennaio 1949;  
- «Regio Decreto del 15 marzo 1944, n.120», GU – Serie speciale, 29 
aprile 1944, n.23; 
- «Regio Decreto-Legge 14 aprile 1939-XVII, n. 636», GU, 3 May 
1939, n.105;  
- «Regio Decreto-Legge 17 marzo 1941-XIX, n. 124», GU, 23 
marzo 1941; 
- «Regio decreto-legge 20 marzo 1941 -XIX, n.123», GU, 23 marzo 
1941, n. 70;  
- «Regio Decreto-Legge 25 marzo 1943-XXI, n.314 - 
Raddoppiamento della misura degli assegni familiari agli 
impiegati privati ed agli opérai richiamati aile armi per 
esigenze di carattere eccezionale», GU, 8 maggio 1943-XXI, 
n.107; 
- «Regio decreto-legge 29 dicembre 1941-XX, n. 1582», GU, 6 
febbraio 1942 n. 30; 
560 
 
- «Regio Decreto-Legge 4 ottobre 1935-XIII, n. 1827 
Perfezionamento e coordinamento legislativo della previdenza 
sociale», GU, 26 ottobre 1935; 
- «Regio Decreto-Legge 6 maggio 1943-XXI, n. 400», GU, 10 
maggio 1943, n. 507; 
- «Regio Decreto-Legge 18 marzo 1943, n. 126 – Aumento delle 
pensioni e dei contributi dell’assicurazione invalidità e 
vecchiaia», GU, 31 marzo 1943-XXI, n.74; 
- «Relazione al Decreto Legislativo del Duce concernente 
l’istituzione dell’Istituto di Gestione e Finanziamento» in R, 
Bonini, La Repubblica Sociale Italiana e la socializzazione delle 
imprese, pp. 298-301; 
- «Repubblica Sociale Italiana – Socializzazione delle imprese. 
Istituto di Gestione e Finanziamento (I.Ge.Fi.)», in R, Bonini, La 
Repubblica Sociale Italiana e la socializzazione delle imprese, pp. 
278-292; 
- «Rivoluzione Sociale - Primi sintomi», La Corrispondenza 
Repubblicana, n.2, November 1943, pp. 49-51; 
- «Social Security Act, August 14th, 1935», 74th Congress, Ch. 531;  
- «The Burden of Taxation», The Economist, 24th October 1942; 
- «Un cavallo di troia», Costruire – Rivista Mensile di Pensiero e di 
Azione Fascista, n.1/1943, pp. 12-13; 
- «Un cavallo di troia», Costruire – Rivista Mensile di Pensiero e di 
Azione Fascista, n.1/1943, pp. 12-13; 
- «Unificazione dei contributi e tenuta del libretto di lavoro nel 
settore dell’industria. Decreti Ministeriali 20 e 16 settembre 
1944-XXII», Biblioteca Legale della Gazzetta del Popolo; 
- «Ventennale sviluppo logico della dottrina fascista», Brescia 
Repubblicana, 23 February 1944-XXII; 
- «Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1897», full text in The 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, What It Mean, and How To Make 
Use of It, London, Fabian Society, 1901; 
- A. Colombo, «Incertezze e orientamenti», La Stampa, 6 agosto 
1944; 
561 
 
- A. Dazzi (ed.), Accordi fra l’Italia e la Germania in materia di lavoro 
e assicurazioni sociali, 1937-1942, Roma, Tipografia Riservata del 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1942; 
- AA.VV., Les étapes de la législation corporative en France, Paris, 
Institute d’études corporatives et sociales, 1944 ;  
- AA.VV., The Economics of Full Employment. Six Studies in Applied 
Economics prepared at The Oxford University Institute of Statistics, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1944;  
- Abbott, Elizabeth, and Bompas, Katherine, The Woman Citizen 
and the Social Security, London, Women’s Freedom League, 
1943; 
- Allocations familiales. Abrégé de la législation concernant les Caisses 
de Compensation, Paris, Edition Sociale Française, 1942 ; 
- Angell, Norman Must Britain travel the Moscow Road?, London, 
Noel Douglas, 1926;  
- Assicurazioni sociali, Capodistria, V. Focardi, 1939; 
- Aubert, M.E., Rapport d’ensemble sur les fleaux sociaux, Paris, 
Union des grandes associations françaises pour l’essor national, 
1920 ;  
- Baldi, Gianni, «Socialismo britannico e socialismo 
internazionale», Quarto Stato, Luglio 1946;  
- Baravalle, Sebastiano, Maternità ed infanzia e previdenza sociale, 
Vercelli, Edizioni SAVIT, 1939;  
- Basso, Lelio, «La politica dei ceti medi», Quarto Stato, Marzo 
1946;  
- Beauchamp, André, Conseils d’un militant. II. L’organisation des 
réunions de propagande, Union Départemental e des Bouches du 
Rhône de la Légion Française des Combattants et de 
Volontaires de la Révolution Nationale, Marseille, 1942 ; 
- Belin, René, «Lettre adressée aux Études sociales et syndicales», 
n. 191/ 1971 ; 
- Belin, René, La politique sociale de Vichy (1940-1942), Paris, Ecrits 
de Paris, 1974 ; 
- Belin, Réné, La politique sociale du gouvernement. La Charte du 
Travail, Bulletin Spécial de Propagande, 1941 ; 
562 
 
- Berger, Suzanne (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe: 
Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981 
- Bertin, Louis, «La Bataille Sociale», Au Travail !, n. 7, a.1, 11 
janvier 1941;  
- Beveridge, William The Past and Present of Unemployment 
Insurance, London, Oxford University Press, 1930; 
- Beveridge, William, «A Criticism of the Government’s 
Employment Policy», in T.S.Newman, Guide to the Government’s 
Employment Policy, London, Hearts of Oak Benefit Society, 1944, 
pp. 19-30; 
- Beveridge, William, «Health and Security in Britain », in Joan S. 
Clarke (ed.), Beveridge on Beveridge. Recent Speeches of Sir William 
Beveridge, London, The Social Security League, 1943, pp.21-26; 
- Beveridge, William, «Killing the Fifth Giant. On the Abolition 
of Unemployment», The Listener, 14th October, 1943; 
- Beveridge, William, «Maintenance of Employment», in Id., The 
Pillars of Security and other War-time Essays and Addresses, pp. 41-
52 
- Beveridge, William, «New Britain. Address at Oxford, 6th 
December, 1942», in Id., The Pillars of Security, London, George 
Allen and Unwin, 1943, pp. 80-97; 
- Beveridge, William, «The Government proposals and the 
Beveridge Report», in Id., Pillars of Security, pp. 126-137 
- Beveridge, William, Causes and Cures of Unemployment, London, 
Longmans, Green &Co., 1931; 
- Beveridge, William, Causes and Cures of Unemployment, London-
New York-Toronto, Longmans, 1931; 
- Beveridge, William, Full Employment in a Free Society, London, 
George Allen and Unwin, 1944; 
- Beveridge, William, Soziale Sicherheit und Vollbeschäftigung, 
Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1946; 
- Beveridge, William, The Pillars of Security and other Wartime 
Essays and Addresses, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1943; 
563 
 
- Beveridge, William, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry, 
London-New York-Toronto, Longmans, Green &Co., 1930; 
- Beveridge, William, Why I am a Liberal, London, H. Jenkins, 
1945; 
- Biagi, Bruno Gli strumenti dell'azione corporativa di intervento 
diretto, Firenze, Casa editrice Poligrafica Universitaria, 
Florence, 1938;  
- Biagi, Bruno, La legislazione sociale di guerra, Roma, INFPS, 1939; 
- Biagi, Bruno, Lineamenti dell'ordine corporativo fascista, Bologna, 
Zanichelli, 1939; 
- Biagi, Bruno, Lo Stato corporativo. I Il sindacato. II la corporazione, 
Roma, Istituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista, 1934;  
- Biagi, Bruno, Prolusione e discorso di chiusura al congresso della 
previdenza sociale, Bologna, INFPS, 1935; 
- Biagi, Bruno, Riforma fascista della previdenza sociale, Roma, 
INFPS, 1939; 
- Bichelonne, Jean, Discours de M. Jean Bichelonne, Ministre du 
Travail par interim, prononcé le 2 mars 1944 au Conseil Supérieur 
du Travail, Paris, Extrait du Bulletin de la Charte du Travail, 
1944 ; 
- Biggini, Carlo Alberto, Giovanni Gentile. Discorso pronunciato alla 
Radio il 23 aprile XXII, Milano, Ministero della Cultura 
Popolare, 1944; 
- Bloch, Marc, «L’étrange défaite. Témoignage écrit en 1940», in 
Id., L’Histoire, la Guerre, la Résistance, Paris, Gallimard, 2006, pp. 
519-653 ; 
- Boissard, Adéodat, La renaissance de la corporation, Paris, Siley, 
1934;  
- Bombacci, Nicola, «Dove va la Russia?», Corriere della Sera, 19 
agosto 1944; 
- Bonnafous, Max, Déat, Marcel, Marquet, Adrien and 
Montagnon, Barthélémy  Néo-socialisme ? Ordre, autorité, nation, 
Paris, Grasset, 1933 ; 
- Bottai, Giuseppe «Tre questioni in discussione sulle 
assicurazioni sugli infortuni», Il Lavoro fascista, 10 giugno 1932, 
564 
 
mentioned in Fabio Bertini, «Il fascismo dalle assicurazioni per 
i lavoratori allo stato sociale», in Marco Palla (ed.), Lo Stato 
fascista, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 2001, pp. 177-314; 
- Bottai, Giuseppe, «E’ vera democrazia?», December 15th, 1942, 
p. 3; 
- Bottai, Giuseppe, «Ordine sociale e ordine internazionale», 
Critica Fascista, November 15th, 1942, pp. 14-16; 
- Bottai, Giuseppe, La Carta del Lavoro, Roma, Edizioni del 
Lavoro, 1928; 
- Bottai, Giuseppe, L'idea corporativa nella Riforma, Roma, Istituto 
per le Relazioni Culturali con l’Estero, 1943; 
- Bouthillier, Yves, Le drame de Vichy. 2 Voll., Paris, Plon, 1951; 
- Bouvier-Ajam, L’Etat français sera corporatif, Paris, Publications 
de l’Office Central d’Organisation Corporative, 1943 ; 
- Bouvier-Ajam, Maurice, La Doctrine corporative, Paris, Sirey, 
1937 ;  
- Bowley, A.L. and Stuart, F.D.«Regularising the demand for 
labour by postponing or accelerating works», in AA.VV., Is It 
Unemployment Inevitable? An Analysis and a Forecast, London, 
MacMillan, 1925; 
- Buret, Antoine-Eugène,  De la misère des classes laborieuses en 
Angleterre et en France, Paris, Chez Pauline, 1840; 
- Cabibbo, Emanuele, «I partiti politici e la previdenza sociale», 
Rivista degli infortuni e delle malattie professionali, Fascicolo Unico 
gennaio-dicembre 1944, pp. 13-48; 
- Cahiers du Travail, Paris, Institute d’études corporatives et 
sociales, aa.1943-44. 
- Carta del Lavoro, edited in Gianni Silei, Lo Stato sociale in Italia. 
Storia e documenti. Vol. I: Dall’Unità al fascismo (1861-1943), 
Manduria-Bari-Roma, Piero Lacaita, 2003; 
- Carter, John, «Studying social policy after modernity», in Id. 
(ed.), Postmodernity and the Fragmentation of Welfare, London-
New York, Routledge, 1998, pp. 15-30;  
- Casson, William, Old Age Pension Act, 1908, London, C. Knight 
& Co., 1908; 
565 
 
- Centonze, Saverio, La tubercolosi dal punto di vista social ed azione 
dell’Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Previdenza, Padova, Società 
Cooperativa Tipografica, 1942; 
- Centre polytechnicien d’études économiques. X Crise, Paris, 1931-
1939 ; 
- Chantry, Henry, Capital et Travail. Leurs rapports après la guerre, 
Nice, Imprimerie de l’Eclaireur, 1917;  
- Chollet, Marcel, and Hamon, Georges, Le problème des 
assurances sociales en Alsace-Lorraine, Paris, Giard&Brière, 1919 ; 
- Churchill, Winston, «The Untrotted Field in Politics», The 
Nation, 7 March 1907; 
- Cione, Edmondo, «Repubblica di lavoratori», Corriere delta Sera, 
February 4th, 1945; 
- Cione, Edmondo, Storia della Repubblica Sociale Italiana, Roma, Il 
Cenacolo, 1948;  
- Clay, Henry, War and Unemployment, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1945; 
- CNR, Programme du Conseil National de la Résistance, Paris, CNR, 
1944 ; 
- Cochrane, Allan, «Globalisation, fragmentation and local 
welfare citizenship» in John Carter (ed.), Postmodernity and the 
Fragmentation of Welfare, pp. 252-266 
- Cole, G.D.H., «A Retrospect of the History», in A.F.C. 
Bourdillon (ed.), Voluntary Social Services. Their Place in the 
Modern State, London, Meuthen & Co., 1945, pp. 11-31; 
- Cole, G.D.H., A Plan for Britain, London, Clarion Press, 1930;  
- Cole, G.D.H., Der Beveridge Plan.sein Inhalt und seine Bedeutung, 
Zürich, Landesring der Unabhängigen, 1943;  
- Cole, G.D.H., Guild Socialism Re-Stated, London, Leonard 
Parsons, 1920; 
- Cole, G.D.H., Socialist Control of Industry, London, Socialist 
League, 1933; 
- Cole, G.D.H., The Means to Full Employment, London, Victor 
Gollanz Ltd., 1943; 
566 
 
- Cole, G.D.H., The Means to Full Employment, London, Victor 
Gollanz Ltd, 1943; 
- Comité du Plan, Le Plan français : doctrine et plan d'action, Paris, 
Fasquelle, 1936 ; 
- Committee on Long-range Work and Relief Policies, Security, 
Work, and Relief Policies, Washington, US Government Printing 
Office, 1942; 
- Committee on Long-range Work and Relief Policies, Security, 
Work, and Relief Policies, Washington, US Government Printing 
Office, 1942; 
- Communist Party, A National Health Service. Memorandum Issued 
by the Communist Party, London, Communist Party, 1944; 
- Confederazione Fascista dei Lavoratori dell’Agricoltura, Rurali 
di Mussolini nella Germania di Hitler, Roma, CFLA – Ufficio 
Propaganda, 1939;  
- Conservative Party. Mr Churchill’s Declaration of Policy to the 
Electors, London: Conservative Party Election Manifesto, 1945;  
- Contri, Siro, Il pensiero cattolico e la socializzazione, Milano, 
Centro Studi per la Socializzazione, 1944; 
- Coppini, Mario Alberto, Prime valutazioni sul costo di un Piano 
Beveridge per l’Italia, Roma, SELI, 1947; 
- Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, Roma, Senato della 
Repubblica, 2009; 
- Crew, A., et al., The Unemployment Insurance Acts, 1920-1930, 
London, Jordan &Sons, 1930;  
- Crick, Wilfred, Franck, An Outline of War-Time Financial Control 
in the United Kingdom, London, MacMillan, 1941; 
- Crivellari, Fabio, «Der Wille zum totalen Krieg», Arbeitskreis 
Militärgeschichte Newsletter, n.12/2000, pp. 10-14 
- Croft, Suzy, and Beresford, Peter, «Postmodernity and the 
future of welfare. Whose critiques, whose social policy?», in 
John Carter (ed.), Postmodernity and the Fragmentation of Welfare, 
pp.103-117;  
- Cummings, A.J., «Spotlight», News Chronicle, 27th October 1942; 
567 
 
- Dangerfield, George, The Strange Death of Liberal England, New 
York, H. Smith & R. Hass, 1935 
- Daquanno, Ernesto, «Combattere e lavorare», Il Lavoro, 28th 
January, 1944;  
- Daquanno, Ernesto, «Fedeltà alle origini», Il Lavoro, 27th 
January, 1944;  
- Daquanno, Ernesto, «Guerra di classe», Il Lavoro, 29th January, 
1944;  
- Daquanno, Ernesto, «Si realizza una più alta giustizia sociale», 
Il Lavoro, 17th February, 1944; 
- Daquanno, Ernesto, «Terra bruciata», Il Lavoro, 3rd February, 
1944; Id. «Questa socializzazione», Il Lavoro, 4-5-6 February, 
1944;  
- Daquanno, Ernesto, «Un’idea portata dalle baionette», Il Lavoro, 
16 February 1944;  
- Davison, Ronald C., The Unemployed. Old Policies and New, 
London-New York, Longmans, Green &Co., 1929;  
- Davison, Ronald, Protezione sociale in Gran Bretagna : lo sviluppo 
dei servizi sociali in Gran Bretagna e il Piano Beveridge illustrato con 
diagrammi, London, G.G.Harrap & Co., 1944;  
- Davison, Ronald, Social Security: The Story of British Social 
Progress and the Beveridge Plan, London, G.G. Harrap & Co., 
1943;  
- De Gherardi, A., La questione sociale e la socializzazione, Padova, 
Quaderni dellTstituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista, 1945; 
- De Giglio, Alberto, Italia, Repubblica, Socializzazione, Milano, 
Edizioni Erre, 1944; 
- De La Hire, Jean, Le Travail, Les Travailleurs et la Nouvelle Europe, 
Paris, Editions du Livre Moderne, 1941 ; 
- De Lagarde, Georges Le Plan Beveridge. Suivi d’un tableau des 
principales modifications apportées à la législation sociale française 
depuis la libération, Paris, Edition Sociale Française, 1945 ; 
- De Lagarde, Georges, La Charte du Travail. Sa place dans 
l’évolution du corporatisme moderne, Angoulême, 1942 ; 
568 
 
- De Man, Henri, Le Plan du travail, Bruxelles, Institut d'économie 
européenne, 1934 ; 
- De Man, Henry, Au-delà du marxisme, Bruxelles, L'Églantine, 
1927;  
- De Rooy, Paul Edouard, L’Ordre Nouveau de Hitler, Toronto, 
Cahiers de l’Ecole des Sciences Sociales, Politiques et 
Economiques de Laval, 1943 ; 
- De Stefani, Alberto, «Il “digesto” del prof. Beveridge», Rivista 
Italiana di Scienze Economiche, n. 1, January 1943, pp. 9-11.  
- De Stefani, Alberto, «Il corporativismo e il monopolio», Rivista 
Italiana di Scienze Economiche, a. XV, n.2, february 1943, pp. 106-
109; 
- De Stefani, Alberto, «Il Piano Beveridge», Rivista Italiana di 
Scienze Economiche, n.l, January 1943, pp. 66-80; 
- De Stefani, Alberto, «La riprivatizzazione», Rivista Italiana di 
Scienze Economiche, a. XIII, n.12, december 1941, pp. 1205-1209; 
- Déat, Marcel, Corporatisme et liberté, Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1938 ; 
- Déat, Marcel, Perspectives socialistes, Paris, Valois, 1930;  
- Del Giudice, Riccardo, «Il Piano Beveridge “dalla culla alla 
bara”», Assicurazioni Sociali, n. 1/1943, pp. 1-17; 
- Délégation Régionale à la Famille, Guide des œuvres et des 
institutions sociales et familiales, Lyon, 1942 ; 
- Di Girolamo, Pasquale, Due estremi: liberalismo e comunismo, 
Chieri, Aspesano, 1944; 
- Di Nucci, Loreto, «Lo Stato sociale in Italia tra fascismo e 
Repubblica: la ricezione del Piano Beveridge e il dibattito alla 
Costituente» 
- Disciplina di guerra e mobilitazione civile. Legge 14 dicembre 1931, 
n. 1699 modificata dal R. decreto-legge 5 settembre 1938, n.1731 e 
corredata di tut te le altre dispos izioni legislative dalla medesima 
richiamate, Napoli, Pietracola, 1939; 
- Disciplina di guerra e mobilitazione civile. Regolamento per 
l’applicazione délia Legge 14 dicembre 1931, n. 1699 approvato con 
R.decreto 15 giugno 1933, n.1176 e modificato con R.decreto 28 
settembre 1934, n. 1791, Napoli, Pietrocola, 1939;  
569 
 
- Disegno di Legge n. 1339, presentato alla Presidenza il 26 aprile 
1941-anno XIX, «Caméra dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni», XXX 
Legislatura, I della Caméra dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni, 
Roma, 1941; 
- Dumoulin, Georges,  « La Charte du Travail. Ce qu’il faut 
admettre, ce qu’il faut rejeter », L’Atelier, 8 Novembre 1941 ; 
- Dumoulin, Georges, « Nous allons avoir la Charte du Travail », 
L’Atelier, 23 Aout 1941 ;  
- Dumoulin, Georges, «Nous ne devons pas torpiller la Charte 
du Travail», L’Atelier, 2 Mai 1942 ;  
- Engely, Giovanni, «Tutti contenti, ma tutti diffidenti», Critica 
Fascista, Febbraio 15th, 1943, pp. 11-12; 
- Errerre [B. Mussolini], «Constatazione e considerazioni», 
Corriere della Sera, April 3rd, 1945; 
- Errerre [B. Mussolini], «Resistere e rinnovarsi», Corriere delta 
Sera, September 14th, 1944; 
- Esprit. Revue internationale, Lyon, 1940-41; 
- Extraits des Conférences prononcées par M. Bichelonne à l’Hôtel de 
Ville de Paris les 5 Aout et 12 Octobre 1943, Paris, 1943 ; 
- Farinacci, Roberto, Il Regime Fascista, 15 gennaio 1944 
- Fenby, Chares, «Beveridge, the Man-power Expert, is Being 
Wasted Himself», Picture Post, March 7th, 1942, pp. 22-23;  
- Franck, Louis, Il corporativismo e l’economia dell’Italia 
fascista,Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1990; 
- Fried, Ferdinand, Les problèmes sociaux dans l’Europe nouvelle, 
Paris, Les Conférences du Groupe « Collaboration », 1941; 
- Funk, Walther, «Wirtschaftliche Neuordnung Europas. Rede 
am 25. July 1940 vor der in- und ausländische Presse». URL: 
http://www.profit-over-
life.org/books/books.php?book=37&pageID=12&expand=no 
- Gignoux, C.-G.,  Felgines, Marcel, and Bouvier-Ajam, Maurice, 
Le corporatisme français, Paris, Publications de l’Office Central 
d’Organisation Corporative, 1943 ; 
- Giobbe, Mirko, «Ordine Nuovo», La Nazione, 9 novembre 1943;  
570 
 
- Goebbels, Joseph, «Nun, Volk steh auf, und Sturm brich los! 
Rede im Berliner Sportpalast,» Der steile Aufstieg, Munich, 
Zentralverlag der NSDAP 1944, pp. 167-204 
- Goebbels, Joseph, Nostro Socialismo, Trieste, Deutscher Adria-
Verlag G.m.h.H., 1944; 
- Greig, Bill «The Man No Government cand Do Without», Daily 
Mirror, May 7th, 1942;  
- Guerdan, René,Travailleur qui pars pour l’Allemagne, Aubenas, 
Editions Habauzit-Le Gonidec, 1942 ; 
- Hannington, Wal, The Lean Years, London, Left Book Club 
Edition (not for sale to the public), 1940; 
- Harris, José, «War and Social History: Britain and the Home 
Front during the Second World War», Contemporary European 
History, n.1/1992, pp. 17-35; 
- Hazell, Howard, Labour and Capital in Alliance, London, John 
Murray, 1927;  
- HMSO, Barlow Report. Royal Commission on the Distribution of the 
Industrial Population. Report Presented to the Parliament by 
Command of His Majesty, London, Cmd. 6153, 1940;  
- HMSO, Control of Manpower in Britain, London, 1942; 
- HMSO, Education (Administrative Provisions) Act, 1907, Ch. 43; 
- HMSO, Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1906, Ch. 57;  
- HMSO, Employment Policy, London, 1944, Cmd. 6527; 
- HMSO, Goods and Services (Price Control Act), 1941, C. 31. 
- HMSO, Ministry of National Insurance Act, 1944, Ch. 46; 
- HMSO, National Assistance Act, 1948, c.29; 
- HMSO, National Health Service Act, 1946, c.81;  
- HMSO, National Industrial Injuries Insurance Act, 1946, c.62;  
- HMSO, National Insurance Act, 1911, Ch. 55; 
- HMSO, National Insurance Act, 1946, c.67;  
- HMSO, National Service Act, 1941, 5 & 6 Geo 6, Ch. 4; 
- HMSO, Price of Goods Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo 6, Ch. 118; 
- HMSO, Report of the Unemployment Assistance Board for the period 
ended 31st December, 1935, Cmd. 5177; 
571 
 
- HMSO, Report of the Unemployment Assistance Board for the period 
ended 31st December, Cmd. 5526;  
- HMSO, Report of the Unemployment Assistance Board for the period 
ended 31st December, Cmd. 5752;  
- HMSO, Report of the Unemployment Assistance Board for the period 
ended 31st December, Cmd. 6021;  
- HMSO, Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance. Final 
Report, Cmd. 4185; 
- HMSO, Scott Report. Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural 
Areas. Report Presented to the Parliament by Command of His 
Majesty, London, Cmd. 6378;  
- HMSO, Social Insurance and Allied Services. Memoranda from 
Organisation. Appendix G to Report by Sir William Beveridge, 
London, 1942, Cmd. 6405; 
- HMSO, Social Insurance and Allied Services. Report by Sir William 
Beveridge Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 
November 1942, London, 1942, Cmd. 6404; 
- HMSO, Social Insurance. Part 1, London, 1944, Cmd. 6550; 
- HMSO, Social Insurance. Part II. Workmen’s Compensation. 
Proposals for an Industrial Injury Insurance Scheme, London, 1944, 
Cmd. 6551; 
- HMSO, Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act, 1934, 
25 Geo. V; HMSO, Special Areas (Amendment) Act, 1937, I Edw. 
VIII and Geo. VI. 
- HMSO, Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom, 
1944, Cmd. 6564; 
- HMSO, Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom, 
p. 26. 
- HMSO, Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. 10 &11 Geo. 6. Ch. 
51;  
- HMSO, Unemployed Workmen’s Act, 1905, Ch 18;  
- HMSO, Unemployment Assistance Act 1934. Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Draft Unemployment Assistance, London, 
Cmd. 6374; 
- HMSO, Unemployment Assistance Act, 1934, Ch. 29; 
572 
 
- HMSO, Uthwatt Report. Expert Committee on Compensation and 
Betterment, London, Cmd. 6386; 
- HMSO, Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1906, C. 58; 
- Hobson, John A., Rationalisation and Unemployment. An 
Economic Dilemma, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1930; 
- Hobson, John A., The Problem of the Unemployed. An Enquiry and 
an Economic Policy, London, Meuthen &Co., 1896;  
- Hobson, John, The Conditions of Industrial Peace, London, Allen 
& Unwin, 1927;  
- II Codice di Camaldoli, Roma, Edizioni Civitas, 1984; 
- ILO, Labour Conditions in War Contracts. With Special Reference to 
Canada, Great Britain and the United States, Montreal, 
International Labour Office, 1943;. 
- Industrial Unrest. The Reports of the Commissioners (July 1917). 
Collated and Epistomed, London, P.S.King and Son, 1917;  
- INFPS, Al di là del lavoro e del salario, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1942; 
- INFPS, Indice degli atti ufficiali . Anno 1943, Roma, INFPS, 1943; 
- INFPS, Rendiconti dell’anno 1941, Roma, INFPS, 1942;  
- INPS, Atti ufficiali – Anno 1944, Roma, 1944 
- Istituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista, Plutocrazia e Bolscevismo, 
Quaderni di divulgazione, Roma, 1942-XXII. 
- Karstedt, La politique social de la nouvelle Allemagne, Paris, 
Fernand Sorlot, 1943 ; 
- Kerschen, Nicole, «L’influence du rapport Beveridge sur le 
plan français de sécurité sociale de 1945», Revue française de 
science politique, n.4/1995,pp. 570-595, p. 572 ; 
- Keynes, John Maynard, «A Short View of Russia», London, 
Hogart Press, 1925, now in Id., The Collected Writing of John 
Maynard Keynes. Vol. IX. Essays in Persuasion, London, 
MacMillan, 1972, pp. 253-271; 
- Keynes, John Maynard, «The end of laissez-faire», London, 
Hogart Press, 1926, now in Id., The Collected Writing of John 
Maynard Keynes. Vol. IX. Essays in Persuasion, pp. 287-288; 
573 
 
- Keynes, John Maynard, Activities 1940-1946. Shaping the Post-
war World: Employment and Commodities, (ed.) Donald 
Moggridge, London, The Royal Economic Society, 1980; 
- Keynes, John Maynard, Activities 1940-1946: Shaping the Post 
War World. Employment and Commodities. The Collected Writings 
of John Maynard Keynes, Cambridge-New York, The Royal 
Economic Society-Palgrave MacMillan, 1980; 
- Keynes, John Maynard, Activities 1940-1946: Shaping the Post 
War World. Employment and Commodities. The Collected Writings 
of John Maynard Keynes, Cambridge-New York, The Royal 
Economic Society-Palgrave MacMillan, 1980; 
- Keynes, John Maynard, How to Pay for the War, A Radical Plan 
for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, London, MacMillan, 1940; 
- Keynes, John Maynard, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 
New York, Harcourt, 1920;  
- Keynes, John Maynard,, The Collected Writings of John Maynard 
Keynes. Vol. XIII. The General Theory and After. Part I. Preparation, 
London, MacMillan, 1973; 
- Keynes, John Maynard,The Collected Writings of John Maynard 
Keynes. Vol. XIV. The General Theory and After. Part II. Defence 
and Development, London, MacMillan, 1973; 
- Krohn, Marie-Elisabeth, Staat und Sozialversicherung in 
Grossbritanien und Deutschland, Berlin-Leipzig-Wien, Deutscher 
Rechtsverlag Gmbh., 1942; 
- L’Inghilterra si autocondanna, 1944; 
- La Carta del Lavoro nei principi generali del diritto fascista, Roma, 
Istituto Nazionale per le Relazioni Culturali con l’estero, 1942; 
- La Communauté du travail. Deuxième Session des Journées d’Etudes 
de Mont-Doré. 16-23 Septembre 1943,  Vichy, Secrétariat 
Permanent des Journées du Mont-Doré, 1943 ;  
- La Communauté professionnelle. Deuxième Session des Journées 
d’Etudes de Mont-Doré. 16-23 Septembre 1943,  Vichy, Secrétariat 
Permanent des Journées du Mont-Doré, 1943 ; 
574 
 
- La Légion des Combattants vous parle. Emissions radiophoniques. 
Janvier, Février, Mars 1942, St. Etienne, Editions de la Légion 
Française des Combattants, 1942 ; 
- La Légion des Combattants vous parle. Emissions radiophoniques. 
Mai, Juin, Juillet, Aout 1941, St. Etienne, Editions de la Légion 
Française des Combattants, 1941 ;  
-  La Légion des Combattants vous parle. Emissions radiophoniques. 
Septembre, Octobre, Novembre, Décembre 1941, St. Etienne, 
Editions de la Légion Française des Combattants, 1942 ;  
- La Notion de sécurité sociale. Vol. 1-2, Institut de Science 
Economique Appliquée, 1945 ; 
- La Pira, Giorgio, 1 problemi della povera gente, Firenze, Libreria 
Editrice Fiorentina, 1951; 
- La Pira, Giorgio, Giorgio La Pira Sindaco. Scritti, discorsi e lettere. 
Vol. I., 1951-1954, Firenze, Cultura Nuova Editrice, 1988; 
- Labour Party, Full Employment and Financial Policy, Labour 
Party, London, 1944; 
- Labour Party, How to Conquer Unemployment, London, Labour 
Party, 1927;  
- Labour Party, Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1944, 
London, Labour Party, 1944; 
- Labour Party, Let Us Face The Future: A Declaration of Labour 
Policy for the Consideration of the Nation, London: 1945 Labour 
Party Election Manifesto, 1945;  
- Labour Party, National Service for Health, London, Labour Party, 
1943; 
- Labour Party, Preliminary Observations on the Government White 
Papers on Social Insurances, Workmen’s Compensations, and a 
National Health Service, London, Labour Party, 1944; 
- Lagardelle, Hubert, «Allocution de M. Hubert Lagardelle du 23 
septembre 1942», in La Charte du Travail et son application, Paris, 
Offices de Comités Sociaux, 1942; 
- Lagardelle, Hubert, «L’unité sociale condition de l’unité 
nationale», Bulletin de la Charte du Travail, n.1 avril 1943;  
575 
 
- Lagardelle, Hubert, «La Charte sera syndicaliste ou ne sera 
pas», Bulletin de la Charte du Travail, n.6, octobre 1943; 
- Lagardelle, Hubert, «Reflexions sur le syndicalisme», Au 
Travail !, n. 51, a.1, 29 novembre 1941; 
- Laroque, «Le plan français de Sécurité sociale, sa conception, 
ses deux premières années», Colloque vingt ans de Sécurité 
sociale, 1945-1965, Nancy-Vandoeuvre, 13 mai 1997, pp.2-20 ; 
- Laroque, Pierre, «De l’assurance sociale à la sécurité sociale : 
l’expérience française», Revue internationale du travail, n.6/1948, 
pp. 621-649. 
- Laroque, Pierre, Rapports entre patrons et ouvriers, Paris, Centre 
de Documentation de la Sorbonne, 1948 ; 
- Laval, Pierre, Discours radiodiffusé du 22 juin 1942 ; 
- Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, «Les idées de la Résistance», in Philippe-
Jean Hesse, Jean-Pierre Le Crom, op. cit., pp. 337-354 ; 
- Letellier, Gabrielle ; et. al., Le chômage en France de 1930 à 1936, 
Paris, Sirey, 1938 ; 
- Liberal Party. 20 Points Manifesto of the Liberal Party, London, 
Liberal Party Election Manifesto, 1945; 
- Llewellyn-Smith, Hubert, Economic Aspects of State Socialism, 
Oxford, Corpus Christi College, 1887; 
- Lloyd George, David, How to Tackle Unemployment. The Liberal 
Plans as laid before the Government and the Nation, London, The 
Press Printers, 1930;  
- Longerich, Peter, «Joseph Goebbels und der totale Kriege. Eine 
unbekannte Denkschrift des Propagandaministers vom 18. July 
1944», Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, n.35/1987, pp. 289-314;  
- Maglione, Giovan Battista «Sicurezza sociale, condizione 
umana», Critica Sociale, 16 giugno 1946;  
- Malgeri, Francesco, La stagione del centrismo. Politica e società 
nell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra (1945-1960), Soveria Marelli, 
Rubettino, 2002;  
- Manunta, Ugo, «Intransigentemente chiari», Il Secolo, 2 
settembre 1944. 
576 
 
- Manunta, Ugo, La caduta degli angeli: storia intima della repubblica 
sociale italiana, Roma, Azienda Editoriale Italiana, 1947;  
- Manunta,Ugo, I tre pilastri del rinnovamento sociale: azienda, 
sindacato, socializzazione, Milano, Centro Studi per la 
Socializzazione, 1944; 
- Marion, Paul, Discours prononcé à Toulouse le 25 Janvier 1942 ; 
- Massimino, Rosario,  «Giustizia distributiva», 19th December, 
1943; 
- Massimino, Rosario,  «Politica Sociale», Il Lavoro, 7th 
December, 1943;  
- Massimino, Rosario,  «Verso una nuova economia», Il Lavoro, 
5th November, 1943;  
- Massimino, Rosario, «Accento sul sociale», Il Lavoro, 18th 
November, 1943;  
- Massimino, Rosario, «Il controllo della produzione», Il Lavoro, 
21 st November, 1943; 
- Massimino, Rosario, «Il nuovo Stato», Il Lavoro, October 24th, 
1943;  
- Mathon, Eugène, La corporation. Base de l’organisation 
économique, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1934;  
- Matteotti, Matteo, «Limiti della politica e dell’azione dei 
laburisti», Iniziativa Socialista per l’Unità Europea, Giugno 1948; 
- Mazzini, Giuseppe La questione sociale, Milano-Venezia, 
Edizioni Erre, 1944; 
- Mazzoni, Giuliano, «La guerra e le esigenze della giustizia 
sociale», Politica Sociale, n. 5-6, 1943, pp. 75-77; 
- Mazzoni, Giuliano, «La guerra e le esigenze della giustizia 
sociale», Politica Sociale, n.5-6/1943; 
- Meade, James, «The Prevention of general unemployment», in 
Susan Howson (ed.), The Collected Papers of James Meade. Vol. I. 
Employment and Inflation, London, Unwin Hyman, 1988, pp. 
171-183; 
- Mersch, Jean, Vers la fin du salariat, Paris, Centre des Jeunes 
Patrons, 1942 ; 
577 
 
- Mesnard, René, «La France ne peut être neutre», L’Atelier, n.14, 
a.2, 8 mars 1941, p.1;  
- Mezzasoma, Fernando, La politica sociale di Mussolini dal 
settembre 1943. Discorso pronunciato al Teatro Carignano di Torino 
il 4 febbraio 1945, Milano, Edizioni Erre, 194; 
- Michaelson, J.M. «He Cures Government Headaches», Answers, 
July 18th 1942; 
- Milhaud, Edgard Le Plan Beveridge, Genève, 1943;  
- Ministère du Travail et de la Prévoyance Sociale, Texte officiel et 
complet de la Loi sur les Assurances sociales. Loi du 5 avril 1928 
modifiée par la loi du 30 avril 1930, Paris, Etienne Chiron Editeur, 
1930 ; 
- Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, Relazione sui 
lavori della Commissione per la riforma della previdenza sociale (4 
luglio 1947 – 29 febbraio 1948), Roma, Atel, 1948; 
- Ministero dell’Economia Corporativa, Regolamento per la 
esecuzione del Decreto 10 maggio 1944 n.376 sull’unificazione dei 
contributi nell’industria, Bergamo, SESA, 1944; 
- Ministry of Health, A National Health Service, London, 1944, 
Cmd. 6502; 
- Ministry of Information, Britain’s War Economy. The mobilisation 
of British Resources for War, London, 1943. 
- Molson, Hugh,  Full Employment and the Budget, London, 
Signpost Booklets on Post-war Problems, 1944;  
- Mounier, Emmanuel, «Programme pour le mouvement de 
jeunesse français», Esprit, n.96, January 1941, pp. 152-167 ; 
- Mussolini, Benito [Gentile, Giovanni], La dottrina del Fascismo, 
Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1935; 
- Mussolini, Benito, «Il secolo scorso ha visto l’economia 
capitalistica, il secolo attuale vedrà l’economia corporativa. 
Congresso dei Sindacati fascisti, Roma 7 maggio 1928-VII», in 
Id., Mussolini parla agli operai, Roma, Confederazione Fascista 
dei Lavoratori dell’Industria, 1941, pp. 25-27; 
- Mussolini, Benito, «La crisi economica mondiale», in Id., Il 
corporativismo fascista, Firenze, La Fenice, 1983, pp. 89-92; 
578 
 
- Mussolini, Benito, «La più alta giustizia sociale fra i popoli 
condizione essenziale per la più alta giustizia sociale fra le 
classi. Teatro Adriano, 23 febbraio 1941», in Id., Mussolini parla 
agli operai 
- Mussolini, Benito, «La più alta giustizia sociale. Discorso del 23 
marzo 1936-XIV», in Id., Mussolini parla agli opérai, Roma, 
Confederazione Fascista Lavoratori dell’Industria, 1941, p.37; 
- Mussolini, Benito, Badoglio, Pietro, and Aytano, Aldo, 
Economia armata, Roma, Edizioni “Centri Tecnici”, 1938; 
- Mussolini, Benito, Il discorso del Duce a Milano, Milano, Edizioni 
Erre, 1944; 
- Mussolini, Benito, Italia, Repubblica, Socializzazione. Discorso 
pronunciato al Quartier Generale il 14 ottobre XXII, Milano, 
Ministero della Cultura Popolare, 1944; 
- Mussolini, Benito, La pace sociale e l’avvenire d’Italia, Roma, 
Berlutti Editore, s.d.;  
- Nenni, Pietro, Perché i socialisti nel governo. Discorso pronunciato 
dall’On. Pietro Nenni al Teatro Adriano di Roma il 29 dicembre 
1963, Roma, PSI, 1964, p.20; 
- Newman, T.S., Guide to the Government’s Employment Policy, 
London, Hearths of Oak Benefit Society, 1944; 
- P. Guieysse, Les retraites ouvrières, Paris, Congres des accidents 
du travail et des assurances sociales, 1904 ; 
- Paillard, Jean, L’A.B.C. du corporatisme, Lyon, Centre d’Etudes 
Corporatives, s.d. ;  
- Parini, Piero, «Partiti e popolo», La Stampa, 4 dicembre 1944. 
- Parodi, Alexandre, «Allocution prononcée par M. Parodi», in 
Après la libération, la liberté. Textes des allocutions diffusées par la 
radiodiffusion française au cours de la deuxième émission, le samedi 
22 septembre 1945, pp. 4-5 ; 
- Partito Nazionale Fascista, La politica sociale del fascismo, Roma, 
Libreria dello Stato, 1936; 
- Partito Socialista Italiano, «Patto d’Alleanza fra Partito 
Socialista e Partito Comunista. 8 agosto 1944», in Ufficio 
579 
 
Stampa PSI (ed.), Cinque anni di politica unitaria. Documenti del 
PSI, Roma, PSI, 1948, pp. 6-7 
- Partito Socialista Italiano, «Patto d’Unità d’Azione col Partito 
Comunista Italiano», in Ufficio Stampa PSI (ed.), Cinque anni di 
politica unitaria. Documenti del PSI, Roma, PSI, 1948, p. 5; 
- Pavolini, Alessando, 28 ottobre 1943. Ritorno aile origini, Milano, 
Edizioni Erre, 1944; 
- Paxton, Robert, La France de Vichy, 1940-1944, Paris, Seuil, 1997 ; 
- PEP, Employment for All, London, Europa Publications Limited, 
1944;  
- PEP, Employment for All, London, Europa Publications Limited, 
1944; 
- Perché combattiamo questa guerra, Milano-Venezia, Edizioni Erre, 
1944;  
- Perroux, François, Capitalisme et communauté du travail, Paris, 
Sirey, 1938 ; 
- Peschadour, J, «Indépendance Syndicale», n.7, a. 1, 11 janvier 
1941, p.1 ; 
- Pétain, Philippe, « Discours du 1er Mars 1941 », Discours aux 
français, pp.110-114 ; 
- Pétain, Philippe, « Message du 11 Juillet 1940 », Discours aux 
français, (ed. by J.-C. Barbas), Paris, Albin Michel, 1989, pp. 63-
66 ; 
- Pétain, Philippe, «Je tiens les promesses, même celles de 
l’autres lorsque ces promesses sont fondées sur la justice», Petit 
Paris, 15 mars 1941 ; 
- Pétain, Philippe, Discours radiodiffuse de Pétain du 11 Octobre 
1940 : l’Ordre Nouveau, URL : https://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/cel-01493582/document; 
- Pétain, Philippe, La politique sociale de la France, Clermont, 
Editions Fernand Sorlot, 1941 ; 
- Pettinato, Concetto, «Insipienza», La Stampa, 22 settembre 1944;  
- Pettinato, Concetto, «Prospettive liberali», La Stampa, 4 agosto 
1944;  
- Pettinato, Concetto, La guerra dei proletari, Vicenza, 1944, p.14;  
580 
 
- Pettinato, Concetto, Questi inglesi, Bertieri, Milano, 1944;  
- Pezzato, Enzo, «Il pericolo viene da destra», La Repubblica 
Fascista, 23 aprile 1943;  
- Pezzato, Enzo, «Rivoluzione sociale», La Repubblica Fascista, 16 
febbraio 1944;  
- Pezzoli, Liberato, «Economia e politica sociale», Il Lavoro, 1 lst 
October, 1943;  
- Pezzoli, Liberato, «Per un’assicurazione intégrale delle malattie 
professionali», Il Lavoro, 22nd September, 1943;  
- Pini, Paolo, La politica sociale in Germania, Roma, Uesisa, 1941;  
- Pirelli, Alberto, Economia e gnerra. Vol. I, Milano, Istituto per gli 
Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940; 
- Pirou, Gaetan, Le Corporatisme, Paris, Sirey, 1935;  
- Pirou, Gaetan, Essais sur le corporatisme, Paris, Sirey, 1938 ;  
- Price, John, British Trade Unions and the War, London, Ministry 
of Information, 1945. 
- Retraites ouvrières et paysannes. Loi du 5 avril , Paris, Dalloz, 
1911 ; 
- Rey, Aimé, « Pourquoi nous sommes collaborationnistes ! », 
L’Atelier, 21 Février 1942 ; 
- Rey, Aimé, «Les vieux seront tous morts», L’Atelier, n. 8, a.2, 
25th janvier, 1941; 
- Ridley, F.A., «Laburismo o socialismo», Iniziativa Socialista per 
l’Unità Europea, 16-30 novembre 1946; 
- Rigola, Rinaldo, «Il lavoro nello Statuto della Repubblica», 
Critica Sociale, 16 giugno 1946; 
- Rigola, Rinaldo, «Il riconoscimento giuridico dei sindacati», 
Critica Sociale, 31 gennaio 1946;  
- Rimensberger, Emil-Friedrich, Qu’est-ce que le Plan Beveridge ?, 
Neuchatel, La Baconnière, 1943 ;  
- Rimensberger, Emil-Friedrich, Was ist der Beveridgeplan?, 
Hausenstein, Verlag Olten, 1943;  
- Romieu, André, «La Charte commence dans l’entreprise», Le 
Comité social d’entreprise, n. 1/1942 ; 
581 
 
- Ronald, Davison, A l’abri du besoin en Grande-Bretagne, historique 
du progrès social en Grande-Bretagne et exposé du Plan Beveridge, 
London, G.G. Harrap & Co., 1944 ; 
- Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 1941 State of the Union Address “The 
Four Freedoms”. Discourse pronounced on January 6th, 1941; 
- Ross, Charles H., The New Plan for Remeding Unempolyment, 
Buxton, Derbyshire Priting Company, 1945;  
- Ross, Colin, L’avènement d’une nouvelle Europe dans le cadre d’un 
nouvel ordre mondial, Paris, Les Conférences du Groupe 
« Collaboration », 1941;  
- Rowntree, Seebohm, Poverty: A Study of Town Life, London, 
MacMillan, 1901; 
- Rowntree, Seebohn, The Way to Industrial Peace and the Problem 
of Unemployment, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1914; 
- Roy, Marcel, «Des possibilités nouvelles offertes à notre main-
d’œuvre», L’Atelier, n.14, a.2, 8 mars 1941;  
- Roy, Marcel, «Que devient la Charte du Travail ?», L’Atelier, 1 
Février 1941 ;  
- Russell, Bertrand, Principles of Social Reconstruction, London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1919; 
- Sacco, Italo Mario, «Considerazioni intorno al Piano 
“Beveridge”», Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, July, 1943, 
pp. 234-240; 
- Salembier, André, «Corporatisme! Syndicalisme», Au Travail !, 
n.49, a.1, 15 novembre 1941; 
- Salotti, Adelchi, L’assistenza sanitaria nell’Ente mutualità fascista: 
proposta di un metodo, Siena, Lazzeri, 1943; 
- Santoni, Enrico Il Risorgimento italiano, Milano-Venezia, 
Edizioni Erre, 1944;  
- Schmitter Philippe, and Lehmbruch, Gerhard (eds.), Patterns of 
Corporatist Policy Making, London, Sage, 1982; AA.VV., The 
Corporate State, Reality or Myth?: A Symposium, London, Centre 
for Studies in Social Policy, 1976;  
- Schmitter Philippe, and Lehmbruch, Gerhard (eds.), Trends 
Toward Corporatist Intermediation, London, Sage, 1979;  
582 
 
- Schulz, F.O.H., Komödie der Freiheit. Die Sozialpolitik der grossen 
Demokratien, Wien, Wilhelm Frick Verlag, 1940 ; 
- Schulz, Heinrich and Heyde, Ludwig,  La politica sociale del 
Terzo Reich, Roma, Thule Italia, 2014; 
- Servoise, René, Le 1er Plan Beveridge, Paris, Domat-
Montchrestien, 1946 ;  
- Servoise, René, Le 2ème Plan Beveridge, Paris, Domat-
Montchrestien, 1946 ;  
- Simonetti, Guido Felice, «Verso la nuova economia sociale», 
Centro Studi per la Socializzazione, Milano, 1944; 
- Simonetti, Guido Felice, Il sistema economico nell’URSS e la 
socializzazione, Milano, Centro Studi per la Socializzazione, 
1944; 
- Social Insurance and Industrial Injury Insurance. Debates on the 
Government White Papers in the House of Commons 2nd, 3rd, 8th, and 
9th November 1944, Conservative and Unionist Party 
Organization, 1944; 
- Social Insurance, Including Industrial Injury Insurance. One Card, 
One Stamp, All Benefits. Brief Guide to the Government’s Plan, 
London, 1944; 
- Soldà, Vittorio, L’unificazione dei contributi, Genova, Società 
d’Arte Poligrafica, 1942; 
- Sona, Ernest, Le problème de la paix, Paris. Desfossés, 1917;  
- Spampanato, Bruno, «Guerra e proclami sociali», La Stampa, 23 
agosto 1944;  
- Spampanato, Bruno, «Il nuovo ordine sociale italiano», Il 
Messaggero, 13 febbraio 1944;  
- Spampanato, Bruno, «Perché combattere», La Stampa, 2 
settembre 1944;  
- Spampanato, Bruno, «Perché siamo socialisti», Il Messaggero,  27 
febbraio-2 marzo 1944;  
- Spinelli, Giuseppe, «Centro di Studio per i problemi della 
socializzazione», Milano, 1944; 
- Spirito, Ugo, Il corporativismo, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 
2009; 
583 
 
- Spykman, Nicholas John, America’s Strategy in World Politics: 
The United States and the Balance of Power, New York, Brace & 
Company, 1942; 
- Stammati, Gaetano Dal “Piano Beveridge” al progetto laburista 
sulle assicurazioni sociali, Roma, Associazione Italo-britannica, 
1946; 
- Sulis, Edgardo, «Democrazia, nemico n. 1», Critica Fascista, 
November lst, 1942, pp. 10-11. 
- Tarchi, Angelo, «Dal discorso di Dalmine alla socializzazione», 
21 settembre 1944; 
- Tarchi, Angelo, «L’organizzazione economico-sociale dello 
Stato Repubblicano del Lavoro», in Id., Teste dure, Milano, 
Editrice S.E.L.C., 1972, pp. 250-259; 
- Tarchi, Angelo, «Relazione al d.g. del Duce 12 febbraio 1944, 
n.375, “Socializzazione delle Imprese” G.U. n. 151 del 30 
giugno 1944», in Francesca Romana Scardaccione (ed.), Verbali 
del Consiglio dei Ministri délia Repubblica Sociale Italiana. Settembre 
1943 - aprile 1945, Roma, Ministero per i Béni e le Attività 
Culturali Direzione Generale per gli Archivi, 2002; 
- Tarchi, Angelo, «Stato del lavoro», Corriere della Sera, 14 maggio 
1944;  
- Tarchi, Angelo, Parole sulla socializzazione, Milano, S.A.M.E., 
1944; 
- Tarchi, Angelo, Premesse per la creazione della nuova struttura 
economico sociale, Milano-Venezia, Edizioni Erre, 1944; 
- Teitgen, Henri, « L’entreprise dans le régime de la Charte », 
Collection Droit social, Janvier 1942 ; 
- Testo Unico della Legge per gli infortuni degli operai sul lavoro: D.R.  
31 gennaio 1904, n. 51, Milano, Società Editrice Libraria, 1904; 
- The Commission on Foreign Inquiry on the National Civic 
Federation, The Labor Situation in Great Britain and France, New 
York, E.P. Dutton & Co., 1919;  
- Tory Reform Committee, Forward by the Right! A Statement by 
the Tory Reform Committee, Printed for private circulation, 
London, 1943; 
584 
 
- Tory Reform Committee, Social Insurance. Bulletin No. 8 of the 
Tory Reform Committee, London, 1944; 
- Tory Reform Committee, Tools for the Next Job – A Policy of 
Progress through Productivity, London, Europa Publications 
Limited, s.d.: 
- Tory Reform Committee, Tools for the Next Job. A Policy of 
Progress through Productivity, London, 1945; 
- Tory Reform Committee, What Shall We Use for Money? Bulletin 
No. 5 of the Tory Reform Committee, London, 1944; 
- Toulouse, Henry, «L’esprit communautaire», Le Comité social 
d’entreprise, n.3a/1942 ; 
- Tout cela, en Italie, a déjà été fait, s.l., s.d ; 
- Town and Country Planning Association, Replanning Britain: 
being a summarized report of the Oxford conference of the Town and 
Country Planning Association, Spring 1941, London, Faber & 
Faber Limited, 1941 
- Treves, P. «Beveridge and the House», Radio Londra, 17th 
October 1944; 
- Trouton, Rupert, Unemployment. Its Causes and Their Remedies, 
London, Hogart Press, 1931;  
- Turner, George, The Case for State Pensions in Old Age, London, 
Fabian Society, 1897; 
- Valat, Bruno «Résistance et sécurité sociale, 1941-1944», Revue 
historique, n.2/1994, pp. 315-346 ; 
- Veil, Simone, Ecrits de Londres et dernières lettres, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1957 ; 
- Vella, Giuseppe, Stato liberale-democratico e Stato corporativo 
fascista, Trani, Paganelli, 1930; 
- Vignini, Filiberto Mazzini agli operai, Milano-Venezia, Edizioni 
Erre, 1944;  
- Vigorelli, Ezio, L’offensiva contro la miseria. Idee e esperienze per 
un piano di sicurezza sociale, Milano, Arnoldo Mondadori 
Editore, 1948; 
585 
 
- Webb, Maurice, et. al., Beveridge Strategy. Report of the Spearhead 
meeting hold at the Livingstone Hall, London, on October 19th, 1943, 
London, Social Security League; 
- Webb, Sidney, and Webb, Beatrice, Soviet Communism: A New 
Civilisation, London-New York, Longmans & Green, 1944 
- Webb, Sidney, and Webb, Beatrice, The Prevention of Destitution, 
London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1911; 
- Webb, Sidney, and Webb, Beatrice, The State and the Doctor, 
London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1910;  
- Webb, Sidney, The Case for an Eight Hours Bill, London, Fabian 
Society, 1891; J. Burns, The Employed, London, Fabian Society, 
1893; 
- Winschuh, Josef, Le Chef d’entreprise dans la Nouvelle Europe, 
Bruxelles, Maison International d’Edition, 1942;  
- Worsfold, Basil, The and Social Reform, London, John Murray, 
1919; After War. A Future Policy, London, The St. Catherine 
Press, s.d.;  
- Young, George Malcolm, (ed.), Country and Town. A summary of 
the Scott and Uthwatt Reports, London, Penguin Books, 1943; 
- Zencovich, L.Z. «Full Employment», Radio Londra, lst June 1944, 
22.30; 
- Zencovich, L.Z., «Social Insurance», Radio Londra, 26th 
September 1944, 21.30; 
- Zincone, Vittorio, «Certi piani», Critica Fascista, February lst, p. 
3; 
- Zuliano, Ezzelino, Come un industriale vede la socializzazione, 
Milano, Centro Studi per la Socializzazione, 1944. 
 
Bibliography : 
 
- « Syndicalismes sous Vichy »,  numéro spécial de la revue Le 
mouvement social, Jean-Louis Robert (ed.), n.158/1992 ; 
- Abel Smith, Brian, «The Beveridge Report: its Origins and 
Outcomes», International Social Security Review, n.1-2/2007, pp. 
5-16. 
586 
 
- Adams, Thomas «The Mixed Moral Economy of Welfare: 
European Perspectives», both in Bernard Harris, Paul Bridgen, 
(eds.), Charity and Mutual Aid in Europe and North America Since 
1800, London-New York, Routledge, 2007, pp. 43-66;  
- Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second 
World War, London, Cape, 1975; 
- Alber, Jens, «L’espansione del welfare state in Europa 
occidentale: 1900-1975», Rivista italiana di scienza politica, 
n.2/1983, pp. 203-260; 
- Alber, Jens, «Le origini del welfare state: teorie, ipotesi ed 
analisi empirica», Rivista italiana di scienza politica, n.3/1982, pp. 
361-421;  
- Alberti, Manfredi, «La disoccupazione nelle statistiche ufficiali 
dell’età giolittiana (1901-1914)», Quaderni Storici, n.2/2010, pp. 
295-317 
- Alford, B.W.E., Depression and Recovery? British Economic 
Growth 1918-1939, London, MacMillan, 1975; 
- Aly, Götz, Hitler’s Beneficiaries. Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi 
Welfare State, New York, Holt Publishers, 2005; 
- Amenta, Edwin, «What We Know about the Development of 
Social Policy: Comparative and Historical Research in 
Comparative and Historical Perspective», in Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, James Mahoney, (eds.), Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, pp. 91-130; 
- Arnaud, Patrice, Les STO : Histoire des Français requis en 
Allemagne, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2010 ; 
- Azéma, Jean-Pierre, Vichy-Paris. Les collaborations, Paris, André 
Versaille Editeur, 2012 ; 
- B. Little, «An explosion of new endeavours: global 
humanitarian responses to industrialized warfare in the First 
World War Era», First World War Studies, 1/2014, pp. 1-16.  
- Backhouse, Roger and Bateman, Bradley, «Keynes and the 
Welfare State», History of Economic Thought and Policy, n.1/2012, 
pp. 7-19; 
587 
 
- Badham, Richard, Theories of Industrial Society, London-New 
York, Routledge, 1986;  
- Bähr, Johannes, and Banken, Ralf, «L’organisation de 
l’économie allemande sous le national-socialisme 1933-1945. 
Synthèse et bilan critique des recherches», in Hervé Joly (ed.), 
Les comités d’organisation et l’économie dirigée du régime de Vichy. 
Actes du colloque international, 3-4 avril 2003, Caen, Centre de 
recherche d’histoire quantitative 2004, pp. 21-38 ; 
- Baldwin, Peter, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of 
European Welfare State, 1875-1975, Cambridge-New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990; 
- Baldwin, Peter, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the 
European Welfare State, 1875-1975, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990; 
- Barber, William J., From new era to New Deal. Herbert Hoover, the 
economists, and American economic policy, 1921-1933, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985; 
- Barbieri, Andrea, Lo Stato sociale in Francia dalle origini alla 
Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Roma, Donzelli, 1999; 
- Barley, James S., and Lacy, William, «British Wartime Control 
of Prices», Law and Contemporary Problems, n.1/1942, pp. 160-
172;  
- Barucco, Piero, Ricostruzione, pianificazione, Mezzogiorno: la 
politica economica in Italia dal 1943 al 1955, Il Mulino, Bologna, 
1978; 
- Bauman, Zygmunt, Work, consumerism and the new poor, 
Maidenhead-New York, Open University Press, 2005; 
- Beck, Hermann, The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in 
Prussia. Conservatives, Bureaucracy, and the Social Question, 1815-
70, Ann Arbor, Michigan University Press, 1995; 
- Beck, Ulrich, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London, 
Sage, 1992; 
- Beckett, Ian, «Total War», in Arthur Marwick, Clive Emsley, 
Wendy Simpson (eds.), Total War and Historical Change. Europe 
1914-1955, London, Open University Press, 2001, pp. 24-41; 
588 
 
- Beito, David, From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal 
Societies and Social Services, 1890-1967, Chapel Hill, University 
of North Carolina Press, 2000;  
- Béland, Daniel, «Social policy concepts and language in 
France», in Klaus Petersen, Daniel Béland (eds.), Analysing 
Social Policy Concepts and Language. Comparative and 
Transnational Perspectives, Bristol, Policy Press at the University 
of Bristol, 2014, pp. 143-156; 
- Belin, René, Du secrétariat de la C.G.T. au gouvernement de Vichy, 
mémoires 1933-1942, Paris, Éditions de l'Albatros, 1978;  
- Bell, David, The First Total War, Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth 
of Warfare as We Know It, Boston-New York, Houghton Miflin 
Company, 2007; 
- Berger, Stefan, «Commentary», in Klaus Weinhauer, Anthony 
McElligott, Kirsten Heinsohn (eds.), Germany 1916-23. A 
Revolution in Context, Bielefeld, Transcript, 2015, pp. 215-256; 
- Bernard Comte, « Emmanuel Mounier devant Vichy et la 
Révolution Nationale en 1940-41 : l’histoire réinterprétée », 
Revue de l’histoire de l’Eglise de France, n.187/1985, pp. 253-279 ;  
- Bertini, Fabio, «Il fascismo dalle assicurazioni per i lavoratori 
allo Stato sociale», in Marco Palla (ed.), Lo Stato fascista, Milano, 
La Nuova Italia, 2001, pp. 177-313; 
- Beveridge, Janet, Beveridge and His Plan, London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1954; 
- Bevir, Mark, «The role of contexts in understanding and 
explanation», in Hans Erik Bödecker (ed.), Begriffsgeschichte, 
Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngesichte, Göttingen, Wallstein 
Verlag, 2002, pp.159-208; 
- Bobbio, Norberto, L’età dei diritti, Torino, Einaudi, 1992; 
- Bonini, Luisa, Economia sociale di mercato, Bologna, Edizioni 
Studio Domenicano, 2012; 
- Booth, Alan, «“Keynesian Revolution” in Economic Policy-
Making», The Economic History Review, n. 1/1983, pp. 103-123. 
- Booth, Alan, «Defining a “Keynesians Revolution”», The 
Economic History Review, n.2/1984, pp. 263-267; Booth, Alan, 
589 
 
«New Revisionists and the Keynesian Era in British Economic 
Policy», Economic History Review, n.2/2001, pp. 346-366;  
- Booth, Alan, «Economic Advice at the Centre of British 
Government, 1939-1941», The Historical Journal, n. 3/1986, pp. 
655-675; 
- Booth, Alan, «New Revisionists and the Keynesian era: an 
expanding consensus?», Economic History Review, n.1/2003, pp. 
125-130 
- Bordeaux, Michèle, La victoire de la famille dans la France défaite : 
Vichy 1940-1944, Paris, Flammarion, 2002 ; 
- Borghi, Marco (ed.) La stampa della RSI. 1943-1945, Milano, 
Guerini e Associati, 2006; 
- Bourdin, Janine, « Des intellectuels à la recherche d’un style de 
vie : l’Ecole nationale des cadres d’Uriage », Revue française de 
science politique, n.4/1959, pp, 1029-1045 ; 
- Briggs, Asa, «The Welfare State in Historical Perspective», 
European Journal in Historical Perspective, n.2/1961, Special Issue: 
On the Welfare State, pp. 221-258. 
- Broadberry, Stephen, and Howlett, Peter, «Blood, Sweat, and 
Tears: British Mobilization for World War II», in Roger 
Chickering, Stig Forster, Bernd Greiner (eds.), A World at Total 
War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 157-176; 
- Broadberry, Stephen, and Howlett, Peter, «The United 
Kingdom: “Victory at All Costs”», in Marl Harrison (ed.), The 
Economics of World War II, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, pp. 42-80; 
- Brooke, Stephen, «Revisionists and Fundamentalists: the 
Labour Party and Economic Policy during the Second World 
War», The Historical Journal, n. 1/1989, pp. 157-175; 
- Brooke, Stephen, Labour’s War: the Labour Party and the Second 
World War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992;  
- Bruce, Maurice, The Coming of Welfare State, London, B.T. 
Batsford, 1961;  
590 
 
- Bruno, Roberto, Breve storia del sindacato in Italia. Lavoro, conflitto 
ed emancipazione, Roma, Ediesse, 2011; 
- Buckwitz, George D.,  America’s Welfare State: From Roosevelt to 
Reagan, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1991;  
- Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin. A Biography, London, Politicos, 
2002; 
- Bullock, Alan, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Vol 2. Minister 
of Labour, 1940-45, London, Heinemann, 1967;  
- Cabares, Bruno, The Great War and the Origins of 
Humanitarianism, 1918-1924, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014; 
- Caffè, Federico, «Nota Introduttiva», in L. Einaudi, Lezioni 
dipolitica sociale, Torino, Einaudi, 1972; 
- Cairncross, Alec. Years of Recovery. British Economic Policy 1945-
1951, London, Eatwell, 1979; 
- Calder, Angus, The Myth of the Blitz, London, Pimico, 1991; 
- Campion, Garry, The Good Fight. Battle of Britain Propaganda and 
The Few, London, Plagrave MacMillan, 2009;  
- Cannistraro, Philip, La fabbrica del consenso, Bari, Laterza, 1974; 
- Cannistraro, Philip, La fabbrica del consenso. Fascismo e mass 
media, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1975; 
- Capet, Antoine, Le poids des années de guerre. Les classes 
dirigeantes britanniques et la réforme sociale 1931-1951, Rouen, 
Publications de l’Université de Rouen, 1991 ; 
- Capuano, Christophe, «L’internationalisation des milieux 
natalistes et familistes durant l’entre-deux-guerres : un 
échec ?», in Jean-Paul Zúñiga, Pratiques du transnational. 
Terrains, preuves, limites, Paris, Centre de Recherche Historique, 
2011, pp. 37-55 ; 
- Capuano, Cristophe, Vichy et la Famille. Réalités et faux-semblants 
d’une politique publique, Rennes, Presse Universitaire de Rennes, 
2009 ; 
- Carocci, Giampiero, Giolitti e l’età giolittiana, Torino, Einaudi, 
1961. 
591 
 
- Caroli, Dorena, Un welfare state senza benessere. Insegnanti, 
impiegati, operai e contadini nel sistema di previdenza sociale 
dell’Unione Sovietica, Macerata, EUM, 2008; 
- Carpenter, Luther Pirie, G.D.H. Cole: an Intellectual Biography, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966; 
- Cartiglia, Carlo, Rinaldo Rigola e il sindacalismo riformista in 
Italia, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1976; 
- Cassese, Sabino, «Bottai e l’economia fascista», in Renzo De 
Felice (ed.), L’economia italiana tra le due guerre. 1919-1939, 
Roma, Ipsoa, 1984; 
- Catalano, Franco, L’economia italiana di guerra 1935-43, Roma, 
Istituto Nazionale per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione, 
1969; 
- Checkland, Sidney, British Public Policy 1776-1939. An Economic, 
Social and Political Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1983; 
- Cherubini, Arnaldo, and Piva, Italo, Dalla libertà all’obbligo. La 
previdenza sociale fra Giolitti e Mussolini, Franco Angeli, Milano, 
1989; 
- Cherubini, Arnaldo, Storia della previdenza sociale in Italia (1860-
1960), Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1977; 
- Chickering, Roger, and Förster, Stig (eds.), A World at Total 
War. Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004; 
- Chickering, Roger, and Förster, Stig (eds.), Great War, Total 
War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000;  
- Chickering, Roger, and Förster, Stig (eds.), Shadows of Total War. 
Europe, East Asia and the United States, 1919-1939, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003; 
- Clarke, Peter The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, 1924-1936, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988; 
- Cohen, Antonin, « « Vers la revolution communautaire». 
Rencontres de la troisième voie au temps de l’ordre nouveau », 
592 
 
Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, n.2/2004, pp. 141-
161 ; 
- Cohen, Antonin, «Du corporatisme au keynésianisme. 
Continuités pratiques  et ruptures symboliques dans le sillage 
de François Perroux», Revue française de science politique, 
n.4/2006, pp. 555-592 ; 
- Cointet, Jean-Paul, Hitler et la France, Paris, Perrin, 2014; 
- Cointet-Labrousse, Michèle, Vichy et le fascisme. Les hommes, les 
structures et le pouvoirs, Paris, Editions Complexe, 1987 ; 
- Collotti, Enzo,L’Europa nazista: il progetto di un Nuovo ordine 
europeo, Roma, Giunti, 2002. 
- Comiti, Vincent-Pierre, Histoire sanitaire et sociale, Paris, PUF, 
1997 ; 
- Conti, Laura, L’assistenza e la previdenza sociale. Storia e problemi, 
Milano, Feltrinelli, 1958; 
- Cordova, Ferdinando, Verso lo Stato totalitario. Sindacati, società e 
fascismo, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2005; 
- Costa Pinto, Antònio (ed.), Corporatism and Fascism: the 
Corporatist Wave in Europe, London, Routledge, 2017;  
- Craft, Nicholas, and Mills, Terence C., «Rearmament to the 
Rescue? New Estimates of the Impact of “Keynesian” Policies 
in 1930s’ Britain», EHES Working Papers in Economic History, 
n.31/ 2012; 
- Cronin, James, The Politics of State Expansion. War, State and 
Society in Twentieth Century Britain, New York, Routledge, 1991;  
- Crouch, Colin, Coping with Post-democracy, London, Fabian 
Society, 2000; 
- D’Angeli, Roberto, Storia del partito fascista repubblicano, Roma, 
Castelvecchi, 2016; 
- Daalder, Hans, Cabinet Reform in Britain, 1914-1963, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1963; 
- Cassese, Sabino, Lo Stato fascista, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2010;  
- Pasetti, Matteo, (ed.), Progetti corporativi tra le due guerre 
mondiali, Roma, Carocci, 2006;  
593 
 
- Pasetti, Matteo, L’Europa corporativa. Una storia transnazionale tra 
le due guerre mondiali, Bologna, Bononia University Press, 2016; 
- Dahrendorf,  Ralf, «Citizenship and Social Class», in Martin 
Bulmer, and Anthony Rees (eds.), Citizenship Today: The 
Contemporary Relevance of T.H. Marshall, London, UCL Press, 
1996, pp. 25-48; 
- Dalisson, Rémi, «La propaganda festive de Vichy. Mythes 
fondateurs, relecture nationaliste et contestation en France de 
1940 à 1944», Guerre mondiales et conflits contemporains, n.3/2002, 
pp. 5-35 ; 
- Dalton, Hugh, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931-1945, London, 
Muller, 1957; 
- Dard, Olivier, La Synarchie. Le mythe du complot permanent, Paris, 
Perrin, 2012 ;  
- Daunton, Martin, The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002; 
- De Angelis, Massimo Keynesianism, Social Conflict and Political 
Economy, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000;  
- De Boni, Claudio, Politica e leggi dell’economia. Il dibattito sulla 
povertà nell’Inghilterra della rivoluzione industriale, Padova, 
CEDAM, 1994;  
- De Felice, Renzo, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 1883-1920, Torino, 
Einaudi, 2005; 
- De Grazia, Victoria, The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of 
Leisure in Fascist Italy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1981; 
- De Luna, Giovanni, «I “quarantacinque giorni” e la Repubblica di 
Salò», in Valerio Castronovo, Nicola Tranfaglia, La stampa italiana 
dalla Resistenza agli anni Sessanta, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1980, pp. 5-
89; 
- Denord, François, and, Rosental, Paul-André, «Comment lier 
l’économique et le social. Une analyse structurale des lieux 
d’expertise sous le régime de Vichy», Gouvernement et action 
publique, n.2/2013, pp. 183-219 ; 
594 
 
- Di Jorio, Irene, Tecniche di propaganda politica. Vichy e la Légion 
Française des Combattants (1940-1944),  Roma, Carocci, 2006 ; 
- Di Nucci, Loreto, «Lo Stato sociale in Italia tra fascismo e 
Repubblica: la ricezione del Piano Beveridge e il dibattito alla 
Costituente», in Carlotta Sorba (ed.), Cittadinanza. Individui, 
diritti sociali, collettività nella storia contemporanea, Roma, 
Ministero per i Beni e per la attività culturali – Direzione 
Generale per gli Archivi, 2002; 
- Djelic, Marie-Laure, «Genèse et fondements du plan Monnet : 
l’inspiration américaine», Revue française d’études américaines, 
n.1/1996, pp. 77-86; 
- Djelic, Marie-Laure, «Genèse et fondements du plan Monnet : 
l’inspiration américaine», Revue Française d’Etudes Américaines, 
n.1/1996, pp. 77-86. 
- Domin, Jean-Paul, Une histoire économique de l’hopital, XIXe-XXe 
siècles. Vol. I (1803-1945), Paris, Association pour l’étude de 
l’histoire de la sécurité sociale, 2008 ; 
- Donno, Michele, Socialisti democratici. Giuseppe Saragat e il PSLI 
(1945-1952), Soveria Mannelli, Il Rubettino, 2009; 
- Dreyfus, Michel, «La Caisse des dépôts et les Assurances 
sociales durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale», in Alya Aglan, 
Michel Margairaz, Philippe Verheyde, La Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations, la Seconde Guerre mondiale et le XXe siècle, Paris, 
Albin Michel, 2003, pp. 162-177 ; 
- Dreyfus, Michel, et. al., Se protéger, être protégé. Une histoire des 
Assurances sociales en France, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de 
Rennes, 2006 ; 
- Du Bois, Daniel Michel, «From “Coolidge Prosperity” to 
“Voluntary Associationism”: Andrew Mellon, Herbert Hoover, 
and America’s Political Economy in the Republican-Era 1920s» 
in Katherine Sibley, (ed.), A Companion to Warren G. Harding, 
Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover, Oxford, Wiley, 2014, pp. 
212-231 
- Dudley Stamp, Laurence, «The Scott Report», in Geographical 
Journal, n. 1/1943, pp. 16-20; 
595 
 
- Duncan, Kenneth, «Social Insurance in the Soviet Union», The 
Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 
178, 1935, pp. 181-189;  
- Durand, Yves, «La collaboration à la française au miroir 
européen », in AA.VV., La France sous Vichy. Autour de Robert O. 
Paxton, Paris, Editions Complexe, 2004, pp. 75-90 ; 
- Dutton, David, British Politics since 1945. The Rise, Fall, and 
Rebirth of Consensus, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 1-85;  
- Dutton, Paul V. The Origins of the French Welfare State. The 
Struggle for social reform in France 1914-1947, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004; 
- Dutton, Paul. V.,  Origins of the French Welfare State. The Struggle 
for Social Reforms in France, 1914-1947, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004; 
- Echternkamp, Jörg, Germany and the Second World War. Volume 
IX/II. German Wartime Society 1939-1945: Exploitations, 
Interpretations, Exclusion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2014; 
- Edgerton, David, Britain’s War Machine. Weapons, Resources and 
Experts in the Second World War, London, Allen Lane, 2011; 
- Edsforth, Ronald The New Deal. America’s Response to the Great 
Depression, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2000; 
- Einaudi, Luigi, Lezioni di politica sociale, Torino, Einaudi, 1972; 
- Elbow, Matthew H.,French Corporative Theory, 1789-1948 : A 
Chapter in the History of Ideas, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1953;  
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, «Welfare States without Work: the 
Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Continental 
European Social Policy», in Id. (ed.), Welfare States in Transition: 
National Adaptations in Global Economies, London, Sage, 1996, 
pp. 68-87; 
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, The Three Worlds of Western Capitalism, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990;  
- Evans, Peter, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, «On 
the Road toward a More Adequate Understanding of the 
596 
 
State», in Id. (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 347-366; 
- Farnsworth, A., «“Pay As You Earn” – The Income Tax 
(Employments, etc.) Acts, 1943 and 1944», The Modern Law 
Review, n.3/1944, pp. 146-148; 
- Fay, Sidney, «Bismarck’s Welfare State», Current History, 
n.18/1950, pp. 1-7;  
- Ferrera, Maurizio Il welfare state in Italia: sviluppo e crisi in 
prospettiva comparata, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984;  
- Ferrera, Maurizio, Fargion, M. Jessoula, Alle radici del welfare 
all’italiana. Origini e futuro di un modello sociale squilibrato, 
Venezia, Marsilio, 2012; 
- Fielder, Paul Social Welfare in Pre-Industrial England, London, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006;  
- Flores, Norma Lisa, «Fear of Revolution», in Klaus Weinhauer, 
Anthony McElligott, Kirsten Heinsohn (eds.), Germany 1916-23. 
A Revolution in Context, pp. 127-150; 
- Förster, Stig (ed.), An der Schwelle zum Totalen Krieg – Die 
militarische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft, 1919-1939, 
München, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2002; 
- Francesco Malgeri, La stagione del centrismo. Politica e società 
nell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra (1945-1960), Soveria Marelli, 
Rubettino, 2002; 
- Frankenstein, Robert, «Intervention étatique et réarmement en 
France 1935-1939», Revue économique, n.4/1980, pp. 743-781, p. 
781. 
- Fraser, Derek, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, London, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2003;  
- Fyfe, Hamilton, Britain’s Wartime Revolution, London, V. 
Gollancz Limited, 1944; 
- Gaeta, Lorenzo, and Visconti, Antonio, «L’Italia e lo stato 
sociale», in Gerhard Ritter, Storia dello stato sociale, Roma-Bari, 
Laterza, 2011, pp. 227-276; 
- Gagliardi, Alessio, Il corporativismo fascista, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 
2010; 
597 
 
- Galbraith, John K., The New Industrial State, Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin, 1967;  
- Ganapini, Luigi, La repubblica delle camicie nere, Milano, 
Garzanti, 2010; 
- Geida, Peter, Le groupement des travaillerus étrangers (GTE) sous 
le régime de Vichy, Paris, LULU, 2017 ; 
- Gentile, Emilio, Fascismo di pietra, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2008; 
- Gentile, Emilio, Le origini dell’Italia contemporanea. L’età 
giolittiana, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2003; 
- Gentile, Emilio, The Struggle for Modernity, Westport-London, 
Praeger, 2003; 
- Geyer, Martin H., «Social Rights and Citizenship during World 
War II», in Id. (ed.), Two Cultures of Rights. The Quest for 
Inclusion and Participation in Modern America and Germany, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002;  
- Gibaud, Bernard, De la mutualité à la sécurité sociale. Conflits et 
convergences, Paris, Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1986 ; 
- Gilbert, Bentley, The Evolution of National Insurances in Great 
Britain, London, Michale Joseph, 1966, pp. 289-447; 
- Ginsburg, Norman, Class, Capital, and Social Policy, London, 
MacMillan, 1979; 
- Giorgi, Chiara, La previdenza del regime. Storia dell’Inps durante il 
fascismo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004; 
- Girotti, Fiorenzo, Welfare State. Storia, modelli e critica, Roma, 
Carocci, 1998, p. 169; 
- Girotti, Fiorenzo, Welfare State: storia, modelli e critica, Roma, 
Carocci, 1998; 
- Glynn, Sean, and Oxborrow, John, Interwar Britain. A Social and 
Economic History, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1976; 
- Götz, Norbert, and Patel, Kiran Klaus, «Facing the Fascist 
Model: Discourse and the Construction of Labour Service in the 
USA and Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s», Journal of 
Contemporary History, n.1/2006, pp. 57-73;   
- Gough, Ian, The political economy of the welfare state, London, 
MacMillan, 1979; 
598 
 
- Gregarek, Rainer, «Le face-à-face de la République française et 
de l’Empire allemande dans les politiques sociales», Revue 
Germanique Internationale, n.4/1995, pp. 103-126. 
- Gregory, Adrian, The Last Great War. British Society and the First 
World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
particularly pp. 187-295; 
- Grimmer-Sollem, Erik, The Rise of Historical Economics and Social 
Reform in Germany 1864-1894, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2003; 
- Guignabaudet, Philippe, Lois de l’économie nouvelle. Doctrine du 
capitalisme sociale, Paris, Plon, 1942 ; 
- Halperin, Sandra, War and Social Change in Modern Europe. The 
Great Transformation Revisited, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004;  
- Hardy, Dennis, From Garden Cities to New Towns. Campaigning 
for Town and Country Planning, 1899-1946, London, 
Chapman&Hall, 1991; 
- Hardy, Dennis, From Garden Cities to New Towns. Campaigning 
for Town and Country Planning, cit., pp. 256-271; Town and 
Country Planning, London, Staples and Staples Limited, 1943; 
- Harris, Bernard, and Bridgen, Paul «Introduction: The “Mixed 
Economy of Welfare” and the Historiography of the Welfare 
Provision», in Id. (eds.), Charity and Mutual Aid in Europe and 
North America Since 1800, pp. 1-18; 
- Harris, Bernard, The Origins of the British Welfare State. State and 
Social Welfare in England and Wales 1800-1945, London, 
Palgrave-MacMillan, 2004; 
- Harris, José, «Did British Workers Want the Welfare State? 
G.D.H. Cole’s Survey of 1942», in Jay Winter (ed.), The Working 
Class in Modern British History, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1983, pp. 200-214; 
- Harris, José, «Le cas de la Grande Bretagne», in AA.VV., Un 
siècle de protection social en Europe. Colloque tenu au Sénat les 24, 
25, 26 octobre 1996 à l’occasion du cinquantenaire de la Sécurité 
599 
 
sociale, Paris, Association pour l’étude de l’histoire de la 
sécurité sociale, 2001, pp. 19-26 ; 
- Harris, José, «Political Thought and the Welfare State 1870-
1940: An Intellectual Framework for British Social policy», 
Past&Present, n. 135/1992, pp. 116-141;  
- Harris, José, «Some Aspects of Social Policy in Britain during 
the Second World War», Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Wolfgang 
Mock (eds.), The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and 
Germany, 1850-1950, London. Croom Helm on behalf of the 
German Historical Institute, 1981, pp. 247-263; 
- Harris, José, William Beveridge. A Biography, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1997;. 
- Harrison, Mark, «The economics of World War II: an 
overview», in Id. (ed.), The Economics of World War II: Six Powers 
in International Comparison, pp. 1-42, see also the table 1.8., p. 21. 
- Heclo, Hugh, «Towards a New Welfare State?», in Peter Flora, 
Arnold J. Heidenheimer (eds.), The Development of Welfare State 
in Europe and America, New Brunswick-London, Transaction 
Publishers, 1984;  
- Heclo, Hugh, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: from 
Relief to Income Maintenance, New Haven-London, Yale 
University Press, 1974; 
- Hellman, John, «Communautaires, non-conformistes et la quête 
d’un « homme nouveau » dans la France de Vichy», in AA.VV., 
La France sous Vichy. Autour de Robert O. Paxton, pp. 105-119 ; 
- Hellman, John, The Knight-Monks of Vichy France. Uriage 1940-
1945, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1993; 
- Hervé, Joly, «Les comités d’organisation : un ensemble vaste et 
disparate», in Id. (ed.), Les comités d’organisation et l’économie 
dirigée de Vichy. Acte du colloque internationale, 3-4 avril 2001, 
Caen, Centre de Recherche Quantitative, 2004, pp. 83-94 ; 
- Hesse, Philippe-Jean, «France and Unemployment Insurance 
from 1920 to 1985. The Myth of Social Security», in Noel 
Whiteside, Robert Salais, (eds.) Governance, Industry and Labour 
600 
 
Markets in Britain and France, London-New York, Routledge, 
1998, pp. 193-211; 
- Hesse, Philippe-Jean, «Les assurances sociales», in Philippe-
Jean Hesse, Jean-Pierre LeCrom (eds.), La protection sociale sous 
le régime de Vichy, pp. 31-84 ; 
- Hesse, Philippe-Jean, Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, « Conclusion », in 
Id., La protection sociale sous le régime de Vichy, pp. 355-364, see 
pp. 361-364 ;  
- Hitchcock, William, «The Marhsall Plan and the creation of the 
West», in Melvyn P. Leffer, and Odd Arne Westad, The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol 1. The Origins, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 154-174; 
- Hobsbawm, Eric J., Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 
1914-1991, London, Abacus, 1995; 
- Hobsbawm, Eric J., Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 
1914-1991, London, Abacus, 1995;  
- Hoffmann, Stanley, « Aspects du Régime de Vichy », Revue 
française de science politique, n.1/1956, pp. 44-69 ; 
- Honig, Jan, «The of Total War from Clausewitz to Ludendorff», 
in AA.VV., The Pacific War as Total War: Proceedings of the 2011 
International Forum on War History, Tokyo, National Institute for 
Defence Studies, 2012, pp. 29-41; 
- Horne, John State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the 
First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997;  
- Horne, John, La guerre totale, le turnant de 1914-1915, Paris, 
Tallandier, 2010 ; 
- Horne, John, Labour at War. France and Britain, 1914-1918, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991;  
- Hutchison, Terence W., Keynes versus the “Keynesians”… ?, 
London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1977. 
- Imlay, Talbot, «Democracy and War: Political Regime, 
Industrial Relations, and Economic Preparations for War in 
France and Britain up to 1940», The Journal of Modern History, 
n.1/2007, pp. 1-47;  
601 
 
- Iriye, Akira, Global and Transnational History: the Past, Present, 
and Future, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; 
- Isnenghi, Mario, «Parole e immagini dell’ultimo fascismo», in 
1943-45. L’immagine della RSI nella propaganda, Milano, 
Mazzotta, 1985, pp. 11.41; 
- J.F. Irwin, «The disaster of war: American understanding of 
catastrophe, conflict and relief», First World War Studies, 1/2014, 
pp. 17-28;  
- Jabbari, Eric, Pierre Laroque and the Welfare State in Postwar 
France, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
- Jackson, Julian, The Politics of Depression in France, 1932-1936, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985; 
- James, Harold, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great 
Depression, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2001; 
- Jeansonne, Glen, «Hoover’s Vision and His Response to the 
Great Depression: Voluntary Efforts; Public Works; the Gold 
Standard; the RFC; the Farm Board; Hoover’s Reputation», in 
Katherine Sibley, (ed.), A Companion to Warren G. Harding, 
Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover, pp. 465-483;  
- Jeffereys, Kevin, «R.A. Butler, the Board of Education and the 
1944 Education Act», History, n.68/1984, pp. 415-431; 
- Jeffreys, Kevin, «British Politics and Social Policy during the 
Second World War», The Historical Journal, n.1/1987, pp. 123-
144; 
- Jocteau, Gian Carlo, «Le origini della legislazione sociale in 
Italia. Problemi e prospettive di ricerca», Movimento operaio e 
socialista, n.2/1982, pp. 289-302; 
- Jones, Harriet «A Bloodless Counter-Revolution: The 
Conservative Party and the Defence of Inequality, 1945-51», in 
Harriet Jones, Michael Kandiah (eds.), The Myth of Consensus: 
New Views on British History, 1945-64, London, MacMillan, 1996 
pp. 1-16;  
- Judt, Tony, «What Is Living and What Is Dead in Social 
Democracy?», Id., When the Facts Change. Essays 1995-2010, 
London, Penguin, 2015, pp. 319-338; 
602 
 
- Julliard, Jacques, «La Charte du Travail», in René Remond, Le 
Gouvernement de Vichy 1940-1942 : institutions et politiques, Paris, 
Armand Colin, 1972, pp. 157-210; 
- Kaeble, Hartmut, «Das europäische Sozialmodell – eine 
historische Perspektive», in Hartmut Kaeble, Günther Schmid 
(eds.), Das europäische Sozialmodell: auf dem Weg zum 
transnationalen Sozialstaat, Berlin, Sigma, 2004, pp. 31-50;  
- Kaeble, Hartmut, A Social History of Europe, 1945-2000. Recovery 
and Transformation after Two World Wars, New York-Oxford, 
Berghahn Books, 2013; 
- Kandiah, Michael, «Conservative Leaders, Strategy – and 
“Consensus”? 1945-65», in Harriet Jones, Michael Kandiah 
(eds.), The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-
64, 58-78; 
- Kaplan, Stephen, «Un laboratoire de doctrine corporatiste sous 
le régime de Vichy : l’Institut d’études corporatives et sociales», 
Mouvement Social, n. 2/2002, pp. 35-77;  
- Kavanagh, Dennis, «The Post-War Consensus», Twentieth 
Century British History, n.2/1992, pp. 175-190; 
- Kayser, Jaques Les grandes batailles du radicalisme des origines aux 
portes du pouvoir 1820-1901, Paris, Marcel Rivière&Co, 1961; 
- Kent, John, William Temple: Church, State and Society in Britain, 
1880-1950, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992; 
- Kerr, Clark, et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1960;  
- Kerschen, Nicole, «L’influence du rapport Beveridge sur le 
plan français de sécurité sociale de 1945», Revue française de 
science politique, n.4/1995,pp. 570-595 ; 
- Kiess, Johannes et Al., «Path dependency and convergence of 
three worlds of welfare policy during the Great Recession: UK, 
Germany, and Sweden», Journal of International and Comparative 
Social Policy, n.1/2017, pp. 1-17 
- Kopsch, Hartmut, The Approach of the Conservative party to social 
policy during world war two, London, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
1970; 
603 
 
- Korpi, Walter, «Power Resources and Employer-Centered 
Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of 
Capitalism», World Politics, n. 58 (Jan. 2006), pp. 167-206;  
- Koselleck, Reinhart, «Hinweise auf die temporalen Strukturen 
begriffsgeschichtlichen Wandels», in Hans Erik Bödecker (ed.), 
Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngesichte, pp. 29-47;  
- Kossoris, Max, «Hours and Efficiency in British Industry», 
Monthly Labor Review, n.6/1941, pp. 1337-1346; 
- Kuisel, Richard, «Vichy et les Origines de la Planification 
Economique : 1940-46», Le Mouvement Social, n.98/1977, pp. 77-
101;  
- Kuisel, Richard, Le capitalisme et l’Etat en France. Modernisation et 
dirigisme au XXe siècle, Paris, Gallimard, 1984 ; 
- La Banca, Domenica, Welfare in transizione. L’esperienza 
dell’ONMI (1943-1950), Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 
2013; 
- Lacroix-Riz, Annie, «Les comités d’organisation et l’Allemagne: 
tentative d’évaluation», in Joly. Hervé (ed.), Les comités 
d’organisation et l’économie dirigée de Vichy. Acte du colloque 
internationale, 3-4 avril 2001, pp. 49-62 ; 
- Lacroix-Riz, Annie, Industriels et banquiers français sous 
l’occupation, Paris, Armand Colin, 2013; 
- Lacroix-Riz, Annie, Les élites françaises entre 1940 et 1944. De la 
collaboration avec l’Allemagne à l’alliance américaine, Paris, 
Armand Colin, 2016 ; 
- Landes, David S., The Unbound Prometheus.Technological Change 
and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the 
Present, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; 
- Laqua, Daniel, (ed.), Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational 
Ideas and Movements between the World Wars, London, I.B. 
Tauris, 2011;  
- Laybourn, Keith, The Evolution of British Social Policy and the 
Welfare State, Keele, Keele University Press, 1995;  
- Le Crom, Jean-Pierre,  «L’assistance publique», in Philippe-Jean 
Hesse, Jean-Pierre Le Crom, La protection sociale sous le régime de 
604 
 
Vichy, Rennes, Presse Universitaire de Rennes, 2001, pp. 166-
169 ; 
- Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, «Comités d’organisation et Comités 
Sociaux ou l’introuvable interpénétration de l’économique et 
du social», Caen, 2003. URL : https://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/halshs-00256587/document; 
- Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, «L’Entre-deux-Guerres : un pré-
corporatisme ?», in Steven Kaplan, Philippe Minard (eds.), La 
France, malade du corporatisme ? XVIIIème-XXème siècles, Paris, 
Belin, 2004, pp. 369-386; 
- Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, «L’Entre-deux-Guerres: un pré-
corporatisme?», in Steven L. Kaplan, Philippe Minard (eds.), La 
France, malade du corporatisme? XVIIIe-XXe siècles, pp. 369-386 ; 
- Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, «Les syndicalismes et la crise du 
libéralisme (1930-1950). Entre planisme, corporatisme et 
liberté», 1996. URL : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-
00190984/document; 
- Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, Au secours Maréchal !, Paris, PUF, 2013 ; 
- Le Crom, Jean-Pierre, Syndicats, nous voilà ! Vichy et le 
corporatisme, , Paris, Les Editions de l’Atelier, 1995 ; 
- Le Gall, Yvon, «Les accidents du travail», in Philippe-Jean 
Hesse, Jean-Pierre LeCrom, La protection sociale sous le régime de 
Vichy, pp. 121-162 ; 
- Loubet Del Bayle, Jean-Louis, Les non-conformistes des Années 30. 
Une tentative de renouvellement de la pensée politique française, 
Paris, Seuil, 1969 ; 
- Lowe, Rodney, «The Second World War, Consensus, and the 
Foundations of the Welfare State», Twentieth Century British 
History, n. 2/1990, pp. 152-182;  
- Lowe, Rodney, «The Second World War, Consensus, and the 
Foundation of the Welfare State», Twentieth Century British 
History, n.2/1990, 152-182; 
- M. S. Alexander, «Dunkirk in military operations, myths, and 
memories», in Robert Tombs, Emile Chabal, Britain and France 
605 
 
in Two World Wars. Truth, Myth and Memory, London, 
Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 93-118;  
- M. Smith, Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory, 
London, Routledge, 2000; 
- M.E. McGuire, «‘A highly successful experiment in 
international partnership?’ The limited resonance of the 
American Committee for Devastated France», First World War 
Studies, 1/2014, pp. 101-115.  
- MacDonald, Simon, «Transnational History: a review of past 
and present scholarship», UCL – Centre For Transnational 
History, 2013. URL: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/centre-transnational-
history/objectives/simon_macdonald_tns_review; 
- Mackay, Robert, Half the Battle. Civilian Morale in Britain during 
the Second World War, Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 2002; 
- MacLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the 
Ministry of Information in World War II, London, Allen & Unwin, 
1979; 
- Madge, John, The Rehousing of Britain, London, The Pilot Press 
Ltd, 1945; 
- Magliulo, Antonio, «La politica della massima occupazione», in 
P. Roggi (ed.), L’attesa déliapover gente. Giorgio La Pira e la cultura 
economica anglosassone, Milano, Giunti, 2005, pp. 104-137; 
- Mahoney, James, «Path Dependence in Historical Sociology», 
Theory and Society, n. 29/2000, pp. 507-548;  
- Mahoney, James, and Schensul, Daniel, «Historical Context and 
Path Dependence», in Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly, (eds.), 
Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, pp. 454-471; 
- Maier, Charles, «The politics of productivity: foundations of 
American international economic policy after World War II», in 
Id., In Search of Stability, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1987, pp. 121-152; 
- Maier, Charles, «The two postwar eras and the conditions for 
stability in twentieth century Western Europe», in Id., In Search 
606 
 
of Stability, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 
153-184; 
- Maier, Charles, Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Stabilization in 
France, Germany, and Italy, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1988; 
- Mantovani, Claudia, Rigenerare la società. L’eugenetica in Italia 
dalle origini ottocentesche agli anni Trenta, Soveria Mannelli, 
Rubbettino, 2004; 
- Marcuzzo, Maria Cristina, «Whose Welfare State? Beveridge 
versus Keynes», in Roger E. Backhouse and Tamotsu 
Nishizawa (eds.), No Wealth but Life. Welfare Economics and the 
Welfare State in Britain, 1880-1945, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, pp. 189-206; 
- Margairaz, Michel, «La Caisse des dépôts, les spoliations et la 
collaboration d’État», in Alya Aglan, Michel Margairaz, 
Philippe Verheyde, La Caisse des dépôts et consignations, la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale et le XXe siècle, pp. 447-475 ; 
- Margairaz, Michel, «La guerre-monde, matrice du Welfare 
State?», in Alya Aglan, Robert Frank (eds.), 1937-1947 : La 
guerre-monde. Vol. II, Paris, Gallimard, 2015, pp. 883-912. 
- Margairaz, Michel, and Rousso, Henry, «Vichy, la guerre et les 
enterprises», Histoire, économie & société, n.11/1992, pp. 337-367; 
- de Lagarde, Georges (ed.), Les assurances sociales peuvent-elles et 
doivent-elles s’adapter à la nouvelle Organisation corporative ?, 
Paris, 1941; 
- Margairaz, Michel, L’Etat, les finances et l’économie. Histoire d’une 
conversion 1932-1952. Vol. II, Paris, Comité pour l’Histoire 
Economique et Financière, 1991 ; 
- Margairaz, Michel, L’État, les finances et l’économie. Histoire d’une 
conversion 1932-1952, Paris, Ministère de l’Economie des 
Finances et du Budget, 1991 ; 
- Marshall, Thomas Humprey, Citizenship and Social Class, and 
other essays; Id. (edited by), Class, Citizenship and Social 
Development, Garden City, Doubleday and Company, 1964;  
607 
 
- Martin, Jacqueline, «Politique familiale et travail des femmes 
mariées en France : perspective historiques 1942-1982», 
Population, n.6/1998, pp. 1119-1153 ; 
- Marucco, Dora, Lavoro e previdenza dall’Unità al fascismo. Il 
Consiglio della previdenza dal 1869 al 1923, Milano, Franco 
Angeli, 1984; 
- Marwick, Arthur, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace 
and Social Change 1900-1967, London, Pelican Books, 1968; 
- Marwick, Arthur, War and Social Change in the Twentieth 
Century: A Comparative Study of Britain, France, Germany, Russia 
and United States, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 1974; 
- Mason, Tim, Social policy in the Third Reich, New York, Berg, 
1993;  
- Maux-Robert, Marie-Antoniette, «Le Commissariat à la lutte 
contre le chômage», Guerres Mondiales et conflits contemporains, 
n.2/2002, pp. 121-146 ; 
- Mazower, Mark, «Hitler’s New Order, 1939-45», Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, n.1/1996, pp. 29-53;  
- Mazower, Mark, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe, 
2009;  
- Mazower, Mark, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe, 
London, Allen Lane, 2008; 
- Mazzacane, Aldo, Somma, Alessandro, Stolleis, Michael, (eds.), 
Il corporativismo nelle dittature sudeuropee, Frankfurt am Main, 
Vittorio Klostermann, 2005; 
- McElligott, Anthony, Rethinking the Weimar Republic: Authority 
and Authoritarianism, 1916-1936, London, Bloomsbury, 2013. 
- Menozzi Dino, «La Chiesa cattolica», in Giovanni Filoramo, 
Dino Menozzi (eds.), Storia del cristianesimo. L’età contemporanea, 
Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1997; 
- Menozzi, Dino, «La Chiesa cattolica», in Dino Menozzi, 
Giovanni Filoramo (eds.), Storia del cristianesimo. L’età 
contemporanea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1997, pp. 131-257; 
- Michel Bergès, Vichy contre Mounier. Les non-conformistes face 
aux années 40, Paris, Economica, 1997, see pp. 32-186 ;  
608 
 
- Michel, Henri, and Mirkine-Guetzévich, Boris (eds.), Les idées 
politiques et socials de la Résistance (documents clandestins, 1940-
1944), Paris, PUF, 1954 ; 
- Michèle Bordeaux, « Le soutien économique aux familles :entre 
seduction et contrainte », in Philippe-Jean Hesse, Jean-Pierre 
LeCrom, La protection sociale sous le régime de Vichy, Rennes, 
Presse Universitaire de Rennes, 2001, pp. 85-120 ; 
- Middlemas, Keith, Politics in Industrial Society: the Experience of 
the British System since 1911, London, A. Deutsch, 1979; 
- Mignemi, Adolfo, «La macchina della propaganda e la guerra 
fascista», in 1940-43. L ’Italia in guerra. Immagini e terni della 
propaganda fascista, Brescia, Fondazione Luigi Micheletti, 1989, 
pp. 12-44; 
- Milward, Alan, «French Labour and the German Economy, 
1942-1945: An Essay on the Nature of the Fascist New Order», 
The Economic History Review, n.2/1970, pp. 336-351; 
- Milward, Alan, The Economic Effects of the Two World Wars on 
Britain, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 1970;  
- Milward, Alan, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London 
and New York, Routledge, 2000; 
- Milward, Alan, The German Economy at War, London, Athlone 
Press, 1965;  
- Milward, Alan, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, 
London, Methuen&co., 1984; 
- Milward, Alan, War, Economy, and Society, London, Allen Lane, 
1977;  
- Minniti, Fortunato, «L’industria degli armamenti al 1940 a 
1943: i mercati, le produzioni», in V. Zamagni (ed.), Come 
perdere la guerra e vincere la pace, pp. 55-148; 
- Minniti, Fortunato, «Piano e ordinamento nella preparazione 
italiana alla guerra negli anni Trenta», Dimensioni e problemi 
della ricerca storica, n.1/1990, pp. 1-41;  
- Mioche, Philippe, «Aux Origines du Plan Monnet», Revue 
Historique, n.2/1981, pp. 405-438; Gérard Bossuat, La France, 
l’aide americaine et la construction européenne : 1944-54. Vol. I, 
609 
 
Paris, Institut de la gestion publique et du développement 
économique. Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière 
de la France, 1997;  
- Mioche, Philippe, «Le démarrage du Plan Monnet : comment 
une entreprise conjoncturelle est devenue une institutions 
prestigeuse», Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, n.3/1984, 
pp. 398-416; 
- Monticone, Alberto (ed.), La storia dei poveri. Pauperismo e 
assistenza nell’età moderna, Roma, Studium, 1985;  
- Montroni, Giovanni, «Lo stato sociale in Gran Bretagna tra le 
due guerre», Studi Storici, n.2/2003, pp. 373-397; 
- Moret Lespinet, «Vers un “corporatisme” républicain? Les 
réformateurs de l’Office du Travail», in Steven Kaplan, 
Philippe Minard (eds.), La France, malade du corporatisme ? 
XVIIIème-XXème siècles,  pp. 355-367;   
- Moretti, Paolo, I due socialismi. La scissione di Palazzo Barberini e 
la nascita della socialdemocrazia, Milano, Mursia, 1975;  
- Morris, Jonathan, «Fascism and the Origins of the Social 
Protection of Shopkeepers in Italy», Contemporaray European 
History, n.3/1996, pp. 285-318; 
- Moses, John A., «German Social Policy (Sozialpolitik) in the 
Weimar Republic 1919-1933», Labour History, n. 42/1982, pp. 83-
93. 
- Murialdi, Paolo La stampa italiana del regime fascista, Roma-Bari, 
Laterza, 2008; 
- Musliedak, Didier (ed.), Les experiences corporatives dans l’aire 
latine, Berne, Peter Lang, 2010;   
- Neal, Larry, «Alan S. Milward and the European Economies at 
War», in Fernando Guirao, Frances Lynch, Sigfrido Ramírez 
Pérez (eds.), Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change, 
London-New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 157-167;  
- Neiberg, Michael S., «Towards a Transnational History of 
World War I», Canadian Military History, n.3/2008, pp. 31-37; 
- Nieri, Rolando, Costituzione e problemi sociali. Il pensiero politico 
di Sidney Sonnino, Pisa, ETS; 2000;  
610 
 
- Nord, Philip «The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914», French 
Historical Studies, n.3/1994; 
- Nord, Philip, France’s New Deal. From the Thirties to the Postwar 
Era, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 18-67. 
- North, Douglass, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990; 
- O’Connor, James, The Corporation and the State: Essays in the 
Theory of Capitalism and Imperialism, New York, 
Harper&Collins, 1974;  
- O’Connor, James, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, New Jersey, 
Transaction Publishers, 2001; 
- Olsen, Gregg, and O’Connor, Julia, «Understanding the 
Welfare State: Power Resources Theory and Its Critics», Id. 
(eds.), Power Resources Theory and the Welfare State: A Critical 
Approach, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 19988, pp. 3-33; 
- Overy, Richard J., The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932-1938, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996;  
- Overy, Richard, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1994;  
- Ozella, Claudio, Socialfascismo: dal programma di San Sepolcro alla 
socializzazione delle imprese, Torino, Noctua, 1999; 
- P. Summerfield, «Dunkirk and the Popular Memory of Britain 
at War, 1940–58», Journal of Contemporary History, n.4/2010, 
pp.788-811;  
- Paci, Massimo, «Long Waves in the Development of Welfare 
Systems», in Charles Mayer (ed.), Changing Boundaries of the 
Political. Essays on the Evolving Balance between the State and 
Society, Public and Private in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987, pp. 179-200;  
- Palier, Bruno, and Chevalier, Tom, «Welfare State Reforms», in 
Edward J. Mullen, Oxford Bibliographies in Social Work, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2013; 
- Palier, Bruno, Gouverner la sécurité sociale, Paris, PUF, 2015 ; 
- Palla, Marco, Fascismo e stato corporativo. Un’inchiesta della 
diplomazia britannica, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992; 
611 
 
- Paolucci, Vittorio (ed.), I quotidiani délia Repubblica Sociale Italiana 
(9 settembre 1943-25 aprile 1945), Urbino, Argalia Editore, 1989; 
- Parisi, Daniela, «Riformismo economico anglosassone. La 
presenza di Beveridge nella cultura economica italiana (1943-
1950)», in Piero Roggi (ed.), L’attesa della povera gente. Giorgio La 
Pira e la cultura economica anglosassone, Firenze-Milano, Giunti 
Editore, 2005; 
- Parlato, Giuseppe, Il convegno di studi italo-francesi (1935) con il 
testo integrale degli atti, Roma, Fondazione Ugo Spirito, 1990; 
- Parlato, Giuseppe, La sinistra fascista. Storia di un progetto 
mancato, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000; 
- Parsons, Talcott, The System of Modern Societies., Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1971; 
- Patel, Kiran Klaus, «Welfare in the Warfare State: Nazi Social 
Policy on the International Stage», German Historical Institute 
London Bulletin, n.2/2015, pp. 3-38;  
- Patel, Kiran Klaus, «Welfare State», in Akira Iriye, Pierre-Yves 
Saunier (eds.), The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, 
London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, pp. 1099-1102; 
- Patel, Kiran Klaus, and Reichardt, Sven, «The Dark Side of 
Transnationalism: Social Engineering and Nazism, 1930s-
1940s’», Journal of Contemporary History, 1/2016, pp. 3-21; 
- Patel, Kiran Klaus, The New Deal: A Global History, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2016; 
- Patel, Kiran Klaus, The New Deal: A Global History, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2016; 
- Pavone, Claudio, Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità 
della Resistenza, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1991; 
- Peden, George C., «New revisionists and the Keynesian era in 
British economic policy: a comment», Economic History Review, 
n.1/2003, pp. 118-124;  
- Peden, George C., «The “Treasury View” on Public Works and 
Employment in the Interwar Period», The Economic History 
Review, n.2/1984, pp. 167-181. 
612 
 
- Peden, George C., British Rearmament and the Treasury: 1932-
1939, Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1979; 
- Peden, George C., Keynes and His Critics. Treasury Responses to 
the Keynesian Revolution 1925-1946, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2004; 
- Pelling, Henry, «The 1945 General Election Reconsidered», The 
Historical Journal, no.2/1980, pp. 399-414; 
- Perfetti, Francesco, Il sindacalismo fascista. Dalle origini alla vigilia 
dello Stato corporativo (1919-1930). Vol I, Rome, Bonacci Editore, 
1988; 
- Peschanski, Denis, «Encadrer ou contrôler ?» in Denis 
Peschanski, Laurent Gervereau, La propagande sous Vichy, Paris, 
BDIC, 1990, pp. 10-32 ; 
- Petri, Rolf, «Innovazioni tecnologiche tra uso bellico e mercato 
civile», in V. Zamagni (ed.), Come perdere la guerra e vincere la 
pace, pp.  245-307; 
- Petri, Rolf, Storia economica d’Italia. Dalla Grande Guerra al 
miracolo economico, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002; 
- Petri, Rolf, Von der Autarkie zum Wirtschaftswunder. 
Wirstchaftspolitik un industrieller Wandel in Italien 1935-1963, 
Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, 2001 
- Petrungaro, Stefano, «The Fluid Boundaries of ´Work´. Some 
Considerations about Concepts, Approaches, and South-
Eastern Europe», Südost-Forschungen, 72/2013, pp. 271-286; 
- Piccialuti Caprioli, Maura,  Radio Londra 1940- 1945. Inventario 
delle trasmissioni per l’Italia, Voll. 1 e II, Roma, Pubblicazioni 
degli Archivi Centrali di Stato, 1980, pp. VII-CXXXIII. 
- Piccialuti Caprioli, Maura, Radio Londra 1940- 1945. Inventario 
delle trasmissioni per l’Italia, Voll. 1 e II, Roma, Pubblicazioni 
degli Archivi Centrali di Stato, 1980; 
- Pierson, Paul, «Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare 
State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies», in Id. (edited 
by), The New Politics of the Welfare State, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, pp. 410-456; 
613 
 
- Pierson, Paul, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher 
and the Politics of Retrenchment, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994;  
- Pimlott, Ben, Kavanagh, Dennis, and Morris, Peter «Is the 
postwar “consensus” a myth?», Contemporary Records, n.6/1989, 
pp. 12-15;  
- Pineau, Christian, La simple vérité, Paris, Phalanx, 1983 ; 
- Pinto, Carmine, Il riformismo possibile. La grande stagione delle 
riforme: utopie, speranze, realtà (1945-1964), Soveria Mannelli, Il 
Rubettino, 2008; 
- Piven, Frances, and Cloward, Richard, Regulating the Poor: the 
Functions of Public Welfare, New York, Vintage Editions, 1993; 
- Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation. The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston, Beacon, 2001; 
- Ponting, Clive, 1940: Myth and Reality, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 
1990; 
- Porter, Bruce, War and the Rise of the Nation-State. The Military 
Foundations of Modern Politics, New York, Simon&Schuster, 
1994;  
- Pratt, Jonathan, «Citizenship, Social Solidarity and Social 
Policy», in Michael Lavalette, Alan Pratt, Social Policy. Theories, 
Concepts and Issues, London, Sage Publications, 2006 ; 
-  Procacci, Giovanna, «Il fronte interno. Organizzazione del 
consenso e controllo sociale», in Daniele Menozzi, Giovanna 
Procacci, Simonetta Soldani (eds.), Un Paese in guerra. La 
mobilitazione civile in Italia (1914-1918), Firenze, Edizioni 
Unicopli, 2010, pp. 15-24; 
- Procacci, Giovanna, «Le politiche di intervento sociale in Italia 
tra fine Ottocento e Prima Guerra Mondiale. Alcune 
osservazioni comparative», Economia e Lavoro, n. 1/2008, pp. 17-
43;. 
- Procacci, Giovanna, «Popular Protest and Labour Conflict in 
Italy, 1915-1918», Social History, n.1/1989, pp. 31-58; 
- Procacci, Giovanna, Gouverner la misère. La question sociale en 
France 1789-1848, Paris, Seuil, 1993 ; 
614 
 
- Procacci, Giovanna, Warfare-Welfare. Intervento dello Stato e 
diritti dei cittadini, Roma, Carocci, 2013; 
- Pryor, Frederic, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist 
Nations, Homewood, Irvin, 1968; 
- Quartermaine, Luisa, Mussolini’s Last Republic, Exeter, Elm 
Bank Publications, 2000; 
- Radtke-Delacor, Arne, «La position des comités d’organisation 
face aux autorités d’occupation : la pomme de discorde des 
commandes allemandes en 1940-1941», Joly Hervé (ed.), Les 
comités d’organisation et l’économie dirigée de Vichy. Acte du 
colloque internationale, 3-4 avril 2001, pp.63-71 ; 
- Raphael, Lutz, «Europäische Sozialstaaten in der Boomphase 
(1948-1973)», in Hartmut Kaeble, Günther Schmid (eds.), Das 
europäische Sozialmodell: auf dem Weg zum transnationalen 
Sozialstaat, Berlin, Sigma, 2004, pp. 51-73 ; 
- Rapini, Andrea, «Il discorso politico di Luigi Rava: lavoro, 
democrazia, riforma sociale», in Paolo Mattera (ed.), Momenti 
del “welfare” in Italia. Storiografia e percorsi di ricerca, Roma, 
Viella, 2012, 19-53;. 
- Rapini, Andrea, «Attori, spazi e saperi della riforma sociale 
durante la Grande guerra», Passato e Presente, n.99/2016, pp. 59-
86; 
- Rapini, Andrea, Lo Stato sociale, Bologna, Archetipolibri, 2010;  
- Reisman, David, Richard Titmuss: Welfare and Society, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001;  
- Renard, Didier «Assistance et assurance dans la constitution du 
système de protection sociale française», Genèses, n.1/1995, pp. 
30-46 ; 
- Rieder, Maximiliane «I rapporti economici italo-tedeschi tra 
alleanza, occupazione e ricostruzione», in Vera Zamagni (ed.), 
Come perdere la guerra e vincere la pace, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, 
pp. 309-345; 
- Rimbotti, Luca Leonelli, Il fascismo di sinistra: da Piazza San 
Sepolcro al congresso di Verona, Roma, Settimo Sigillo, 1989; 
615 
 
- Rimlinger, Gaston V., Welfare Policy and Industrialization in 
Europe, America, and Russia, New York, Wiley, 1971;  
- Rimlinger, Gustav V. «Social Policy Under German Fascism», 
in Martin Rein, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Lee Rainwater (eds.), 
Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy: the Rise and Fall of Social 
Policy Regimes, New York, Armonk, 1987;  
- Rimlinger, Gustav, «Social Security and Social Change in 
Germany», The Journal of Human Resources, no.4/1968, pp. 409-
421; 
- Ritschel, Daniel, The Politics of Planning. The Debate On Economic 
Planning in Britain in the 1930s, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1997; 
- Ritter, Gerhard, Der Sozialstaat. Entstehung und Entwicklung im 
internationalen Vergleich, München, GmbH, 1991; 
- Roberts, Andrew, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 
1900, HarperCollins, New York, 2006; 
- Rodgers, Daniel T., Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a 
Progressive Age, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2000; 
- Roggi, Piero «La Pira e la storiografia», in Id. (ed.), L ’attesa della 
povera gente. Giorgio La Pira e la cultura economica anglosassone, 
Milano-Firenze, Giunti, 2005, pp. 3-23; 
- Rosanvallon, L’état en France de 1789 à nos jours, Paris, Seuil, 
1990 ; 
- Rosanvallon, Pierre, L’État en France. De 1789 à nos jours, Paris, 
Seuil, 1991 ; 
- Rose, Sonya, Which People’s War? National Identity and 
Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939-1945, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003; 
- Rosental, Paul-André, «Politique familiale et natalité en France 
: un siècle de mutations d’une question sociétale», Santé, Société, 
et Solidarité, n. 2/2010, pp. 17-25 ; 
- Rousso, Henry, « Les paradoxes de Vichy et de l’Occupation. 
Contraintes, archaïsmes et modernités », in Patrick Fridenson 
and André Straus (eds.), Le capitalisme français 19ème et 20ème 
616 
 
siècles. Blocages et dynamismes d’une croissance, Paris, Fayard, 
1987, pp. 67-82 ; 
- Rousso, Henry, «Le plan et les administrations économiques 
jusqu’en 1965 : l’expérience des hommes», in Id. (ed.), De 
Monnet à Massé. Enjeux politiques et objectifs économiques dans le 
cadre des quatre premiers Plans (1946-1965), Paris, Editions du 
CNRS, 1986, pp. 15-40; 
- Rousso, Henry, «Vichy, le grand fossé», Vingtième Siècle, 
n.5/1985, pp. 55-79. 
- Rousso, Henry, Vichy. L’événement, la mémoire, l’histoire, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1992 ; 
- Salvati, Mariuccia «Lo stato sociale in Italia: caratteri originali e 
motivi di una crisi», Passato e Presente, n.32/1994; 
- Salvati, Mariuccia, «The Long History of Corporatism in Italy: 
A Question of Culture or Economics?», Contemporary European 
History, n. 2/2006, pp. 223-244; 
- Santomassimo, Gianpasquale, La terza via fascista. Il mito del 
corporativismo, Roma, Carocci, 2006, pp. 181-190. 
- Sayers, Richard Sidney, «1941-The First Keynesian Budget», in 
Charles Feinstein (ed.), The Managed Economy: Essays in British 
Economic Policy and Performance since 1929, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1983; 
- Sayers, Richard Sidney, Financial Policy 1939-45, London, 
HMSO and Longmans, Green & Co., 1956; 
- Schivelbusch, Wolfgang, Three New Deals: Reflections on 
Roosevelt’s America, Mussolini’s Italy, and Hitler’s Germany, 1933-
1939, New York, Picador, 2007; 
- Schmitter, Philippe, «Still the Century of Corporatism?», The 
Review of Politics, n.1/1974, pp. 85-131; 
- Schmitter, Philippe, «Still the Century?», The Review of Politics, 
n.1/1974, pp. 85-131; 
- Schoenbaum, David, Hitler’s Social Revolution, New York, 
Doubledays, 1966; 
617 
 
- Schötter, Peter, Du Rhin à la Manche. Frontières et relations franco-
allemande au XXe siècle, Tours, Presse Universitaire François-
Rabelais de Tour, 2017;  
- Schulz-Forberg, Hagen, «Laying the Groundwork: 
Transnational Networks and the Semantics of Neoliberalism in 
the 1930s», in Hagen Schulz-Forberg, Niklas Olsen (eds.), Re-
Inventing Western Civilisation : Transnational Reconstructions of 
Liberalism in Europe in the Twentieth Century, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, pp. 13-39; 
- Serra, Maurizio, Una cultura dell’autorità. La Francia di Vichy, 
Roma-Bari, Laterza Editori, 1980; 
- Shay Jr., Robert Paul British Rearmament in the Thirties. Politics 
and Profit, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977; 
- Silei, Gianni, «Una occasione mancata? La questione della 
riforma dello Stato sociale in Italia nel secondo dopoguerra», 
Storia e Futuro, n. 4/2004; 
- Silei, Gianni, Lo Stato Sociale in Italia. Storia e Documenti. Vol. II. 
Dalla caduta del fascismo ad oggi (1943-2004), Roma-Manduria-
Bari, Piero Lacaita Editore, 2004; 
- Simone,  Giulia, Il Guardasigilli del regime. L’itinerario politico e 
culturale di Alfredo Rocco, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2012; 
- Sinclair, Peter R., «Fascism and Crisis in Capitalist Society», 
New German Critique, n. 9/ 1976, pp. 87-112; 
- Skidelski, Robert, John Maynard Keynes. Vol. 3. Fighting for 
Freedom, 1937-1946, New York, Penguin, 2002; 
- Skocpol, Theda, and Amenta, Edwin «States and Social 
Policies», Annual Review of Sociology, n.12/1986, pp. 131-157.  
- Skocpol, Theda, and Weir, Margareth, «State Structures and the 
Possibilities for “Keynesian” Responses to the Great 
Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States», in Peter 
B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bring the 
State Back In, pp. 107-163; 
- Skocpol, Theda, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. The Political 
Origins of Social Policy in the United States, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1992; 
618 
 
- Slack, Paul, The English Poor Law, 1531-1782, London, 
MacMillan, 1990;  
- Smith, Harold (ed), War and Social Change. British Society in the 
Second World War, 1986; 
- Soucy, Robert Le fascisme français, 1924-1933, Paris, Presse 
Universitaire de France, 1989, pp. 179-242; 
- Soucy, Robert, Fascismes français ? 1933-1939. Mouvements 
antidémocratiques, Paris, Editions Autrement, 2004, pp. 303-358 ; 
- Spencer, Stephen, «William Temple and the Welfare State: A 
Study of Christian Social Prophecy», Political Theologyn. 3/2001, 
pp. 92-101; 
- Steber, Martina, and Gotto, Bernhard (eds.), Visions of 
Community in Nazi Germany. Social Engineering and Private Lives, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014;  
- Sterhell, Zeev, Ni droite ni gauche. L’idéologie fasciste en France, 
Paris, Gallimard, 2012 ; 
- Stevenson, John, And Cook, Chris, The Slump. Society and 
Politics during the Depression, London, Cape, 1977; 
- Stone, Judith, The Search for Social Peace, New York, State 
University of New York Press, 1985; 
- Strauss, David, «The Roosevelt Revolution: French Observers 
and the New Deal», American Studies, n.2/1973, pp. 25-42. 
- Struthers, James, No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the 
Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941, Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1983; 
- Süssmilch, Andreas, Modernisation and Rationalisation in 
National Socialist Germany, 1933-1945. We Must Create the New 
Man!, Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2012;  
- Sylos Labini, Paolo, Saggio sulle classi sociali, Bari, Laterza, 1974; 
- T.D. Westermann, «Touring occupied Belgium: American 
humanitarians at ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ (1914-1917)», First World 
War Studies, 1/2014, pp. 43-53;  
- Taylor, Warwick, The Forgotten Conscript: a History of the Bevin 
Boy, Bishop Auckland, Pentland Press, 1995; 
619 
 
- Taylor-Gooby, Peter, Leruth, Benjamin, and Chung, Heejung, 
After Austerity: Welfare State Transformation in Europe after the 
Great Recession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017;  
- Temple, William, Christianity and Social Order, London, 
Penguin, 1976. 
- Temple, William, Citizen and Churchman, London, Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1941, p.36; 
- Thane, Pat, «The Working Class and State “Welfare” in Britain, 
1880-1914», The Historical Journal, n.4/1984, pp. 877-900;  
- Thane, Pat, The Foundations of the Welfare State, London, 
Longsman, 1996; 
- The Atlantic Charter, London, National Peace Council, 1942; 
- Thebaud, Françoise, «Le mouvement nataliste dans la France 
de l’entre-deux-guerres: l’Alliance nationale pour 
l’accroissement de la population française», Revue d’histoire 
moderne et contemporaine, no.2/1985, pp. 276-346; 
- Therborn, Göran, «Karl Marx returning. The Welfare State and 
Neo-Marxist, Corporatist, and Statist Theories», International 
Political Science Review, n. 2/1986. The State and the Public 
Sphere, pp. 131-164; 
- Thomas, Mark, «Rearmament and Economic Recovery in the 
Late 1930s», The Economic History Review, n.4/1983, pp. 552-579;  
- Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-
1992, London, Blackwell, 1990; 
- Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare 
State, London, HarperCollins, 1995; 
- Titmuss, Richard, «War and Social Policy», in Id., Essays on the 
Welfare State, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958, pp. 
75-86.  
- Titmuss, Richard, Social Policy: an Introduction, London, Allen & 
Unwin, 1974; 
- Tomlinson, Jim, «Mr. Attlee’s Supply-Side Socialism», The 
Economic History Review, n.1/1993; 
620 
 
- Tomlinson, Jim, «Why was there never a “Keynesian 
Revolution” in Economic Policy?», Economy and Society, 
n.10/1981, pp. 72-87;  
- Tomlinson, Jim, Employment Policy: The Crucial Years, 1939-1955, 
Oxford, Clarendon, 1987; 
- Tooze, Adam, «No Room for Miracles. German Industrial 
Output in World War II Reassessed», Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft, n.3/2005, pp. 439-464; 
- Tooze, Adam, «No Room for Miracles. German Industrial 
Outputs in World War II Reassessed», Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft, n.3/2005, pp. 439-464 
- Tooze, Adam, and Martin, Jamie, «The Economics of the War 
with Nazi Germany», in Adam Tooze, Michael Geyer (eds.), 
The Cambridge History of the Second World War. Vol. III. Total 
War: Economy, Society, and Culture, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, pp. 27-55;  
- Toye, «Keynes, the Labour Movement, and “How to Pay for 
the War”», Twentieth Century British History, n.10/1999, pp. 255-
281; 
- Toye, Richard, «From “Consensus” to “Common Ground”: the 
Rhetoric of the Postwar Settlement and its Collapse», Journal of 
Contemporary History, n.1/2013, pp. 3-23; 
- Toynbee, Arnold J., War and Civilization, London-New York-
Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1951; 
- Van der Wee, Herman, Prosperity and Upheaval: The World 
Economy, 1945-1980, Berkley, University of California Press, 
1987; 
- van Kersbergen, Kees, Vis, Barbara, and Hemerijck, Anton, 
«The Great Recession and Welfare State Reform: Is 
Retrenchment Really the Only Game Left in Town?», Social 
Policy & Administration, n.48/2014, pp. 883-904;  
- van Oorschot, Wim, «The Dutch Welfare State. From collective 
solidarity towards individual responsibility», CCWS Working 
paper, 41/2006; 
621 
 
- Vaudagna, Maurizio, (ed.), Il New Deal, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
1981;  
- Vaudagna, Maurizio, «Social Protection and the Promise of a 
Secure Future in Wartime Europe and America», in Id. The New 
Deal and the American Welfare State. Essays from a Transatlantic 
Perspective (1933-1945), New York, Otto Editions, 2014, pp. 275-
294; 
- Vaudagna, Maurizio, «Social Protection and the Promise of a 
Secure Future in Wartime Europe and America», in Id., The 
New Deal and the American Welfare State. Essays from a 
Transatlantic Perspective (1933-1945), pp. 275-293; 
- Vaudagna, Maurizio, «Social Protection and the Promise of a 
Secure Future in Wartime Europe and America», in Id., The 
New Deal and the American Welfare State. Essays from a 
Transatlantic Perspective (1933-1945), pp. 275-293; 
- Vaudagna, Maurizio, «The United States and Social Rights at 
Home and Abroad: the Rise and Decline of “Freedom from 
Want” (1941-1952), in Id., The New Deal and the American Welfare 
State. Essays from a Transatlantic Perspective (1933-1945), pp. 247-
274; 
- Vaudagna, Maurizio, «The United States and Social Rights at 
Home and Abroad: the Rise and Decline of “Freedom from 
Want” (1941-1952), in Id., The New Deal and the American Welfare 
State. Essays from a Transatlantic Perspective (1933-1945), pp. 247-
274; 
- Veillon, Dominique, Vivre et survivre en France (1939-1947), 
Paris, Aubier, 1980;  
- Vidalenc, Jean, L’Exode, Paris, PUF, 1957;  
- Vigreux, Jean, Histoire du Front Populaire, Paris, Tallandier, 
2016 ; 
- Weber, Eugen, La France des années 30. Tourments et perplexités, 
Paris, Fayard, 1995. 
- Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, «“Absoluter” und “totaler” Krieg: 
Clausewitz von Ludendorff», Politische Vierteljahresschrift, n.2-
3/1969, pp. 220-248 
622 
 
- Weiler, Peter, The New Liberalism: Liberal Social Theory in Great 
Britain 1889-1914, New York, Garland Publishing Inc., 1982 
- Whiting, Richard The Labour Party and Taxation, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000; 
- Whitman, James, «Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New 
Deal», The American Journal of Comparative Law, n.4/1991, pp. 
747-778; 
- Wiener, Joel, (ed.), Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of 
Empire 1689-1971: A Documentary History, Vol. 2, New York, 
Chelsea House/McGraw-Hill, 1972; 
- Wigham, Eric, Strikes and the Government 1893-1974, London, 
MacMillan, 1976;  
- Wilensky, Harold, and Lebeaux, Charles, Industrial Society and 
Social Welfare, New York, Russell Sage, 1958 
- Wincott, Daniel, «Original and imitated or elusive and limited? 
Towards a genealogy of the welfare state idea in Britain», in 
Klaus Petersen, Daniel Béland (eds.), Analysing Social Policy 
Concepts and Language. Comparative and Transnational 
Perspectives, pp. 127-142; 
- Wincott, Daniel, «Original and imitated or elusive and limited? 
Towards a genealogy of the welfare state idea in Britain», in 
Daniel Béland, Klaus Petersen, Analysing Social Policy Concepts 
and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives, Bristol, 
Policy Press, 2014, pp. 127-142; 
- Winkler, Heinrich A., La Repubblica di Weimar, Roma, Donzelli 
1998; 
- Yagil, Limore, Jean Bichelonne, 1904-1944. Un polytechnicien sous 
Vichy. Entre memoire et histoire, Paris, SPM, 2015 
- Yamanouchi, Yasushi, «Total War and Social Integration: A 
Methodological Introduction», Yasushi Yamanouchi, J.Victor 
Koschmann, Ryūichi Narita (eds.), Total War and 
“Modernization”, New York, Cornell University East Asia 
Program, 1998, pp. 1-39; 
- Yelling, J.A., Slums and Redevelopment. Policy and Practice in 
Britain, 1918-1945, London, UCL Press, 1992; 
623 
 
- Zamagni, Vera, «Economic History and the Political Economic 
Approach», in Fernando Guirao, Frances Lynch, Sigfrido 
Ramírez Pérez (eds.), Alan S. Milward and a Century of European 
Change, London-New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 189-205; 
- Zamagni, Vera, «Italy: How to Lose the War and Win the 
Peace», in Mark Harrison (ed.), The Economies of World War II: 
Six Great Powers in International Comparison, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 177-223; 
- Zamagni, Vera, Dalla periferia al centro. La seconda rinascita 
economica dell’Italia (1861-1990), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1990; 
- Zamagni, Vera, Dalla periferia al centro. La seconda rinascita 
economica dell’Italia (1861-1990), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1990; 
- Zamagni, Vera, The Economic History of Italy, 1860-1990. 
Recovery after Decline, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997; 
- Simon, Dominique, «Les assurances sociales et les mutualistes 
(1920-1932)», Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 
n.4/1987, pp. 587-614; 
- Smith, Timothy, «Renegotiating the social contract: Western 
Europe, Great Britain and North America», in Michael Geyer, 
Adam Tooze (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Second World 
War. Vol. 3. Total War: Economy, Society and Culture, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 552-574; 
- Bertini, Fabio «Il fascismo dalle assicurazioni per i lavoratori 
allo stato sociale», in Marco Palla (ed.), Lo Stato fascista, Firenze, 
La Nuova Italia, 2001, pp. 177-314; 
- Cordova, Ferdinando, Verso lo Stato totalitario. Sindacati, società e 
fascismo, Soveria Mannelli, Il Rubbettino, 2005; 
- Nottingham, Chris and De Rooy, Piet, «The Peculiarities of the 
Dutch: Social Security in the Netherlands», in Steven King, 
John Stewart (eds.), Welfare Peripheries. The Development of 
Welfare States in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe, pp. 39-
66;  
- Petersen, Jørn Henrik and Petersen, Klaus, «Shake, Rattle and 
Roll! From Charity to Social Rights in the Danish Welfare State 
1890-1933», in Steven King, John Stewart (eds.), Welfare 
624 
 
Peripheries. The Development of Welfare States in Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century Europe, pp. 149-179;  
- Markkola, Pirjo, «Changing Patterns of Welfare: Finland in the 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries», in Steven King, 
John Stewart (eds.), Welfare Peripheries. The Development of 
Welfare States in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe, Bern, 
Peter Lang, 2007, pp. 207-230;  
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, «The Making of Social Democratic 
Welfare State», in Klaus Misged, Karl Molin, Klas Åmark 
(eds.), Creating Social Democracy. A Century of the Social 
Democratic Labour Party in Sweden, University Park, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992, pp. 35-66; 
- Searle, Geoffrey, «“National Efficiency” and the “Lesson” of 
the War», in David Omissi, Andrew Thompson (eds.), The 
Impact of the South African War, London, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 194-
211.  
- Spektorowksi, Alberto and Mizrachi, Elisabeth, «Eugenics and 
the Welfare State in Sweden: The Politics of Social Margins and 
the Idea of a Productive Society», Journal of Contemporary 
History, n.3/2004, pp. 333-352; 
- Kettunen, Pauli and Petersen, Klaus, «Introduction: rethinking 
welfare state models», in Id. (eds.), Beyond Welfare State Models. 
Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, pp. 1-15;  
- Conrad, Cristoph, «Social policy history after the transnational 
turn», in Pauli Kettunen, Klaus Petersen (eds.), Beyond Welfare 
State Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011, pp. 218-240; 
- Conrad, Christoph, «Wohlfahrtsstaaten im Vergleich: 
Historische und sozialwissenschaftliche Ansätze», in Heinz-
Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (eds), Geschichte und 
Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender 
Geschichtsschreibung, Frankfurt -New York, Camous Verlag, 
1996, pp. 155–180;  
- Inglot, Tomasz, Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919-2004, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008; 
625 
 
- Liebscher, Daniela, Freude und Arbeit. Zur internationalen 
Freizeit- und Sozialpolitik des faschistischen Italien und des NS-
regimes, Köln, SH-Verlag, 2009;  
- Schröder, Steffen, Sozialpolitik im “Dritten Reich”. Eine 
Bewertung der sozialen Entwicklung in Deutschland ab 1933 im 
Kontext der wirstchaftlichen Situation, Friedrich Schiller-
Universität Jena, Studienarbeit, 2007; 
- Cavarocchi, Francesca, Avanguardie dello spirito. Il fascismo e la 
propaganda culturale all’estero, Roma, Carocci, 2010;  
- Pasetti, Matteo, «Un’operazione di “marketing”: la propaganda 
all’estero del corporativismo fascista», in Alberto Pen-
Rodriguéz, Heloísa Paulo, A cultura do poder. A propaganda nos 
estados autoritários, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade de 
Coimbra, 2016, pp. 215-238; 
- Pasetti, Matteo, «Neither Bluff nor Revolution. The 
Corporations and the Consolidation of the Fascist Regime», in 
Giulia Albanese, Roberta Pergher (eds.), In the Society of the 
Fascists: Acclamation, Acquiescence and Agency in Mussolini’s 
Italy, New York, Palgrave Mac Millan, 2012, pp. 87-107; 
- Petri, Rolf, «Dalla ricostruzione al miracolo economico», in 
Giovanni Sabbatucci, Vittorio Vidotto (eds.), Storia d’Italia. Vol. 
5. La Repubblica, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1997, pp. 313-349; 
- Bartocci, Enzo, Le politiche sociali nell’Italia liberale (1861-1919), 
Roma, Donzelli, 1999; 
- Adorni, Daniela, L’Italia crispina: riforme e repressione. 1887-1896, 
Milano, Sansoni, 2002. 
- Hay, James Roy, The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms 1906-
1914, London, MacMillan, 1977; 
- Young-Sun, Hong, Welfare, Modernity, and the Weimar State, 
1919-1933, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998; 
- Parker, Robert A.C., «British Rearmament 1936-9: Treasury, 
Trade Unions and Skilled Labour», The English Historical 
Review, n. 379/1981, pp. 306-343; 
- «Letter of Marshal Pétain to Maurice Bouvier-Ajam. 27 June, 
1941», in Service de Documentation. Cahiers du Travail, s.d ; 
626 
 
- Azéma, Jean-Pierre, «La Milice», Vingtième Siècle, n.1/1990, pp. 
83-106 ; 
- Intereconomics. Review of European Economic Policy, n.4/2012, 
special issue Forum: The Welfare State After the Great 
Recession.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
627 
 
List of abbreviations: 
 
- The National Archives of UK: TNA 
 
- London School of Economics Archives: LSEA 
 
- Archives Nationales: AN 
 
- Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présents: IHTP 
 
- Centre d’Histoire Sociale du XXème Siècle : CHS 
 
- Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale 
Contemporaine : BDIC 
 
- Archivio Centrale di Stato : ACS 
 
- Archivio Fondazione Micheletti : AFM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
628 
 
Vers un nouveau “pacte social” : La Deuxième Guerre Mondiale et les 
politiques sociales en Grande-Bretagne, Italie et dans l’État Français 
 
Introduction 
 
Dès le début de la guerre, les Alliés ainsi que les puissances de 
l’Axe et ses satellites étaient conscients que le conflit aurait élargi le 
périmètre des droits de citoyenneté et redéfini globalement le pacte 
social. La Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, sous ce point de vue, n’a pas 
seulement été un événement militaire, mais aussi un tournant en ce qui 
concerne les politiques sociales. 
Cette thèse aborde ce sujet à plusieurs niveaux. Les trois Pays 
objet de l’analyse sont la Grande Bretagne, l’Italie Fasciste – et 
notamment la période de la République Sociale Italien (RSI) – et l’État 
Français. Ces études de cas correspondent à trois modèles politiques 
différents : une démocratie libérale, le Royaume-Uni, une expérience 
fasciste extrême, la RSI, et une situation que l’on peut définir 
intermédiaire, telle que le régime vichyste. D’un point de vue 
diachronique, l’évolution des politiques sociales (assurances sociales, 
politiques de santé, allocations familiales) est un processus 
incrémental ; les plans de réforme de l’état-providence des années 1939-
1945 reposent dans les héritages politiques et administratives des 
cinquante années précédentes.  
 La thèse se compose de trois parties ; les deux premières parties 
sont des comparaisons « traditionnelles » parmi les politiques mises en 
place dans les trois Pays, alors que la troisième partie propose une 
approche transnationale. La première partie prend en compte les 
politiques sociales des Pays considérés sur la moyenne durée du siècle, 
en soulignant les caractéristiques nationales de chaque système de 
prévoyance sociale, par rapport à des tendances plus ample qui ont 
concerné tous les Pays industriels. La deuxième partie se concentre sur 
la période d’exception représentée par la guerre ; le moment de rupture 
conjoncturelle politique et économique de la Deuxième Guerre 
Mondiale permet de comprendre la mesure du changement à niveau 
d’élaboration des politiques publiques, qui ne sont pas de toute 
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manière discernables de la tradition politique antérieure, 
précédemment analysée. La troisième partie, toujours liée à la 
dimension du changement mise en route par la guerre, est attentive aux 
exchanges et circulations de plans de réforme sociale anglo-saxonnes – 
la pierre de touche de cette étude supranationale – sur le Continent et à 
travers l’Atlantique. Le transfert des informations sur les nouvelles 
politiques sociales en cours de discussion en Grande-Bretagne a pris la 
forme de propagande de guerre et des débats politiques et 
intellectuelles. Il a concerné les régimes de l’Axe ainsi que les 
mouvements démocratiques et de la Résistance, générant une 
discussion qui est allée bien au-delà de la guerre, et qui a concerné la 
redéfinition du pacte politique et social dans les démocraties 
européennes d’après-guerre. 
 La perspective générale de la thèse, donc, combine deux 
perspective : le moyenne terme des politiques sociales en tant que 
« politiques d’état », et l’impact de la « guerre totale » dans la réforme 
globale des systèmes d’assurance sociale et de santé. L’utilisation de la 
catégorie historiographique de « guerre totale » doit être contextualisée. 
Si dans le cas britannique l’impact structurelle de l’effort de guerre est 
évident, et traverse tous les domaines d’intervention étatique, ainsi que 
le débat public, la « guerre totale » concerne aussi l’Italie fasciste, et – 
dans une certaine mesure – l’État Français. Ces deux Pays ont été 
plongés dans l’économie de « guerre totale » de l’Allemagne nazie ; 
l’opinion générale auprès de l’ordre établie italienne et française est 
d’être au milieu d’un moment charnière par rapport aux politiques 
précédentes en matière d’intervention sociale. Pour cela, la « guerre 
totale » reste une hypothèse interprétative valable, mais sa portée doit 
être considérée dans le différents contextes politiques dans lesquelles 
les trois Pays se trouvaient.  
 Les systèmes d’assurances sociales sont un phénomène 
complexe qui a impliqué différents acteurs politiques et sociaux dès ses 
origines. L’importance du tournant de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale 
repose aussi sur le fait que, après le 1945, la prévoyance sociale est 
incorporée d’une manière de plus en plus importante au cœur des 
tâches des états. La perspective qu’on a adopté dans cette thèse ne veut 
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pas sous-estimer l’importance des éléments mutualistes, politiques et 
syndicaux dans le déploiement des nouvelles politiques sociales 
d’après-guerre. Bien au contraire, comme l’on a essayé de montrer da 
ce travail, les différentes capacités des gouvernements dans ces trois 
Pays de négocier avec, voire s’imposer sur, les différents intérêts 
organisés a contribué à déterminer l’ampleur ou même le succès des 
projets de réforme. Et pourtant, l’importance qu’on a décidé de donner 
à l’acteur étatique – qu’on estime être justifié par l’évolution 
subséquente des états-providences – nous a amené à faire un tri des 
sources primaires et d’archive utilisées. Elles sont pour la plupart les 
archives des différents départements gouvernementaux impliqués dans 
la mise au point de nouvelles politiques sociales nationales ou dans 
leur promotion, ou encore la littérature grise de l’époque produite par 
les experts, les intellectuels, les fonctionnaires engagés dans ces 
réformes.  
 Le sujet des politiques sociales concerne d’une façon plus 
générale l’évolution globale des politiques publiques dans les Pays 
industriels. L’égard à la fois comparatif et transnational s’avère être le 
plus adapté, car il permet de saisir la complexité des processus 
simultanés et superposés à l’origine de l’état-providence d’après-
guerre. Au-delà d’un substrat de path dependence inscrit dans les 
traditions et processus administratifs et politiques liés à chaque Pays, 
différents critical junctures ont affecté le changement radical de 
paradigme des années 1942-5 : la crise des Années 30 et le chômage de 
masse dans la plupart des Pays capitalistes ; les propositions 
alternatives des régimes Fascistes et Nazis pour assurer le plein emploi 
et la paix sociale ; le bogey de l’Union Soviétique et des mouvements 
communistes européens ; les conditions extrêmement difficiles de la 
guerre. Après avoir traversé tous ces bouleversements, les Pays 
capitalistes en Europe occidentale ont été capables d’établir un 
nouveau modèle de développement. Il a été défini à la fois 
« capitalisme-providence », « économie mixte », « néo-corporatisme ». 
Aujourd’hui, l’état-providence est une composante permanente des 
systèmes capitalistes modernes, quoi qu’il en soit les orientations 
générales en matière économique. Une politique effective de 
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compression des dépenses ne semble pas être à l’ordre du jour, même 
si le projet politique néo- et ordo-libérale en demande la 
« restructuration ».  
 Le modèle actuel du capitalisme semble subir une crise 
structurelle qui, à bien des égards, est comparable à celle des années 30, 
car elle remet en question les politiques et les discours hégémoniques. 
Le parallélisme s’arrête là ; le changement de paradigme après 1945 a 
résulté de bouleversements et d’affrontements militaro-idéologiques 
qui ont contraint les classes dirigeantes occidentales à reformuler leurs 
politiques et à établir un lien entre la croissance économique, la 
redistribution des richesses et le bien-être social. De nos jours, alors que 
les politiques d’austérité persistent avec le soutien de la gauche et de la 
droite, le marché libre, les politiques de redistribution, la richesse 
économique et l’état-providence s’effondrent près que complètement. Il 
faut voir si le capitalisme occidental sera une nouvelle fois capable de 
se réformer, et si les démocraties occidentales d’affirmer un nouveau 
pacte social, juste comme ils l’ont fait entre la Deuxième Guerre 
Mondiale et les soi-disant « Trente Glorieuses » de l’après-guerre. 
 
Première partie. L’évolution générale de la politique sociale jusqu’à la 
Deuxième Guerre mondiale 
 
 La littérature scientifique convient que l’origine des modernes 
formes de protection sociale remonte aux assurances sociales 
obligatoires mises en œuvre par Bismarck en Allemagne, à partir des 
années ‘80 du 19ème siècle. Elles ont constitué le modèle dont se sont 
inspirées les autres législations continentales et – dans une certaine 
mesure – le Royaume-Uni.  
La première vague des lois sociales a été plutôt réalisée par les 
conservateurs ; elle s’est développée autour de mesures limitées, 
concernant tout d’abord les accidents du travail, et une législation 
résiduelle en matière de protection contre la maladie et la vieillesse. Du 
côté des législateurs de l’époque, ces réformes été inspirées tout 
d’abord au paternalisme conservateur et aux inquiétudes pour la 
préservation de la paix sociale face à la monté du mouvement ouvrier 
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organisé. Sur le continent ainsi qu’en Grande-Bretagne, les 
programmes d’assurance publiques croisaient le secteur privé et les 
fonds mutualistes, dont ils empruntaient la nature « corporatiste », 
c’est-à-dire, occupationnelle.  
Une deuxième, plus consistante, période réformatrice s’est 
concrétisée entre la fin du 19ème et le début du 20ème siècles. Les 
gouvernements libéraux et la progressive intégration socialistes et 
d’autres partis de masse dans les systèmes politiques ont permis une 
plus ample activité législative à l’égard de la protection sociale. 
L’ouverture aux instances du mouvement ouvrier allait aussi à 
l’encontre des exigences « structurelles » des sociétés industrielles de 
masse naissantes. Ceci était, par exemple, le cas des soi-disant Liberal 
Welfare Reforms en Grande-Bretagne (1906-1914), dont une des 
principales causes étaient les préoccupations à l’égard de l’efficience 
nationale face aux rivalité impériales et les taux croissants de chômage. 
Mais ceci était aussi le cas de réforme sociale de l’époque du Président 
Giolitti en Italie, qui accompagnaient la première vague 
d’industrialisation du Pays. 
Ce processus de progressive intégration et étatisation de la 
prévoyance sociale a connu une accélération au lendemain de la 
Première Guerre Mondiale et pendant l’entre-deux-guerres, un 
première moment charnière dans l’histoire des politiques sociales. D’un 
côté, la guerre a créé un nouveau vaste group d’assurés : les invalides, 
les vétérans, les familles des soldats morts au front. La guerre a 
comporté dans tous les Pays concernés un bouleversement matériel et 
social auquel les gouvernements ont dú faire face. De l’autre côté, les 
changements structurelles mises en places par l’économie de guerre ont 
introduits des nouveaux acteurs sociaux ainsi que des nouvelles formes 
d’interventionnisme d’état dans la vie économique. En conséquent, 
dans la plupart des Pays, les gouvernements, bien qu’en trahissant les 
promises faites pendant la guerre, ont retenu, voire étendu, les 
précédents schèmes des assurances sociales ; en Italie et en France, par 
exemple, des commissions gouvernementales ont été chargées de 
l’étude des possibles réformes du régime de protection sociale dans son 
ensemble. Ces enquêtes ont abouti aux réformes d’une certaine 
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importance : l’Italie devient l’un des rares Pays à établir une assurance 
obligatoire contre le chômage en 1919 ; en France, l’annexion des 
anciens territoires allemands de l’Alsace et de la Lorraine a contribué à 
déclencher une discussion qui a finalement a conduit à la première 
réforme globale des assurances sociales entre 1928 et 1930. Cette 
réforme a été la base sur laquelle se sont appuyées les subséquentes 
réformes de la l’état-providence.  
Après la crise du 1929, la scène politique ainsi économique 
mondiale change. Les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, l’Allemagne et – 
dans une moindre mesure – l’Italie et la France sont frappées par les 
répercussions de la Grande Dépression, notamment pour la chute de la 
production industrielle, les hautes taxes de chômage, la forte inflation. 
Ses effets ont été néfastes aussi à niveau politique. En Allemagne, les 
dispositions combinées de chômage et inflation ont donné le coup de 
grâce au fragile compromis de la République de Weimar, et – 
rétrospectivement – ont ouvert la voie au Nazis. Aux États-Unis, le New 
Deal du Président Roosevelt s’est traduit dans un programme de 
sauvetage de secteur bancaire, de travaux publics, de sécurité sociale et 
de rétablissement de la confiance de l’opinion publique par rapport au 
système capitaliste.  
Dans les trois Pays considérés, la crise économique et politique 
des années 30 a pesé différemment dans les politiques des trois Pays. 
En Italie, la Grande Crise a éclaté concomitamment au déploiement des 
politiques économiques et sociales du régime. Celles-ci se sont 
développées en continuité avec la dernière phase de l’Italie libérale, et 
peuvent être assimilées aux politiques de’ « économie mixte » mises en 
place dans la même période en différents Pays européens. Dans la ligne 
tracée par les dernières mesure d’époque libérale, la rationalisation et 
unification des systèmes d’assurances sociales a poursuivi à un rythme 
accéléré après le 1933, avec la création des instituts nationaux pour les 
assurances sociales (INFPS) et des accidents du travail (INFAIL), qui, 
en réalité, ont réorganisé les précédentes assurances obligatoires. Au 
contraire, la création des institut semi-public pour supporter le système 
du crédit italien et pour le crédit à long et moyenne terme (IRI et IMI) 
s’inscrivaient dans des politiques anticycliques pour faire face à la 
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Grande Dépression. A côté de ces mesures, le régime Fasciste formulait 
une doctrine inspirée au principes du « corporatisme », bientôt devenus 
un instrument de propagande à l’intérieur ainsi qu’à l’étranger.   
En France, les effets de la crise ont eu un impact plus faible par 
rapport au reste d’Europe, bien qui ils se soient prolongés plus 
longtemps. En effet, jusqu’à l’arrivée au pouvoir du cartel de gauche du 
Front Populaire, l’orthodoxie en matière économique et sociale ne 
semblait pas être remise en cause. Le gouvernement du Front Populaire 
(1936-1938) a correspondu à la période de plus grandes réformes en 
matière de politique industrielle et syndicale, ainsi que de protection 
sociale (allocations familiales, congés payés, aides aux chômeurs, 
projets concernant les allocations aux vieux travailleurs). L’effort 
d’extension de la protection sociale mené par le Front Populaire n’a pas 
changé sa nature, qui se bifurquait dans une structure mutualiste et 
occupationnelle des assurances sociales et une intervention plus 
marquée de l’état dans le secteur des politiques familiales. Ce qui a 
caractérisé la France des années 30 a plutôt été un climat de croissante 
délégitimassions des institutions républicaines face à la monté des 
mouvements s’inspirant au Fascisme ou à l’extrême droite. A côté de 
ces mouvements politiques, le débat intellectuel de ces années a été 
caractérisé par le ferment des groups nommés des « non-
conformistes » ; cet ensemble hétérogène des groups et personnalités 
partageait la méfiance vers les institutions discréditées de la IIIème 
République ainsi que vers le libre marché. Ce milieu « technocratique » 
a graduellement été capable d’assumer des rôles importants au sein des 
départements ministériels, au cheval de la IIIème République, le régime 
de Vichy, et la France de l’après-guerre. 
En Grande-Bretagne, le développement des politiques sociales 
était encouragé par la nécessité de faire face à la montée et persistance 
du chômage au cours de la décade 1929-39. Les responsables politiques 
et les intellectuels s’interrogeaient sur les conséquences des taux élevés 
de chômage sur les institutions anglaises, et surtout sur les remèdes à la 
persistante crise du capitalisme du laissez-faire. Et pourtant, les recettes 
pour sortir de la crise, à la fois des formes de planisme, socialisation, ou 
keynésianisme se limitaient à un vif débat politique, académique et 
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auprès de l’opinion publique. Les nouvelles théories ne pénétraient pas 
les départements économiques du gouvernement, qui préférait 
adresser la question du chômage cyclique à travers des dispositions 
temporaires et que souvent croisaient assistance et prévoyance, plutôt 
qu’avec de programmes d’intervention macro- ou micro-économique. 
Globalement, toutefois, les organismes de prévoyance sociale ont été 
mieux intégrés et rationalisé à travers la réponse à la conjoncture 
économique et sociale. La mesures de protection sociale au Royaume-
Uni se sont adressées principalement à l’atténuation des effets 
économiques du chômage, qui était une donnée structurelle de 
l’économie britannique, aggravé par la conjoncture économique des 
années ’30. Les mesures prises pour affronter le chômage contribuait à 
changer l’approche de l’intervention publique aux nécessiteux, même si 
n’envisageait pas le tournant représenté par la guerre à cet égard.  
A la fin des années ’30, donc, dans ces trois Pays – et dans 
contextes institutionnels assez différent – l’approche générale aux 
politiques sociales (et économiques) suivait des tendances similaires. 
Dans tous les trois Pays, les nécessités d’ajustement structurel du 
système capitaliste ont croisé l’importance de relégitimer les 
institutions politiques ainsi que sociales. Ces exigences ont concerné les 
régimes libéraux ainsi, tels que la France et l’Italie, ainsi que le régime 
Fasciste en Italie. De la même manière, les politiques sociales se 
développées selon une tendance similaire, compte tenu des différentes 
conditions économiques et de la différente structure occupationnelle 
dans les trois Pays. A la fin des années Trente, dans les Pays européens, 
les systèmes de protection sociale convergeaient vers la consolidation 
des régimes obligatoires d’assurance sociale et leur progressive 
centralisation et unification. En même temps, le vieux paradigme 
libérale d’intervention résiduel dans la protection sociale était dépassé 
dans les événements après la Grande Dépression, même si l’orthodoxie 
libérale était encore la « doctrine » officielle des gouvernements dans 
leur action sociale et économique.  
A l’aube de la Deuxième guerre mondiale, donc, le panorama 
intellectuelle et politique concernant les politiques sociales, et l’espace 
d’intervention étatique dans le domaine économique était changé ; les 
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plans du réarmement en Grande-Bretagne et en France, et les politiques 
autarciques dans l’Italie Fasciste avait redéfini le rôle de l’état. Et 
pourtant, le moment charnière pour comprendre la « révolution » 
survenue dans les politiques sociales est la Deuxième guerre mondiale, 
en tant que « guerre totale ». Cette catégorie historiographique a été 
investigué par une vaste littérature dans les sciences politiques et par 
l’historiographie. Bien que la « guerre totale » puisse être défini à 
travers des paramètres objectifs et mesurables économiquement, selon 
de critères exclusivement économique ni le cas italien, ni – bien 
évidemment – celui français relèveraient de cette catégorisation. Et 
pourtant, le modèle de la « guerre totale » - généralement appliqué au 
cas britannique – pourrait être utilisé dans une perspective 
supranationale, en déplaçant l’attention de la mobilisation structurelle 
vers un climat de guerre similaire qui favorisait le flux d’informations 
et l’engagement aux plans de reconstruction, qui a impliqué 
gouvernements, acteurs sociaux et politiques, organisations 
internationales.   
Le lien entre « guerre totale » et changement sociale ne réside 
pas seulement dans les transformations structurelles, ni dans les tâches 
de l’état face aux dévastations matérielles et à l’action humanitaire, et 
même pas dans l’établissement d’une « société sans classes ». ces 
facteurs expliquent une partie du changement de paradigme opéré 
pendant la Seconde guerre mondiale, mais ils reposent sur un niveau 
national. La guerre a également conduit à des réformes sociales parce 
que les responsables politiques des deux côtés ont préfiguré la mise en 
place d’un nouveau « pacte social » et ordre international. Deux traits 
distinctifs ont été le creuset de la guerre entre 1939 et 1945 : d’un côté, le 
mythe de « la guerre qui met fin à toutes les guerres » ; de l’autre, la 
tentative de résoudre une fois pour toutes la « question sociale » dans 
l’état-nation industriel moderne à travers plus d’inclusion. 
 
Deuxième Partie. Politiques sociales en comparaison 
 
 En Grande-Bretagne, entre 1939 et 1945, tous les aspects les 
plus importants concernant les politiques publiques étaient 
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inextricablement liés à la guerre et aux plans pour la reconstruction. 
Dans les discours publics, et dans les projets gouvernementaux, ces 
deux moments étaient reliées entre eux ; d’un côté, le War Cabinet 
devait justifier les contraints matériaux et les restrictions des droits 
sociaux auprès de l’opinion publique ainsi que des travailleurs.  
 Les mesures de contrôle de la conflictualité dans les usines et 
de surmenage étaient toutefois négocié avec les syndicats et le 
gouvernement – notamment le Secrétaire d’état à l’emploi, le 
travailliste Ernest Bevin – échangeait ces mesures avec la promesse de 
nombreuses réformes sociales et économiques pour l’après-guerre. 
L’impact de la guerre a touché également les politiques fiscales ; dans le 
moment le plus dur de la guerre entre 1940 et 1942, le gouvernement a 
comprimé les biens de consommation et – à partir du 1941 – a calculé le 
budget en intégrant des éléments du Keynésianisme pour réguler la 
demande intérieure et pour contrôler l’inflation, notamment avec 
l’introduction de l’outil macroéconomique de l’ « écarte inflationniste », 
suggéré par John Maynard Keynes pour stabiliser les prix dans un 
contexte d’économie de guerre et plein emploi. Ces changements 
structurels menés par la guerre ont été accompagnés par l’effort du 
War Cabinet de planifier la reconstruction une fois la guerre finie. Sous 
la supervision du Ministère de la Reconstruction, un nombre 
remarquable des Commissions gouvernementales composées par 
politiciens et experts ont proposé des réformes structurelles de 
l’économie et de la société ; la guerre a fourni l’occasion pour adresser 
globalement les problèmes socio-économique au Royaume-Uni : 
urbanisme, aménagement industrielle, réforme foncière, etc.  
Dans ce contexte, en 1941 le gouvernement a chargé la Inter-
Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Service, présidée 
par Lord William Beveridge, de mener une enquête sur l’état du 
système des assurances sociales et de suggérer des lignes directrices 
pour sa réforme. Cette Commission a impliqué ou travaillé en étroite 
collaboration avec les hauts fonctionnaires publics, les départements 
gouvernementaux, ainsi que les syndicats, les fonds mutualistes, les 
partis politiques et les lobbies ; les travaux de recherche et rédaction se 
sont étalés pour environ un an. La poursuite du développement du 
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rapport Beveridge vers des résultats plus importants a été le résultat du 
dérapage en temps de guerre : le climat favorable aux réformes 
sociales, l’accueil enthousiaste du public et la dynamique politique au 
sein du gouvernement ont rendu possible le saut qualitatif.  
Les propositions finales du Rapport Beveridge, publié en 1942, 
allaient bien au-delà des buts originaux. Le document proposait la 
réforme et unification des assurances sociales selon des principes 
universalistes. Les pivots de la réforme proposée portaient sur la 
centralisation et la nationalisation des différents régimes et autorités, 
l’unification de la base contributive des assurances sociales, la 
rationalisation du financement, l’universalisme des bénéfices pour tous 
les citoyens, indépendamment de leurs revenus et de leur catégorie de 
travail. La création d’un Service de Santé Nationale et la nationalisation 
des assurances pour les accidents du travail – ces deux dernières 
entièrement financés par la fiscalité générale – complétaient le tableau 
d’une approche que pensait la protection sociale en tant que droit de 
citoyenneté, indépendamment de revenus ou statut social ; l’état, 
l’individu, et la communauté dans son ensemble, prenaient en charge 
pour garantir le revenu vital minimal des citoyens dans tous les 
événements de leur vies.  
Les bureaucraties gouvernementales et les experts, ainsi que les 
intérêts sectionnelles, ont au début résisté à certains aspects spécifiques 
de ce tournant universaliste, tout en approuvant leurs principes 
généraux, ou du moins en les acceptant comme inévitables. Les parties 
ont également accueilli le Rapport Beveridge avec un débat approfondi. 
Les conservateurs et les travaillistes étaient sceptiques quant à la 
possibilité de mettre en œuvre le plan présenté par Beveridge. Les 
conservateurs avaient peur de son fardeau financier et de ses 
implications politiques et sociales. Mais les organisations de gauche se 
méfiaient aussi, initialement du rapport ; sorti du milieu libéral, il était 
intrinsèquement centralisateur et il prônait à l’état beaucoup des tâches 
précédentes des organisations ouvrières. Cependant, les partis 
britanniques ont finalement accepté les directives générales du plan. 
D’après sa publication, le gouvernement s’est mis au travail pour 
l’élaboration des Livres Blanches officiaux, concernant les assurances 
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sociales, le service de santé national et les politiques de plein emploi. 
Ces documents affirmaient sa position officielle ; le gouvernement 
adoptait les indications de Beveridge, même si certaines propositions 
différaient du Rapport, comme par exemple pour la quantification du 
minimum vital ou les politiques du plein emploi proposées par le 
gouvernement, qui, selon Beveridge, n’étaient pas encore des mesures 
structurelles, mais se limitaient à des interventions anticycliques qui 
sur la longue période n’auraient pas garanti des niveaux stables 
d’emploi. 
Bien qui le « consensus » dans la politique britannique après 
1945 ait sans doute été exagérée à ce sujet, en 1945 tous les partis 
britanniques avaient intégré la sécurité sociale dans leurs programmes. 
Après les élections générales de cette année, le Parti Travailliste au 
gouvernement relevait le défi d’implémenter – notamment entre 1946 
et 1948 – les réformes sociales promises pendant la guerre. La Seconde 
Guerre mondiale a donné l’élan nécessaire pour s’attaquer de front à 
certains problèmes en Grande-Bretagne, sous l’étiquette de « politiques 
de reconstruction ». Cette formule caractérisait la démocratie 
britannique après 1945 avec l’engagement de l’état à garantir la sécurité 
sociale à tous les citoyens et à placer le plein emploi au nombre des 
objectifs politiques. Ceux-ci n’étaient pas étrangers aux déclarations 
idéologiques des Alliées, résumées dans la Charte de l’Atlantique du 
1941. Ils n’étaient pas non plus exempts de considérations liées à 
l’ordre international d’après-guerre, à la projection britannique sur 
l’Europe et à la nécessité de contenir la menace communiste. La 
politique sociale ne traitait pas seulement de la prospérité interne, mais 
aussi de la sécurité internationale et de l’équilibre des forces. 
En France, la défaite du 1940 conduit à un bouleversement 
institutionnel, marquant ainsi la fin de la IIIème République, et la 
création de l’État français, le régime collaborationniste sous 
l’occupation allemande. Le soi-disant régime de Vichy, néanmoins, 
essayé de déployer des politiques autonomes, notamment dans le 
champ économique et sociale. Les projets de planification, ou la 
restructuration de la production par branches professionnelles, par 
exemple, répondaient aux intérêts allemands ; en même temps, ils 
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s’inscrivaient dans des tendances de plus longue période et, à la fois, ils 
voulaient être le début d’une politique globale pour redresser la France 
et pour insérer le Pays dans le Nouveau Ordre Européen, gouverné par 
l’Allemagne Nazie. Dans la même logique, les politiques sociales du 
régime appuyaient sur la tradition législative et le réforme des 
dernières années de la IIIème République, et elles étaient affectées par 
la conjoncture de la guerre.  
Le nouveau Secrétariat à la Production Industrielle et au 
Travail, dirigé par l’ancien secrétaire de la CGT, René Belin, a essayé à 
maintes reprises, entre 1940 et 1942, de reformer le régime des 
assurances sociales avec une réforme d’ensemble. En 1940, le projet de 
réforme établait l’unification des cotisations pour les assurances 
sociales, les allocations familiales et les congés payés, en 
homogénéisant les cotisations des différentes catégories et en 
prévoyant un rôle plus important de l’état d’un point de vue 
administratif et financière. Cette réforme envisageait aussi la création 
des pensions sociaux pour les travailleurs à faibles revenus. Deux ans 
plus tard, une réforme plus limitée préfigurait la coordination centrale 
des fonds mutualistes et leur réorganisation territoriale, ainsi que 
l’unification des cotisations pour l’assurance maladie et les allocations 
familiales. Les deux projets ont été rejetés à cause des résistances dans 
les cercles gouvernementaux, mais surtout pour l’opposition des 
intérêts organisés es fonds mutualistes, de catégorie et du secteur privé. 
La seule réalisation importante, dans le secteur de la prévoyance 
sociale, a été l’Allocations aux Vieux Travailleurs Salariés, introduite 
aussi pour faire face à la montée du chômage suite à la démobilisation 
après la défaite. Aussi les autres mesures relatives à la protection 
sociales (allocations familiales, politiques sanitaires, indemnités de 
chômage) n’ont pas été promulguées dans le cadre d’une réforme 
organique, mais d’une manière fragmentaire. 
Même si ces réformes suivaient certains critères assimilables 
aux lignes directrices des réformateurs anglais, le contexte idéologique 
était assez différent. Dans la rhétorique du régime, les assurances 
sociales étaient une partie d’un projet de refonte des bases 
institutionnelles et socio-économique du Pays. À côté de la réforme de 
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la protection sociale, le régime promulguait aussi la Charte du Travail 
en 1941 ; ce document, dans les intentions des réformateurs sociaux 
vichystes, était censé être la pierre angulaire des politiques et de 
l’idéologie de l’Était Français. En vérité, i n’y avait pas un véritable 
consensus au sein du régime à l’égard de quel type de corporatisme 
mettre en œuvre. De plus, les projets corporatistes se heurtaient au 
corporatisme « formelle » qui avait été implémenté en liaison avec les 
nécessités de guerre allemandes. Là où le régime envisageait une 
« collaboration sociale » (plus ou moins) paritaire entre les différentes 
catégories de producteurs, le corporatisme « substantielle » mis en 
place à travers les Comités d’Organisations excluaient la composante 
ouvrière des organismes de consultation. Le cheval de bataille 
idéologique du régime, la collaboration sociale à travers les 
corporations, a finalement resté n’a jamais eu des répercussions 
concrètes de vaste portée, et a resté pour la plupart étranger au monde 
ouvrier.  
La politique sociale de Vichy, telle qu’une grande partie des 
autres politiques du régime, a été caractérisé par les événements 
conjoncturelles (la guerre, le chômage, la division administrative, 
l’occupation) et, en même temps, par l’effort d’envisager des politiques 
pour la reconstruction, capable de relier la France à l’Allemagne Nazie. 
Pareillement, les politiques publiques du régime de Vichy avaient 
nombreuses continuités avec la dernière phase de réformes de la IIIème 
République et ont jeté des bases – dans un contexte institutionnelle et 
international totalement différent – pour le plan de sécurité sociale du 
1944-5. Ceci a été affecté par l’héritage politique de la protection sociale 
française et par les idées nouvelles provenant notamment du monde 
anglo-saxonne. Il s’agissait, dans les intentions des anciens 
collaborateurs de Belin, Alexandre Parodi et Pierre Laroque, d’intégrer 
un plan de réforme inspiré aux principes d’universalisme dans les 
institutions démocratiques.  
En Italie, le régime avait produit, pendant vingt ans, une 
législation sociale assez importante, qu’un tout état de cause est restée 
dans le sillon d’un système occupationnel et mutualiste. L’Italie 
Fasciste n’a pas mobilisée son économie pour la guerre d’une manière 
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« totale » ; bien au contraire, les données macroéconomiques suggèrent 
une mobilisation faible, là où les processus de modernisation de 
l’appareil industriel, qui était le vrai but de l’ordre établi économique 
italien à l’époque. Pourtant, le climat de la « guerre totale » a affecté le 
discours politique du régime aussi ; pendant les années précédentes la 
guerre, les hiérarques avaient élaboré une doctrine de la « guerre 
totale » sous le point de vue de sa préparation technique ; pareillement, 
entre 1939 et 1942, le régime s’était intéressé aux différentes législations 
sociales de guerre.  
En ce qui concerne la législation concrète, jusqu’au 1943, les 
mesures prises en Italie visaient à augmenter la protection économique 
des familles des soldats, et à garantir le maintien de l’ordinaire 
administration des prestations sociales. Et pourtant, au sein des 
administrations chargées des assurances sociales, des propositions de 
réforme de la législation conformément aux tendances contemporaines 
commençaient à circuler ; les exigences de renforcer le front intérieur et 
de simplifier la stratification législative était un besoin ressenti en Italie 
aussi. Et pourtant, les renverses militaires et l’effondrement du régime 
en 1943, avec la reconstitution d’une république sous le contrôle Nazi 
au Nord ont amené à un changement dans la rhétorique et dans les 
projets du régime, qui pourtant n’ont jamais eu aucune conséquence en 
termes législatifs, ni a affecté les réformes des assurances sociales que 
même ont été passées pendant l’éphémère expérience de la République 
Sociale Italienne.  
D’un côté, le programme économique-sociale du régime visait à 
la socialisation des industries. Les entreprises n’étaient pas 
nationalisées – sauf pour celles considérées d’intérêt nationale – mais 
leur gestion et leurs profits étaient partagés parmi tous les éléments de 
la fabrique. A niveau institutionnelle, ceci impliquait un transfèrement 
de la collaboration corporative des corps représentatifs nationaux à 
l’échelle de l’entreprise. De l’autre côté, la réforme du régime des 
assurances sociales en 1944 était la fin d’un parcours cohérent de 
réarrangement des assurances sociales, commençait en 1935 ; dans cette 
première réforme, une agence nationale unique était chargée de 
coordonner les fonds mutualistes. Avec la loi du 1939, l’INFPS 
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fournissait des prestations sociales complémentaires ainsi que les 
allocations familiales. La réforme du 1944 procédait d’une manière 
cohérente dans ce processus d’unification des fonds, cotisations et 
prestations, ainsi que dans l’extension du champ d’intervention ; 
l’année précédente, le régime avait lancé une agence nationale de 
coordination des fonds mutualiste de protection contre la maladie 
(dans une manière toute à fait similaire à ce que le régime de Vichy 
avait essayé de faire en 1942, d’ailleurs).  
Le discours idéologique révolutionnaire du régime et la 
politique effective mise en place par le régime divergeaient d’une 
manière criante. Au-delà des conditions conjoncturelles et politiques 
qui n’ont pas permis au régime d’avoir une véritable politique 
autonome ni la légitimation nécessaire pour la faire, ce décalage entre 
la rhétorique du régime et la substantielle continuité des politiques 
repose sur le fait que ces dernières peuvent être considérées comme des 
politiques de longue période, d’une certaine manière structurelle, qui 
se sont déroulées indépendamment des changements idéologiques 
internes au régime. Cette interprétation semble être corroborée par le 
maintien des institutions sociales fascistes pendant les années de 
l’après-guerre. Différemment aux cases britannique et français, pendant 
les années immédiatement suivantes la guerre, aucune réforme globale 
de la protection sociale a été entamé en Italie. Cependant, les acteurs 
politiques et sociaux ont longuement réfléchi sur la possibilité de 
réformer les assurances sociales italiennes selon les principes de la 
naissante sécurité sociale, comme l’attestent les propositions sorties de 
la Commission gouvernementale présidé par le socialiste Ludovico 
D’Aragona. 
Un bilan comparatif des trois expériences pendant la guerre, et 
leurs conséquences dans les plans de réforme pour l’après-guerre ne 
peut pas être univoque. D’un côté, le tournant universaliste du 1942 en 
Grande-Bretagne marque une rupture avec le passé et par rapport aux 
expériences continentales : la nationalisation des fonds d’assurance, le 
service national de santé, la couverture universelle visant à garantir le 
minimum vital de tous citoyens britanniques, l’idée de promouvoir – à 
travers la sécurité sociale et les politiques du plein emploi – l’abri du 
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besoin de la société britannique. Ceux-ci sont des points qui 
différencient d’une manière importante l’approche britannique par 
rapport à ceux français et italiens pendant la guerre. Dans ces deux 
Pays, les réformes proposées continuaient dans le sillon de la tradition 
occupationnelle/corporatiste ; dans le domaine des assurances sociales 
e de la santé publique, il s’agissait plutôt de réorganiser les fonds 
mutualistes, en introduisant des éléments de plus en plus importants 
d’intervention étatique et de solidarité, tels que les AVTS en France ou 
la révision des mécanismes de financement des assurances sociales en 
Italie.  
D’une certaine manière, ces différences importantes ont été 
retenues même dans la reformulation de la protection sociale dans 
l’après-guerre ; bien que universalistes, le plan de sécurité sociale 
français ainsi que les propositions de réforme en Italie gardaient des 
systèmes occupationnels, ainsi avec des importantes dérogations en 
termes d’unification administrative (par exemple la gestion des caisses 
d’allocations familiales) ainsi qu’en ceux de couverture effective, 
comme pour le service de santé national ou l’allocation chômage, qui 
n’ont pas été intégrés dans le plan du 1945.  
 Et pourtant, certaines directrices de réforme administrative, 
notamment la centralisation des fonds mutualistes et l’unification des 
caisses et cotisations, n’était pas prérogative des projets anglo-
saxonnes, mais elle était cherchée, comme ligne directrice, aussi par les 
réformateurs vichystes ou fascistes ; dans l’immédiate après-guerre, les 
mêmes préoccupations ont animé les législateurs qui se sont opposés – 
non sans certaines ambiguïtés – au Nazisme et à l’Occupation. Dans la 
même période où les réformateurs britanniques épinglaient leurs plans 
de création de la sécurité sociale (assurances sociales, service de santé 
national, allocations familiales, plein-emploi), sous Vichy et dans l’Italie 
Fasciste, les gouvernements respectifs ciblaient séparément les 
domaines principaux de la protection sociale ; la tendance commune 
était la propension à assurer un rôle de plus en plus important à l’état 
en ces matière. En dernier ressort, la reprise de la prévoyance sociale 
par l’état a réussi en Grande-Bretagne et a failli en France en Italie parce 
que le climat de la « guerre totale » et la majeure légitimation du War 
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Cabinet au Royaume-Uni lui a permis de l’emporter sur les résistances 
politiques et du secteur mutualiste et privé.  
La progressive étatisation et extension des régimes de 
protection sociale était, d’un côté, les résultats d’un processus 
« structurel », commun à tous les Pays industriels, et par conséquent 
sans égard aux différents systèmes politiques en cause. De l’autre côté, 
des différences considérables parmi les modèles sociaux existaient ; 
elles ne résidaient pas tant la division traditionnelle « démocratie » 
contre « fascisme », mais bien dans celle entre « universalisme » et 
« corporatisme ». Ces deux régimes de protection sociale se sont donc 
confrontés pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale ; le conflit étant 
« totale », il s’est avéré nécessaire pour les différents ordres établis de 
créer consensus à l’intérieur et – pour le cas britannique – d’être 
capable de mobiliser aussi l’opinion publique à l’étranger.  
 
Troisième Partie. Idées et politiques pendant la guerre : une perspective globale 
 
 Les promesses d’une plus grande justice sociale ne sont pas une 
exclusivité de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, mais, pendant ce conflit, 
les gouvernements ont attaché une importance nouvelle à la question 
sociale. Le gouvernement anglais, bien évidemment, voulait faire de la 
sécurité sociale la pierre angulaire pour obtenir le consensus des 
ouvrières et réduire les revendications, face à une militarisation des 
rythmes de travail. En même temps, étant donné les caractéristiques 
« universaliste » de ces projets de réforme (le Rapport Beveridge, ainsi 
que les Livres Blanches gouvernementaux), ils se prêtaient aussi bien à 
être exploité pour convaincre l’ensemble de la population britannique 
d’être en train de combattre pour la bonne cause.  
 Dans un contexte assez différent, les régimes français et celui 
italien essaient aussi d’utiliser les politiques sociales comme levier sur 
la population. En France, sous le régime de Vichy la « collaboration 
sociale » et le prestations sociales que le régime élargissait n’étaient pas 
utilisées pour mobiliser la société pour la guerre, mais pour mieux 
l’encadrer dans ce que le régime considéré déjà « l’après-guerre ». La 
Charte du Travail et les assurances sociales étaient les éléments 
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concrètes d’une reformulation du pacte sociale selon les principes de la 
hiérarchie et de la communauté (aussi de la communauté du travaille).  
Encore différent c’est le cas de la RSI en Italie ; après 20 ans de 
propagande sur les conquêtes sociales du régime, qui a pénétré le 
monde ouvrier, le collapse des institutions du Fascisme ont créé un 
vide que la nouvelle république a essayé de combler dans une situation 
de progressive désagrégation des bases politiques et sociaux du régime. 
L’importance donné par la RSI aux socialisations et aux autres mesures 
en faveur de la classe ouvrière s’est avérée être le seul outil à travers 
lequel le Fascisme pouvait justifier son existence sous la forme d’un 
gouvernement fantoche des Nazis.    
En Grande-Bretagne, le « pacte sociale » proposé, l’abri du 
besoin comme promesse pour l’après-guerre à travers la sécurité sociale 
et le plein-emploi, s’est montré capable de relier différents secteurs de 
la société autour d’une plus ample solidarité sociale et l’engagement de 
l’état à être garant, intermédiaire, et dispensateur des prestations 
sociales. L’État Français a poursuivi un discours idéologique que, par 
contre, définissait la solidarité sociale tout d’abord en termes de 
« solidarité corporative », c’est-à-dire, de solidarité à l’intérieur des 
catégories professionnelles. Sous la RSI, les anciens postulats du 
corporatisme Fasciste étaient reproposés, même si dans le contexte 
totalement changé de la guerre et de l’occupation. Au lieu des 
communautés professionnelles par branche industrielle, la « gauche » 
du régime envisageait la création d’unités corporatives « de bases » ; le 
corporatisme « institutionnel » était replacé par des socialisations dans 
chaque entreprise.  
La réception par la population, dans ses différentes classes 
sociales, de la propagande des trois gouvernements a été très variée. En 
Grande-Bretagne, « l’esprit du 1941 » et la perception que les distances 
sociales s’étaient annulées grâce à la guerre ont conduit à une vague 
d’enthousiasme vers les propositions du Plan Beveridge, qui a censé le 
gouvernement à mettre au point rapidement les Livres Blanches. Dans 
l’État Français et dans la RSI, par contre, les efforts des régimes pour 
obtenir le consensus populaire, et notamment celui des ouvrières, se 
sont heurtés à la faible suite des différents secteurs sociaux pour les 
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projets corporatifs ou « socialisants ». Tout compte fait, les situations 
dans les trois Pays étaient totalement différentes ; le régime de Vichy et 
la RSI étaient perçues tels que des régimes fantoches, et manquaient de 
la légitimité nécessaire pour pouvoir obtenir le consensus autour de 
leurs projets sociaux. Au contraire, le War Cabinet était un gouvernait 
une Puissance pour laquelle – déjà à partir du 1942 – la force d’inertie 
du conflit était favorable ; il s’agissait désormais de préparer l’après-
guerre à l’intérieur, et de préserver le rôle de la Grande-Bretagne 
comme Puissance de premier rang dans l’ordre international qu’allait 
se préfigurer.  
La politique sociale, dans ce sens, a joué un rôle important 
aussi dans la propagande britannique à l’étrangère. Depuis le début, les 
services d’information britanniques étaient conscients du fait que le 
Plan Beveridge aurait pu mobiliser et rapprocher du Royaume-Uni 
différentes forces intellectuelles et sociales. Le plan de sécurité sociale 
aurait dú circuler tout d’abord dans les milieux politiques et 
intellectuels : partis politiques, syndicats, haute administration 
publique, académie. Mais les bureaux du Ministère de l’Information 
visaient en même temps à véhiculer ces réformes auprès de la 
population européennes (ainsi que l’américaine et dans le Dominions). 
Les dispositions combinées du Plan Beveridge et d’autres mesures en 
faveur des travailleurs et du progrès sociale – dans cette logique – 
aurait pu placer la Grande-Bretagne comme le Pays chef de file en ce 
qui concernait les droits sociaux des travailleurs. L’objectif était 
explicitement de se disputer le consensus de la classe ouvrière de 
l’après-guerre avec l’Union Soviétique. 
En ce sens, le Plan Beveridge et la sécurité sociale doivent être 
contextualisés dans l’exchange transatlantique entre États-Unis et 
Grande-Bretagne, qui avait en précédence abouti à la Charte Atlantique 
et à la préfiguration des organisations internationales pour l’après-
guerre. En même temps, le Plan Beveridge, qui empruntait plusieurs 
mots d’ordre et principes de la Charte Atlantiques et de la rhétorique 
roosveltienne à l’égard de « quatre libertés », a – à son tour – affecté le 
débat à partir du 1942, et a remplacé la Charte Atlantique et les autres 
références au centre des discours politiques des Alliés dans le monde 
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anglo-saxonne. La même idée de « sécurité sociale » était le résultat de 
la synergie entre les organisations internationales de travailleur, tels 
que l’ILO, et les gouvernements des États-Unis et de la Grande-
Bretagne. Le déploiement des nouveaux programmes pour l’après-
guerre, centré sur la Charte Atlantique, se sont avérés ne pas avoir 
succès dans la mobilisation des opinions publiques dans le Pays Alliés, 
ainsi que dans les Pays sous occupation allemande.      
La campagne d’information du Plan Beveridge s’est déployée 
selon différentes axes et avec des différents moyens et médias. Un 
nombre impressionnant de traductions, résumés, synthèse, analyses 
critiques du Plan étaient adressé à la circulation plus étroite du plan 
parmi les acteurs qui auraient pu jouer un rôle décisionnel dans l’après-
guerre. De l’autre côté, pour la diffusion à grande échelle, les 
Britanniques se sont appuyés principalement à Radio Londres, pour 
véhiculer les lignes directrices des réformes sociales, ainsi qu’aux tracts 
et brochures. Si le but direct était de mettre en opposition les 
réalisations sociales des démocraties contre les politiques sociales du 
Nazisme et des autres Puissance de l’Axe, à l’arrière-plan l’on peut 
envisager déjà la confrontation avec les communistes pour gagner le 
consensus des masses populaires. Sous ce point de vue, les 
Britanniques n’ont pas succédé dans leurs objectifs. La connaissance du 
Plan a resté assez limité dans le champs ouvrière et paysan, qui, dans la 
radicalisation du conflit, regardait avec espoir aux solutions 
communistes, renforcées en Europe par le sucées militaires de l’Armée 
Rouge.  
Les plans britanniques, par contre, one eu une plus profonde 
circulation dans les ordres établis des différents Pays. Bien qu’assez 
souvent de seconde main, une bonne partie des dirigeants politiques et 
syndicaux, les Nazi-Fascistes autant que les membres de la Résistance, 
connaissaient les grandes lignes directrices du Plan Beveridge. Bien 
évidemment, dans les deux champs, ce document a été perçu avec des 
réceptions divergentes. Les Nazis et les Fascistes ont compris la portée 
innovatrice des plans britanniques et avaient gardé une position de 
contrepropagande similaire : dans les articles et analyses du Plan 
Beveridge, les Nazis ainsi que les Fascistes, ont remarqué les caractères 
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éphémères des réformes anglaises qui étaient entachées des nécessités 
de la guerre. Les régimes de protection sociale en Allemagne et en Italie 
étaient le résultat d’une politique incrémentale de cinquante ans et des 
mesures en faveur des ouvrières mises en place par les régimes ; au 
contraire, les plans de sécurité sociale tels que le Plan Beveridge, sortis 
d’un milieu libéral, étaient motivées par des raison d’opportunité, dans 
le moment où le gouvernement demandait un maximum d’effort pour 
la mobilisation.  
Les principales critiques des Fascistes italiens ne s’écartaient 
pas des directives allemandes : le caractéristiques conservatrices et la 
portée limitée du Plan Beveridge par rapport à la législation sociales 
italienne ; la nature propagandiste des mots d’ordre du plan. D’autres 
éléments étaient plutôt typiques de la propagande antibritannique 
menée par le Fascisme : l’expansion de la sécurité sociale britannique 
au détriment des colonies ; l’accent mis sur la « guerre idéologique » 
entre les puissances impérialistes traditionnelles et les nations 
prolétariennes « plus jeunes ». Dans un second moment, le régime a 
tenté de mettre en évidence le clivage entre les promesses des Alliés de 
l’amélioration sociale, et les difficultés à les mettre en œuvre dans 
l’Italie du Sud occupée. Pour la propagande fasciste, cela prouvait que 
les Anglo-Américains étaient entrés en guerre pour renverser les acquis 
sociaux fascistes. Le point de vue général de Fascistes sur le Rapport 
Beveridge combinait des hypothèses idéologiquement biaisées et des 
critiques qui  
Parmi les mouvements antifascistes et de Résistance en France 
et Italie, le Plan a eu un certain succès, même s’il est toujours resté un 
point de référence intellectuel plutôt qu’une source à superposer à la 
précédente tradition législative. Les experts de France Libre à Londres 
ont eu la possibilité d’assister de première main au débat en cours en 
Angleterre pendant les années 1941-2. Les Commissions en charge des 
réformes économiques et sociales ont étudié les régimes de protection 
sociale dans les Pays anglo-saxonnes, et se sont chargés de faire circuler 
le Plan Beveridge dans la France occupé et dans les milieux de la 
Résistance. Et apparemment, déjà en 1944, la sécurité sociale anglaise 
était connue, et même, elle était un point de référence obligé. Et 
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pourtant, les réformateurs sociaux français à Londres et en France, ont 
toujours essayé de combiner les nouveaux principes universalistes avec 
la précédente législation sociale. Au fait, pendant les années 
d’élaboration théorique des nouvelles politiques sociales ainsi que 
pendant la mise en œuvre des textes législatifs de la sécurité sociale, le 
poids de la stratification de la protection sociale française a joué un rôle 
déterminant ; les trois principes fondamentaux d’unité, universalité, 
uniformité – émanation directe du réformisme beveridgien – n’ont pas 
été atteints totalement avec les lois du 1945-1946.  
En Italie, la connaissance du Plan Beveridge et des autres 
réformes sociales étaient encore plus médiées par les services 
d’information Anglo-Américains. Et pourtant, même en Italie ces 
documents ont donné lieu à un grand intérêt ; de la Démocratie 
Chrétienne aux Libéraux, tous les principaux partis démocraties se sont 
interrogés sur la possibilité et l’extension d’une réforme universaliste 
sur la même page de la sécurité sociale britannique. Ces principes ont 
particulièrement influencé certains secteurs des socialistes réformistes 
et du mouvement catholique. Et pourtant, en Italie, tous les discussions 
et propositions à cet égard n’ont pas abouti à une réforme organique 
des assurances sociales, même pas dans la forme d’un compromis entre 
le système universaliste « pure » anglais et un système occupationnel 
« continental », comme en France. L’achèvement de la sécurité sociale 
est pourtant devenu un objectif des réformateurs sociaux italiens, et a 
été réalisé d’une manière fragmentaire au fil des Années ’60 et ’70.    
De ce point de vue, partant, la Deuxième Guerre mondiale a 
joué un rôle fondamental dans la programmation, et dans un second 
moment, dans la circulation, des nouvelles idées concernant la sécurité 
sociale pour l’après-guerre. Le Plan Beveridge a été pensé 
originairement comme un outil pour la propagande contre l’Allemagne 
Nazie et son ordre sociale, et, ensuite, comme un instrument pour 
disputer l’hégémonie sur le monde ouvrier avec les Soviétiques. C’est 
pour cette raison que la sécurité sociale doit beaucoup au contexte de la 
guerre ; avant même que pour l’impact structurelle de la mobilisation – 
qui a été une des causes en Grande-Bretagne, mais n’a pas concerné ni 
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l’Italie Fasciste ni l’État Français – pour la dimension idéologique du 
conflict. 
 
Conclusion 
 
La reconstruction historique du développement des régimes de 
protection sociale, des assurances sociales à la sécurité sociale et ensuite 
à l’état-providence, ne peut pas être réduite à des explications mono-
causales. Au fait, l’évolution de la politique sociale a été un processus 
progressif et complexe. Différents facteurs ont contribué à la 
redéfinition de la sécurité sociale après 1945. Ils résultent de la 
stratification législative et d’importantes ruptures politiques et socio-
économiques. L’analyse comparative réfute encore plus les explications 
linéaires et les généralisations. Une approche fructueuse pour 
comprendre la nouvelle place de la sécurité sociale dans les scénarios 
nationaux et internationaux considère le rôle de l’État en tant qu’acteur 
principal dans l’expansion des régimes de protection sociale à partir de 
1945. La politique sociale a assumé des tâches fondamentales dans la 
régulation du conflit social et dans la lutte contre les inégalités sociales 
entre les citoyens. Les assurances sociales obligatoire sont liées à la 
percée du capitalisme industriel et à la « question sociales » qui en 
découle, et remettent en question les droits de la citoyenneté et leur 
étendue. Mais il concernaient aussi des problèmes plus vastes ouverts 
par l’effondrement de l’Ancien Régime ; la rupture des liens sociaux 
traditionnels a nécessité la reconfiguration des mécanismes de secours 
social.  
Entre le 19ème et le 20ème siècle, la protection sociale a changé 
dans sa fonction d’objectifs politiques. Jusqu’à la Seconde Guerre 
mondiale, le modèle combinait la réglementation législative et 
l’entraide mutuelle. Les assurances sociales n’étaient pas 
nécessairement identifiées aux droits de la citoyenneté ; ils traitent 
plutôt des problèmes conjoncturels (chômage) ou des préoccupations 
non directement liées aux droits sociaux (politiques démographiques). 
Le moment charnière a été la Seconde Guerre mondiale ; 
l’interprétation classique du sociologue T. H. Marshall sur l’expansion 
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quantitative et qualitative des droits sociaux de la citoyenneté pourrait 
être affectée par le contexte britannique des Années ’60. Son analyse, 
cependant, a capturé une caractéristique réelle de l’état-providence ; 
après 1945, les démocraties ont réformé les régimes précédents et 
introduit des nouvelles politiques pour intégrer autant de citoyens que 
possible dans le nouveau « pacte social », puisque l’accès aux bénéficies 
sociaux et aux services est devenu progressivement un droit.  
D’un côté, la législation sociale s’est déroulée comme un 
processus incrémental de coordination et de rationalisation des régimes 
obligatoires. Il s’agissait d’un changement politique et socio-
économique à long-terme, qui n’a pas connu de ruptures importantes ; 
les régimes sociaux ont même connu un certain degré de convergence, 
qui ne doit cependant pas être surestimé. Les solutions administratives 
peuvent converger, mais les différents cadres conservent des 
divergences substantielles, comme pour la division traditionnelle entre 
les systèmes libéraux universalistes et les régimes continentaux 
« conservateur-corporatistes ». Le terrain commun pendant les années 
de guerre était la volonté politique de poursuivre des politiques 
sociales plus cohérentes et intégrées. Les décideurs, dans tous les Pays 
considérés, ont élaboré des projets pour la refont des systèmes 
précédents ; redéfinit leurs tâches et leur ampleur a fait l’objet d’un 
débat animé qui a traversé les catégories traditionnelles de 
« démocraties » et de « totalitarismes ». 
De l’autre côté, sur les différences idéologiques réside la grande 
divergence entre les trois études de cas. En 1942-5, les buts et la portée 
de la politique sociale ont été soumis à une véritable « révolution 
copernicienne ». Les projets sociaux britanniques, ainsi que les réformes 
italiennes et françaises faisaient partie d’un transfert international plus 
large de politiques et d’idées qui s’est produit dans les Années Trente. 
Après la Grande Dépression, il n’était plus possible de refondre le 
capitalisme du laissez-faire, ni d’ignorer les masses populaires dans la 
ré-légitimation des États. La Grande-Bretagne a reconfiguré la politique 
sociale en fonction de la « citoyenneté » ; l’État a assuré les citoyens de 
la perte de revenus qui aurait pu miner le tissu social et les institutions 
politiques. Les régimes italien et français, au contraire, ont réorganisé la 
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relation entre l’État et les individus vers des formes de « collaboration 
sociale ». Vichy a souligné la solidarité corporative et national, tandis 
que dans la RSI les droits sociaux ont été accordés aux trvailleurs, en 
tant qu’éléments productifs de la communauté nationale.  
Trois aspects des politiques sociales en temps de guerre ont été 
approfondi dans ce travail. Premièrement, la convergence progressive 
des trois systèmes vers des pratiques administratives similaires et 
l’importance croissante de la politique sociale publique. Le deuxième 
axe porte sur les projets en temps de guerre. Dans les plans pour le 
règlement de l’après-guerre, la politique sociale avait un rôle 
primordial pour les puissances Anglo-américaines et pour l’Axe. La 
troisième caractéristique fondamentale est liée à la nouvelle dimension 
de la politiques sociale sur la scène nationale et internationale. La 
« sécurité sociale » a été utilisée par les Britanniques pour légitimer 
l’effort de guerre face l’opinion publique à la maison et pour prendre la 
leadership sur le Continent, en opposition au Nazi-Fascisme et au 
Communisme soviétique. La propagande sociale britannique avait non 
seulement des objectifs immédiats liés à la guerre, mais aussi des 
objectifs plus larges. La sécurité sociale devait légitimer le « pacte 
social » démocratique et contribuer à réinstaller les relations 
internationales d’après-guerre sur la base de la coopération pacifique 
entre les nations. Mutuellement, les Puissances de l’Axe ont fondé leur 
rhétorique sur leurs « nouvelles » politiques sociales et sur la 
réorganisation des relations internationales selon ce nouvel ordre 
social. La « collaboration sociale » en tant qu’objectif politique était 
également importante pour le régime de Vichy et pour les Fascistes en 
Italie. 
Il n’est pas exagéré d’imaginer que les raisons de l’échec de 
l’Axe et de ses satellites dans la mise en œuvre de leurs politiques et 
dans la conquête du consensus des classes populaires et moyennes sont 
plutôt attribuable aux rebuffades militaires à partir de 1942. Les 
événements militaires ont également changé l’humeur de l’opinion 
publique en Europe et le « climat idéologique » de la guerre. Il est 
extrêmement difficile de saisir un seul facteur qui a déterminé la 
« révolution copernicienne » en temps de guerre. Diachroniquement, 
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les assurances sociales se sont progressivement développées au fil du 
temps, à tel point que même les projets de 1939-1945 n’ont pas marqué 
une véritable rupture législative. Mais les conditions de guerre 
exceptionnelles (qu’elles aient été combattues ou subies) ont affecté de 
manière décisive les réformateurs et l’ordre établi politique. DU point 
de vue politique, dans les trois Pays, la principale préoccupation était la 
fin des luttes sociale et de l’insécurité économique et le renforcement 
d’un nouveau « pacte social » ; les états sont devenus de plus en plus 
attachés à la « solidarité sociale », qui varie selon chaque régime 
politique et idéologique. La « solidarité corporative » de Vichy diffère 
légèrement de l’idéologie qui a inspiré le fascisme républicain, et bien 
sûr du type de solidarité qui sous-tend les réformes britanniques.  
En fait, les états-providence « totalitaires » ou « libéraux » n’ont 
jamais existé ; il serait pus approprié de distinguer entre la sécurité 
sociale universaliste et la protection sociale 
professionnelle/ « corporatiste », et les façons correspondantes de 
redéfinir le « pacte social » et les formes de solidarité sociale. 
L’évaluation de l’ « affirmation » du modèle britannique est 
extrêmement ambivalente et nécessite plusieurs niveaux d’analyse. 
D’un côté, les mécanismes administratifs « universalistes » n’ont été 
que partiellement adoptés sur le Continent ; de l’autre, les idées 
fondamentales de la « sécurité sociale universaliste » ont pénétré les 
réformateurs sociaux et les gouvernements européens. Ils ont changé la 
nature de la politique sociale à la fois dans les années qui ont suivi la 
guerre et à plus long terme, car il n’était plus possible de gérer la 
réforme de la protection sociale sans prendre en considération 
l’universalisme inspiré par le modèle de Beveridge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
